SC08-64 – Cary Michael Lambrix v. State of Florida

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State: Florida

Docket No: SC08-64

Case Date: 04/15/2010

Preview:Supreme Court of Florida
____________ No. SC08-64 ____________ CARY MICHAEL LAMBRIX, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. [April 15, 2010] PER CURIAM. Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1983 murders of Clarence Moore and Aleisha Bryant. This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of death in Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1986). This case is now before the Court on appeal from an order denying a successive motion for postconviction relief. Among other claims raised, Lambrix asserted two claims that were the subject of an evidentiary hearing: that the main witness against him at trial, Frances Smith,1 had a sexual

1. Frances Smith has subsequently remarried and is currently known as Frances Ottinger. For purposes of this appeal, we refer to her as Smith.

relationship with one of the State's investigators and that another witness, Deborah Hanzel, recanted her trial testimony. The trial court, following an evidentiary hearing on both of these issues, rejected the claim that Smith had a sexual relationship with an investigator and concluded that Hanzel's recantation was unreliable. We affirm the trial court's order denying postconviction relief as to these claims, as well as all other claims raised, for the reasons more fully explained in this opinion. GENERAL INTRODUCTION This death case, which has been in the judicial system for a substantial period of time, has a lengthy procedural history. The first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury could not agree on a verdict. A second trial was held before a different judge, Judge Richard M. Stanley, and the jury found Lambrix guilty of both counts of murder. After a penalty phase hearing, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two for the murder of Aleisha Bryant and by a vote of eight to four for the murder of Clarence Moore. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death, after finding five aggravating circumstances2 and no

2. The trial judge found the following five aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felonies were committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony; (3) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; (4) the capital felonies were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the capital felonies were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). -2-

mitigation in regard to the murder of Moore and four aggravating3 and no mitigating circumstances in regard to the murder of Bryant. On appeal, this Court discussed the relevant facts of the underlying crime: On the evening of February 5, 1983, Lambrix and Frances Smith, his roommate, went to a tavern where they met Clarence Moore, a/k/a Lawrence Lamberson, and Aleisha Bryant. Late that evening, they all ventured to Lambrix' trailer to eat spaghetti. Shortly after their arrival, Lambrix and Moore went outside. Lambrix returned about twenty minutes later and requested Bryant to go outside with him. About forty-five minutes later Lambrix returned alone. Smith testified that Lambrix was carrying a tire tool and had blood on his person and clothing. Lambrix told Smith that he killed both Bryant and Moore. He mentioned that he choked and stomped on Bryant and hit Moore over the head. Smith and Lambrix proceeded to eat spaghetti, wash up and bury the two bodies behind the trailer. After burying the bodies, Lambrix and Smith went back to the trailer to wash up. They then took Moore's Cadillac and disposed of the tire tool and Lambrix' bloody shirt in a nearby stream. On Wednesday, February 8, 1983, Smith was arrested on an unrelated charge. Smith stayed in jail until Friday. On the following Monday, Smith contacted law enforcement officers and advised them of the burial. A police investigation led to the discovery of the two buried bodies as well as the recovery of the tire iron and bloody shirt. A medical examiner testified that Moore died from multiple crushing blows to the head and Bryant died from manual strangulation. Additional evidence exists to support a finding that Lambrix committed the two murders in question. Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 1986). Some of the additional evidence included testimony by Deborah Hanzel, who met Lambrix after the

3. The trial judge found all of the same aggravating factors except that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.

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murders and saw him in a black Cadillac. She and her boyfriend, Preston Branch, helped Lambrix retrieve some of his possessions from Lambrix's trailer and on the way back home, Lambrix offered to show them where two bodies were buried and made incriminating statements. On appeal, Lambrix raised five issues.4 This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of death. 494 So. 2d at 1148. A death warrant for Lambrix was issued, and his execution was scheduled for November 30, 1988. Lambrix filed a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court and a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. In his habeas petition, Lambrix asserted that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue numerous issues.5 This Court denied habeas relief. See Lambrix v. Dugger, 529 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1988). During this time, Lambrix's motion for 4. Lambrix raised the following claims: (1) it was unconstitutional to exclude jurors opposed to the death penalty; (2) the trial court erred in excluding a certain juror because it violated the standards set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); (3) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of the State's key witness, Frances Smith; (4) the trial court erred in restricting the cross-examination of Connie Smith (no relation to Frances), a special agent with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), concerning a certain notebook found in a vehicle belonging to one of the victims; and (5) the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner, Dr. Schultz, to use the term homicide in reference to the deaths of the victims because there was no proper predicate for that conclusion. 5. This Court addressed only two of his claims in its written opinion: (1) whether appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to argue several issues regarding voir dire and the defendant's absence; and (2) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to voluntary intoxication.

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postconviction relief was also proceeding before the circuit court. After the circuit court summarily denied postconviction relief, Lambrix appealed this decision, raising two claims.6 This Court denied relief. See Lambrix v. State, 534 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1988). Lambrix then filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus with the trial court, which was summarily denied. On appeal, Lambrix raised one issue: that his collateral counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of juror misconduct in his prior motion for postconviction relief. This Court again denied relief. Lambrix v. State, 559 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1990). Lambrix also filed a second motion for postconviction relief in the circuit court, which was summarily denied because his claims were without merit and procedurally barred as untimely and successive or abusive. Lambrix v. State, 698 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996). In affirming the summary denial, this Court concluded that Lambrix was untimely in presenting the claim that he should have been allowed to represent himself in postconviction proceedings, particularly since Lambrix waited six years to raise this claim. Id. at 248. Lambrix also filed postconviction attacks in the federal courts. He filed a

6. Lambrix raised the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to develop additional evidence that would have entitled Lambrix to jury instructions on voluntary intoxication; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing evidence of Lambrix's alcoholism during the penalty phase.

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federal habeas petition, raising numerous claims including whether jury instructions on HAC and CCP violated Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992). See Lambrix v. Dugger, No. 88-12107-CIV-Zloch (S.D. Fla. May 12, 1992), aff'd sub nom. Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 520 U.S. 518 (1997). Lambrix's Espinosa claim was eventually denied.7 As to the remaining issues, the Eleventh Circuit then affirmed the denial of relief of Lambrix's federal habeas corpus petition after an evidentiary hearing. Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit denied relief without further discussion as to certain claims.8 After analysis, the Eleventh

7. After the federal district court denied relief, Lambrix appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Because this Court had not been given an opportunity to address the substance of the Espinosa claim, the Eleventh Circuit stayed the proceedings and directed Lambrix to return to the Supreme Court of Florida to settle any unresolved issues regarding this claim. Lambrix v. Dugger, No. 92-4539 (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 1993). In Lambrix v. Singletary, 641 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1994), this Court held that Lambrix's Espinosa claim was procedurally barred because although it was raised before the trial court, appellate counsel failed to preserve the error on appeal. Further, this Court held that Lambrix was procedurally barred from asserting that appellate counsel was ineffective based on this failure since he had previously litigated other alleged instances of ineffective appellate counsel in prior habeas proceedings. Id. at 848. The Eleventh Circuit held that the decision in Espinosa could not retroactively apply under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit court's decision, holding that Espinosa v. Florida was a new rule and the failure to apply this case retroactively could not be the basis for federal habeas relief. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997). 8. The Eleventh Circuit did not elaborate on the following claims, but simply denied them as meritless: (1) Lambrix's counsel rendered ineffective -6-

Circuit denied Lambrix's claim that he received ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase of his trial because counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence of Lambrix's alcoholism and drug dependence and evidence that Lambrix had been subject to sexual and physical abuse as a child. Lambrix, 72 F.3d at 1504-06. The Eleventh Circuit also denied Lambrix's claim that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present certain sentencing issues, that his second trial conducted after the first trial ended in mistrial was barred by double jeopardy, and that Lambrix was denied his fundamental right to testify. Id. at 1506-08. Lambrix has filed numerous pro se extraordinary writ petitions that this Court has either denied or dismissed.9 During postconviction proceedings and before this Court, Lambrix also filed a pro se complaint against some of his attorneys. He also previously sought to have this entire Court disqualified because assistance during the guilt phase; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a change in venue; (3) the trial court denied Lambrix his right to confront witnesses against him by limiting the cross-examination of some witnesses; (4) the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication; and (5) the trial court made miscellaneous erroneous rulings and instructions during sentencing. 9. See, e.g., Lambrix v. Reece, 705 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1998) (denying petition for writ of mandamus); Lambrix v. State, 727 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1998) (denying petition for writ of prohibition); Lambrix v. State, 766 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2004) (unpublished order dismissing petition for writ of mandamus as moot); Lambrix v. State, 900 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2005) (unpublished order dismissing petition for writ of mandamus); Lambrix v. State, 944 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2006) (unpublished order dismissing petition for writ of mandamus).

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Chief Justice Quince is recused. In his most recent filing, Lambrix filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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