05-0297 GRANT V. STATE

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Florida » Florida Third District Court » 2005 » 05-0297 GRANT V. STATE

State: Florida

Court: Florida Third District Court

Docket No: 05-0297 GRANT V. STATE

Case Date: 12/14/2005

Preview:NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA THIRD DISTRICT JULY TERM, 2005

CARLTON EUGENE GRANT, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

** ** ** ** ** ** LOWER TRIBUNAL NO. 98-15655 CASE NO. 3D05-297

Opinion filed December 14, 2005. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Henry Leyte-Vidal, Judge. Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Marisa Tinkler Mendez, Special Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Lucretia A. Pitts, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LEVY, SHEPHERD, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.

ROTHENBERG, Judge. On November 5, 2002, the defendant, Carlton Eugene Grant, entered into a negotiated plea with the State and was convicted

and sentenced to fifteen years incarceration for the offenses of armed kidnapping, armed robbery, armed burglary with an assault, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and

aggravated battery.

His plea provided that the sentence imposed

was to run consecutive to his twenty-five year federal sentence. Since entering his plea, the defendant has filed three

postconviction motions: (1) a motion to withdraw his plea on November 26, 2002; (2) a motion to mitigate his sentence on October 26, 2003; and (3) a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on December 22, 2003. motions were denied. his motion for All

The defendant appeals the order denying relief, entered after an

postconviction We affirm. claims that

evidentiary hearing. The defendant

his

trial

counsel

provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to preserve for appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, and that his plea was involuntary as his counsel failed to advise him that by entering his plea of guilty to the charges, he would be giving up his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The State and the trial court properly recognized that an evidentiary hearing was required. Thus, the trial court

conducted a two-day hearing at which both the defendant and his

2

trial

attorney of

testified. the

After the

considering plea

the

conflicting and other

testimony

witnesses,

colloquy,

evidence, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the defendant's testimony, in light of the other evidence, was not credible. It is well-settled law that an appellate court will not "`substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on

questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court,'" if the findings of fact are supported by competent substantial evidence. Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252

(Fla. 1997)(quoting Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1984))(quoting Goldfarb v. Robertson, 82 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1955)); Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1998). As we

conclude that there was ample evidence to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. Approximately thirty days prior to the defendant entering his plea of guilty to the charges, his motion to suppress was litigated and subsequently denied by the trial court. It is

undisputed that after the motion was denied, the defendant and his trial attorney discussed that the denial of the motion would be appealed. It is also undisputed that at the time of these

discussions, the defendant was adamant about proceeding to trial and both he and his attorney were prepared and expecting to try

3

the case.

On the morning of the trial, however, the State

offered the defendant a plea which he accepted after extensive consultation with his attorney. The defendant alleges that when he accepted the plea, he did so with the understanding that his lawyer would appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. His trial attorney, however,

testified at the evidentiary hearing that, when he discussed the plea offer with the defendant, he specifically went over the plea colloquy with him and explained that by entering a plea of guilty, he would be waiving his right to appeal. the plea colloquy which reflects that the In light of trial court

specifically advised the defendant of the constitutional rights he was waiving by accepting the plea, which included his right to appeal, and the inconsistencies in the defendant's own

testimony, we find that there was sufficient factual support for the trial court's conclusions. Additionally, we note that the

plea colloquy reflects that the defendant admitted that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty of the charges and that no other promises were made to him. The defendant, in

fact, asked for, and was granted, an opportunity of addressing the victim, to apologize. that he had waited for The defendant explained to the victim "four long years" to ask for her

forgiveness, and that while he had been "living in a life of sin

4

and wickedness" and "was a robber, a thief, a liar" that he found God and was going to be a better person. We also conclude motion for that the trial court's relief denial on of the

defendant's

postconviction

ineffective

assistance of counsel grounds was appropriate, as the defendant did not satisfy his burden under Strickland v. Washingtion, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984), which requires the defendant to

demonstrate that counsel was not functioning as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and that the defendant was prejudiced by showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different), and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), which clarified ineffective (requiring the two-prong of test for determining regarding claims of

assistance that the

counsel

guilty

pleas

defendant

must

demonstrate

deficient

performance of counsel and demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial). See also Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176, 1181-82 (Fla. 2004)(holding that "a court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea, including such factors as whether a particular defense was likely to succeed at trial, the colloquy between the defendant and the trial court at the time of the plea, and the difference between the sentence imposed

5

under the plea and the maximum possible sentence the defendant faced at trial"). The record reflects that under the recommended guidelines, the defendant scored 18.23 years to 30.39 years incarceration, and that he was potentially facing life sentences on three of the charges. The defendant, however, was sentenced below the

guidelines based upon his negotiated plea, to fifteen years. Additionally, the defendant's trial counsel testified that the motion to suppress evidence was to not dispositive the and that there if was the

sufficient

convict

defendant

even

evidence had been suppressed. additionally supports a

This record evidence, therefore, that the defendant did not

finding

satisfy his burden of demonstrating that he would have proceeded to trial had he understood that by entering his plea of guilty, he could not appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Affirmed.

6

Download 05-0297 GRANT V. STATE.pdf