01-3193 JONES V. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

State: Florida

Court: Florida Third District Court

Docket No: 01-3193 JONES V. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

Case Date: 12/18/2002

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA THIRD DISTRICT JULY TERM, A.D. 2002

JEFF J. JONES, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee. ** ** ** ** **

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CASE NO. 3D01-3193 LOWER TRIBUNAL NO. 01-30415

Opinion filed December 18, 2002. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Scott Silverman, Judge. Jeff J. Jones, in proper person. Judy Bone (Tallahassee), Assistant General Counsel, for appellee. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON, J., and NESBITT, Senior Judge. SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. We find that the trial court properly denied the application of the appellant, a convicted second degree murderer in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, for additional

overcrowding gain time credits, see Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997), and for credits equivalent to those granted to inmates eligible for Control Release. Our review of the record shows

that as a person designated in Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 822 (1999) as a member of Offender Group 5, Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 513 n.3, he had in fact been granted, as required by Lynce, all the provisional gain time credits which had already been awarded and of which he therefore could not be deprived. As Gomez squarely holds, however, he was

not entitled, as he argues, to additional credits which had not yet been awarded when section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993), which purported to cancel all such credits, was enacted. Winkler v. Moore, ___ So. 2d ___ (Fla. Case nos. See

SC93294,

SC94507, SC00-614, opinion filed, April 25, 2002)[27 FLW S373]. Furthermore, as a convicted murderer, he was not eligible for and thus was not entitled to credits under the Control program. Release

Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 5061; see also Winkler, ___ So. 2d

1

The petitioners also argue that for the years in which Control Release allotments were awarded they should receive the much higher number of Control Release allotments that were given to the Control Release eligible inmates. We conclude that under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the petitioners are only entitled to the number of credits that should have been awarded under the prior statutes, not what other inmates were actually awarded under the Control Release program. To do otherwise would result in an undue windfall for the petitioners.

Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 506.

at ___ [27 FLW at S373]; Meola v. Department of Corrections, 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1998). Affirmed.

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