2D04-2474 / Geiger v. State

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Southern District Court

Docket No: 2D04-2474

Case Date: 07/29/2005

Plaintiff: 2D04-2474 / Geiger

Defendant: State

Preview:NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CLETUS GEIGER,                                                                              )
)
Appellant,                                                                                  )
)
v.                                                                                          )   Case No. 2D04-2474
)
STATE OF FLORIDA,                                                                           )
)
Appellee.                                                                                   )
)
Opinion filed July 29, 2005.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota
County; Harry M. Rapkin, Judge.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender,
and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,
for Appellee.
SILBERMAN, Judge.
Cletus Geiger appeals the conviction and sentence entered following his
no contest plea to sexual battery on a mentally defective person.   He reserved the right
to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and his motion challenging the
constitutionality of section 92.565, Florida Statutes (2003), which addresses the
admissibility of confessions in sexual abuse cases.

The State filed charges against Geiger after he made incriminating
statements.   We conclude that under section 92.565, the statements would have been
inadmissible at trial due to the absence of corroborating evidence.   Because the State
had no other evidence establishing that a crime had occurred, the trial court should
have granted Geiger's motion to dismiss.   Therefore we reverse and remand for entry of
an order of dismissal.   Because this case can be resolved without determining
constitutional issues, we do not address Geiger's constitutional challenge to section
92.565.   See State v. Boyd, 846 So. 2d 458, 459-60 (Fla. 2003); Matthews v. Weinberg,
645 So. 2d 487, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Geiger was a certified nursing assistant at Quality Healthcare Center in
North Port.   His duties included feeding, dressing, and bathing patients.   In July 2003,
Geiger told an elder at his church that he had exposed himself to one of the patients at
the facility and that he had placed his penis into the mouth of another patient.   The
church elder reported these statements through the Florida Abuse Hotline, resulting in
an investigation by the Florida Department of Children and Family Services.   When the
facility's administrator and its director of nursing learned of Geiger's statements they
contacted Geiger, who repeated his statements to them.   Geiger later spoke with a
police detective, again admitting to improper conduct with the patients.   The State
charged Geiger with one count of sexual battery and one count of lewd or lascivious
exhibition.
Geiger filed a sworn motion to dismiss, contending that apart from his
statements there was no proof that he committed any crime.   The motion asserted that
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there were no witnesses to the charged crimes; that the patients, who both suffer from
Alzheimer's disease, were incapable of telling anyone about the incidents; and that
there was no physical evidence to corroborate the charged crimes.   The motion
concluded that the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt.
Both the State and Geiger filed motions for a hearing to determine the
trustworthiness of Geiger's statements for admission at trial pursuant to section 92.565.
Geiger asserted and the State acknowledged that the patients were unable to tell
anyone about what Geiger might have done and were unable to testify due to mental
and physical disabilities; that there were no witnesses or physical evidence linking
Geiger to the charged crimes; and that the only evidence that the alleged incidents
occurred was Geiger's statements.   The State added that "there is no known forensic
evidence indicating that sexual contact took place" and that medical examinations on
the victims were inconclusive.
SECTION 92.565 AND THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Section 92.565(2) provides that when a defendant is charged with
committing a specified crime, including sexual battery,
the defendant's memorialized confession or admission is
admissible during trial without the state having to prove a
corpus delicti of the crime if the court finds in a hearing
conducted outside the presence of the jury that the state is
unable to show the existence of each element of the crime,
and having so found, further finds that the defendant's
confession or admission is trustworthy.   Factors which may
be relevant in determining whether the state is unable to
show the existence of each element of the crime include, but
are not limited to, the fact that, at the time the crime was
committed, the victim was:
(a) Physically helpless, mentally incapacitated, or mentally
defective, as those terms are defined in s. 794.011;
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(b) Physically incapacitated due to age, infirmity, or any
other cause; or
(c) Less than 12 years of age.
Section 92.565(3) addresses the need for corroborating evidence of the trustworthiness
of the confession or admission as follows:
Before the court admits the defendant's confession or
admission, the state must prove by a preponderance of
evidence that there is sufficient corroborating evidence that
tends to establish the trustworthiness of the statement by the
defendant.   Hearsay evidence is admissible during the
presentation of evidence at the hearing.   In making its
determination, the court may consider all relevant
corroborating evidence, including the defendant's
statements.
Pursuant to section 92.565, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to
determine the trustworthiness of Geiger's statements.   The State established that at the
time of the alleged crimes, the victims suffered from total dementia and were unable to
communicate rationally.   Geiger was the sole caretaker of the victims during the night
shift and would have had the opportunity to commit the charged crimes.   The State
introduced Geiger's recorded statement to the police in which he admitted to the
incidents, described the incidents in detail, and claimed that the victims had
communicated their desire to have sex with him.   The State presented evidence that
Geiger was not coerced and freely made each of his admissions.
The State also introduced into evidence a letter from Geiger to the facility's
director of nursing that contained his request for a change from the night shift to the day
shift due to "benifits [sic] to my health and family life."   The State argued that Geiger
sent the letter about ten days to two weeks before the alleged crimes took place and
that it showed Geiger's state of mind.   Based on Geiger's statements, the State
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contended that Geiger asked for the shift change because "[h]e knew that there was a
temptation.   He was having trouble resisting that temptation."
The defense elicited testimony from Dr. Eddy Regnier, a clinical
psychologist who examined Geiger, reviewed his medical records, and spoke with his
wife.   Dr. Regnier determined that Geiger was competent to proceed in the case and
that he was not insane at the time of the alleged offenses.   However, Dr. Regnier
diagnosed Geiger with major depression with psychotic features and anxiety disorder,
and he noted that Geiger had abused alcohol, sedatives, hypnotics, and other drugs in
the past.
Dr. Regnier noted that Geiger had a breakdown and was hospitalized in
1975 and diagnosed with schizophrenia.   The diagnosis was later revised to major
depression with psychotic features.   Because of the "psychotic break" in 1975, Geiger
was given antipsychotic medication.   He had been on a range of medications, but he
never consistently followed a medication regimen because of side effects.   He had
ceased the medication years before the alleged crimes.   During the 1975
hospitalization, Geiger also began a "mucusless diet,"1 which resulted in rapid weight
loss.
Dr. Regnier testified that Geiger did not have another psychotic episode
until just before or around the time that the alleged crimes occurred.   He learned from
Geiger's wife that Geiger had resumed the mucusless diet and had become more
withdrawn and obsessed about his diet.   Geiger had the idea that the women at the
nursing home, who were unresponsive, were trying to communicate that they wanted
1    Apparently, the diet involves eating grains, garlic, celery, and raw and cooked
onions.
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sexual relations with him.   Dr. Regnier stated that "[t]he idea that he was having these
kinds of discussions or beliefs about people who were basically unresponsive is quirky
and may, in fact, represent some psychotic thinking."   Further, Dr. Regnier noted that
together with "isolation at home, this abrupt change in his pattern of behavior suggests
that something psychological is going on."
Dr. Regnier stated that a person making a false confession is "quite a
common phenomenon."   Persons with delusions, including those of a sexual nature,
"firmly believe that these events are true and will tell others in a way to warn them, in a
way to try to get help for themselves."   He added that psychotic individuals tell the same
story with amazing accuracy over and over again.   He stated that Geiger's admissions
could be a fantasy or the result of a mental disorder.   Based on Geiger's having a prior
mental disorder and breakdown that resulted in hospitalization, his purported behavior
changes, and his belief that the women were communicating with him, Geiger's
repeated statements could be due to a mental disorder or fantasy, or the "fabrication of
a diseased mind."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court observed that no one knew
that any crime had occurred apart from Geiger's statements.   The court then stated that
there was "quite a bit of indicia of reliability"2 concerning Geiger's statements.   The court
observed that Geiger's statement, that the noncommunicative women had indicated
they wanted the sexual contact, was a double-edged sword.   The court indicated that
this claim might somehow have legitimized what Geiger did: "He was doing something,
2    Although section 92.565 requires that a trial court determine whether a
defendant's confession or admission is trustworthy, the trial court used the word
"reliability" in making its findings.   In context, it appears that the trial court was using
"reliability" as equivalent to "trustworthy" or "trustworthiness."
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quote, to satisfy these woman's [sic] sexual needs or desires, as bizarre as that might
be, and it's quite possible that he would think of that as their consent or as being a
defense."
The trial court commented that Geiger's statement to a church elder was
because Geiger "thought, just like going into a confessional, you get right with God, but
you don't necessarily expect to get right with the law or with the community."   The court
stated that another indicia of reliability was that Geiger spontaneously made consistent
statements to the church elder and others.   The court added that Geiger's letter to
change his hours was "because he felt the urges and the need to have -- during the day
that he wouldn't have the opportunity and probably not the inclination, and so that's why
that letter was a request to have his hours changed."   The trial court concluded that for
those reasons, it was "satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement
is trustworthy" under section 92.565.
The trial court later entered its orders denying Geiger's motion to dismiss
the sexual battery charge and his motion challenging the constitutionality of section
92.565.   The court dismissed the lewd and lascivious exhibition charge, but that
dismissal is not before us on appeal.
THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE
The Florida Supreme Court has described the corpus delicti rule as
follows:
It is a fundamental principle of law that no person be
adjudged guilty of a crime until the state has shown that a
crime has been committed.   The state therefore must show
that a harm has been suffered of the type contemplated by
the charges (for example, a death in the case of a murder
charge or a loss of property in the case of a theft charge),
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and that such harm was incurred due to the criminal agency
of another.   This usually requires the identity of the victim of
the crime.   A person's confession to a crime is not sufficient
evidence of a criminal act where no independent direct or
circumstantial evidence exists to substantiate the occurrence
of a crime.   The judicial quest for truth requires that no
person be convicted out of derangement, mistake or official
fabrication.
State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1976) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Traditional application of the corpus delicti rule requires the State to " 'at least show the
existence of each element of the crime' to authorize the introduction of a defendant's
admission or confession."   State v. Colorado, 890 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
(quoting Allen, 335 So. 2d at 825).   In Chaparro v. State, 873 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2004), this court reiterated that without independently established corpus delecti, a
defendant's admissions or confessions cannot be admitted into evidence.   "The primary
purpose behind the rule 'is to protect a defendant from being convicted of a nonexistent
crime due to "derangement, mistake or official fabrication." ' "   Id. (citations omitted).
The corpus delicti rule has come under criticism, and several
commentators have called for its replacement by the trustworthiness doctrine, which is
used in the federal court system and in some other states.   See, e.g., Burks v. State,
613 So. 2d 441, 445-46 (Fla. 1993) (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Shaw stated that the requirement that the State offer independent evidence of
each element of an offense before allowing the State to admit a defendant's confession
was "a technicality that impedes rather than fosters the search for the truth."   Id. at 446.
He suggested that the more workable rule is that used by the federal courts and
elsewhere, that "the evidence independent of defendant's statements need not prove
the corpus delicti as long as the government introduces substantial independent
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evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the defendant's
statements."   Id.
THE TRUSTWORTHINESS DOCTRINE
In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), the United States Supreme
Court rejected the traditional corpus delicti rule for the trustworthiness doctrine.   Under
that doctrine, a defendant's admission or confession may be used to support a
conviction if sufficient independent evidence corroborates the admission or confession
so as to establish its trustworthiness.   Id. at 93.   In discussing the quantum of
corroborative evidence required, the Court stated:
[W]e think the better rule to be that the corroborative
evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the
statements, to establish the corpus delicti.   It is necessary,
therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial
independent evidence which would tend to establish the
trustworthiness of the statement.   Thus, the independent
evidence serves a dual function.   It tends to make the
admission reliable, thus corroborating it while also
establishing independently the other necessary elements of
the offense.   It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the
essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference
of their truth.   Those facts plus the other evidence besides
the admission must, of course, be sufficient to find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. (citation omitted).   The Court observed that in the case before it there was
substantial independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of Opper's admission
and one of the two elements of corpus delicti.   Id. at 93-94.
In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954), the Court reiterated
"[t]he general rule that an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated
confession."   Concerning the nature and quantity of corroborative evidence required, the
Court stated:
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In addition to differing views on the substantiality of specific
independent evidence, the debate has centered largely
about two questions: (1) whether corroboration is necessary
for all elements of the offense established by admissions
alone, and (2) whether it is sufficient if the corroboration
merely fortifies the truth of the confession, without
independently establishing the crime charged.   We answer
both in the affirmative.   All elements of the offense must be
established by independent evidence or corroborated
admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for
the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and
thereby prove the offense "through" the statements of the
accused.
Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
In United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 1992), the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the corroboration requirement of Opper is two-pronged:
[F]irst, although the state need not introduce independent
evidence of the corpus delicti in conformance with the
traditional test, it must introduce sufficient evidence to
establish that the criminal conduct at the core of the offense
has occurred.   Second, it must introduce independent
evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of the
admissions, unless the confession is, by virtue of special
circumstances, inherently reliable.   Only when both these
prongs are satisfied will a jury be "sufficiently justified" in
believing the truth of a criminal admission; only then will the
evidence be deemed sufficient in a case in which the
conviction depends in part on such admission.
The court explained that while there must be independent verification that criminal
conduct occurred,
the state no longer need introduce independent, tangible
evidence supporting every element of the corpus delicti.
Instead, the state is required to support independently only
the gravamen of the offense--the existence of the injury that
forms the core of the offense and a link to a criminal
actor--with tangible evidence.
Id. at 591; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 489 n.15 (1963) ("Where
the crime involves physical damage to person or property, the prosecution must
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generally show that the injury for which the accused confesses responsibility did in fact
occur, and that some person was criminally culpable. . .                                      [O]ne uncorroborated
admission by the accused does not, standing alone, corroborate an unverified
confession.").
The Fifth District Court of Appeal has noted that "[s]ection 92.565
eliminates corpus delicti as a predicate for the admission of a defendant's confession
when the state is unable to show the existence of each element of the offense because
the victim is either physically helpless, mentally incapacitated, mentally defective, or
physically incapacitated."   State v. Dionne, 814 So. 2d 1087, 1091 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
The statute substitutes the trustworthiness standard in place of the corpus delicti rule in
the circumstances addressed by the statute.   Id.   Concerning the difference between the
two approaches, the court explained "that the corroboration aspect of corpus delicti is
more concerned with the elements of the offense whereas the trustworthiness doctrine
is concerned with the trustworthiness of the statements contained within the
confession."   Id.
We agree that section 92.565 replaces the corpus delicti rule with the
trustworthiness doctrine with respect to the enumerated offenses.   Therefore, in the
circumstances specified by the statute, the State may admit a defendant's confession
into evidence without first proving corpus delicti if sufficient corroborating evidence is
presented that tends to establish the trustworthiness of the confession.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE
Geiger argues that the State failed to produce corroborative evidence to
establish the trustworthiness of his statements and that the court should have
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determined that his statements would not be admissible during trial.   He further argues
that because there was no other evidence of his commission of any crimes, the trial
court should have granted his motion to dismiss.
The evidence established that Geiger was the sole caretaker of the
alleged victims during his work hours.   In addition, the State presented Geiger's letter
requesting a shift change.   The balance of the evidence consisted of testimony
concerning Geiger's employment, the statements that he made to others which led to
the charges, and Dr. Regnier's testimony concerning Geiger's mental history and his
opinions regarding delusional behavior and false confessions.
In making its findings, the trial court relied on the contents of Geiger's
statements and how the statements provided their own trustworthiness.   For example,
the trial court thought it significant that, based on Geiger's statements, consent could
perhaps be used as a defense.   The court also found that Geiger's statements were
reliable because Geiger voluntarily made the statements to a church elder and others.
The court stated that the confession to the elder showed that perhaps Geiger believed
his confession was privileged and would let him "get it right with God."   However, these
findings are not based on independent evidence corroborating the trustworthiness of the
statements or establishing that a crime occurred; instead, the court simply viewed the
statements as credible based on the statements themselves.
Similarly, the trial court's evaluation of Geiger's letter requesting a shift
change─that he sent the letter because he had urges and wanted to avoid the
opportunity to act on his inclination─was based on Geiger's statements and not any
independent corroborating evidence.   The letter itself cites health and family benefits as
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the basis for the request.   Absent Geiger's oral statements, the request for a shift
change is at least as consistent with an innocent motivation as any devious one.
Section 92.565(3) provides that the State must prove "that there is
sufficient corroborating evidence that tends to establish the trustworthiness" of the
defendant's statement and that the court "may consider all relevant corroborating
evidence, including the defendant's statements."   Here, the State presented no
corroborating evidence establishing the trustworthiness of Geiger's statements and no
evidence, apart from those statements, that Geiger committed any crime.   Instead, the
focus of the State's evidence was that Geiger voluntarily repeated his statements to
various individuals and that he asked for a shift change.
As discussed previously, although the trustworthiness doctrine does not
require independent proof of each element of the crime in order for a confession to be
admitted, there must be some evidence that tends to establish the type of harm for
which the defendant is being criminally charged.   See, e.g., Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 489
n.15; Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 592.   In United States v. Lee, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1038
(D. Ariz. 2003), the court noted that although the defendant's confession was the only
evidence that he touched the victim's genitalia, sufficient circumstantial evidence
corroborated the confession.   The corroborating evidence included witness observations
of the defendant carrying the victim to a bedroom, closing the door, and barring entry
into the room for several minutes.   After the defendant later opened the door, witnesses
found the victim lying on a bed, with a pillow covering her face and upper body.   The
victim was wearing different pants with her underwear on backwards.   Id. at 1040.   The
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court stated that strong circumstantial evidence corroborated the defendant's admission,
and it emphasized the following:
If this circumstantial evidence did not exist--if Defendant had
merely been at the house that evening and nothing
suspicious had been observed by others who were
present--then his confession to touching the child would be
entirely uncorroborated.   There would be no independent
evidence to suggest that a crime occurred.
Id. at 1044; see also State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Iowa 2003) (reiterating that
the State must offer sufficient proof to corroborate the defendant's confession in order
for the confession to serve as a basis for conviction, that corroboration must confirm
some material fact connecting the defendant with the crime, and that the State must
show that the crime has been committed).
Here, only Geiger's statements suggest that any crime occurred, and Dr.
Regnier's testimony addressed why those statements were suspect.   Although the
State's evidence established that Geiger had the opportunity to engage in criminal
conduct, no independent evidence established that a crime occurred or that Geiger's
admissions to criminal conduct were trustworthy.
CONCLUSION
Because the State did not present competent, substantial evidence to
establish that Geiger's statements were trustworthy, the trial court erred in holding that
the statements were admissible pursuant to section 92.565.   Moreover, because no
evidence existed apart from Geiger's statements to establish that any crime had
occurred, the trial court should have granted Geiger's motion to dismiss the sexual
battery charge.   Therefore, we reverse Geiger's conviction and remand with instructions
that the trial court enter an order dismissing the sexual battery charge.
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Reversed and remanded.
SALCINES and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
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