SC08-1033 – Paul Anthony Brown v. State of Florida

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State: Florida

Court: Supreme Court

Docket No: sc08-1033

Case Date: 06/17/2010

Plaintiff: SC08-1033 – Paul Anthony Brown

Defendant: State of Florida

Preview:Supreme Court of Florida
THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2010
CASE NO.:  SC08-1033
Lower Tribunal No.:   92-34756 CFAES
PAUL ANTHONY BROWN                                                                      vs.  STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellant(s)                                                                            Appellee(s)
Paul Anthony Brown, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit
court’s summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V,
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  After this Court affirmed Brown’s conviction for first-degree
murder and his sentence of death on direct appeal, see Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d
274 (Fla. 1998), he filed his initial motion for postconviction relief, with
subsequent amended motions, in the circuit court.  Relief was denied after an
evidentiary hearing and Brown appealed to this Court, where he also filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  This Court affirmed the denial of
postconviction relief and denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Brown v.
State, 846 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2003).
In 2008, Brown filed this successive motion for postconviction relief
alleging newly discovered evidence, a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and a claim under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  The
claims turned on allegations that at the time of trial in 1996, the State knew or
should have known that Brown’s codefendant, who was a State witness, testified
under the false name of Scott Jason McGuire, thereby concealing the fact that he
was Scott Jeffrey Keenum, an escapee from an Ohio felony conviction and
sentence.  Brown alleged that the State knowingly presented false testimony by

calling the codefendant to the stand and allowing him to testify as McGuire.
Brown contended that this resulted in nondisclosure of important impeachment that
would probably have resulted in a lesser verdict or sentence.  The circuit court
summarily denied the claims, finding that the evidence was not newly discovered
and that the claims were procedurally barred.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(1) generally prohibits the filing
of a postconviction motion more than one year after the judgment and sentence
become final.  An exception allows the filing beyond this deadline if “the facts on
which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant’s
attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A).  A successive motion may be summarily denied
“[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is
entitled to no relief.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).  Because the postconviction
court’s decision whether to grant a rule 3.851 evidentiary hearing depends on the
written materials before the court, its ruling essentially constitutes a pure question
of law and is subject to de novo review.  See Grossman v. State, 29 So. 3d 1034,
1042 (Fla.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (2010).
After a complete review of the record in this case, and applicable precedent,
we conclude, as the circuit court concluded, that the evidence which Brown claims
as newly discovered was known, or with due diligence could have been known, by
Brown’s counsel at the time of the initial postconviction proceeding.  The
evidentiary hearing was held in the initial postconviction proceeding in 2001 and
the case was final in 2003 when this Court affirmed denial of postconviction relief
in that proceeding.  See Brown, 846 So. 2d at 1126.  The record demonstrates that
at that time, postconviction counsel was aware that the witness who testified under
the name McGuire had used numerous aliases and that he was an escapee from an
Ohio sentence imposed for a felony conviction he received under the name of
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Keenum.  We recognized in our decision in 2003 that Brown’s counsel became
aware sometime after the trial in 1996 that the codefendant had been convicted of
aggravated battery in Ohio and that he had escaped from a correctional institution
there.  See id.  We previously concluded that in light of the other evidence of
Brown’s guilt that was presented to the jury, the impeachment evidence that could
have been discovered concerning Keenum’s past and his escape from Ohio did not
meet the test for granting a new trial.  See Brown, 846 So. 2d at 1126.
Brown also claims in this proceeding that the newly discovered evidence he
is citing was the conduct of the prosecutor at the evidentiary hearing held in the
first postconviction proceeding.  Brown characterizes the prosecutor’s conduct
there as raising a “red flag” indicating that the State may have known of
McGuire’s true identity as Keenum when the original trial was held in 1996.
However, this argument is unavailing, again, because any facts surrounding the
prosecutor’s conduct at the evidentiary hearing in 2001 could have been the subject
of a successive motion filed within one year of the date that the information
became known.  Instead, Brown waited until 2008 to file his successive newly
discovered evidence claim relating to the conduct of the prosecutor.  Moreover,
counsel conceded in the circuit court that he had no evidence to support the
allegation that the prosecutor was aware at the time of the original trial that
McGuire might have actually been Scott Jeffrey Keenum.  For the reasons set forth
above, we find that the claims asserted in this successive motion for postconviction
relief are procedurally barred.  We therefore affirm the order of the circuit court
summarily denying Brown’s successive postconviction motion.
It is so ordered.
LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and  PERRY, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, C.J., dissenting.
While this Court has addressed as a newly discovered evidence claim the
issue of whether one of the State’s primary witnesses, the codefendant in this case,
used an alias, this issue has not been addressed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), or Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  Both a Brady claim
and a Giglio claim involve the role of the prosecutor in either withholding
exculpatory or impeaching evidence or the prosecutor’s knowing use of false
evidence.  In either case, this is a potentially serious issue which could be easily
resolved by an evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, I dissent from the affirmance of the
trial court’s denial of these claims without an evidentiary hearing.
The defendant argues that the codefendant used the name Scott Jason
McGuire at trial and that he was actually Scott Jeffrey Keenum, an Ohio prison
escapee.  The defendant further alleges that, based on the prosecutor’s action at the
prior evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor may have had this information, but did
not give it to the defense and allowed McGuire to testify under false colors.
McGuire testified that Brown was the one who conceived the idea of killing
the victim and that Brown was the person who retrieved the steak knives and
stabbed the victim.  Brown, on the other hand, testified at trial that McGuire killed
the victim while he, Brown, was asleep.  He also testified that McGuire threatened
to frame him if he told anyone about the murder.  Thus, McGuire’s credibility was
of paramount importance in this case.
This is a case that is ripe for a warrant, and I believe we should address the
issue of the prosecutor’s knowledge or lack thereof in regards to the true identity of
McGuire while we are not under the constraint of any deadlines.
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PARIENTE, J., concurs.
A True Copy
Test:
jn
Served:
ROSEMARY CALHOUN
STEPHEN J. FINTA
CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON
BARBARA C. DAVIS
KENNETH S. NUNNELLEY
HON. R. MICHAEL HUTCHESON, JUDGE
HON. DIANE M. MATOUSEK, CLERK
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