2D06-1935 / Yoder Brothers Inc. v. Weygant

State: Florida

Court: Florida Southern District Court

Docket No: 2D06-1935

Case Date: 01/25/2008

Plaintiff: 2D06-1935 / Yoder Brothers Inc.

Defendant: Weygant

Preview:NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

YODER BROTHERS, INC.,

) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) JAMES WEYGANT, ) ) Appellee. ) ) ________________________________ )

Case No.

2D06-1935

Opinion filed January 25, 2008. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; R. Thomas Corbin, Judge. Edmund J. McKenna and Jennifer Monrose Moore of Ford & Harrison LLP, Tampa, for Appellant. Jason L. Gunter of Webb, Scarmozzino & Gunter, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellee. Richard E. Johnson, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae The National Employment Lawyers Association, Florida Chapter.

KELLY, Judge. Yoder Brothers, Inc., challenges the order of the trial court denying its motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2004). We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Yoder Brothers' proposal for settlement was inconsistent with section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes (2004), and therefore affirm. James Weygant sued Yoder Brothers alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA).1 Yoder Brothers served an offer of judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 and section 768.79. After Yoder Brothers prevailed at trial, it moved for attorney's fees pursuant to its offer of judgment. The trial court denied the motion after concluding that the offer of judgment statute conflicted with section 760.11(5), which governs awards of attorney's fees in actions brought under the FCRA. On appeal, Yoder Brothers contends that the trial court erred in interpreting the two statutes. We disagree. The question presented in this appeal is one of law; specifically, whether the trial court's interpretation of the statutes at issue was proper. Therefore, the applicable standard of review is de novo. See B.Y. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004). The FCRA's attorney's fee provision states in pertinent part: In any action or proceeding under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. It is the intent of the Legislature that this provision for attorney's fees be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal case law involving a Title VII action.
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