5D03-2636 Noblin v. Harbor Hills Development

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Fifth District Court

Docket No: 5D03-2636

Case Date: 01/10/2005

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JANUARY TERM 2005

NANCY NOBLIN, Appellant, v. Case No. 5D03-2636 HARBOR HILLS DEVELOPMENT, L.P., ET AL., Appellees. / Opinion filed January 14, 2005 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, William G. Law, Jr., Judge. Nancy Noblin, Orlando, pro se. Gary L. Summers of Williams, Smith & Summers, P.A., Tavares for Appellees Harbor Hills Development, L.P. and Charles A. Schell. SAWAYA, C.J. Nancy Noblin appeals a partial summary judgment in favor of Harbor Hills Development and Charles Schell rendered in a suit to quiet title concerning certain property located in Lake County, Florida. The partial summary judgment extinguishes Noblin's right of access to the property owned by Harbor Hills and Schell to exercise certain oil and mineral rights Noblin has in the property. The specific issues we must resolve are: 1) whether Noblin has an easement, express or implied, that allows her ingress and egress to the subject property to search for and extract the oil and mineral deposits thereon; and 2) if Noblin has such an easement, whether it has been extinguished by the Marketable Record Titles To Real Property Act Corrected Opinion

(MRTA) found in chapter 712, Florida Statutes. In order to resolve these issues, we will explain the factual background followed by a discussion of each issue in the order presented.

Factual Background We note at the outset that the facts related to the history of the underlying action are convoluted due to the interrelationship between the original owners of the property interests and the current heirs and interested parties. For purposes of the issues we must resolve, we will only relate the facts and the essential deraignment of title to the property that affect resolution of those issues. William Dietrich owned certain property in Section 1, Township 18 South, Range 24 East located in Lake County, Florida. The property that is the subject of the instant proceeding consists of a portion of the East one-half of Section 1, Township 18 South, Range 24 East. Dietrich executed a deed, which included the property subject to the instant proceeding, to D.O. Rainey and his wife, Gladys. This deed made no mention of any separate oil or mineral rights. On October 1, 1948, the Raineys executed a deed that conveyed one-half of the oil and mineral rights on the subject property to E.C. Huey. Specifically, this deed provided in pertinent part that Rainey conveyed to Huey "[o]ne-half of the mineral and oil rights, including the right to exploit the same . . . ." On October 22, 1950, the Raineys conveyed the subject property to A.M. Collins and several other grantees by a deed that made no mention of the previously conveyed oil and

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mineral interest to Huey. Harbor Hills and Schell correctly assert, as we will later explain, that this deed constitutes the root of title to their property under MRTA. It is not necessary to list and discuss all of the instruments of conveyances in the chain of title. For purposes of the issues we must resolve, suffice it to say that Harbor Hills acquired title to the majority of the subject property through a deed recorded in 1994 and to the remainder of the property by a deed recorded in 2000. Harbor Hills subsequently conveyed a portion of the property to certain grantees, who in turn conveyed the property to Schell. Harbor Hills initiated a suit, later joined by Schell as a party plaintiff, to quiet title to the subject property against a number of defendants, including Wilma Boyles, who was an heir of Huey. After Boyles died, her heir, Noblin, became a party defendant. Although Harbor Hills and Schell did not contest Noblin's ownership of one-half of the oil and mineral rights, they did file a motion for summary judgment asserting that Noblin did not have an easement interest in the property or, alternatively, that any easement previously created had been extinguished under MRTA. The trial court agreed with Harbor Hills and Schell and entered the partial summary judgment that we now review. Having discussed the factual background and the pertinent deraignment of the title to the subject property, we will address the first issue previously presented, which is whether an easement was created in favor of Noblin.

Whether An Easement, Expressed Or Implied, Was Created In order to determine whether Noblin, as successor in interest to Huey and heir of Boyles, has an easement, we must analyze the pertinent provisions of the 1948 deed from the

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Raineys to Huey. When the Raineys executed the deed, they included the following provision to describe the interest conveyed to Huey: "One-half of the mineral and oil rights, including the right to exploit the same . . . ." Noblin contends that the provision "right to exploit the same" conveys an easement that allows her the right to enter the property to search for and extract one-half of the oil and minerals located thereon. We agree. We note the plain meaning of "exploit" is generally to employ to the greatest extent possible, i.e., "to put to productive use." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 438 (9th ed. 1989). Accepting Noblin's uncontested ownership of the one-half oil and mineral rights in the subject property, then the logical productive use of this interest would be to search for and extract the oil and minerals for consumer or other use. Hence, it appears to us that the intent of the parties in accordance with the plain meaning of the language employed in the deed, which is what we must consider to discern the meaning of the pertinent provisions in the deed, was to convey an easement to Huey for ingress and egress onto the subject property to search for and remove one-half of the oil and mineral deposits located thereon. This interpretation comports with the general rule we next discuss regarding the creation of an implied easement when a grant of oil and mineral rights is contained in an instrument of conveyance. The general rule alluded to provides that a reservation or grant of oil and mineral rights reflects an intent on the part of the parties to sever the surface estate from the underlying mineral estate and create two separate estates. Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., 275 So. 2d 521, 525-26 (Fla. 1973) ("When the surface estate and the mineral estate are severed, they remain independent. Possession of one does not carry with it possession of the other."); P & N Inv. Corp. v. Florida Ranchettes, Inc., 220 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1969). This is 4

the view adopted by the courts in many other jurisdictions.1 In Tufts College, the Florida Supreme Court recognized, citing the decision in P & N Investment, that when the surface estate and the mineral estate are severed, the mineral estate is dominant over the surface estate allowing the mineral estate owner the right of ingress and egress over the surface estate to explore, locate, and remove the minerals. The court in P & N Investment explained this rule more fully: We are convinced that the weight of authority in the country, especially in the major oil-producing states, is as follows: When the surface estate is severed from the mineral estate, the mineral estate is the dominant estate and, therefore, the owner of the mineral estate has the right of ingress and egress to explore for, locate, and remove the minerals, but he cannot so abuse the surface estate so as unreasonably to injure or destroy its value and is answerable in damages to the owner of the surface estate for any unreasonable injuries done. One of the leading cases recognizing the just-summarized rule is Parker v. Texas Co., 326 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). For the citations to many cases upholding this rule see

See Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 254 S.W. 345 (Ark. 1923); Nevada Irrigation Dist. v. Keystone Copper Corp., 36 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) ("The owner of real property may divide his lands horizontally as well as vertically, and when he conveys the subsurface mineral deposits separately from the surface rights, or reserves them from a conveyance of such surface rights, he creates two separate fee simple estates in the land, each of which has the same status and rank.") (citations omitted); Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 47 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ill. 1943) ("It has long been recognized in this State that mineral rights may be severed from the surface rights and conveyed separately, and that two estates are thus created in the land, each of which is distinct, and each of which may be conveyed or devised, and each is subject to taxation.") (citations omitted); Maynard v. McHenry, 113 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1938); Calvert Joint Venture # 140 v. Snider, 816 A.2d 854 (Md. 2003); Groves v. Terrace Mining Co., 340 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Mo. 1960) ("The owner of land containing minerals may segregate the surface rights from the underlying minerals by a conveyance in writing so that there is a complete severance of title and separate estates are created.") (citations omitted); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976). 5

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58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals

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