SC04-2443 – Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., Etc., Et Al. v. Leslie Reid, Et Al.

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Florida » Supreme Court » 2006 » SC04-2443 – Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., Etc., Et Al. v. Leslie Reid, Et Al.

State: Florida

Court: Supreme Court

Docket No: sc04-2443

Case Date: 05/11/2006

Plaintiff: SC04-2443 – Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., Etc., Et Al.

Defendant: Leslie Reid, Et Al.

Preview:Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC04-2443
SAIA MOTOR FREIGHT LINE, INC., etc., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
LESLIE REID, et al.,
Respondents.
[May 11, 2006]
WELLS, J.
We have for review the decision in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid,
888 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).  In this case, the Third District held that “the
trial court may award costs pursuant to a final judgment’s reservation of
jurisdiction despite a party’s failure to comply with the 30-day time period set forth
in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525.”  Id. at 104.  The Third District agreed
with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Fisher v. John Carter &
Associates, Inc., 864 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).  The Third District certified
conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Gulf Landings
Ass’n, Inc. v. Hershberger, 845 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and the Fifth

District Court of Appeal’s decision in Wentworth v. Johnson, 845 So. 2d 296 (Fla.
5th DCA 2003).  The Third District’s decision is also in conflict with the decision
of the First District Court of Appeal in State Department of Transportation v.
Southtrust Bank, 886 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).  We have jurisdiction.  See
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of a request for attorney fees and costs in a wrongful
death action.  Respondents Leslie Reid and Keichan Lewis filed a wrongful death
action as personal representatives of the estate of Joan Bryan against petitioner
Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc.  See Saia, 888 So. 2d at 102.  The trial court entered
a first amended final judgment on January 2, 2003,1 in the amount of $1,805,000 in
favor of respondents and “reserve[d] jurisdiction to award the Plaintiff costs and to
consider Plaintiff’s claim for attorneys’ fees upon a determination of entitlement
thereto.”  Reid v. Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., No. 01-28040 CA 06 at 1-2 (Fla.
11th Cir. Ct. order filed Jan. 3, 2003).
1.   The trial court originally entered a final judgment on November 15, 2002,
but subsequently vacated this order on November 26, 2002, and substituted an
amended final judgment.  See Reid v. Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., No. 01-28040
CA 06 at 3 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. order filed Nov. 26, 2002).  Pursuant to an agreement
between the parties, the trial court then vacated the amended final judgment on
January 2, 2003, and entered a first amended final judgment.  A reservation of
jurisdiction to consider attorney fees and costs was included in each of the final
judgments.
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On March 17, 2003, more than thirty days after entry of the judgment,
respondents filed a verified motion to tax costs.  The trial court awarded
respondents attorney fees in the amount of $68,567.14 and costs in the amount of
$66,429.79.  Saia appealed the award of attorney fees and costs; however, only the
award of costs is at issue in this case because the award of attorney fees was
reversed by the Third District.2
ANALYSIS
The certified conflict issue involves the interpretation of the Court’s rules
and is a question of law subject to de novo review.  See Smith v. Smith, 902 So. 2d
859, 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“The standard of review regarding the trial court’s
construction of the rules [of civil procedure] is de novo.”)  It is well settled that the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are construed in accordance with the principles of
statutory construction.  See generally Brown v. State, 715 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla.
1998) (“Our courts have long recognized that the rules of construction applicable
to statutes also apply to the construction of rules.”).
We resolve the conflict by approving the decisions of the Second District in
Gulf Landings, the Fifth District in Wentworth, and the First District in Southtrust
Bank.  We quash the decision of the Third District in the present case and
disapprove that of the Fourth District in Fisher in respect to the conflict issue.  In
2.   The Third District determined that the offer of settlement was invalid
because it was not submitted jointly by the co-personal representatives.
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resolving the conflict, we apply the plain language of Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.525.
The Civil Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar recommended the
adoption of rule 1.525 in 2000.  We adopted that rule, effective January 1, 2001.
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Civil Pro., 773 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2000).  Rule 1.525
provides:
Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys’ fees, or
both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment,
including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of
voluntary dismissal.
The Committee Note to the rule states:   “2000 Adoption.  This rule is intended to
establish a time requirement to serve motions for costs and attorneys’ fees.”  In
adopting the proposed rule, we stated:
Rule 1.525 is adopted, establishing the time for serving motions
for attorneys’ fees and costs.   We add a court commentary clarifying
that this rule only establishes time requirements for serving such
motions, and in no way affects or overrules the pleading requirements
outlined by this Court in Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla.
1991).
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Civil Pro., 773 So. 2d at 1098-99.
In 1997, before the adoption of rule 1.525, we decided Gulliver Academy,
Inc. v. Bodek, 694 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1997).  At the time that we decided Gulliver
Academy, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure did not have a rule setting time
requirements within which motions for costs and attorney fees were required to be
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served.  In Gulliver Academy, we held that a reservation of jurisdiction in a final
judgment allowed the trial court to consider further proceedings on the issue of
attorney fees even though a motion for fees was filed more than thirty days after
the entry of the judgment.  We further held that the reservation of jurisdiction in
the final judgment was an enlargement of time pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.090(b).
The Third District in the present case and the Fourth District in Fisher relied
on Gulliver Academy in deciding that when the final judgment contained a
reservation of jurisdiction, the time requirement of rule 1.525 did not apply.
Fisher, 864 So. 2d at 496.  We do not agree.
When we adopted rule 1.525, effective January 1, 2001, we established a
bright-line time requirement for motions for costs and attorney fees which the
Rules of Civil Procedure had not previously contained.3  Judge Altenbernd
correctly made this point stating, in Diaz v. Bowen, 832 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2002), that “[r]ule 1.525 was created to establish a bright-line rule to resolve
the uncertainty surrounding the timing of these posttrial motions,” and in Gulf
Landings, 845 So. 2d at 346, “It is no longer enough for parties to plead a basis for
fees in their pretrial pleadings.”  We agree.  Rule 1.525 provided the time
3.   Following the adoption of rule 1.525, the time requirements could be
enlarged in accord with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090, as explained in
Southtrust Bank.
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requirement which the rules did not have at the time Gulliver Academy was
decided, and the rule applies to all cases pending on or filed after January 1, 2001.
CONCLUSION
We therefore quash the Third District’s decision in this case and remand for
further proceedings in accord with this decision.
It is so ordered.
QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, C.J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.  By holding that a reservation of jurisdiction in a
judgment to consider attorneys’ fees and costs is not the procedural equivalent of
an order extending the time to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant
to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(b), the majority has reached a conclusion
contrary to Gulliver Academy, Inc. v. Bodek, 694 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1997).
In Gulliver Academy, we held that “a reservation of jurisdiction in a final
judgment is procedurally an enlargement of time under rule 1.090(b),” and
observed that “[a]ny other interpretation would make the trial court’s reservation in
the final judgment not only a nullity but a procedural trap.”  Id. at 677.  The
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majority’s holding in this case has the effect of transforming a reservation of
jurisdiction into the “nullity” and “procedural trap” we condemned in Gulliver
Academy.   Id.  And to what end?  In this case, neither party was surprised and
neither party was prejudiced by the filing of the motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs beyond the time period set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525.4  If
the majority concludes that it is best to recede from the reasoning of Gulliver
Academy and strictly interpret the civil rules in all circumstances, this
interpretation should be applied prospectively to ensure that all litigants are put on
notice.  We have on occasion determined that our interpretation of the rules of
procedure applicable to the appeal of a civil action filed in this state should be
applied prospectively.  See Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 326
So. 2d 177, 181 & n.10 (Fla. 1976) (“[T]he time for taking an appeal should be
governed by the rendition of a formal document of judgment by the trial judge,
pursuant to Fla. App. Rule 1.3, rather than by the signed entry in a minute book,”
4.   In this case, the plaintiffs had previously filed a timely motion seeking
attorneys’ fees based on the offer of settlement statute and Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.442 on December 16, 2002, after the amended final judgment was
entered on November 26, 2002.  On February 10, 2003, the plaintiffs filed an
amended motion for attorneys’ fees after the first amended final judgment was
entered on January 2, 2003.    Both of these motions had also requested costs as part
of the request for attorneys’ fees.  On March 17, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a verified
motion to tax costs based on their prevailing party status.  It appears that the
plaintiffs diligently pursued the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs but apparently
relied on the reservation of jurisdiction in the final judgment as extending the time
for filing a motion under rule 1.525.
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but the “application of this decision with respect to the time for taking appeals
shall be prospective only, and it shall not affect appeals pending on the date this
decision becomes final.”); see also Boyett v. State, 688 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1996)
(“Unless we explicitly state otherwise, a rule of law which is to be given
prospective application does not apply to those cases which have been tried before
the rule is announced;” therefore, it was error in Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009
(Fla. 1995), for the Court to apply the definition of “presence” articulated therein
to the facts of that case); Coney, 653 So. 2d at 1013 (clarifying that “presence” as
used in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180 means that a defendant has a
right under rule 3.180 to be physically present at the immediate site where juror
challenges are exercised, but stating that “our ruling today clarifying this issue is
prospective only”).
It is not surprising that both the Third District in this case and the Fourth
District in Fisher v. John Carter & Associates, Inc., 864 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA
2004), believed that the reasoning of Gulliver Academy applied in determining the
timeliness of a motion filed pursuant to rule 1.525.  In Gulliver Academy, the
Court addressed the procedural effect of a trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction to
consider attorneys’ fees and costs in the context of a motion filed under the offer of
judgment statutes, which provide that a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs must
be filed within thirty days of entry of judgment.  See 694 So. 2d at 677-78.  The
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precise issue was whether a reservation of jurisdiction in a judgment to consider
attorneys’ fees and costs was an enlargement of time under rule 1.090(b), which
delineates the procedure for enlarging prescribed time periods.  As stated above,
we held in Gulliver Academy that “a reservation of jurisdiction in a final judgment
is procedurally an enlargement of time under rule 1.090(b),” which may allow a
party to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs beyond the thirty-day time
period prescribed in the offer of judgment statutes.  See id. at 677.    More
significantly, we observed that any other interpretation would render the trial
court’s reservation of jurisdiction in the final judgment meaningless.  See id.
It is true that at the time of Gulliver Academy, rule 1.525 had not been
adopted.  But the Court in Gulliver Academy did not end its analysis with the
interpretation of the offer of judgment statutes.  The Court elaborated by discussing
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(g), which had been recently adopted to
impose a specific thirty-day time limit on motions for attorneys’ fees and costs
filed pursuant to the offer of judgment statutes.  See id.5  In no uncertain terms, we
5.   Rule 1.442(g) was adopted in 1996.  See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules
of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1996).  At that time, the rule
provided:
Sanctions.  Any party seeking sanctions pursuant to applicable
Florida law, based on the failure of the proposal’s recipient to accept a
proposal, shall do so by service of an appropriate motion within 30
days after the entry of judgment in a nonjury action, the return of the
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determined that in the context of rule 1.442(g), a trial court’s reservation of
jurisdiction to consider attorneys’ fees and costs constitutes an enlargement of time
under rule 1.090(b).  See Gulliver Academy, 694 So. 2d at 677.  We reasoned that
the trial court should have discretion to extend the time for filing a rule 1.442(g)
motion by reserving jurisdiction in the judgment because “[i]ssues related to the
setting of fees under [the offer of judgment statutes] are not fully adjudicated until
the disposal of posttrial motions.”  Id. at 678.   However, we also concluded that
absent a reservation of jurisdiction, a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs must
be filed within thirty days as provided in rule 1.442(g) or the entitlement to fees
and costs is waived, unless there is a basis for relief under rule 1.090(b)(2).  See id.
Both the version of rule 1.442(g) construed in Gulliver Academy6 and rule
1.525 contain mandatory language requiring that a motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs be filed within thirty days of entry of judgment.  Yet, the majority eschews
the effect given to the reservation of jurisdiction in Gulliver Academy.  The
majority does not even mention the Court’s conclusion in Gulliver Academy as it
verdict in a jury action, or the entry of a voluntary or involuntary
dismissal.
6.   Subsequent to the adoption of rule 1.525 in 2000, rule 1.442(g) was
amended to conform it to rule 1.525.   Thus, rule 1.442(g) now provides:
Any party seeking sanctions pursuant to applicable Florida law, based
on the failure of the proposal’s recipient to accept a proposal, shall do
so by serving a motion in accordance with rule 1.525.
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relates to rule 1.442(g).  In fact, the reason we gave in Gulliver Academy for
treating a reservation of jurisdiction in a final judgment as the equivalent of an
order extending the time to file a motion for attorneys’ fees is equally applicable in
this case.
After judgment has been entered in a case, parties often file posttrial
motions.  As we recognized in Gulliver Academy, issues relating to the setting of
attorneys’ fees and costs may not be adjudicated fully until the disposition of
posttrial motions.  See 694 So. 2d at 678.  Judicial efficiency and economy is
furthered by allowing the trial court “discretion to extend the time for filing the
motions by reserving jurisdiction in the final judgment.”  Id.   Moreover, a
reservation of jurisdiction to consider attorneys’ fees and costs allows the trial
court to conduct further proceedings on this issue.
Although the Court today states that the use of mandatory language in rule
1.525 overrules or limits our decision in Gulliver Academy, the Court’s
commentary to rule 1.525 does not refer to the rule’s effect on the continuing
validity of Gulliver Academy.  If we intended to overrule or limit Gulliver
Academy by adopting rule 1.525, we should have said so directly.  As explained in
Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. 2002), “this Court does not
intentionally overrule itself sub silentio.”  Thus, Gulliver Academy should remain
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good law as to the effect of reservations of jurisdiction to consider attorneys’ fees
or costs.  At the very least, litigants were justified in relying on our decision.
I do not quarrel with the purpose of adopting rule 1.525:  to remove the
uncertainty created by the “reasonable time” standard, which was previously used
to determine the timeliness of a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs; to put
parties on notice; and to prescribe a time certain for filing motions for attorneys’
fees and costs.  Yet, the fact is that the rule did create confusion as to the
continuing effect of a reservation of jurisdiction as demonstrated by the various
conflict cases.
In fact, in 2005, subsequent to the adoption of rule 1.525, the Court adopted
Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.525, which states that rule 1.525 does
not apply in family law proceedings.  See Amendments to the Fla. Family Law
Rules of Procedure (Rule 12.525), 897 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 2005).  Rule 12.525 was
adopted at the request of the Family Law Rules Committee because the Committee
stated that “rule 1.525 is ill-fitting to family law matters.”  Id. at 467.  The Court
accepted the argument that “the application of rule 1.525 in family law cases could
be creating confusion among the courts, and [that] there already is a well-
established body of statutory and case law authority regarding the award of
attorneys’ fees and costs in family law matters.”   Id. at 468.  The confusion cited in
the opinion referred to the very conflict we resolve today; that is, whether a
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reservation of jurisdiction to assess attorneys’ fees and costs is equivalent to an
extension of time.
While strict time limits in our procedural rules can serve an important
purpose, even the majority acknowledges that if a motion to enlarge time had been
filed and granted, the thirty-day time limit would have been extended.  Entry of an
order granting a motion to extend time, like a reservation of jurisdiction in a
judgment, recognizes that often posttrial motions must be resolved before
entitlement to fees and costs can be determined.
Based on the reasoning of Gulliver Academy, which remains good law, and
the fact that a reservation of jurisdiction in a judgment affords notice to all parties
involved in the litigation, I conclude that a reservation of jurisdiction in a judgment
to consider attorneys’ fees and costs amounts procedurally to an enlargement of
time under rule 1.090(b).  For the future, parties will be on notice that motions
must be filed within thirty days as provided in rule 1.525 unless a motion for
extension of time is filed in accordance with the requirements of rule 1.090(b) and
granted by the court.  But for today, litigants who relied on Gulliver Academy will
have found themselves the victims of the very trap the Court sought to avoid in that
case.
ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D03-2140 and 3D03-2713
(Dade County)
Hinda Klein of Conroy, Simberg, Canon, Krevans and Abel, P.A., Hollywood,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Barbara A. Silverman and Ervin A. Gonzalez of Colson, Hicks and Eidson, Coral
Gables, Florida
for Respondent
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