02-0233 CHUCK V. CITY OF HOMESTEAD

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Third District Court

Docket No: 02-0233 CHUCK V. CITY OF HOMESTEAD

Case Date: 12/15/2004

Preview:NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA THIRD DISTRICT JULY TERM, A.D. 2004

WAYNE CHUCK and JOHN TONEY, Appellants, vs. CITY OF HOMESTEAD POLICE DEPARTMENT and VILLAGE OF PINECREST, Appellees.

** ** ** ** ** ** CASE NOS. 3D02-233 and 3D01-2768

LOWER TRIBUNAL NO. 01-28427 and 01-15161

Opinion filed December 15, 2004. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jennifer D. Bailey and Philip Bloom, Judge. John E. Bergendahl, and Kenneth P. Speiller, for appellants. Andrew B. Ginsburg, and Robert S. Glazier; and Cynthia A. Everett, for appellees. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE, LEVY, GERSTEN, GODERICH, GREEN, FLETCHER, SHEVIN, RAMIREZ, WELLS, and SHEPHERD, JJ. EN BANC RAMIREZ, J. We have heard two cases en banc in an attempt to clarify the

controversy surrounding the standing issue at the preliminary adversarial hearing stage of a forfeiture of seized currency proceeding. The standing issue has all too often been confused At these adversarial hearings,

with the merits of the actual case.

the property rights of claimants have been summarily decided by the trial court, depriving them of their statutory and constitutional rights to a trial by jury. We hold that John Toney, who had sworn

his unconditional ownership of the subject currency, who had never disavowed such ownership, and for which no other competing claim had been made to the seizing authority, had a sufficient property interest to confer him standing to proceed with his claims at the adversarial preliminary hearing stage of a forfeiture proceeding pursuant to Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act. Toney's case for a trial on the merits. We thus remand

In Wayne Chuck's case,

because there was evidence that he contradicted himself as to the ownership of the currency, we reverse and remand for a new hearing on standing. In case number 01-2768, John Toney appealed the trial court's order determining that he had no standing in the forfeiture of $60,600 in U.S. currency, as well as the denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to hold a timely adversarial preliminary hearing under Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act. In case number

02-233, Wayne Chuck appealed the trial court's order determining that he had no standing in the forfeiture of $380,015.00 in U.S. 2

currency, as well as the denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to hold a timely adversarial preliminary hearing also under Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act. banc is hereby granted. The motion for rehearing en

We withdraw our prior opinion dated

September 30, 2002, and substitute the following opinion in its place. In addition, this opinion also serves as the decision in

Toney's case. I. Facts and Proceedings Below in Case Number 02-233 Wayne Chuck v. In re: Forfeiture of $380,015.00 On November 3, 2001, the City of Homestead Police Department (Homestead) received an allegedly reliable tip that a person, subsequently identified as Wayne Chuck, was involved in money laundering and narcotics transactions. A Homestead Narcotics Unit

detective established surveillance on Chuck's 2001 Acura Legend. The detective requested that Florida Highway Patrol monitor and execute a traffic stop on the vehicle. The Florida Highway Patrol

trooper allegedly observed the driver of the Legend commit an improper lane change, and thus stopped the vehicle. Following the stop, a second Florida Highway patrolman arrived on the scene. passenger. Donovan A. Grant was the driver, and Chuck was the A canine

Grant consented to a search of the vehicle.

sniffed the vehicle and alerted to the trunk.

When the officers

opened the trunk, two canines alerted to a red, white and blue Huggies diaper box. the box. The trooper asked Grant and Chuck what was in

Grant responded that he did not know, that it was "his" 3

box, and pointed to Chuck.

Chuck responded that it was money.

The

trooper asked Chuck how much money was in the box, and he replied that it was $380,000.00. Another detective opened the box and Chuck was then given his Chuck told the

found a large amount of U.S. currency.

Miranda warnings1 and interrogated about the money.

detective that the box was his and that Grant did not know about the money. Chuck further stated that he did construction work and He then told the detective that he

saved the money over the years.

did not pay income tax, that he lived in Jamaica, that he made the money in the United States, and that he had the money with him because he was taking it home. The detective asked Chuck if he had The

a money transmitter's license, to which Chuck replied, "No."

detective then asked Chuck if the money was proceeds from something illegal and Chuck responded, "I don't know, maybe." Chuck told the Chuck

detective he was going to give the money to someone.

shrugged his shoulders and did not reply when asked how much he was going to make for dropping off the money. The currency was Homestead

packaged in bundles of $20.00, $10.00, and $5.00 bills. agents seized the currency. Chuck was arrested for violating section

896.101(3)(B), On

Florida Statutes (2000), of the Florida Money Laundering Act.

November 8, 2001, a Notice of Seizure Pending Forfeiture was sent to Chuck at the jail where he was being detained.
1

The jail

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

4

received the Notice on November 9, 2001, but the corrections officers did not deliver it to Chuck until November 15, 2001. November 27, 2001, Chuck sent a request for an On

adversarial

preliminary hearing pursuant to section 932.703(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), claiming the $380,015.00 which was taken from him on November 3, 2001. Chuck spent 21 days in jail before the State

dropped the money-laundering charges. On November filed 28, an 2001, in response Request to for Chuck's an request,

Homestead

"Emergency

Adversarial

Preliminary Hearing Pursuant to Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act." Homestead asked the trial court to conduct the hearing no later than December 10, 2001, or as soon as reasonably possible to avoid dismissal. Despite this warning, the trial court scheduled the The complaint for forfeiture was On December 17, 2001, the parties

hearing for December 17, 2001. served on December 4, 2001.

agreed to continue the hearing to December 19, 2001. At the hearing on December 19, 2001, Chuck moved to dismiss the forfeiture action for failure to hold the adversarial

preliminary hearing within ten days after the request was received or as soon as practicable thereafter, pursuant to section

932.703(2)a), Florida Statutes (2000).

Chuck argued that the tenth

day following his request was Saturday, December 8, 2001, thus the trial court should have scheduled the hearing on December 10, 2001. The trial court explained that the delay in scheduling was that the 5

court was presiding over a medical malpractice case and denied Chuck's motion to dismiss.2 The trial court then addressed the standing issue. Chuck

contended that he only had to demonstrate that he was a "person entitled to notice," as the term is defined in section

932.701(a)(9)e(), Florida Statutes. which stated the following: 1)

Chuck submitted an affidavit

On November 3, 2001, I was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Donavan Grant. For no apparent reason a police officer stopped the vehicle around the intersection of Southwest 117th Avenue and Southwest 88th Street, Miami, Florida. Following the stop of the vehicle, additional police officers arrived and the vehicle was searched. During the course of the search the police found a box in the trunk of the vehicle and asked Mr. Grant what was in the box. Mr. Grant responded, "I don't know" and told the officers that the box belonged to me. I was then asked what was in the box and I told the officers that it was money. When asked how much I told them Three Hundred EightyThousand ($380,000.00). I also told the officers that the money was mine. Following my telling the police that the money in the box belonged to me, I was placed under arrest and taken to jail. On November 13, while in jail, I received a letter notifying me that my money had been seized and that forfeiture proceedings were going to be initiated. When I received the letter I immediately made a written notation on the envelope the letter came in showing the date I received it. A copy of the envelope is attached as Exhibit "A".

2)

3)

Specifically, the trial court stated, "There are many cases on there. If you are in the middle of a malpractice case, then you have to immediately interrupt a malpractice case and immediately hear a forfeiture case? Is there anything on that?"

2

6

4)

On or about November 26, 2001, I was released from jail when the State of Florida decided not to file charges against me regarding what had happened back on November 3, 2001. At all times material I am and have been the owner of the Three Hundred Eight-Thousand Dollars ($380,000.00) in United States currency which was discovered during the search of Mr. Grant's vehicle on November 3, 2001, and which has subsequently been seized and is now subject to these forfeiture proceedings. In addition on November 3, 2001, I was in possession of this currency.

5)

Homestead advised the court that the burden was on Chuck to establish standing and to show "the bona fide nature of the claim." The trial court announced that the affidavit was insufficient and asked if Chuck was going to testify. Chuck did not testify, and

Homestead relied on its own complaint and affidavit. The trial court found that Chuck failed to establish standing by virtue of his failure to provide sufficient sworn proof of a possessory and/or ownership interest in the subject property and denied Chuck's motion to dismiss for failure to conduct a timely adversarial hearing. The court found that Chuck failed to explain

the source of the currency or how he amassed such a large sum of currency, citing to Vasquez v. State, 777 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). The court further found that Chuck failed to meet

the burden of establishing the "bona fide nature of his claim", citing again to Vasquez and Fraser v. Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 727 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). appealed to this Court the trial court's order. 7 Chuck

This Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing the forfeiture proceeding. In reaching our decision, we did not address the specific issue of standing. We reversed because Chuck was not given a preliminary

hearing within the ten day-period provided in section 932.703, Florida Statutes (2000). Homestead then moved for rehearing en

banc, contending that the opinion ordered the dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding, even though the trial court had held that Chuck lacked standing to challenge the forfeiture proceeding. Homestead argued that the opinion was contrary to the law stated in Munoz v. City of Coral Gables, 695 So. 2d 1283, 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), Arango v. In re Forfeiture of $477,890.00 in U.S. Currency, 731 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), and Gonzalez v. City of Homestead, 825 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). rehearing en banc. II. Facts and Proceedings Below in Case Number 01-2768 John Toney v. Village of Pinecrest On May 31, 2001, a Village of Pinecrest police officer stopped a 1994 Nissan Maxima for not having a visible tag. The driver of We granted

the car was Omar Jackson, and the passenger was Lakeisha Thomas. When Jackson opened the trunk to search for his identification, he opened a lock box and the officers viewed some cash underneath. The officer arrested Jackson for a violation of a driver's license restriction. The officer searched the vehicle incident to the In the lock box,

arrest and found a gun in the glove compartment. 8

they found jewelry and $60,660.00 in U.S. currency (590 $100 bills and 33 $50 dollar bills). Pinecrest sent notices of seizure to Jackson and Thomas. Thomas requested an adversarial preliminary hearing by certified mail, received by Pinecrest on June 18, 2001. John Toney requested

a preliminary hearing on or about June 22, 2001, which Pinecrest received on June 25, 2001. Pinecrest filed a Verified Complaint of

Forfeiture on June 26, 2001 and a Motion for Emergency Adversary Preliminary Hearing on June 28, 2001. The trial judge in that

division was on vacation, so the case was transferred to an alternate judge, who scheduled a hearing for July 12, 2001. When

the parties appeared for the adversarial preliminary hearing on July 12, 2001, the alternate judge only had a status conference scheduled, and Pinecrest subsequently filed a second emergency motion for adversarial preliminary hearing. The adversarial

preliminary hearing was finally held on July 24, 2001, as were Thomas' and Toney's motions to dismiss. Toney filed affidavits. Toney's At the hearing, Thomas and affidavit stated the

sworn

following: 1. My name is JOHN TONEY. 2. I own the above-referenced U.S. Currency totaling approximately $60,600.00 that was seized from the Village of Pinecrest Police Department. 3. The seized currency should not be forfeited and should be released immediately to me. 4. My interest in the seized currency is superior to any right 9

of the State of Florida. The trial court ruled that the affidavits were insufficient, so it took Thomas' and Toney's testimony. Thomas testified that she She

owned the car and some of the jewelry found in the lock box.

did not mention the currency or that Toney was the owner of the money. Toney testified that he bought and sold real estate and that he used cash in these transactions. He also bought and sold cars

and used cash in these transactions, especially in car auctions because cash was required to purchase the cars at the auctions. told the trial court that he sold two houses and He

received

$150,000.00 from the deal.

He kept twenty-thousand dollars in cash Over a period of

at his home, and the rest he kept at his bank. six years, he accumulated another $40,600.

Toney testified that he

had given his nephew, Omar Jackson, $60,000 and change to buy a couple of duplexes as part of his real estate business. He gave

Jackson the money approximately three weeks before the subject seizure. He also testified that the currency was in denominations

of twenties, hundreds and tens. Pinecrest asked Toney if he had the records of those he talked to about purchasing the duplexes. Toney's attorney objected,

stating that because standing was the only issue before the trial court, Pinecrest was not allowed to delve into the ownership of the money issue, which he claimed should be reserved for trial. 10 The

court allowed the questioning.

Toney testified that he could not

remember the addresses of any of the houses that he had looked at except for one in North Miami on Sixth Avenue, nor could he remember the names of owners of any of the properties he had looked at, but he did have records. Toney further testified that it was He was

his money because his nephew did not have his own money.

not on the scene when the police officer stopped the car, and he did not know how the money got into the lock box. The Pinecrest

arresting officer testified, after the trial court had already ruled on the standing issue, that the seized currency was in denominations of $100.00 and $50.00 bills and one $10.00 bill. The trial court found that Thomas had standing and that Toney had no standing. preliminary Thus, Toney had no right to an adversarial and no right to contest any forfeiture

hearing

proceeding, as he did not present sworn proof of a possessory and/or ownership interest in the $60,000 in U.S. currency. The

court did not find Toney's explanation credible and cited to Vasquez v. State, 777 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), Piqueras v. State, 770 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), and Munoz v. City of Coral Gables, 695 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The trial court

further found that there was probable cause for Pinecrest's seizure of the $60,600, pursuant to section 932.703, Florida Statutes (2000). The trial court denied Toney's motion to dismiss and stated that "it's a close call in this case," with regard to the court's 11

failure to hold the adversarial preliminary hearing within ten days of Tony's request. Toney appealed the final order of no standing.

The case was set for hearing en banc, along with the rehearing on banc of Chuck's case. III. Discussion A. Constitutionality of Forfeiture Statutes It is firmly established that claimants have a constitutional right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 22 of the Florida Constitution, in civil forfeiture proceedings instituted under Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act, sections 932.701-.704, Florida Statutes. See In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van VIN:

CGD1584167858, 493 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986).

Article I, Section 9 of

the Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Under the Florida Constitution, substantive due process protects the full range of individual rights from unwarranted encroachment by the government. As the Florida Supreme Court stated in

Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991): Substantive due process under the Florida Constitution protects the full panoply of individual rights from unwarranted encroachment by the government. To ascertain whether the encroachment can be justified, courts have considered the propriety of the state's purpose; the nature of the party being subjected to state action; the substance of that individual's right being infringed upon; the nexus between the means chosen by the state and the goal it intended to achieve; whether less restrictive 12

alternatives were available; and whether individuals are ultimately being treated in a fundamentally unfair manner in derogation of their substantive rights. Substantive due process may implicate, among other things, the definition of an offense, see State v. Bussey, 463 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1985); Baker v. State, 377 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1979); the burden and standard of proof of elements and defenses, see, e.g., State v. Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla.1990); the presumption of innocence, see State v. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991); State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315, 317 (1978); vagueness, see, e.g., Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991); Bussey; State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1972); the conduct of law enforcement officials, see Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987); State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985); the right to a fair trial, see Kritzman v. State, 520 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1988); and the availability or harshness of remedies, see In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck, 576 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1990); Roush v. State, 413 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1982). Id. at 960 (footnotes omitted). Where substantive rights are at issue, procedural due process ensures justice. fair treatment through the proper administration of

Under the Florida Constitution, procedural due process

guarantees that a defendant shall be given fair notice and an opportunity to be heard and defend before judgment is rendered against him. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (procedural

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner). In 1980, Florida enacted the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act ("the Act"). The Florida Supreme Court upheld the

constitutionality of the Act, holding that the act was facially 13

constitutional provided that it was applied consistent with the minimal due process requirements of the Florida Constitution. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 959. See

The Florida Supreme

Court held the act was constitutional by its interpretation that the act included substantive and procedural safeguards that were not in the wording of the act. The Florida Legislature adopted

most of the requirements of Department of Law Enforcement when it enacted Florida Session Laws chapter 92-54 (codified at Fla. Stat.

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