SC05-1018 – Paul Alfred Brown v. State Of Florida

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State: Florida

Docket No: SC05-1018

Case Date: 04/12/2007

Preview:Supreme Court of Florida
_____________ No. SC05-1018 _____________

PAUL ALFRED BROWN, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. [April 12, 2007] PER CURIAM. This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's finding that Paul Alfred Brown is not mentally retarded and affirm its denial of relief. After confessing to the police, Brown was convicted of first-degree murder, as well as other crimes, in the 1986 murder of seventeen-year-old Pauline Cowell. The judge followed the jury's recommendation of death, finding that the

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors that were presented, and sentenced Brown to death. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence of death on direct appeal. See Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994). Brown filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was denied. Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2000). The Court also denied Brown's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Brown v. Moore, 800 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2001). In September of 2001, Brown filed a successor motion to vacate sentence, 1 asserting that he is mentally retarded based on the definition provided in section 921.137, and hence the penalty of death must be vacated. The trial court held an initial evidentiary hearing in the case, at which time the State and the defendant presented conflicting expert opinions as to whether Brown was mentally retarded. Brown presented Dr. Valerie McClain, and the State presented Dr. Gregory Prichard. The court then appointed its own expert, Dr. Michael Maher, and an

1. The motion also requested the trial court to declare a provision of section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2001), unconstitutional since section (8) of the statute stated that it was not to be applicable to defendants who were sentenced to death prior to the effective date of the act. Following Atkins v. Virgina, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), we adopted Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203, which adopted the statutory definition of mental retardation and recognized that Atkins applies to defendants currently on death row. See Phillips v. State, 894 So. 2d 28, 39-40 (Fla. 2004) (holding that one may file an Atkins claim under rule 3.203 even if section 921.137 did not exist at time of sentencing). This renders moot the claim that the statute is unconstitutional. Moreover, the trial court determined Brown's claim of mental retardation using the statutory definition. -2-

additional evidentiary hearing was conducted. On April 25, 2005, the lower court entered an order denying relief as follows: As in Bottoson [v. State, 813 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2002)], three doctors were enlisted to evaluate the mental capacity of Defendant in regard to the instant motion. Drs. Valerie McClain, Gregory Prichard, and Michael Maher each submitted an evaluation on defendant's mental capacity and testified as to their findings. Drs. Prichard and Maher determined Defendant to be mentally competent, but Dr. McClain found Defendant to be mildly mentally retarded. The Court has struggled with the determination made by Dr. McClain. Recent testing suggests that Defendant's IQ is near the mildly mentally retarded range. However, Dr. McClain's report of Defendant's adaptive functioning indicates that Defendant would be classified in the severely mentally retarded range. It is this inconsistency in Dr. McClain's reporting that gives the Court pause. It seems that Dr. McClain relies very heavily on the language of the rule regarding the onset of mental deficits prior to age 18, ignoring the fact that mental deficits must manifest by age 18 and exist presently. Dr. Prichard specifically addresses this point during his testimony. Furthermore, on cross-examination, defense counsel inquired into Dr. Prichard's reasoning for failing to interview individuals to comment on Defendant's adaptive functioning prior to age 18. Dr. Prichard explained that due to the fact that Defendant's present adaptive functioning did not meet the criteria for mental retardation, there was no reason to address the third prong of the test for retardation. Dr. McClain testified regarding Defendant's ability to maintain a five-year intimate relationship, "I do believe that was after he was 18." That Defendant may have been described at an early age as having socialization issues, does not mean that he satisfies the statutory definition of mentally retarded if he is currently able to socialize and adapt at an acceptable level. The mental deficits have to manifest prior to 18 and continue to exist presently, or concurrently with significant subaverage general intellect. Dr. McClain failed to report on Defendant's current adaptive functioning. Contrary to Dr. McClain's assessment, Drs. Prichard and Maher each tested the Defendant and found that the recent IQ scores suggesting a range of mildly mentally retarded were a result of -3-

malingering.[n.1] Dr. Prichard believes Defendant to be in the "high end of the borderline range or at the low end of the average range." According to Drs. Prichard and Maher, it is reasonable to believe that a person in Defendant's situation has a strong motivation to perform poorly on examinations in order to be declared mentally retarded. [n.1] Dr. Prichard testified that he did not believe Defendant's IQ score of 68 represented an accurate reporting. Specifically, Dr. Prichard felt that Defendant was purposely hesitating in giving responses. Dr. Maher testified that he believed the testing he performed on Defendant did not accurately reflect Defendant's true intellectual capabilities. Likewise, the results of the Vineland test administered by Dr. Prichard suggest Defendant is not mentally retarded in terms of adaptive functioning.[n.2] Dr. Prichard commented on the level of support needed by an individual that scores 29 in adaptive functioning--the value attributed by Dr. McClain in her examination: An adaptive functioning of 29 would correspond to a support level of extensive. It would mean the person would need extensive support, which is characterized by individuals requiring extensive or continuous support and supervision. For example, an individual may attain beginning self-care skills, but may need continuous supervision from someone within the same room or nearby. [n.2] Dr. Prichard testified that he has administered the Vineland test approximately 300 times. Dr. Prichard's results from the administration of the Vineland test was accepted by the trial court in Bottoson v. State, 813 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2002). Dr. Prichard's examination supports the fact that Defendant is clearly capable of caring for himself and places extreme doubt on the validity of Dr. McClain's assessment.[n.3] Therefore, the Court finds Dr. Prichard's and Dr. Maher's analysis to be accurate. Based on Dr. Prichard's, Dr. Maher's, and the Court's observations of the Defendant and on the doctors' determination that Defendant is not -4-

mentally retarded, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to the relief requested. [n.3] Dr. Prichard lists the tasks Defendant has been able to perform and continues to do. Brown appeals this order. To establish mental retardation, Brown must demonstrate all three of the following: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the condition before age eighteen. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(b). 2 The trial court determined that based on the three experts' evaluations, Brown did not come within the definition of mental retardation. When reviewing the trial court's findings relative to the existence of mental retardation, this Court looks to whether competent, substantial 2. Likewise, section 921.137 defines mental retardation as follows: [T]he term "mental retardation" means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The term "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning," for the purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The term "adaptive behavior," for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community. The Agency for Persons with Disabilities shall adopt rules to specify the standardized intelligence tests as provided in this subsection.

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