4D07-2010-Brookins v. Ford Credit Titling Trust

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Fourth District Court

Docket No: 4D07-2010

Case Date: 07/09/2008

Preview:DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
July Term 2008

ELAINE DENISE BROOKINS, Appellant, v. FORD CREDIT TITLING TRUST, Appellee. No. 4D07-2010 [July 9, 2008] FARMER, J. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of a long term Lessor of a motor vehicle in a suit by a party claiming injuries in an accident involving the leased vehicle. The trial judge's stated basis for the summary judgment was that federal law has pre-empted Florida's dangerous instrumentality law. The Lessor had also argued that even if the case were governed by Florida law, it was entitled to judgment. We address both contentions. Pre-emption of State law by federal statute is, of course, founded on the Constitution's supremacy clause.1 But this supremacy is not the omnipotence of absolute monarchy. Rather it is a necessary constituent in a federal system of shared powers. The Government of the United States has been afforded primacy only in matters uniquely assigned to it by the Constitution.2 As a consequence, the United States Supreme Court has long followed a principle that Congress did not intend to supersede the historic police
See U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). 2 See U.S. Const., amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
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powers exercised by the States in matters of public health and safety unless Congress made such a purpose "clear and manifest" in plain language. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause `starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942) ("this Court has long insisted that an `intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested.' "); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) ("The intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested."). As the Court said in Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902): "It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede ... the exercise of the police powers of the states, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested. This court has said -- and the principle has been often reaffirmed -- that `in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together.' ").[3] More recently in Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), the Court made explicit the correct methodology for determining pre-emption: "interpretation [of federal statutes for pre-emption] is informed by two presumptions about the nature of preemption. First, because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has `legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' we `start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Although dissenting Justices have argued that this assumption should apply only to the
Nothing in the recent decision in Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 552 U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 999 (Feb. 20, 2008), changes this principle.
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question whether Congress intended any pre-emption at all, as opposed to questions concerning the scope of its intended invalidation of state law, we used a `presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations' to support a narrow interpretation of such an express command in Cipollone. That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety. "Second, our analysis of the scope of the statute's preemption is guided by our oft-repeated comment, that `[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every preemption case. As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on a fair understanding of congressional purpose.' " [c.o., e.s.] 518 U.S. at 485-86. In short the operative principle for discerning federal pre-emption of state law involving the exercise of police powers for public health and safety is this: (a) there is a presumption against pre-emption of such State law unless Congress has made that intention "clear and manifest", and (b) when Congress has clearly and manifestly stated an intent to pre-empt such state law, even then the scope and extent of that preemption must be narrowly interpreted. We now apply this operative principle to determine if the applicable Florida law has been pre-empted by Congress. According to the common law in Florida, the Lessor of a vehicle may be held vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a Lessee or a Lessee's agent. As the Florida Supreme Court has explained: "The validity or effect of restrictions on such use, as between the parties, is a matter totally unrelated to the liabilities imposed by law upon one who owns and places in circulation an instrumentality of this nature. "The Florida cases initially applying this doctrine in the field of automobile liability law clearly support this conclusion. `The principles of the common law do not permit the owner of an instrumentality that is ... peculiarly dangerous in its operation, to authorize another to use
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such instrumentality on the public highways without imposing upon such owner liability for negligent use. The liability grows out of the obligation of the owner to have the vehicle ... properly operated when it is by his authority on the public highway. The non-delegable nature of this obligation is apparent from a consideration of the doctrine in the master-servant relation: `The servant is empowered by the master to discharge certain duties, and it is incumbent upon him to exercise the same care and attention which the law requires of the master; and, if that care and attention be about the management and custody of dangerous appliances, the master cannot shift the responsibility connected with the custody of such instruments to the servant to whom they have been entrusted, and escape liability therefor. This rule arises from the absolute duty which is owing to the public by those who employ in their business dangerous agencies or appliances, engines, or instruments liable, if negligently managed, to result in great damage to others.' The disobedience, or contractual violations, of one to whom such an instrumentality is entrusted can no more logically exonerate a bailor than a `master' or employer: `Says the Supreme Court of the United States: `The intrusting such a powerful and dangerous engine as a locomotive, to one who will not submit to control, and render implicit obedience to orders, is itself an act of negligence the `causa causans' of the mischief; while the proximate cause, or the ipsa negligentia which produces it, may truly be said, in most cases to be the disobedience of orders by the servant so entrusted. If such disobedience could be set up by a railroad company as a defense, when charged with negligence, the remedy of the injured party would in most cases be elusive. ... Any relaxation of the stringent policy and principles of the law affecting such cases could be highly detrimental to the public safety.' Some of the apparent inconsistencies in the cases result from efforts to reason within the confines of inapplicable principles, such as those of respondent superior. Confusion can be reduced by recognition that liability under this doctrine is imposed independent of other theories of vicarious responsibility in tort law. Where dangerous instrumentalities are utilized then, contrary to ordinary
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master-servant law, `with practical unanimity the courts hold the master liable for damages caused thereby, even though the servant, who has the sole custody and control thereof, is at the time acting willfully, wantonly, and in disobedience to his master's order ... the public safety demands that he shall be answerable for the exercise of his servant's judgment.' This underlying theory is equally applicable to the field of bailment. If the owner of such a vehicle cannot, in the performance of his primary duty to the public to see that it is used in a safe and proper manner, substitute or delegate such duty to a servant, then neither can he by contract substitute a bailee, except, of course, as between the parties to such contract." [c.o.] Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832, 836-37 (Fla. 1959). Florida's common law has been augmented by legislative enactment. By statute, a Lessor under a long term lease is made vicariously liable if the Lessor has failed to meet statutory conditions.4 We note that the statute in question, section 324.021, is placed in a Chapter of the FLORIDA STATUTES pointedly entitled "Financial Responsibility." Section 324.021, itself, is entitled: "Definitions; minimum insurance required." The drafters of this statutory augmentation to our common law thereby manifested their intent in the plainest of terms that this subject concerns the financial responsibility of those who by lease allow the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways of Florida, as well as the minimum requirements of such financial responsibility as reflected in their liability insurance satisfying that responsibility. One may not rationally doubt that this statute imposes liability on lessor-owners of

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