5D02-3673 Ronald Coates v. State

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Florida » Florida Fifth District Court » 2003 » 5D02-3673 Ronald Coates v. State

State: Florida

Court: Florida Fifth District Court

Docket No: 5D02-3673

Case Date: 09/22/2003

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2003

RONALD JAY COATES, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA Appellee. ___________________________________/ Opinion filed September 26, 2003 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, J. Preston Silvernail, Judge. James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. MONACO, J. There were a lot of odd things that happened in this case, but in the final analysis, each was properly addressed by the trial judge, and none require a reversal. Ronald J. Coates appeals the judgment and sentence that resulted in his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and a sentence of life imprisonment. He seeks a new trial. The testimony at the jury trial reflected that after a series of altercations with the victim, Jeremy Welch, Mr. Coates shot Mr. Welch in front of a number of witnesses. After the initial volley of gunfire, the victim fell to the ground on his face. Mr. Coates and his accomplice then CASE NO. 5D02-3673

approached the fallen Mr. Welch and continued to shoot until Mr. Welch died. An autopsy reflected that the victim had been shot ten times. Mr. Coates appeals a number of rulings made by the trial judge, only three of which merit discussion. A. JURY QUESTIONING AND NOTE-TAKING.

Mr. Welch asserts as error the trial court's decision to allow the jury to take notes during the trial and to ask questions of witnesses under controlled circumstances. Mr. Coates objected to each procedure both prior to trial and at the trial. We find no error. The court authorized jurors to take notes, but advised the jury that their notes could not leave the court room at any time, except that jurors would be permitted to take them into the deliberation room when they retired to consider their verdict. He told them as well that their notes would be collected at the conclusion of the trial and shredded, and that no one would read them. He reminded them that notes are intended as an aid to memory, but should not take precedence over their independent recollections of the evidence. Finally, he advised them that whether they elected to take notes was up to each juror individually, but that they should not be distracted from the evidence by taking notes. Mr. Coates objected to the procedure, however, because he argued, "that's very confusing, distracting. They

overemphasize notes over memory, et cetera." We conclude that his objections to note-taking were not well-founded. The arguments for and against allowing jurors to take notes were summarized concisely in United States v. Maclean, 578 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1978). The strongest arguments for note-taking are that it is a valuable tool for refreshing memory and helps jurors to concentrate on the proceedings. The arguments against include concerns that the best note2

takers may dominate a jury, or that too much emphasis might be placed on notes. As the Maclean court pointed out, however, there is no particular need to decide whether the dangers of note-taking outweigh its benefits. It is enough to conclude that the benefits are substantial enough to allow judges to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to permit it. Thus, whether to allow a jury to take notes and use them in deliberations is a question within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Kelley v. State, 486 So. 2d 578, 583 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986); see also United States v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1980). Frankly, it is hard to understand why anyone would find note-taking by jurors to be offensive. Studies reflect that juries allowed to take notes are better informed about the evidence and the law to be applied, and that note-taking is not distracting or disruptive. J.D. Cowan, et al., What Lawyers Think of Jury Trial Innovations, 86 Judicature 192 (2003); R. Creswell, Georgia Courts In The 21st Century, 53 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (Fall 2001). Certainly trial judges routinely take notes during non-jury trials when the judge is the trier of fact, and for years jurors have routinely been allowed to take notes during eminent domain trials without evident adverse effect. Florida Eminent Domain Practice and Procedure (2000), Chapter 11, Jury Instructions, 11-7. Moreover, the legislature saw fit to adopt a statute calling for jurors to be allowed to take notes in civil trials that are likely to exceed five days, provided jurors were properly instructed on the use of notes. See

Download 5D02-3673 Ronald Coates v. State.pdf