5D05-3398 Sebastian Gonzalez v. StateA

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Southern District Court

Docket No: 5D05-3398.op

Case Date: 11/13/2006

Plaintiff: 5D05-3398 Sebastian Gonzalez

Defendant: State

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2006

SEBASTIAN GONZALEZ, Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D05-3398
STATE OF F LORIDA ,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed November 17, 2006
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, John H. Adams, Sr., Judge.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Robert E. Wildridge, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
ORFINGER, J.
Sebasti an Gonzalez appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to declare section 828.122(3), Florida Statutes (2005), which outlaws animal fighting, unconstitutional as overbroad. We affirm.
Sheriff office investigators interviewed Mr. Gonzalez about his participation in cockfighting at a rural location that had been raided. Mr. Gonzalez admitted that he had gone to the location to watch cockfights. As a result, Mr. Gonzalez was charged with violating section 828.122(3), which prohibits knowingly baiting or using an animal for the purpose of fighting or baiting any other animal; owning, managing, or operating a facility kept or used for the purpose of fighting or baiting animals; promoting, staging, advertising, or charging admission to fight or bait animals ; betting on fighting or baiting animals; or attending the fighting or baiting of animals. In its statement of particulars, the State more specifi cally alleged that Mr. Gonzalez: (1) was present at a cockfight, and (2) possessed spurs, which the roosters wear in order to fight, thus , promoting cockfighting.
Mr. Gonzalez filed a motion to declare section 828.122(3) unconstitutional. He argued that the statute was overbroad, as it could prohibit innocent conduct.1 Mr. Gonzalez further argue d that "attend " should be defined to mean "participation or helping ," instead of merely being present at. T he trial court denied the motion, stating:
It seems to me that the sense of the statute is clear in prohibiting knowingly attending and that there is another sense of the word attend as in to attend a football game or a basketball game or a concert where perhaps you purchase a ticket. And maybe it's without charge, but you're going to that place, for a purpose. And the purpose is a particular exhibition and that that meaning of the statute is both clear and narrow because it --what is prohibited is knowingly attending. I find that the Tennessee case is most instructive and the Court in that case found their statute to be constitutional, as I find our statute.
. . . .
1 The overbreadth doctrine permits an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited to challenge an enactment facially

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