2D12-2200 / Thomas v. State

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Southern District Court

Docket No: 2D12-2200

Case Date: 06/29/2012

Plaintiff: 2D12-2200 / Thomas

Defendant: State

Preview:NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

FRENECIA LATRICE THOMAS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

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Case No. 2D12-2200

Opinion filed June 29, 2012. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Gregory P. Holder, Judge. Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and Rebecca S. Sinclair, Assistant Public Defender, Tampa, for Petitioner. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Suzanne Bechard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.

WALLACE, Judge. Frenecia Latrice Thomas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the trial court's order finding her incompetent to proceed in two criminal cases and directing that she be involuntarily committed to the Department of Children

and Family Services (DCF). By order, we treated the petition as a petition for writ of certiorari.1 Because the trial court's ruling that Ms. Thomas met the requirements for involuntary commitment under section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2011), is not supported by clear and convincing evidence, the challenged order departs from the essential requirements of the law. See, e.g., Dep't of Children & Families v. Alvarado, 946 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Accordingly, we quash that portion of the order committing Ms. Thomas to DCF, and we remand for further proceedings. I. THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The State charged Ms. Thomas in two cases with aggravated battery, grand theft motor vehicle, and criminal mischief. Because of questions concerning whether Ms. Thomas was incompetent to proceed within the meaning of section 916.12(1), the trial court, under section 916.115(1), appointed two mental health experts to examine her. The two experts, Bala K. Rao, M.D., and Charles O. Matthews, Ph.D., examined Ms. Thomas and filed written reports with the trial court. At the competency hearing, the parties and the trial court relied solely on the experts' written reports; the trial court did not hear any live testimony. Both experts opined that Ms. Thomas was incompetent to proceed within the meaning of section 916.12(1). Ms. Thomas does not challenge that portion of the trial court's order finding her incompetent to proceed, and her competency is not at issue in this proceeding. Instead, we address that portion of the trial court's order involuntarily committing her to DCF for treatment.

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See Oren v. Judd, 940 So. 2d 1271, 1272 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

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II. THE PERTINENT STATUTE Section 916.13 addresses the question of the involuntary commitment to DCF of defendants charged with a felony who have been adjudicated incompetent to proceed. The statute provides, in pertinent part: (1) Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be involuntarily committed for treatment upon a finding by the court of clear and convincing evidence that: (a) The defendant has a mental illness and because of the mental illness: 1. The defendant is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and, without treatment, the defendant is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for herself or himself and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to the defendant's well-being; or 2. There is a substantial likelihood that in the near future the defendant will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or himself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm; (b) All available, less restrictive treatment alternatives, including treatment in community residential facilities or community inpatient or outpatient settings, which would offer an opportunity for improvement of the defendant's condition have been judged to be inappropriate; and (c) There is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future. (2) A defendant who has been charged with a felony and who has been adjudicated incompetent to proceed due to mental illness, and who meets the criteria for involuntary commitment to the department under the provisions of this

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chapter, may be committed to the department, and the department shall retain and treat the defendant. Here, our task is to determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling that Ms. Thomas met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment. Thus we turn to an examination of the experts' written reports--the only evidence before the trial court at the hearing. III. THE EXPERTS' REPORTS In his written report, Dr. Rao said that Ms. Thomas suffers from a bipolar disorder. Dr. Rao did not explicitly address whether Ms. Thomas met the criteria for involuntary commitment under subsections 916.13(1)(a)(1) and (2). However, Dr. Rao did opine that Ms. Thomas did not meet the criteria for commitment under the Baker Act.2 Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2011), of the Baker Act states the criteria for involuntary inpatient placement based on mental illness. Subsections 394.467(1)(a)(2)(a) and (b) require the trial court to make the same findings as sections 916.13(1)(a)(1) and (2), and the language of the two statutes is substantially similar. Although Dr. Rao determined that Ms. Thomas was mentally ill, he also determined that she did not meet the criteria for involuntary inpatient placement under the Baker Act. It follows that Dr. Rao implicitly found that Ms. Thomas did not meet the criteria set forth in subsections 916.13(1)(a)(1) and (2) for involuntary commitment to DCF. In addition, Dr. Rao did not specifically address the question of whether all less restrictive treatment alternatives would be inappropriate--a requirement for involuntary commitment under subsection 916.13(1)(b). However, Dr. Rao did The Florida Mental Health Act is also known as the Baker Act, and it appears in part I of chapter 394, from sections 394.451 to 394.4789. See

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