5D05-1495 Marcy v.Daimlerchrysler

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Fifth District Court

Docket No: 5D05-1495

Case Date: 02/20/2006

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JANUARY TERM 2006

MARILYN MARCY AND KENNETH MARCY, Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellee. ________________________________/ Opinion filed February 24, 2006 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, William G. Law, Jr., Judge. Alex D. Weisberg of Krohn & Moss, Ltd., Sunrise, and Theodore F. Greene, III of Law Offices of Theodore F. Greene, LC, Orlando, for Appellant. Gregory A. Anderson and Jeffrey L. Smith, of AndersonGlenn, LLC, Jacksonville, and John J. Glenn of AndersonGlenn, LLC, Boca Raton, for Appellee. Case No. 5D05-1495 (CORRECTED)

MONACO, J. In this appeal the appellants, Kenneth and Marilyn Marcy, challenge the legality of an award of attorneys' fees against them as a result of an unsuccessful claim that they brought under 15 USC Section 2301, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Because we conclude that the fees were properly awarded to the appellee, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, we affirm. Mr. and Mrs. Marcy purchased a Dodge Neon having a standard new car factory warranty from an authorized DaimlerChrysler dealer. The air conditioner did not work to the satisfaction of the Marcys, despite numerous attempts at repair by DaimlerChrysler. Although Mr. and Mrs. Marcy sent a letter revoking acceptance of the Neon, and demanding a refund and attorneys' fees, DaimlerChrysler refused to take back the vehicle, and the Marcys filed suit on a breach of warranty theory under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"). During the course of the suit, DaimlerChrysler made a proposal for settlement to Mr. and Mrs. Marcy in the amount of $1,500 in accordance with rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2003). The Marcys

rejected the offer, filed a motion to strike it, and proceeded to a non-jury trial. The trial had an unhappy result for Mr. and Mrs. Marcy. The trial court directed a verdict against them, and they recovered nothing. DaimlerChrysler then filed a

motion for attorneys' fees premised on their proposal for settlement. Mr. and Mrs. Marcy objected, arguing that the MMWA preempted the mechanism for awarding attorneys' fees under state statutes. The trial court, however, found that the MMWA did not preempt Florida's attorneys' fees statute and rule, and awarded $19,435.85 in favor of DaimlerChrysler.1 In its order awarding fees the trial court found that the settlement offer was made in good faith, and that the award was based in part on the "frivolity of the (Marcys') claims." The trial judge wrote, as well, that Mr. and Mrs. Marcy

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The amount awarded is not in controversy. 2

"certainly knew [that the case was frivolous] after discovery." appealed. A. Standard of Review.

The Marcys then

When faced with questions of statutory application and federal preemption, we apply a de novo standard of review. See Clines v. State, 912 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2005); Montage Group, Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Computer Sys., Inc., 889 So. 2d 180, 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). In this instance, we conclude after application of that standard that the trial court was correct in its determination that the MMWA did not preempt the Florida statute and rule concerning an award of attorneys' fees to a successful defendant. B. Federal Preemption. Within constitutional limits, and specifically by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress may preempt state statutes and regulations in essentially three ways. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Frank Bros., Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., 409 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2005). First, Congress may preempt state authority by expressly articulating the intention to preempt in the language of a statute. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Second, federal

preemption might be implied from a scheme of federal regulation that is so pervasive that it can reasonably be inferred that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it; or because the field is such that the federal interest is so dominant as to preclude the enforcement of state laws on the same subject; or because the object sought to be obtained by federal law and regulation yields the same implication of

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preemption. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). Finally, even in cases where Congress does not entirely displace state

regulation in a particular area, state law may be preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. That is to say, where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility." See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). After examining the Florida statute and rule, and

comparing it to the MMWA, we find no express, implied or conflict federal preemption by the MMWA. C. Analysis. In considering whether there is a federal preemption, we first focus on the premise that state law is displaced only "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204. See also Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). The attorneys' fee provision contained with the MMWA states: If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under [this section], he may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate cost and expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such an award of attorneys' fees would be in appropriate. 15. U.S.C.

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