5D07-167 5D07-327 State v. Leonard Mason

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State: Florida

Court: Florida Fifth District Court

Docket No: 5D07-167

Case Date: 03/10/2008

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JANUARY TERM 2008

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. LEONARD JEFFREY MASON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ________________________________/ Opinion filed March 14, 2008 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, David B. Eddy, Judge. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. J. Melanie Slaughter, Ocala, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Case Nos. 5D07-167 5D07-327

ORFINGER, J. The State of Florida appeals the sentence imposed on Leonard Mason following his conviction of lewd and lascivious molestation by a person eighteen years or older on a child less than twelve years of age in violation of section 800.04(5)(a)(b), Florida Statutes (2004). The State contends that the trial court was required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence set forth in the Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act, section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (2004), because Mr. Mason's no contest plea to the

same offense in an earlier case constitutes a prior "conviction." Mr. Mason responds that since the trial court withheld adjudication of guilt in his earlier case, he has no prior conviction for purposes of the Act. We find merit in the State's argument and reverse on the sentencing issue. Mr. Mason cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting similar fact evidence. We find no merit to Mr. Mason's cross-appeal and

affirm on this issue without further comment. The Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act requires the imposition of a twentyfive year minimum mandatory sentence on any defendant twice or more convicted of certain enumerated sex crimes. However, the Act does not define the term "conviction." As a result, we must construe the term "conviction" as used in the Act. In doing so, we recognize that the term "conviction" is a "chameleon-like" term that has drawn its meaning from the particular statutory context in which the term is used. Raulerson v. State, 763 So. 2d 285, 291 (Fla. 2000) (citing State v. Keirn, 720 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). "Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review." BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003). The courts' job in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002). To determine legislative intent, courts look first to the plain language of the statute. Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000). Only when the statutory language is unclear or ambiguous, do courts apply rules of statutory construction and explore legislative history to determine legislative intent. Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1993).

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Legislative intent is gathered from consideration of the statute as a whole rather than from any one part thereof. State v. Hayles, 240 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1970). A law should be construed together with any other statute relating to the same subject matter or having the same purpose if they are compatible. Fla. Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Howell Water & Reclamation Dist., 274 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. 1973). Consequently, to

determine the Legislature's intent in using the word "conviction" in the Act, we are guided by other statutes touching on the same subject to the extent possible. Id. at 525. The obvious intent of the Act is to provide enhanced sentences for repeat sex offenders. That purpose is best achieved if the term "conviction" in the Act is construed in the same manner as it is used in other statutes dealing with sentencing issues. Almost universally in the criminal sentencing context, "conviction" has been either defined by the Legislature or construed by the court to include no contest pleas followed by withheld adjudication. See, e.g.,

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