SC10-2293 – Ronald Morel v. David E. Wilkins, Etc.

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Florida » Florida Supreme Court » 2012 » SC10-2293 – Ronald Morel v. David E. Wilkins, Etc.

State: Florida

Docket No: SC10-2293

Case Date: 03/08/2012

Preview:Supreme Court of Florida
____________ No. SC10-2293 ____________ RONALD MOREL, Appellant, vs. DAVID E. WILKINS, etc., Appellee. [March 8, 2012] PER CURIAM. This case involves an application of Florida`s Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, commonly known as the Jimmy Ryce Act, to Ronald Morel, who has been detained by the State of Florida and awaiting a civil commitment trial pursuant to that Act since April 2002. After nearly seven years of pretrial detention at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC) in DeSoto County, Morel filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, seeking full access to the comprehensive sexual offender treatment program (SOTP) made available only to those persons for whom commitment orders have already been entered.

Following the circuit court`s denial of his habeas petition, Morel appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal. On appeal, the Second District certified to this Court that the constitutional issues ra ised by the circuit court`s judgment, including questions regarding what was at that point an eight -year delay in [Morel`s] treatment and trial, affected the proper administration of justice throughout the state and required immediate resolution by this Court. In re Commitment of Morel, 67 So. 3d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(5) of the Florida Constitution and relinquished jurisdiction to the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on Morel`s claims in the court where his Jimmy Ryce proceedings were pending. See Morel v. Sheldon, 59 So. 3d 1082 (Fla. 2011). 1 Jurisdiction has returned to this Court, and we now affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief. We hold that (1) neither the Jimmy Ryce Act nor the Constitution entitles Morel to the treatment he seeks as a noncommitted detainee; 1. Morel contemporaneously filed in this Court a motion requesting a stay of his civil commitment trial that was to commence in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court. In our order of relinquishment, we granted Morel relief in part by temporarily staying the civil commitment trial pending the resolution of factfinding that was to be conducted during the relinquishment period. See Morel, 59 So. 3d at 1083. After the relinquishment period ended, we lifted the temporary stay and ordered Morel`s civil commitment proceedings to move forward immediately without any further delay. See Morel v. Satz, No. SC11-105 (Fla. Sup. Ct. order filed Dec. 14, 2011).

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(2) Morel has failed to establish that the FCCC treatment program is constitutionally defective; and (3) because t he delay in Morel`s commitment trial has been made for tactical reasons at his own request, his detention did not result in a constitutional violation. Despite our holding in this case, we emphasize that even though Morel sought the delays in trial, neither the legislative scheme nor the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators (Jimmy Ryce Rules of Procedure) contemplate extended delay in a detainee being brought to trial under the Jimmy Ryce Act. Accordingly, we urge all trial courts to take immediate steps to ensure that these cases are timely tried in accordance with the intent of the Legislature and Jimmy Ryce Rules of Procedure. We refer this matter to the appropriate rules committees to make recommendations as to whether Jimmy Ryce Rule of Procedure 4.240 should be further amended. I. BACKGROUND In March 1996, Morel was sentenced in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court in Broward County to ten years` imprisonment following his adjudication of guilt for several sexually violent offenses.2 While he was serving his sentence, the

2. Morel was convicted of two counts of sexual battery pursuant to section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (1993), which criminalizes the sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older, without that person`s consent, [when] in the process thereof [the offender] does not use physical force and violence likely to cause serious personal injury. Morel was also convicted of kidnapping. -3-

circuit court granted a postconviction motion that Morel filed, the result of which reduced the term of his sentence by approximately three and half years and made him immediately eligible for release. Due to the nature of Morel`s underlying criminal offenses, his eligibility for release triggered his transfer from a Broward County jail to the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) on April 18, 2002, for a determination of whether he should be subject to involuntary commitment as meeting the definition of a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act. In accordance with the Act`s immediate release provisions set forth in section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2002), Morel was then transferred to the FCCC in DeSoto County, which is located within the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. While he was at the FCCC, Morel`s release from custody was placed on a seventy-two-hour hold in order for DCF`s multidisciplinary team to evaluate Morel, make a written assessment, and offer a recommendation to the state attorney in Broward County regarding whether Morel should be committed as a sexually violent predator. After an evaluation, two psychologists determined that Morel met the criteria of being a sexually violent predator and that he required intensive treatment before being released into the community. Four other members of DCF`s multidisciplinary team concurred with the psychologists` determination, and the team issued its written recommendation and report.

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On April 23, 2002, upon receipt of the multidisciplinary team`s report, the state attorney filed a petition in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court, alleging that Morel met the criteria for commitment. That same day, the trial court issued an ex parte order finding probable cause to believe that Morel was a sexually violent predator as defined in section 394.912, Florida Statutes (2002), and thus eligible for commitment, and ordered DCF to hold Morel pursuant to section 394.915, Florida Statutes (2002). At an April 29, 2002, hearing in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court, Morel was present and found to be indigent. Consequently, the circuit court appointed the Office of the Public Defender to represent Morel, and an assistant public defender was there to represent him. After consultation with counsel, Morel agreed in open court to waive his right under section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), to have a commitment trial held within thirty days of the court`s probable cause determination, and he executed a written waiver to the same effect. For the reasons discussed in more detail below, after waiving the thirty-day deadline in April 2002, Morel`s Jimmy Ryce trial was delayed for nearly ten years. During that time period, Morel remained a noncommitted, pretrial detainee in the custody of DCF and housed at the FCCC amongst other detainees and committed residents. As opposed to noncommitted detainees, committed residents, who have been adjudicated as sexually violent predators, have access to the full range of

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comprehensive sexual offender treatment DCF offers through its independent contractor, GEO Group, Inc. (GEO).3 On February 10, 2009, although represented by private counsel in his ongoing civil commitment proceedings pending in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court, Morel filed a pro se emergency petition for habeas corpus in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court, naming the Secretary of DCF as respondent. In his petition, Morel primarily asserted that due to a policy excluding noncommitted detainees from participation, DCF was unconstitutionally denying him full access to the sexual offender treatment program. Morel claimed that because successful completion of the treatment program is a prerequ isite to a resident`s release, DCF`s decision to refuse him complete access to the treatment program was impeding his efforts to secure release from indefinite detention. As a remedy, Morel sought total discharge from detention and dismissal of the State` s civil commitment petition with prejudice. Without conducting a hearing, the trial court entered an unelaborated order denying Morel`s habeas petition on April 1, 2009. When Morel appealed the judgment of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court to

3. Since 2006, GEO has managed and operated the FCCC and its sex offender treatment programs. Pursuant to section 394.9151, Florida Statutes (2011), DCF may contract with a private entity or state agency for use of and operation of facilities to comply with the requirements of the Act. In 2006, DCF replaced Liberty Behavioral Healthcare Corpora tion (Liberty) as the FCCC`s operator, and on July 1, 2006, DCF awarded the contract to GEO.

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the Second District, the district court was troubled by the undisputed eight-year delay in Morel receiving treatment and proceeding to trial. See In re Commitment of Morel, 67 So. 3d 1062, 1063-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). The district court noted that it lacked any information about the cause of such delay and observed that it is not unusual for both the circuit court in DeSoto County and [the Second District Court] to have no territorial jurisdiction over the forum in which the civil proceeding is pending. Id. at 1063. The Second District further observed that although this case was an extreme example, from its anecdotal experience, it [was] not unique. Id. at 1064. Although the Jimmy Ryce Act contemplates that detainees will receive a speedy trial and then annual reviews upon commitment, the Second District explained that once the right to a trial within thirty days is waived, these proceedings often seem to take many years. Id. The district court reasoned that if DCF were not providing treatment during this delay, then a pretrial detainee may not actually hold the keys to the cell in which he is civilly detained. Id. Because it lacked territorial jurisdiction over the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court where Morel`s Jimmy Ryce proceedings were pending, t he Second District expressed concern over how this matter could be fairly resolved for all parties without a hearing involving that circuit court. Id. Noting that the facts of this case raised substantial questions concerning the constitutionality of Mor el`s Jimmy

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Ryce proceedings, as well as those proceedings involving other individuals detained at the FCCC, the Second District certified the circuit court`s judgment as having a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state and requiring this Court`s immediate resolution. Id. at 1062-64. After receiving the Second District`s certification, this Court concluded that the failure to receive treatment as a pretrial detainee and the failure to have held a civil commitment trial for eight years presented serious questions as to the functioning of this state`s system for civil commitments and the legality of Morel`s continued confinement. See Morel v. Sheldon, 59 So. 3d 1082, 1083 (Fla. 2011). Given these concerns, the Court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court, where Morel`s civil commitment proceedings were actually pending, to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the following factual issues: a. Whether Morel`s allegations in his petition regarding the inability to receive treatment because of his pretrial detainee status are accurate and to obtain details regarding the issues surrounding treatment (or lack thereof) for pretrial detainees awaiting civil commitment trials; b. Whether Morel`s allegations in his petition regarding the waiting list to obtain treatment, even if eligible for treatment, are accurate and, if not, explain; c. Whether Morel`s commitment is illegal or unlawful because of the inordinate amount of time (eight years) since his release from his prison sentence; and d. The reason why the trial in this case has not taken place for eight years and whether Morel has had counsel throughout that time, and if not, the reasons for lack of counsel. -8-

Id. at 1084. After conducting a two-day evidentiary hearing, during which nine witnesses testified, 4 the circuit court issued a comprehensive order with extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The circuit court provided detailed answers to this Court`s questions, concluding as follows: (1) as a pretrial detainee, Morel is not provided the full panoply of sex offender specific treatment, but is eligible for a variety of other treatment offerings; (2) there are no waiting lists for treatment, but for valid reasons, gaps in time exist between specific programs in the first phase of treatment; (3) neither the Act nor the Constitution requires access to all four phases of treatment, and Morel`s detention has been lawful; and (4) the delays in Morel`s commitment trial have been made for tactical reasons at his own request, he has never requested a commitment trial, and during the course of the 4. The following nine witnesses testified: (1) Jeanine Cohen (Morel`s civil commitment attorney from 2005 to present); (2) Rob Jakovich (an assistant public defender who represents defendants in Jimmy Ryce proceedings); (3) Kristin Kanner (the assistant state attorney who has handled Morel`s case since December 2004); (4) Dr. Amy Swann (a forensic psychologist who works at the FCCC and has spoken to Morel); (5) Barbara Brown (an employee in the Broward County clerk`s office who explained the docket sheet); (6) Dr. Suzonne Kline (the Director of the Sexually Violent Predator Program for DCF); (7) Timothy Budz (the Facility Administrator for GEO at the FCCC); (8) Dr. Robin Wilson (the Clinical Director at the FCCC); and (9) Ronald Morel himself. Morel also introduced into evidence a composite exhibit of 170 surveys from residents of the FCCC who described waiting periods they encountered before entering into treatment programs; the State filed a rebuttal declaration authored by Keri Fitzpatrick, a recreational therapist at the FCCC.

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delay, Morel has been consistently represented by counsel. Based on these findings, the circuit court determined that Morel`s commitment t rial should move forward because counsel had explored all reasonable avenues to secure his release. We now address Morel`s arguments on appeal. II. ANALYSIS In support of reversing the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court`s denial of habeas relief, Morel raises the following three claims: (1) denying him treatment because of his pretrial detainee status violates his rights to due process and equal protection; (2) because of the delays residents experience before receiving treatment, the sexual offender treatment program at the FCCC is constitutionally defective; and (3) Morel`s confinement is illegal based upon the inordinate amount of time Morel has remained a pretrial detainee since release from his prison sentence.5 Our review of these issues involves a mixed question of law and fact. The circuit court made findings of fact regarding the exact parameters of the sexual offender treatment program that DCF offers to FCCC residents through GEO, as well as the cause of the delay in Morel`s treatment and trial. The circuit court then determined whether the factual circumstances surrounding Morel`s pretrial

5. Morel explains the factual basis for the delay as a separate issue, but he does not set forth a claim for relief with respect to that issue.

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detention amounted to a constitutional violation. Therefore, where, as here, the circuit court has conducted an evidentiary hearing, we employ a two-step approach, deferring to the factual findings of the trial court that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the application of the law to the facts de novo. See Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 192 (Fla. 2010) (If the ruling consists of a mixed question of law and fact addressing certain constitutional issues . . . the ultimate ruling must be subjected to de novo review but the court`s factual findings must be sustained if supported by competent substantial evidence. (quoting State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 n.7 (Fla. 2001))), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1476 (2011). Guided by this standard, we first provide an overview of the Jimmy Ryce Act and then separately address each issue Morel raises on appeal, beginning with his claims that center on treatment. A. The Jimmy Ryce Act On January 1, 1999, the Jimmy Ryce Act went into effect in Florida, see ch. 98-64,

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