11-4288 STATE OF FLORIDA, v. JACOB THOMAS GAULDEN

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State: Florida

Court: Florida First District Court

Docket No: 11-4288

Case Date: 04/12/2012

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. JACOB THOMAS GAULDEN, Appellee. _____________________________/ Opinion filed April 12, 2012. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Jan Shackelford, Judge. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED CASE NO. 1D11-4288

RAY, J. The State appeals from an order dismissing a charge that Jacob Thomas Gaulden, Appellee, left the scene of a crash involving death, contrary to section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2010). In granting Appellee's motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that a driver does not violate section 316.027(1)(b) by

failing to stop when a passenger suffers death as a result of being separated from the driver's moving vehicle. The State argues that this conclusion was error. For the reasons that follow, we agree and reverse. The material facts are undisputed for the purposes of this appeal. The decedent was a passenger in a vehicle Appellee was driving until he became separated from the vehicle, struck the road, and suffered fatal injuries. When the decedent became separated from the vehicle, Appellee continued driving. He did not stop at the scene or as close to the scene as possible, and he did not remain at the scene until he had fulfilled the requirements of section 316.062, Florida Statutes (2010). Because there was no evidence that the decedent's body came into contact with Appellee's vehicle, the trial court concluded that the decedent's separation from the vehicle and collision with the road did not constitute a "crash" within the meaning of section 316.027(1)(b). The court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss on this basis. A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a criminal charge is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Sexton v. State, 898 So. 2d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The propriety of the trial court's ruling in this case turns on its interpretation of section 316.027(1)(b), which is also a question of law, reviewable de novo. See Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 807 (Fla. 2008).

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The goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, which should be gleaned primarily from the language of the statute at issue. Id. at 807. In construing the plain language of a statute, courts are to give undefined terms their ordinary meanings, consulting a dictionary when necessary. Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992). The statute under which Appellee was charged provides in pertinent part as follows: The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in the death of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. . . . Any person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the first degree . . . .

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