FOWLER, ET AL., V. GARTNER

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Third District Court

Docket No: 11-2198

Case Date: 05/30/2012

Preview:Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida, January Term, A.D. 2012
Opinion filed May 30,2012. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D11-2198 Lower Tribunal No. 07-627 ________________

Richard Fowler, Esq., et al.,
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, vs.

Leonard Gartner,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Tegan Slaton, Judge. Pollack, Pollack & Kogan, and Gary W. Pollack, for appellant. Morgan, Cintron & Hogan and Robert Cintron, Jr., for appellee. Before SHEPHERD, ROTHENBERG, and EMAS, JJ. PER CURIAM. This appeal and cross-appeal arise from an ex parte default final judgment entered against Leonard Gartner. Therein, the trial court ordered Gartner to pay his former counsel, Richard Fowler, Esq. and the Fowler Law Firm (collectively

Fowler) the amount remaining due under the terms of a mediated settlement agreement the parties reached after Gartner discharged Fowler in a dissolution of marriage action. In the same order, the trial court refused to enforce a provision of the agreement which required Gartner to pay a higher sum in the event of a default. Fowler appeals the trial court's determination that this provision created an unenforceable penalty. Gartner cross-appeals the trial court's determination that he defaulted and failed to timely cure his default. We conclude the default was cured timely and reverse on that basis. Accordingly, we do not reach the issue raised by Fowler's appeal. The facts here essentially are undisputed. Gartner retained Fowler to

represent him in his dissolution of marriage proceeding. While the matter was pending, Gartner discharged Fowler and hired alternate counsel. Fowler and

Gartner then became enmeshed in a fees dispute. Ultimately, the parties submitted to mediation and reached a settlement agreement. Gartner agreed to pay Fowler a total of $107,000, instead of the $208,000 claimed by Fowler, in twelve equal payments. Each payment was due the "first of each month." In the event of a default, Fowler was required to issue a notice of default to Gartner. From the date of that notice, Gartner would be given "a five business day right" to cure the default. If Gartner failed to timely make a cure, Fowler would then be entitled to the full $208,000 claimed.

2

When Fowler did not receive a payment from Gartner on June 1, 2011, Fowler's attorney sent an email to Gartner's attorney, at 4:51 p.m. that day, which purported to be a notice of default. Apparently, Gartner had placed a check in the mail that day, which Fowler's attorney received June 3, 2011. However, the check was not cashed until June 7, 2011, at which point Gartner's account had a negative balance and the check was returned for insufficient funds. Thereafter, on June 9, 2011, Gartner wired his payment to Fowler's attorney, but the transfer was refused. Instead, Fowler opted to file a motion for default judgment, seeking the $208,000, less payments made to date, as provided for in the parties' agreement. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered the order on appeal, and found Gartner defaulted on the agreement by failing to pay on June 1 and failing to cure within five business days from June 1. We disagree. "As a general proposition, the use of different language in different contractual provisions strongly implies that a different meaning was intended." Kel Homes, LLC v. Burris, 933 So. 2d 699, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Here, Fowler contends both the payment and cure provisions should be given the same meaning

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