03-3328 LEGRANDE V. EMMANUEL

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Florida » Florida Third District Court » 2004 » 03-3328 LEGRANDE V. EMMANUEL

State: Florida

Court: Florida Third District Court

Docket No: 03-3328 LEGRANDE V. EMMANUEL

Case Date: 12/22/2004

Preview:NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA THIRD DISTRICT JULY TERM, A.D. 2004 DEVIL LEGRANDE and ELIAMISE LEGRANDE, his wife, Appellants, vs. JOSEPH JOHNSON EMMANUEL and JACQUES ST. LOUIS, Appellees. ** ** ** ** ** ** LOWER TRIBUNAL NO. 03-21985 CASE NO. 3D03-3328

Opinion filed December 22, 2004. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Roberto M. Pineiro, Judge. Remer & Georges-Pierre, P.A. and Anthony M. Georges-Pierre, for appellants. Carl A. Richardson, for appellees. Before GREEN, FLETCHER, and RAMIREZ, JJ. PER CURIAM. Devil Legrande, a Baptist minister, and his wife Eliamise, sued two congregational members, appellees Joseph Johnson

Emmanuel and Jacques St. Louis, for slander, slander per se,

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress,

intentional Prior the

infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. to filing an answer, the appellees moved to dismiss

complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action on various grounds. The trial court granted the motion and This appeal followed. in the complaint are

dismissed the action with prejudice. The bases for all of the

counts

encompassed in the following allegations: 7. On November 15, 2002, during a church meeting at New Bethany Baptist Mission Church, Inc. 6311 N.E. 2nd Avenue, Miami, Florida 33139, consisting of a congregation numbering at or about 250 persons in attendance, Defendants both spoke the following false and defamatory words in the congregation [sic] presence and hearing: "Pastor Legrande purchased a 2002 Mercedes in cash and used money he stole from the church to purchase the car." Moreover, Defendants referred to Pastor Legrande as "Satan" and "Makout" (name for oppressive secret police from Haitian dictator Duvalier's regime). Defendants further detailed that Plaintiff's name means Satan. Defendants knew of good name, credit, and reputation of Plaintiff on November 15, 2002 in which, among other things, the following false scandalous and defamatory statement concerning Plaintiff was made including maliciously intending to injure Plaintiff and to bring Plaintiff into public scandal and disgrace by publicly calling him a thief and creating and publishing specific instances of theft from the church by Plaintiff. 8. By these words, Defendants mean, and was so understood by those who heard the words, to charge that Plaintiff was "Satan" and a "Makout." 9. On the day of Defendants' false, slanderous, and defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff, plaintiff had for forty-five (45) years been a pastor and began New Bethany Baptist Mission church in 1988.

2

10. As a result of Defendants' false statements, plaintiff lost over sixty (60) percent of his congregation and his reputation and good name and reputation [sic] were destroyed, causing him to suffer great mental pain and anguish, all to his damage in the sum of $750,000.00. Also, as a result of Defendants' statements, Plaintiff has lost the consort, companionship, society, affection, services, and support of his spouse. 11. Moreover, as a result of the Defendants' statements and publication of said statements as described above, the Plaintiff suffered severe emotional damages and resulting pain and suffering which still continues to this day. The emotional injuries sustained by Plaintiff are permanent. The Plaintiff has incurred medical bills and expenses and will incur the same in the future as well as lost income which will continue into the future. Plaintiff has suffered economic damages from said slanderous statements. Based upon these allegations, the appellees moved to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action for slander; intentional infliction of emotional

distress; and negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) the First Amendment barred the court from resolving this dispute and (3) the plaintiffs failed to join the church and the Florida Baptist Convention as indispensable parties. We, first of all, reverse the dismissal of the counts for slander and slander per se because they state

a cause of action.

The allegation that the appellees told third

parties that Pastor Legrande purchased a 2002 Mercedes with cash stolen from the church is legally sufficient to state a cause of

3

action for slander.

See Shedeko v. Gomez, 837 So. 2d 1122, 1122

(Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ("The statement that appellant was a forger stated a cause of action for slander"); Axelrod v. Califano, 357 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (holding that a publication that falsely and maliciously charges another with the commission of a crime, i.e. theft, is actionable per se.) Bobenhausen v. Cassat Ave. Mobile Homes, Inc., 344 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) ("[s]poken words falsely imputing a criminal offense to another[, i.e. `thief' and a crook,] are actionable per se."). Moreover, we do not think that it can be concluded from the face of these allegations that the First Amendment is a bar to this litigation. Because the well-pled bare allegations of the

complaint preliminarily reveal that this suit involves a neutral principle of tort law that does not involve "excessive"

entanglement in internal church matters or in the interpretation of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law, the dismissal of this complaint, at this stage of the proceedings, on First

Amendment grounds was error.1

See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347

(Fla. 2002); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002); Carnesi v. Ferry Pass United Meth. Church, 826 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 2002),
1

Our reversal is of course without prejudice for the appellees to assert any excessive entanglement claims in a summary judgment proceeding if the evidence so warrants. See The House of God Which is The Church of the Living God, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth Without Controversy, Inc. v. White, 792 So. 2d 491, 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). We, however, express no opinion as to the merits of any such assertion at this juncture. 4

cert. denied Ferry Pass United Meth. Church v. Carnesi, 537 U.S. 1190 (2003). We do, however, affirm the trial court's dismissal of the count for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We do

not believe that the conduct complained of, taken as true, rises to the level of extreme conduct necessary to support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. for this tort are: (1) The wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless, that is, he intended his behavior when he knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result; (2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) (4) the conduct caused emotion distress; and the emotional distress was severe. As The elements

Clemente v. Horne, 707 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

we held in Clemente, the allegations in this case fail to rise to that level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to satisfy element two. Id. The Restatement of Torts, defines the

requisite extreme and outrageous conduct as that which is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!'

5

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) recognize that

OF

TORTS,

Download 03-3328 LEGRANDE V. EMMANUEL.pdf