SC09-2245 – David Beasher Snelgrove v. State of Florida

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State: Florida

Court: Supreme Court

Docket No: sc09-2245

Case Date: 04/19/2012

Plaintiff: SC09-2245 – David Beasher Snelgrove

Defendant: State of Florida – Revised Opinion

Preview:Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC09-2245
DAVID BEASHER SNELGROVE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[April 19, 2012]
PER CURIAM.
David Beasher Snelgrove appeals his sentences of death for the 2000
murders of 84-year-old Glyn Fowler and his 79-year-old wife, Vivian Fowler.1   We
previously affirmed his convictions but reversed his original death sentences and
remanded for a new penalty phase.   Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2005).
For the reasons stated below, we now affirm his sentences.
I.   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of this case were fully set out in this Court‟s opinion on the initial
direct appeal:
1.   We have jurisdiction.   See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

On Sunday, June 25, 2000, Glyn and Vivian Fowler were found
dead in their home.   The elderly couple had been brutally beaten and
stabbed to death, as evidenced by multiple fractures and stab wounds
spread throughout their bodies.   Ultimately, Vivian died from a stab
wound to the heart, and Glyn died of a brain injury caused by blunt
force trauma to the head.
Evidence at the crime scene and in the surrounding area linked
David Snelgrove, the twenty-seven-year-old nephew of one of the
Fowlers‟ neighbors, to the murder.   Snelgrove had recently moved in
with his aunt and his cousin, Jeff McCrae, after being expelled from a
drug rehabilitation program.   Blood droplets matching Snelgrove‟s
DNA were found throughout the house, as were bloody fingerprints
and footprints matching Snelgrove‟s.   A trained bloodhound followed
a scent from the blood on the Fowlers‟ broken window to Snelgrove,
and the police recovered a knife in the woods next to the Snelgrove
home with blood matching Snelgrove‟s DNA.
Snelgrove denied any involvement with the murder.   On the day
the Fowlers‟ bodies were discovered, the Flagler County Sheriff‟s
Office questioned Snelgrove about his activities that weekend and the
cause of the cut on his hand.   Snelgrove claimed he and Jeff McCrae
had spent Friday evening at Don Silva‟s home.   Around 12:30 a.m., he
and McCrae left Silva‟s together, and Snelgrove claimed he spent the
rest of the night at home.   He attributed the cut on his hand to an
accident that occurred on Monday, June 19, the last day of his
landscaping job.
At trial, Jeff McCrae presented a different version of events.
He testified that he and Snelgrove arrived at Silva‟s separately on
Friday, June 23, and they left together at approximately 12:30 a.m.
On the way back to their house, they stopped to purchase crack
cocaine.   He did not notice any cuts or bandages on Snelgrove‟s hand
at that time.   During the middle of the night, McCrae awoke to the
sound of someone entering his house.   He arose to find Snelgrove in
the bathroom cleaning a cut on his hand and wiping what appeared to
be blood from his leg and foot.   Snelgrove stated that he had been in a
fight, but he refused McCrae‟s offer to take him to the hospital.
Instead, he wrapped his hand in what was possibly a shirt,3 and told
McCrae that he wanted to get more cocaine.   The two went to
purchase cocaine from a man named “Kimo” (Cornelius Murphy).
McCrae testified that the money used to buy the cocaine had blood on
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it.   Later that night, police stopped “Kimo” at a Jiffy Food Store after
he attempted to make a purchase with blood-stained money.   DNA
tests on one of the bills showed that the blood matched Snelgrove‟s
DNA.
N.3.   In the attic of the Snelgrove home, the police
discovered a bag with two bloody t-shirts.   The bag
smelled of ammonia.   Blood samples from the t-shirts
matched Snelgrove‟s DNA profile.   Two pairs of blood-
stained shorts were also found in the Snelgrove home.
Blood samples from the shorts revealed a mixture of
DNA:  Snelgrove was determined to be the primary
contributor; the testing was unable to exclude Jeff
McCrae as a possible secondary contributor.
Additional testimony came from Gary Matthews, an inmate at
the Flagler County Jail, where Snelgrove was detained when he was
arrested on June 25.   Mathews alleged that Snelgrove made critical
admissions to him. . .
At trial, Matthews testified to his jailhouse conversations with
Snelgrove.   Specifically, Matthews testified that Snelgrove told him of
a cooperative effort between him and McCrae to break into the
Fowlers‟ home and rob them of cash that the elderly couple kept in
their bedroom.   According to Matthews, Snelgrove claimed he knew
of this money because he had borrowed money from the Fowlers in
the past, and he was in need of money because another neighbor had
refused his request for a loan.   Snelgrove allegedly told Matthews that
with McCrae acting as his lookout, Snelgrove broke a window with
his hand and entered the house.   He found his way to the master
bedroom, but Glyn Fowler startled him before he could find the
dresser where the money was kept.   Glyn began to fight, and
Snelgrove reported to Matthews that he beat and stabbed Glyn to
death.   In the commotion, Vivian awoke, and he beat and stabbed her
as well.   Matthews further testified that Snelgrove expressed remorse
at his failure to look to the left when he entered the bedroom.   If he
had done this, he would have seen Vivian‟s purse, and he could have
taken it without having to kill the victims.
Snelgrove, 921 So. 2d at 562-65 (various footnotes omitted).
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On direct appeal, we affirmed Snelgrove‟s convictions but reversed the
death sentences based on the jury‟s failure to make individualized
recommendations for each murder.   Id. at 572-73.
On the first day of jury selection for Snelgrove‟s new penalty phase,
Snelgrove moved for a continuance, requesting “[a]dditional time” to test for
mental retardation.   According to defense counsel, on the night before jury
selection, Dr. Robert M. Berland, a forensic psychologist who examined Snelgrove
and testified at the first penalty phase, notified defense counsel of his
recommendation to again test Snelgrove to determine whether Snelgrove was
mentally retarded.2   As Dr. Berland later explained, his recommendation was based
on his understanding of the “Flynn Effect,” which describes the tendency of
revisions to the Weshler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) test to produce lower
scores for the same person than previous versions.   Dr. Berland testified that,
because Snelgrove‟s previous score on the WAIS-R test was “borderline,” the
WAIS-III test might produce a score in the retarded range.   The trial court denied
the motion to continue but allowed Snelgrove to proceed with the desired testing.
2.   In preparation for his first trial, Snelgrove completed the revised Weshler
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R) test and scored a 78, within the “borderline
range of intellectual functioning” and above the retarded range.
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Following the second day of jury selection, Dr. Stephen Bloomfield, another
forensic psychologist, conducted the requested WAIS-III test.   Snelgrove indicated
that his IQ score on the WAIS-III test was 70, a score consistent with “mild mental
retardation.”   Therefore, on the third day of jury selection, defense counsel
renewed the motion for continuance, arguing that the WAIS-III results merited
additional testing and that the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine
mental retardation pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203.   The trial
court denied the renewed motion after noting its belief that a delay was
unnecessary because a determination on retardation could be made any time prior
to sentencing.
At the new penalty phase, the prosecution presented extensive evidence
detailing the scene of the crime, injuries to the victims, and incriminating injuries
to Snelgrove.    The prosecution‟s evidence included expert testimony from forensic
pathologist Dr. Thomas Beaver, who testified that both victims bore defensive
wounds and had been severely beaten, strangled, and stabbed in the context of a
prolonged struggle involving significant pain and suffering.   Dr. Beaver further
testified that, unlike Mrs. Fowler, who lived through all inflicted injuries, Mr.
Fowler was alive only through the beating and strangling and died just prior to the
stabbings.   There was no sign of sexual assault.
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Snelgrove presented testimony from corrections officers, family members,
and experts.   Dr. Drew Edwards, an expert in cocaine addiction, testified that
cocaine impairs one‟s judgment, decision-making, and behavioral control.   Dr.
Edwards also provided his opinion that Snelgrove was addicted to cocaine at the
time of the murders, and he further expressed his opinion on cross-examination
that Snelgrove would not have committed the crime if he was not intoxicated.   Dr.
Joseph Wu, an expert in PET scanning, testified that Snelgrove‟s temporal lobe
and subcortical areas were asymmetrical, abnormalities “consistent with a history
of possible trauma” and producing a “disproportionate response to an insult or
provocation or threat.”   Dr. Wu also testified that cocaine can exacerbate abnormal
functioning of the brain.   Dr. Berland testified that Snelgrove exhibited signs of a
psychotic disturbance, specifically, depression and delusional paranoid thinking.
Based on that result, Dr. Berland testified that Snelgrove was acting under an
extreme mental or emotional disturbance and was substantially impaired in his
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law (but not in his
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct).3   Snelgrove presented his
educational records to Dr. Berland, who was questioned regarding Snelgrove‟s
3.   On cross-examination, Dr. Berland clarified that he did not seek any
information from Snelgrove or law enforcement regarding the crime and did not
have the information necessary to form a causal link between Snelgrove‟s
psychosis and the crime.
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placement in special education classes (ESE) as a child.   And Dr. Bloomfield
testified that he administered the WAIS-III test and that Snelgrove scored a 70,
suggestive of mild mental retardation.   However, Dr. Bloomfield testified that
further testing was necessary for a diagnosis of retardation.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented testimony from Dr. Lawrence Holder,
a radiologist and nuclear medicine physician, who reviewed PET scan video and
images prepared and analyzed by Dr. Wu.   Dr. Holder testified that he observed no
abnormality in the PET scan and instead found that Snelgrove‟s brain operated
normally.   The prosecution also played video of Snelgrove‟s statement to law
enforcement and presented testimony from the officer who interrogated Snelgrove.
The interrogating officer testified that Snelgrove appeared sober and aware
throughout their contact.
The jury recommended, by separate votes of 8-4 and 8-4, death sentences for
each murder.
Following the penalty phase, Snelgrove moved for a continuance to conduct
further testing on mental retardation prior to a Spencer4 hearing.   In requesting the
continuance, Snelgrove represented that an additional six months was necessary to
properly investigate.   The record indicates that the motion was granted and that the
trial court accommodated Snelgrove by continuing the Spencer hearing from
4.   Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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March 27, 2008, to June 3, 2009.   In the meantime, Snelgrove concluded his
testing and filed a motion to prohibit the death sentence.
At the Spencer hearing, Snelgrove presented evidence regarding possible
mental retardation.   His family members reiterated testimony given at the penalty
phase that Snelgrove was twice hospitalized as a child, once when he fell out of a
shopping cart and once when he overdosed on a relative‟s prescription medication.
Family members offered their observations that Snelgrove was a hyperactive child
and mentally “slow,” and an older cousin recalled that Snelgrove grew depressed
after his parents died.   Snelgrove also presented testimony from Dr. Bloomfield,
who added to his penalty-phase testimony by detailing his findings that Snelgrove
had a significant deficit in adaptive functioning and that the adaptive decifit
“likely” manifested prior to age 18.   Dr. Bloomfield testified that he inferred both
findings from the fact that, when Snelgrove was a child, he was classified by the
public school system as “emotionally handicapped” (EMO) and, as a result of the
classification, placed in exceptional student education (ESE) classes.   Dr.
Bloomfield could not locate any records to explain Snelgrove‟s ESE/EMO
designation.   However, he testified that such a designation—made before
Snelgrove was 18—would have resulted from “some combination” of observable
“maladaptive behavior” which serves to define an emotional handicap and could be
roughly transferred to a determination that Snelgrove had deficient adaptive
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functioning.   Dr. Bloomfield clarified that he could not provide a definitive answer
as to intellectual functioning prior to age 18 because he could not find an IQ score
on Snelgrove prior to age 18.
In response to Dr. Bloomfield‟s testimony, the prosecution presented expert
testimony from Dr. Gregory Prichard, a forensic psychologist who evaluated
Snelgrove for mental retardation and reviewed the same documentation used by
Dr. Bloomfield.   Dr. Prichard administered the Stanford-Binet 5 test and
determined that Snelgrove‟s full-scale IQ was 75, above the retarded range.
Prichard further testified that, while Snelgrove‟s ESE/EMO designation likely
indicated behavioral problems beginning prior to age 18, it also meant that the
school system had likely ruled out the possibility of intellectual problems first by
testing Snelgrove‟s IQ and declining to classify him as mentally retarded.   Placing
a mentally retarded child in EMO classes, he said, would be illegal.   Dr. Prichard
did not see any evidence of intellectual limitations in his four-hour interview with
Snelgrove or in Snelgrove‟s records.
After the Spencer hearing but before the sentencing hearing, the trial court
issued an order denying Snelgrove‟s mental retardation claim and specifically
noting that the claim would have failed even under the preponderance of the
evidence standard.   In its order, the trial court noted the conflict among Drs.
Bloomfield (IQ of 70) and Prichard (IQ of 75) regarding Snelgrove‟s intellectual
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functioning.   It further found that Snelgrove was not deficient in adaptive
functioning, citing evidence that Snelgrove had no trouble communicating,
maintaining relationships, keeping full-time employment, and caring for himself.
Finally, the trial court determined that the record conclusively refuted
manifestation of the condition prior to the age of 18 because Snelgrove‟s
placement in ESE/EMO classes did not constitute evidence of mental retardation.
Ultimately, the trial court followed the jury‟s recommendation and imposed
two death sentences for the murders.   The trial court found five aggravators
applicable to each of the two murders:   (1) the murder was committed when
Snelgrove was on community control for a felony offense of tampering with
physical evidence (little to some weight); (2) prior violent felony based on the
contemporaneous murder (great weight); (3) the murder was committed during the
commission of robbery and/or burglary, merged with pecuniary gain (significant
weight); (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great
weight); and (5) the victim was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age
(significant weight).   The trial court found one statutory mitigator—extreme
mental or emotional disturbance (significant weight)—and the following
nonstatutory mitigators:   (1) Snelgrove was a hard worker (some weight); (2)
Snelgrove was a loving and caring person who was loved by his family (some
weight); (3) Snelgrove had a long history of drug addiction (significant weight);
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(4) Snelgrove was greatly impacted by the death of his parents (some weight); (5)
Snelgrove is a model inmate and has adjusted well to a structured environment
(little weight); (6) Snelgrove suffers from some abnormal brain functioning and
has a somewhat limited level of intelligence (some weight).
II.   ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
Snelgrove raises seven issues on appeal:   (A) whether the trial court erred in
denying Snelgrove‟s motion for continuance before the penalty phase to further
explore the possibility that Snelgrove was retarded; (B) whether the trial court
erred in finding that Snelgrove was not mentally retarded; (C) whether the trial
court erred in admitting video of Snelgrove‟s statement to law enforcement; (D)
whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on its advisory role; (E) whether
the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine mental health
experts Dr. Berland and Dr. Edwards regarding their knowledge of the facts
surrounding the murders; (F) whether the prosecution‟s comments and the trial
court‟s instructions regarding victim impact evidence together constituted
reversible error; and (G) whether the trial court erred in considering and weighing
several aggravators and mitigators.
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A.   Snelgrove’s Motion for Continuance
Snelgrove argues that the trial court erred in denying his pre-penalty phase
motion for continuance in which Snelgrove sought additional time to test for
mental retardation and to present the evidence at the penalty phase.   We disagree.
We have repeatedly explained that
[a] court‟s ruling on a motion for continuance will only be reversed
when an abuse of discretion is shown.   An abuse of discretion is
generally not found unless the court‟s ruling on the continuance
results in undue prejudice to the defendant.   This general rule is true
even in death penalty cases.   While death penalty cases command our
closest scrutiny, it is still the obligation of an appellate court to review
with caution the exercise of experienced discretion by a trial judge in
matters such as a motion for a continuance.
Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 486 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Hernandez-Alberto v.
State, 889 So. 2d 721, 730 (Fla. 2004) (citations omitted)).
Under that rubric, we have held that the trial court does not abuse its
discretion where the requesting party has unjustifiably caused the delay or requests
an indefinite suspension of the proceedings.   See Doorbal, 983 So. 2d at 489;
Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. 1994).   In Doorbal, this Court affirmed
denial of a motion for continuance where postconviction counsel sought to
postpone an evidentiary hearing to investigate mental health evidence.   Id.   This
Court in Doorbal observed that postconviction counsel was responsible for several
delays in the case and held that, under those facts, the postconviction court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a continuance.   Id. at 488-89.   Likewise, in Wyatt,
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this Court determined that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a
continuance where the delay was attributable to the defendant and the length of the
requested continuance was unknown.   641 So. 2d at 1340 & n.5.
Here, the trial court did not err in denying Snelgrove‟s motion for
continuance because Snelgrove requested an indefinite continuance at a late stage
in the proceedings to investigate information within his control.   In his initial
motion for continuance, Snelgrove sought additional time to collect evidence on
mental retardation for presentation to the jury.   At that time, Snelgrove requested
time to collect evidence on all three statutory prongs necessary to show mental
retardation:                                                                           (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning;5 (2)
concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of both during the
period from conception to age 18.   See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).
As in Doorbal and Wyatt, the information sought had been available to the
defendant, and the length of the requested continuance was unknown.   Snelgrove
made this motion on the first day of jury selection on his second penalty phase.
Snelgrove was permitted to undergo IQ testing at this stage to satisfy the first
prong.   After Snelgrove received the results, he renewed his motion on the third
day of jury selection and requested an indefinite period of additional time to
5.   This Court has “consistently interpreted this definition to require a
defendant seeking exemption from execution to establish he has an IQ of 70 or
below.”   Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009).
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conduct mental retardation investigation on the second and third prongs.   The trial
court denied the motion on the basis that mental retardation as a bar to execution
could be proven at any time prior to sentencing.
In any event, Snelgrove was not unduly prejudiced by the trial court‟s
decision against giving him additional time to investigate mental retardation prior
to the conclusion of the penalty phase.   See Israel v. State, 837 So. 2d 381, 388
(Fla. 2002) (“Because the trial court‟s informed ruling did not result in undue
prejudice to Israel, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion . . .        .”).   At the
penalty phase, Snelgrove presented as mitigating evidence his WAIS-III results,
records of childhood placement in ESE classes, and testimony from family that he
was “never all there” and had “always been slow.”6   Snelgrove presented the same
evidence and the same experts to support his mental retardation claim at the
Spencer hearing, which took place after a delay of over a year.   Although
Snelgrove‟s experts provided additional discussion at the Spencer hearing
regarding adaptive deficits and the age of onset, the experts‟ opinions were mere
inferences derived from the educational records already discussed by the experts at
the penalty phase.    Snelgrove was wholly unable to present evidence of
subaverage general intellectual functioning as a child, even after the year-long
6.   This evidence was considered by the trial court and ultimately supported
a mitigator on Snelgrove‟s “somewhat limited level of intelligence.”
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delay.   Because his IQ score of 70 and his academic problems were presented as
mitigation without the continuance and because Snelgrove was unable to present
any further evidence of retardation after a post-penalty-phase continuance,
Snelgrove was not unduly prejudiced by the denial of his motion for continuance
prior to the penalty phase.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Snelgrove‟s motion for continuance.
B.   Trial Court’s Finding that Snelgrove Was Not Mentally Retarded
Snelgrove argues that the trial court erred by finding that Snelgrove was not
mentally retarded.7   However, we affirm.
Florida law includes a three-prong test for mental retardation as a bar to
imposition of the death penalty.   See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2009); Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.203; Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 141 (Fla. 2009); Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d
7.   In a related claim, Snelgrove argues that Florida‟s mental retardation
standard is unconstitutional.   However, we have repeatedly rejected Snelgrove‟s
argument that a firm IQ cut-off score of 70 or below is unconstitutional, see, e.g.,
Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 92-94 (Fla. 2011), and Snelgrove failed to preserve
for appeal his equal protection argument, see Doorbal, 983 So. 2d at 492 (“For an
issue to be preserved for appeal, it must be presented to the lower court, and the
specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that
presentation.”).   We decline to address Snelgrove‟s claim that the statute‟s clear
and convincing evidence standard is unconstitutional because the trial court
specified that Snelgrove failed to establish mental retardation under either the clear
and convincing standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard.   See
Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 145.
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702, 711 (Fla. 2007).   This Court has “consistently interpreted section 921.137(1)
as providing that a defendant may establish mental retardation by demonstrating all
three of the following factors:   (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of
the condition before age eighteen.”   Nixon, 2 So. 3d at 142.   At trial, the defendant
“carries the burden to prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence.”
Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011); see § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. (2009).
“We review the circuit court‟s determination that a defendant is not mentally
retarded for competent, substantial evidence, and we do not reweigh the evidence
or second guess the circuit court‟s findings as to the credibility of the witnesses.”
Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 91 (internal quotations marks omitted)).   But “to the extent
that the circuit court decision concerns any questions of law, we apply a de novo
standard of review.”   Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 246 (Fla. 2011).
Here, there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court‟s
finding that Snelgrove is not mentally retarded.   See Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 91.
First, competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Snelgrove failed
to establish subaverage general intellectual functioning.   We have found support
for a finding against subaverage general intellectual functioning where the IQ
scores did not definitively suggest mental retardation.   See Phillips v. State, 984
So. 2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he majority of Phillips‟s IQ scores exceed that
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required under section 921.137.   Moreover, the court questioned the validity of the
only IQ score falling within the statutory range for mental retardation.”); Jones v.
State, 966 So. 2d 319, 329 (Fla. 2007) (“Jones‟s scores on the WAIS were as
follows:   72 (1991), 70 (1993), 67 (1999), 72 (2003), and 75 (2005).   In other
words, the scores did not indicate „significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning.‟ ”).   Snelgrove scored a 78 on the WAIS-R, a 70 on the WAIS-III, and
a 75 on the Stanford-Binet 5.   The trial court found the last score of 75 to be more
credible than the score of 70, given Snelgrove‟s childhood placement in
“emotionally handicapped” classes instead of “educable mentally handicapped” or
“trainable mentally handicapped” classes.   See Burns v. State, 944 So. 2d 234, 247
(Fla. 2006) (finding competent, substantial evidence in spite of one IQ score of 69
because the more credible expert scored Burns‟ IQ at 74).
Second, competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that
Snelgrove failed to demonstrate deficits in adaptive behavior.   See Dufour, 69 So.
3d at 248.   Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes, defines “adaptive behavior” as
“the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of
personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural
group, and community.”   Along these lines, the prosecution‟s expert testified that
Snelgrove was able to use abstractions in communication and had no trouble
communicating or comprehending questions.   Snelgrove‟s family testified that he
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maintained significant family relationships, especially with his mother, and had no
trouble maintaining employment in businesses inside and outside of family
ownership.   Snelgrove had a driver‟s license, drove company vehicles, and babysat
for the family.   Additionally, while in prison, Snelgrove lodged several complaints,
sought services for basic needs, and requested items that included a dictionary,
pinochle cards, and prior medical reports.   In short, there was evidence to support
the finding that Snelgrove met “the standards of personal independence and social
responsibility.”                                                                        § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat.
Finally, there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court‟s
finding regarding the age of manifestation.   Though the school records indicated
academic problems beginning prior to age 18, Snelgrove offered no evidence to
explain them or his placement in ESE/EMO classes.   In the absence of records,
Snelgrove and the prosecution offered conflicting expert testimony regarding why
a child may receive such a designation.8   Yet Snelgrove‟s expert limited his
discussion to the manifestation of deficient adaptive behavior and admitted that he
could not provide a definitive answer as to intellectual functioning prior to age 18.
Based on the lack of information to support the claim, Snelgrove could not satisfy
8.   In its order rejecting the mental retardation claim, the trial court found the
expert for the prosecution to offer the more credible explanation—that Snelgrove
was likely tested and determined not to be retarded because it would have been
illegal to place a retarded child in EMO classes.
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the third prong of the mental retardation statute.   See Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 512
(“As the trial court found, „there was no evidence [t]o support the Defendant‟s
contention that his poor grades were a result of mental retardation.‟ ”); Cherry, 959
So. 2d at 711 (clarifying the statutory requirement by explaining that the defendant
must establish that both “subaverage general intellectual functioning and deficits in
adaptive behavior manifested before the age of eighteen”).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‟s mental retardation determinations.
C.   Snelgrove’s Statement to Law Enforcement
Snelgrove argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to
present a videotape of Snelgrove‟s interrogation in rebuttal to Snelgrove‟s mental
health evidence.9   For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2008), “provides „wide latitude . . . in
admitting penalty-phase evidence.‟ ”   Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 996 (Fla.
9.   Snelgrove also argues that the prosecution committed a discovery
violation by providing the redacted video late in the trial and that he should have
received a continuance in order to review the video.   But it is undisputed that
Snelgrove received a copy of the video without redactions at the original trial,
reviewed the redacted version prior to its introduction, and was given additional
time to view the video in and out of court and to prepare for its introduction.
Snelgrove has waived his claim that the video was “materially changed” by the
redactions because Snelgrove failed to offer any argument to support this assertion,
either to this Court or to the trial court.   See Kearse v. State, 969 So. 2d 976, 990
(Fla. 2007).
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2009) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 221 (Fla. 1998)).   Specifically,
it provides that, during the penalty phase of a capital trial,
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant
and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6).   Any
such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be
received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to
rebut any hearsay statements.
§ 921.141(1), Fla. Stat.   A trial court‟s admission or exclusion of evidence under
section 921.141 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.   Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204,
225 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 935 (2011).
Here, the videotape of Snelgrove offering an alternative account of his
whereabouts and the cause of his injury provided evidence to rebut expert
testimony in support of the impaired capacity mitigator because it demonstrated
that Snelgrove knew right from wrong and was capable of taking logical steps to
deceive law enforcement.   See Abdool v. State, 53 So. 3d 208, 220-21 (Fla. 2010)
(holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to present expert
testimony regarding the defendant‟s ability to tell right from wrong to rebut mental
health mitigation argument); see also Zommer v. State, 31 So. 3d 733, 750 (Fla.
2010) (“This Court has previously upheld rejection of this statutory mitigating
factor where a defendant „took logical steps to conceal his actions from others.‟ ”)
(quoting Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 531 (Fla. 2003) (quoting trial court‟s
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order)).   Notably, the video did not contain statements from Snelgrove or law
enforcement indicating that he lacked remorse, and the prosecution did not argue
that the video depicted alleged lack of remorse.   Cf. Sireci v. State, 587 So. 2d 450,
454 (Fla. 1991) (holding that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to
present testimony that “after Sireci read about the murder in the newspaper, „he
seemed rather proud of it.‟ ”).
Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
prosecution to play a portion of the video in which Snelgrove answered questions
for the purpose of conducting a computer voice stress analysis (CVSA) test.   His
answers to basic questions, including what type of shoes he was wearing, his name,
and in which state he was located, were relevant to show awareness and a general
ability to communicate.   Moreover, the prosecution did not reveal the results of the
CVSA test.   See Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla. 1974) (declining to
reverse even though the witness referred to a polygraph test and noting “that the
witness never referred to the actual results of the polygraph test in any manner”).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
prosecution to present the videotape of Snelgrove‟s statement to law enforcement.
D.   Instructions Concerning Jury’s Advisory Role
Snelgrove argues that the trial court‟s instruction improperly advised the
jury on its role in issuing an advisory sentence and that the prosecution improperly
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urged jurors to follow the allegedly erroneous instruction.   He argues that the trial
court should have given his requested instruction that the jury was “never required
to recommend a sentence of death.”   We disagree.
“[F]ailure to give special jury instructions does not constitute error where the
instructions given adequately address the applicable legal standards.”   Coday v.
State, 946 So. 2d 988, 994 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 747,
755 (Fla. 2001)).   A trial court‟s denial of special jury instructions is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.   See Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 112 (Fla. 2008).
Here, the trial court declined to give Snelgrove‟s requested instruction and
instead instructed the jury as follows:
The sentence that you recommend to this Court must be based
on the facts you find from the evidence and the law.   You should
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating
circumstances, and your advisory sentence . . . must be based on these
considerations.
The trial court did not err because it provided instructions substantially
tracking this Court‟s approved instruction at that time and adequately addressed the
role of the penalty-phase jury.   See Phillips v. State, 39 So. 3d 296, 304 (Fla.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 520 (2010).    Even after this standard instruction
was amended, this Court has maintained that the instructions in the former version
“fully advise the jury of the importance of its role, correctly state the law, and do
not denigrate the role of the jury.”   Id. (quoting Reese v. State, 14 So. 3d 913, 920
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(Fla. 2009)).   And, because the instruction given was not erroneous, it follows that
the prosecution‟s argument that the jury “follow the law” as instructed could not
have contributed to any error.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on its role.
E.   Cross-examination of Dr. Berland and Dr. Edwards
Next, Snelgrove argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution
to cross-examine his mental health experts, Drs. Berland and Edwards, regarding
their knowledge of the facts surrounding the murders.   Specifically, he claims that
the prosecution improperly questioned Dr. Berland as to whether he had reviewed
a statement from an inmate to whom Snelgrove confessed and Dr. Edwards as to
whether Snelgrove disclosed his efforts to wash off blood and hide bloody clothes
from law enforcement.   We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‟s decision
against limiting the scope of cross-examination in these instances.
“The facts and data relied upon in forming the expert‟s opinion may be
explored on cross-examination.”   Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 702.5
(2011 ed.); see also § 90.705(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“On cross-examination the
expert shall be required to specify the [underlying] facts or data.”).   The trial court
also has the discretion to permit cross-examination into additional matters.               §
90.612(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 185 (Fla. 2005).
- 23 -

Trial court decisions on the scope of cross-examination are reviewed for abuse of
discretion.   Boyd, 910 So. 2d at 185.
With respect to the cross-examination of the defense‟s penalty-phase expert,
this Court has stated that “it is proper for a party to fully inquire into the history
utilized by the expert to determine whether the expert‟s opinion has a proper
basis.”   Parker v. State, 476 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 1985).   Moreover, because of the
broader admissibility of evidence during the penalty phase, see § 921.141(1), Fla.
Stat. (2008), an expert witness at the penalty phase of a trial may be subjected to
cross-examination on matters not admissible in other contexts.   See Coday, 946 So.
2d at 1006-07; Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 46 (Fla. 1991).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution
to question Snelgrove‟s experts because the questions properly explored the bases
of the experts‟ opinions.   See Parker, 476 So. 2d at 139.   First, cross-examination
of Dr. Berland regarding his knowledge of a witness statement that revealed
Snelgrove had first attempted to obtain money legally and had planned the robbery
in advance was relevant to Dr. Berland‟s testimony in support of the extreme
mental or emotional disturbance mitigator.   See Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 189
(Fla. 2010) (“Ault‟s admission that he planned the abduction and assault of the
victims in advance . . . negates a finding that he was under an extreme mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the offense.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 224
- 24 -

(2011); Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 17 (Fla. 2007) (“The defense‟s own expert
testified that Hoskins‟s actions required planning.   The facts of the murder are
inconsistent with a claim that Hoskins was under the influence of an extreme
mental or emotional disturbance.”).   Similarly, cross-examination of Dr. Edwards
regarding Snelgrove‟s attempts to wash the blood and hide his bloody clothes in
the attic was proper to explore Dr. Edward‟s direct testimony that cocaine would
have limited Snelgrove‟s judgment, decision-making, and behavioral control.   See
Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 750 (“[T]hese actions are indicative of someone who knows
he has committed a serious crime and is taking steps to avoid detection.   Therefore,
although Zommer may have had some drugs in his system at the time of the
murder, the evidence does not support a finding that those drugs substantially
impaired his capacity . . .                                                             .”).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to limit
the scope of the prosecution‟s cross-examination.
F.   Jury Instructions and Prosecutorial Comment on Victim Impact Evidence
Snelgrove argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
proposed instruction regarding victim impact evidence.   He also argues that the
prosecutor delivered an improper argument regarding the victim impact evidence
and that the argument, together with the instruction, constituted reversible error.
On both points, we disagree.
- 25 -

“[F]ailure to give special jury instructions does not constitute error where the
instructions given adequately address the applicable legal standards.”   Coday, 946
So. 2d at 994 (quoting Stephens, 787 So. 2d at 755).   A trial court‟s denial of
special jury instructions is reviewed for abuse of discretion.   See Hudson, 992 So.
2d at 112.
Here, the trial court did not err because the instruction as given adequately
addressed the applicable legal standards.    See Coday, 946 So. 2d at 994.   The trial
court told the jury that victim impact evidence “shall not be considered as
establishing either an aggravating circumstance or rebuttal of a mitigating
circumstance.”   It added, however, that the jury “may still consider victim‟s impact
evidence in making your decision in this matter.”   These are adequate statements
of the law, the substance of which has been approved by this Court in other cases.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642, 666 (Fla. 2009); Hoskins, 965 So. 2d at
13-14; Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998).
Snelgrove also challenges as improper the comments made by the prosecutor
in closing arguments that Mr. Fowler was a World War II veteran and that Mrs.
Fowler was a “wife of a lifetime.”   Because there was no contemporaneous
objection to the comments, Snelgrove must demonstrate that there was
fundamental error.   See Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 42 (Fla. 2009).
Fundamental error is error that “ „reaches down into the validity of the trial itself‟
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and that a sentence of death „could not have been obtained without the assistance
of the alleged error.‟ ”   Id. (quoting Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1146 (Fla.
2009)).
In this case, the prosecutor‟s comment does not rise to the level of
fundamental error because the comment was brief and merely summarized victim
impact information already in evidence.   This Court has held that similar
arguments were permissible statements showing the victim‟s uniqueness as an
individual.   See, e.g., Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725, 739-40 (Fla. 2005) (finding
permissible prosecutorial argument describing the victim as “a young nurse just
finishing her studies, just completing her exam, trying to raise a son, trying to
come help a friend who complained of being sick”); Cherry v. Moore, 829 So. 2d
873, 880 (Fla. 2002) (“The victims were in fact elderly and the State may argue the
facts in the record”).   Additionally, elsewhere in his closing argument, the
prosecutor‟s argument reminded the jury that victim impact evidence should not be
considered as supportive of an aggravator.
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on
victim impact evidence and because the prosecutor made permissible comments at
closing argument, we find no reversible error.
- 27 -

G.   Consideration and Weight Given to Aggravators and Mitigators
Snelgrove makes numerous claims of trial court error in the sentencing
order.   For the reasons that follow, however, we reject these claims.
This Court has explained that
[t]he weight to be given aggravating factors is within the discretion of
the trial court, and it is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.
Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 934 (Fla. 2000).   “[D]iscretion is
abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by
the trial court.”   Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990)
(quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)).
We affirm the weight accorded an aggravator if based on competent,
substantial evidence.   Sexton, 775 So. 2d at 934.
Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1216 (Fla. 2006).   And with respect to a
trial court‟s findings on mitigators,
[t]he Court in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990),
established relevant standards of review for mitigating circumstances:
1) Whether a particular circumstance is truly mitigating in nature is a
question of law and subject to de novo review by this Court; 2)
whether a mitigating circumstance has been established by the
evidence in a given case is a question of fact and subject to the
competent substantial evidence standard; and finally 3) the weight
assigned to a mitigating circumstance is within the trial court‟s
discretion and subject to the abuse of discretion standard.
Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
1.   Weight given to community control aggravator
First, Snelgrove argues that the trial court should have assigned less weight
to this aggravator because community control was imposed for a nonviolent
offense that did not merit a prison sentence.   In weighing the aggravator, the trial
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court explicitly considered the nature of the underlying offense and concluded,
“Because this offense was non-violent in nature, the Court gives it little to some
weight.”   Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning “little
to some weight” to the community control aggravator.   See Buzia, 926 So. 2d at
1216.
2.   Weight given to prior violent felony aggravator
Next, Snelgrove argues that the trial court erred in assigning “great weight”
to the prior violent felony aggravator because the prior violent felony was a
contemporaneous murder and because Snelgrove had, up to the time of the
murders, lived a “violence-free life.”   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
assigning great weight to this aggravator.   See Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806,
816 (Fla. 2007).   We have repeatedly stated that “the prior violent felony
aggravator is considered one of the weightiest aggravators,” Silvia v. State, 60 So.
3d 959, 974 (Fla. 2011), and have found no abuse of discretion when the trial court
assigns great weight to the prior violent felony aggravator based on a
contemporaneous murder, see, e.g., Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 846 (Fla.
2005).
3.   Improper doubling
Next, Snelgrove argues that the trial court erred by improperly doubling the
HAC and victim vulnerability aggravators.   We disagree.
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This Court has explained that
[i]mproper doubling occurs when both aggravators rely on the
same essential feature or aspect of the crime.   Provence v. State, 337
So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976).   However, there is no reason why the
facts in a given case may not support multiple aggravating factors so
long as they are separate and distinct aggravators and not merely
restatements of each other, as in murder committed during a burglary
or robbery and murder for pecuniary gain, or murder committed to
avoid arrest and murder committed to hinder law enforcement.
Echols v. State, 484 So. 2d 568, 575 (Fla. 1985); see, e.g., Davis v.
State, 604 So. 2d 794, 798 (Fla. 1992) (improper doubling where
murder was found to be both committed during the course of a
burglary and for pecuniary gain where purpose of burglary was
pecuniary gain).
Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 367 (Fla. 1997).
Here, the trial court did not err because the aggravators of HAC and victim
vulnerability focus on different aspects of the crime and are not “merely
restatements of each other.”   Id.   In finding HAC, the trial court recounted the facts
that Mr. Fowler likely observed the death of his wife, that Mrs. Fowler was either
strangled or held by the neck while attacked, and that both victims were conscious
while being attacked, received multiple blows to the head and face, and were
stabbed multiple times.   The victim vulnerability aggravator, meanwhile, relied on
the disparity in age, health, and size between Snelgrove and his victims.
Accordingly, there was no improper doubling in this case.
- 30 -

4.   Weight given to drug addiction
Snelgrove claims that the trial court erred in rejecting or giving little weight
to the fact that, at the time of the murders, Snelgrove craved crack cocaine and was
controlled by his addiction to the drug.   However, contrary to Snelgrove‟s
assertion, the trial court gave “significant weight” to a nonstatutory mitigator
entitled “Defendant had a long history of drug addiction.”   In making this finding,
the trial court indeed recognized that Snelgrove‟s “drug addiction played a role in
the crimes committed” and that Snelgrove had “unsuccessfully sought treatment”
in the past.   Significantly, Snelgrove‟s addiction to and use of drugs prior to
commission of the murder also formed the sole basis for the statutory mitigator of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, given “significant weight.”
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
5.   Full consideration of evidence to support mental or emotional disturbance
Next, Snelgrove argues that, in its finding on the extreme mental or
emotional disturbance mitigator, the trial court failed to consider the irresistible
impact of Snelgrove‟s addiction, the recent death of Snelgrove‟s parents, and
Snelgrove‟s biological brain damage.   Again, contrary to Snelgrove‟s assertions,
the trial court explicitly considered all of the evidence referenced by Snelgrove.
Evidence of Snelgrove‟s drug addiction supported the extreme mental or emotional
disturbance mitigator (significant weight) and the “long history of drug addiction”
- 31 -

mitigator (significant weight).   His parents‟ deaths supported a separate
nonstatutory mitigator entitled “The death of David Snelgrove‟s parents greatly
impacted the Defendant” (some weight).   And the evidence on Snelgrove‟s
biological brain damage supported a nonstatutory mitigator noting “abnormal brain
function” and “somewhat limited level of intelligence” (some weight).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
6.    Rejection of impaired capacity mitigator
Finally, Snelgrove argues that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory
mitigator that Snelgrove‟s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 10
However, we disagree and affirm the trial court‟s rejection of the impaired capacity
mitigator.
As explained in Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 560-61 (Fla. 2010),
[t]his Court will not disturb a trial court‟s rejection of a mitigating
circumstance if the record contains competent, substantial evidence to
support the trial court‟s rejection of the mitigation.   See Spencer v.
State, 645 So. 2d 377, 381, 385 (Fla. 1994); Nibert v. State, 574 So.
10.   Snelgrove also argues that the trial court should have considered, for
purposes of the impaired capacity mitigator, evidence of brain damage, impulse
control problems, biological brain malfunction, and low IQ.   In fact, the trial court
did consider this information; in its sentencing order, the trial court discussed
Snelgrove‟s mental problems, “abnormal brain function,” and “limited
intelligence,” yet found that these problems did not substantially impair
Snelgrove‟s capacity.   Additionally, there was no testimony describing the
relationship of this evidence to Snelgrove‟s capacity.
- 32 -

2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990).   There must be a rational basis for the trial
court‟s rejection of such mitigation at a capital sentencing proceeding.
Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 660 (Fla. 2008). . .
We have articulated a distinction between factual evidence and
opinion testimony. . .                                                                  “[C]ertain kinds of opinion testimony clearly
are admissible—and especially qualified expert testimony—but they
are not necessarily binding even if uncontroverted.   Opinion testimony
gains its greatest force to the degree it is supported by the facts at
hand, and its weight diminishes to the degree such support is lacking.”
Walls [v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 390-91 (Fla. 1994)].
With regard to the impaired capacity mitigator, “[t]his Court has previously
upheld rejection of this statutory mitigating factor where a defendant „took logical
steps to conceal his actions from others.‟ ”   Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 750 (quoting
Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 531 (quoting trial court‟s order)).   Evidence of “logical
steps” conflicts with expert testimony on this mitigator because the steps constitute
“purposeful actions . . . indicative of someone who knew those acts were wrong
and who could conform his conduct to the law if he so desired.”    Hoskins, 965 So.
2d at 18 (quoting Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 531); see also Ault, 53 So. 3d at 188;
Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177, 1184 (Fla. 1986) (“[S]everal actions taken
by Provenzano on the day of the shootout support a finding that he knew his
conduct was wrong and that he could conform his conduct to the law if he so
desired.”).
Here, there is competent, substantial evidence to support rejection of the
impaired capacity mitigator.   There was evidence that, after committing the
- 33 -

murders, Snelgrove washed off the blood, hid his clothes in the attic, and lied to
law enforcement about committing the murders.   Such evidence demonstrated that
Snelgrove was capable of taking logical steps to conceal his actions from others.
See Abdool, 53 So. 3d at 220-21; Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 750.   Additionally, Dr.
Berland‟s testimony in support of the mitigator did not provide evidence of
Snelgrove‟s mental state at the time of the crime.   Dr. Berland clarified that he had
not spoken to Snelgrove about the crime and did not have the information
necessary to form a causal link between Snelgrove‟s psychosis and the crime.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‟s rejection of the impaired capacity
mitigator.
III. PROPORTIONALITY
Although Snelgrove did not challenge the proportionality of the death
sentence, “proportionality of the death sentence is an issue that this court must
review in every death penalty case.”   Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 553 (Fla.
2009).   We conclude that Snelgrove‟s sentence is proportionate.
This Court is required to review the proportionality of a death sentence “in
order to prevent the imposition of unusual punishments under the Florida
Constitution.”   Phillips, 39 So. 3d at 305.  However, in analyzing proportionality,
“[t]his Court‟s function is not to reweigh the mitigating factors against the
aggravating factors; that is the function of the trial judge.”   Id. (quoting Blake v.
- 34 -

State, 972 So. 2d 839, 846 (Fla. 2007)).   Instead, in deciding whether death is a
proportionate penalty, this Court considers the “totality of the circumstances” and
compares the case with other capital cases.   Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 417
(Fla. 1998) (quoting Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662, 672 (Fla. 1997)).   As it
compares the case with others, this Court performs “a two-pronged inquiry . . . to
„determine [whether] the crime falls within the category of both (1) the most
aggravated, and (2) the least mitigated of murders.‟”   Ault, 53 So. 3d at 196
(quoting Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 933 (Fla. 1999)).   The review is a
“qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each aggravator and
mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.”   Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 416.   In other
words, “comparison is not simply a calculation of the number of aggravators and
mitigators.”   Lebron, 982 So. 2d at 668.
In this case, the jury recommended, in separate 8-4 votes, the death sentence
for each murder.   The trial court found five aggravators applicable to each of the
two murders:   (1) commission while on community control (little to some weight);
(2) prior violent felony (great weight); (3) commission during robbery and/or
burglary, merged with pecuniary gain (significant weight); (4) HAC (great weight);
and (5) the victim was particularly vulnerable (significant weight).                     “[T]he heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravator is one of the „most serious aggravators set out in the
statutory sentencing scheme.‟ ”   Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 610 (Fla.
- 35 -

2009) (quoting Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999)).   And “the prior
violent felony aggravator is considered one of the weightiest aggravators.”   Silvia,
60 So. 3d at 974.   The trial court found one statutory mitigator—extreme mental or
emotional disturbance (significant weight)—and the following nonstatutory
mitigators:                                                                              (1) Snelgrove was a hard worker (some weight); (2) Snelgrove was a
loving and caring person who was loved by his family (some weight); (3)
Snelgrove had a long history of drug addiction (significant weight); (4) Snelgrove
was greatly impacted by the death of his parents (some weight); (5) Snelgrove is a
model inmate and has adjusted well to a structured environment (little weight); (6)
Snelgrove suffers from some abnormal brain functioning and has a somewhat
limited level of intelligence (some weight).
This case is comparable to numerous other cases involving similar
aggravators and similar or weightier mitigators.   See Aguirre-Jarquin, 9 So. 3d at
600 (death sentence proportionate in double homicide with aggravators of prior
violent felony, commission during burglary, and HAC (and for one murder, avoid
arrest and victim was particularly vulnerable due to disability); statutory mitigators
of extreme emotional disturbance, impaired capacity, and age; and nonstatutory
mitigators including long-term substance abuse, childhood abuse, and brain
damage from substance abuse); Frances, 970 So. 2d at 820-21 (death sentence
proportionate in double homicide with aggravators of commission during robbery
- 36 -

and prior violent felony (and for one victim, HAC); statutory mitigator of age; and
nonstatutory mitigators including abandonment by mother and pathological
relationship with brother); Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 141 & n.12 (Fla. 2002)
(death sentence proportionate in double homicide with aggravators of prior violent
felony, commission during robbery, HAC, and victims were particularly vulnerable
due to advanced age; statutory mitigators including defendant‟s age and extreme
mental or emotional disturbance; and nonstatutory mitigators including mental
illness, impaired capacity, and no significant history of prior violent criminal
activity).
Accordingly, we conclude that the death sentence is proportionate in this
case.
IV.   CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Snelgrove‟s sentences of death
for the murders of Glyn and Vivian Fowler.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA,
and PERRY, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County,
Kim Crane Hammond, Judge - Case No. 00-00323-CFA
- 37 -

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, James R. Wulchak and Christopher Sinclair
Quarles, Assistant Public Defenders, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach,
Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Scott A. Browne,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
- 38 -

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