5D05-1380 Cagle v. St.Johns Co. School

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Fifth District Court

Docket No: 5D05-1380

Case Date: 08/28/2006

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2006

ANDREA J.B. CAGLE, Appellant, v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., Appellee. ________________________________/ Opinion filed September 1, 2006 Administrative Appeal from the Public Employees Relations Commission. Andrea J.B. Cagle, South Ponte Vedra Beach, Pro Se. Thomas J. Leek and Kelly V. Parsons, of Cobb & Cole, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. Case No. 5D05-1380

ORFINGER, J. Andrea J.B. Cagle timely appeals an order of the Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") dismissing her amended unfair labor practices charge against the St. John's County School District ( "School District"). On appeal, Ms. Cagle argues that PERC erred by summarily dismissing her unfair labor practices charge and not providing her with an evidentiary hearing on these charges. For the reasons explained hereafter, we affirm.

Ms. Cagle is the wife of a disabled veteran who qualifies for a veterans' preference in hiring pursuant to section 295.07(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004). 1 After the School District did not hire Ms. Cagle for employment in 2001, she filed an administrative complaint with PERC against the School District based on her veterans' preference. During the hearing, a no trespass order was issued against Ms. Cagle's husband for threatening the well-being of those at the hearing. Notwithstanding, Ms. Cagle prevailed at the hearing. The School District appealed the decision, but, As a result of the

ultimately, the parties entered into a settlement agreement.

settlement agreement, Ms. Cagle signed a one -year contract with the School District and was employed at R.B. Hunt Elementary School for the 2003-2004 school year as a fourth grade teacher. Ms. Cagle entered into service at R.B. Hunt Elementary as agreed upon. In the fall of 2003, the vice-principal of R.B. Hunt assessed Ms. Cagle's skills in the classroom, giving Ms. Cagle overall good marks, with several suggestions for improvement. However, in March 2004, Principal Barbara Stevens conducted an unannounced observation of Ms. Cagle's classroom, or classroom "snap shot," which was not favorable to her.
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In relevant part, section 295.07(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), provides: (1) The state and political subdivisions in the state shall give preference in appointment and retention in positions of employment to: .... (b) The spouse of any person who has a total disability, permanent in nature, resulting from a serviceconnected disability and who, because of this disability, cannot qualify for employment . . . . 2

In response to the unflattering evaluation, Ms. Cagle provided Principal Stevens with a 146-page packet of documents. The packet included a copy of the transcript from the 2002 hearing at which Ms. Cagle testified regarding her veterans' preference. Shortly thereafter, Principal Stevens sent a copy of the documents to James Springfield, the Executive Director of Human Resources at the School District. She explained to Mr.

Springfield via e-mail that she needed his "input and support in this recommendation issue" because if she does not recommend Ms. Cagle for re-appointment for the following school year, "it will bring litigation." In late April 2004, Principal Stevens met with Ms. Cagle for her year-end evaluation. At the meeting , Principal Stevens told Ms. Cagle that she was Ms. Cagle left the meeting without

recommending that Ms. Cagle not be rehired.

signing her evaluation. The following day, Ms. Cagle called in sick. Later that day, Ms. Cagle's grandson entered her classroom under the guise of giving a chorus announcement, but, instead, informed the class that Principal Stevens was trying to fire his grandmother and the students should tell their parents. After Ms. Cagle refused to answer six investigative questions asked by the School District, she was placed on administrative e l ave until the end of her contract term. Ms. Cagle's annual contract expired May 25, 2005, and she was not rehired for the following school year. Ms. Cagle then filed a pre-hearing statement with PERC in a new veterans' preference case. In the statement, Ms. Cagle alleged, among other things, that the School District had retaliated against her, in violation of section 447.501(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2004), by discharging or otherwise discriminating against her through a series of unfair labor practices, including an unlawful suspension and violations of personnel

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laws. PERC transferred and docketed Ms. Cagle's retaliation claim as an unfair labor practice charge. Ms. Cagle subsequently filed a separate unfair labor practice charge against the School District. In addition to alleging violations of section 447.501(1)(d), Ms. Cagle

also alleged that the School District violated section 447.501(1)(a), which prohibits an employer from interfering with, restraining, or coercing a public employee in the exercise of any rights guaranteed by chapter 447 of the Florida Statutes. Ms. Cagle's charges were consolidated to determine whether the allegations established a prima facie violation of the unfair labor practice laws. In Ms. Cagle's consolidated charges, she alleged that the School District discriminated against her due to her status as the wife of a disabled veteran and because she had previously filed a veterans' preference case against the School District in 2001. Specifically, Ms. Cagle asserted that the School District acted adversely to her in the following ways: issued a no trespass order against her husband in 2002 at the previous veterans' preference hearing , did not comply with PERC's 2002 final order or the subsequent settlement agreement between the parties, treated Ms. Cagle disparately during the 2003-2004 school year, charged Ms. Cagle with

"unprofessionalism" and sent untruthful letters to the parents of the students in her class, suspended Ms. Cagle and placed her on administrative leave, discharged Ms. Cagle from her teaching position under the guise of a "non-renewal of an annual contract," and subjected her to a hate crime.2

The alleged hate crime was requiring Ms. Cagle to attend a ceremony honoring a teacher from her school as teacher of the year. Ms. Cagle asserts this was a "hate crime" because the teacher of the year had been hired instead of Ms. Cagle in 2001. 4

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PERC's General Counsel summarily dismissed both unfair labor practice cases, finding that they failed to provide facts that demonstrated that Ms. Cagle's prior veterans' preference complaint and testimony were substantial or motivating factors in the alleged retaliation by the School District. However, the General Counsel noted that that if Ms. Cagle felt that the School District had not complied with the settlement agreement, she should seek enforcement of that settlement agreement in the circuit court. Ms. Cagle appealed to PERC, amending her charge and alleging eleven incidents that constituted violations of section 447.501(1)(d). Because the appeal

alleged additional facts and included supporting documents that were not previously considered, the appeal was remanded as an amended charge for the General Counsel to determine the sufficiency of Ms. Cagle's allegations. On remand, PERC's General Counsel determined that Ms. Cagle's amended charge failed to establish a prima facie violation of the unfair labor practice laws and summarily dismissed it. According to the General Counsel, some of the allegations were untimely and others did not constitute adverse actions because there were no tangible punitive impacts as a result of their occurrence. Additionally, the General Counsel found that there were facially valid

reasons for the School District to take certain actions against Ms. Cagle but not against other employees, and that there was no objective evidence linking Ms. Cagle's protected activity to the School District's actions. Ms. Cagle again appealed to PERC, alleging ten "exceptions" to the General Counsel's summary dismissal of the amended charge, which she claimed were sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of section 447.501(1)(d). Ms. Cagle

objected to the conclusions of the General Counsel, and also included new factual

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allegations and supporting documents that had not previously been provided to the General Counsel. PERC subsequently issued a final order, affirming the General Counsel's summary dismissal of the amended charge. In its final order, PERC incorporated the additional evidence that Ms. Cagle provided in her exceptions, and found that this new allegation would have been dismissed by the General Counsel as untimely. Thereafter, incorporating the new allegation, PERC considered all of Ms. Cagle's arguments, and dismissed the unfair labor practice charge in its entirety. This appeal followed. This Court reviews the record to determine whether the administrative action is supported by competent, substantial evidence.

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