SC03-1155 – Lawrence Logan v. State Of Florida

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SC03-1155 – Lawrence Logan v. State Of Florida - Revised Opinion

State: Florida

Court: Supreme Court

Docket No: sc03-1155

Case Date: 10/20/2005

Plaintiff: SC03-1155 - Lawrence Logan

Defendant: State Of Florida -Revised Opinion

Preview:Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC03-1155
LAWRENCE LOGAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[October 20, 2005]
REVISED OPINION
BELL, J.
We have for review Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003),
which expressly and directly conflicts with our decision in Smith v. State, 537 So.
2d 982 (Fla. 1989).1  In December 1984, Logan was sentenced for offenses he
committed on March 17, 1984.  That sentence was later set aside, and Logan was
resentenced on May 8, 2001.  At this 2001 resentencing hearing, Logan elected to
be sentenced “under the guidelines.”   The question before us is which sentencing
provision applies to this election:  section 921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes
1.      We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

(2001), also known as the 1983 guidelines, or section 921.002, Florida Statutes
(2001), also known as the Criminal Punishment Code (“CPC”).
The Second District Court of Appeal held that Logan’s election in 2001 was
an election to be resentenced according to the CPC.  However, Logan argues that,
like the appellant in Smith, his election was to be sentenced according to section
921.001(4)                                                                           (b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the 1983 guidelines.  Logan is correct. 2
Consistent with our holding in Smith and a fair reading of both sections
921.001(4)                                                                           (b)(1) and 921.002, we hold that Logan elected and is entitled to be
sentenced under section 921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the 1983
guidelines.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Logan was charged by information with six counts of armed robbery with a
firearm.  The offenses occurred on March 17, 1984.  Logan was tried on November
6-9, 1984, and was convicted on five counts.  A sentencing hearing was held on
December 11, 1984.  The trial court applied but departed from the 1983 guidelines
and sentenced Logan to five concurrent sentences of life in prison.  Written,
supplemental grounds for departure were filed on December 19, 1984.
2.   We decline to address other claims raised by Logan.  See Kelly v.
Community Hosp. of Palm Beaches, 818 So. 2d 469, 470 n.1 (Fla. 2002) (declining
to address issues raised that were beyond the scope of this Court’s conflict
jurisdiction).
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On October 18, 1999, Logan filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).  Relying on Smith, which
was decided in January 1989, Logan argued that his sentence should be vacated
and his case remanded for resentencing where he would have the express option to
choose between a nonguidelines sentence or affirmatively elect to be sentenced in
accordance with the guidelines in effect at the time of resentencing.  The State
agreed.  On May 2, 2000, the trial court entered an order granting Logan’s motion.
Logan’s resentencing occurred on May 8, 2001.  Logan elected to be
sentenced “under the guidelines.”3  The trial court accepted this election and, as in
1984, imposed a departure sentence.  Logan was sentenced to concurrent life
sentences for each of the five counts of armed robbery with a firearm.  However,
though the court orally stated its reasons for the departure sentence, it failed to file
the requisite written reasons for departure.
3.   The following colloquy occurred:
Q.  Mr. Logan, we are here for your resentencing this morning.  And,
of course, you have had an opportunity to talk to Mr. Rinella [defense
counsel] and you have heard the arguments that were made.  But I do
need to have you actually make the official decision on whether you
want to elect to go under the guidelines or do you want a
nonguidelines sentence.
A.  I would like to go under the guidelines, Your Honor.
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Logan appealed this new sentence to the Second District Court of Appeal.
He argued that this new sentence was illegal because no written reasons for
departure were filed as required by the 1983 guidelines.  For the first time, the
State took the position that Logan’s election to be sentenced “under the guidelines”
was an election to be resentenced under the CPC.    Under the CPC, life sentences
on Logan’s offenses are not departure sentences; therefore, there is no need to file
written reasons for departure.  In reply, Logan reiterated that his election was to be
sentenced under the 1983 guidelines--not the CPC.  Alternatively, he argued that
to apply the CPC to his offenses would violate the ex post facto clauses of the
constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida.
Agreeing with the State, the Second District affirmed Logan’s resentencing,
stating:
A defendant who elects to be sentenced under the guidelines,
elects to be sentenced under the guidelines in effect at the time of the
election.    Smith [v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 987 (Fla. 1989)].   Because
Logan made his election in 2001, he elected to be sentenced pursuant
to the Criminal Punishment Code.   See Quevado v. State, 838 So. 2d
1253, 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that defendant sentenced in
1999  had right to choose "either a nonguidelines sentence or one
under the 1998 Criminal Punishment Code").
Pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code, the five concurrent
life sentences received here by Logan were not departure sentences.
Accordingly, the trial court was not required to file written departure
reasons.   See § 812.13 (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001).   Therefore, we affirm
Logan's sentences.
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Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).  The Second District did
not address the ex post facto claim.
ANALYSIS
The Second District’s reliance upon Smith to reach its conclusion that
Logan’s election to be sentenced under the guidelines was an election to be
sentenced under the CPC is incorrect.  According to Smith, Logan had the right to
elect a sentence under the appropriate provision of section 921.001, Florida
Statutes (2001).  The appropriate provision, in this case, is section 921.001(4)(b)(1)
because Logan committed his crimes during the time period specified in this
provision.  Therefore, Logan’s election entitled him to a sentence under section
921.001(4)                                                                               (b)(1).
Logan is entitled to have his sentence determined by the provisions in
section 921.001 because he is in the same “unique posture” as the defendant in
Smith.  In Smith, this Court’s primary holding was that the 1983 sentencing
guidelines (which had been promulgated by this Court as procedural rules on
September 8, 1983) were invalid; however, the Court also held that the Legislature
rectified this invalidity when it adopted the same rules by statute effective July 1,
1984.   The Court then addressed the impact of its holding on Smith.  It held that
section 921.001(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), gave Smith the right to elect to be
sentenced under the 1983 guidelines when he was resentenced in 1988.
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Smith’s position was remarkably similar to Logan’s.  Smith committed his
offenses and received his departure sentence before July 1, 1984, the effective date
of the 1983 guidelines.  The departure sentence was overturned on appeal.  Smith
was resentenced on June 23, 1988, at which time the trial court held the sentencing
guidelines statute unconstitutional and sentenced Smith to a  nonguidelines
sentence.
This Court recognized that Smith was in a “unique posture” because his
crime was committed before the effective date of the guidelines, but his re-
sentencing occurred afterwards.   537 So. 2d at 987.  It also recognized that the
right to elect a sentence was a right granted by the Legislature.  Specifically,
section 921.001(4)(a) provided:
The guidelines shall be applied to all felonies, except capital felonies,
committed on or after October 1, 1983, and to all felonies, except
capital and life felonies, committed prior to October 1, 1983, for
which sentencing occurs after such date when the defendant
affirmatively selects to be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of this
act.
§ 921.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983).   Relying upon this statutory right to
affirmatively select a guidelines sentence, the Court then held:
Under section 921.001(4)(a), a person whose crime was committed
before the effective date of the guidelines but sentenced thereafter
may affirmatively select to be sentenced under the guidelines.  When
appellant appeared for resentencing in 1988, his effort to be sentenced
under the guidelines constituted the affirmative selection
contemplated by section 921.001(4)(a).  Therefore, appellant should
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have been sentenced under the guidelines which were effective on that
date.
Smith, 537 So. 2d at 987.  Therefore, after Smith, defendants who are in this
“unique posture” are authorized to elect a guidelines sentence.  This election
requires the trial court to look to the express language of section 921.001, Florida
Statutes, to determine which sentencing guidelines apply.
In Logan’s case, we find that Logan was authorized to elect a guidelines
sentence and that the 1983 guidelines apply to his case.  Similar to Smith, Logan’s
crimes were committed prior to July 1, 1984.  His original sentence was vacated,
and he appeared for resentencing after July 1, 1984.  At his May 8, 2001,
resentencing, Logan affirmatively elected to be sentenced under the guidelines.
The sentencing provisions which were effective on that date expressly provided
that section 921.004(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the current codified version of
the 1983 guidelines, applied to Logan’s offenses.  Specifically, section
921.001(4)                                                                             (b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001) (formerly section 921.001(4)(a)),
provided:
The guidelines enacted effective October 1, 1983, apply to all
felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1,
1983, and before January 1, 1994; and to all felonies, except capital
felonies and life felonies, committed before October 1, 1983, when
the defendant affirmatively selects to be sentenced pursuant to such
provisions.
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Pursuant to this express language of section 921.001(4)(b)(1) and consistent with
Smith, this affirmative election entitled Logan to be sentenced under the 1983
guidelines.4
Moreover, the express language of the CPC, section 921.002, confirms this.
The CPC expressly states that “[t]he Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all
felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998.”   §
921.002, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added).  Logan’s offenses were not committed
on or after October 1, 1998.  His offenses were committed in 1984.  Therefore, by
its express terms, the CPC does not apply to Logan’s offenses.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, we hold that section 921.001(4)(b)(1)
applies to Logan’s offenses, and his affirmative election at resentencing was an
election to be resentenced under the 1983 guidelines.  We quash the decision of the
4.   The only potentially significant factual distinction between Smith and
Logan is that the right to elect in section 921.001(4)(b)(1) is expressly granted to
defendants whose crimes were committed before October 1, 1983.  Smith’s offense
was committed prior to this date; Logan’s crime was committed after this date.
But, if section 921.001(4)(b)(1) applies to Logan’s offenses, he cannot be denied
the right to elect to be sentenced under the 1983 guidelines.  As a consequence of
the primary holding in Smith and consistent with a fair reading of the statute, the
pertinent cut-off date for purposes of  the right to elect under section
921.001(4)                                                                              (b)(1) is July 1, 1984.  Logan’s offenses were committed prior to July 1,
1984, so he is entitled to be resentenced under the 1983 guidelines if he so elects.
See Kunkel v. State, 765 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Gibbons v. State,
543 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla.2d DCA 1989).
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Second District Court of Appeal and remand to the district court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict of Decisions
Second District - Case No. 2D01-3151
(Hendry County)
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Carol J.Y. Wilson, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss,
Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals and Dale E. Tarpley, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent
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