SC12-1 – In Re: Senate Joint Resolution Of Legislative Apportionment 1176

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State: Florida

Court: Supreme Court

Docket No: Filed_03-09-2012_Opinion

Case Date: 03/09/2012

Preview:Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC12-1
IN RE:   SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION OF LEGISLATIVE
APPORTIONMENT 1176.
[March 9, 2012]
PARIENTE, J.
With the goal of reforming this state‘s legislative apportionment process, in
2010, the Florida voters approved an amendment to the Florida Constitution
establishing stringent new standards for the once-in-a-decade apportionment of
legislative districts.   These express new standards imposed by the voters clearly act
as a restraint on the Legislature in drawing apportionment plans.   After the
Legislature draws the apportionment plans, this Court is required by the Florida
Constitution to review those plans to ensure their compliance with the constitution.
In this review, we are obligated to interpret and apply these standards in a manner
that gives full effect to the will of the voters.   In order to do so, our review
necessarily becomes more extensive than in decades past.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we declare the plan apportioning

districts for the Florida House of Representatives to be constitutionally valid under
the Florida Constitution.   We declare the plan apportioning the districts for the
Florida Senate to be constitutionally invalid under the Florida Constitution.   The
Legislature is now tasked by the Florida Constitution with adopting a new joint
resolution of apportionment ―conforming to the judgment of the supreme court‖ as
set forth in article III, section 16(d).
I. INTRODUCTION
The once-in-a-decade process of redistricting follows the United States
Census Bureau‘s release of new census data.   Article III, section 16, of the Florida
Constitution expressly entrusts the Legislature with the obligation to redraw this
state‘s legislative districts and expressly entrusts this Court with the mandatory
obligation to review the Legislature‘s decennial apportionment plans.   The Florida
House of Representatives and the Florida Senate must adopt a joint resolution
apportioning the legislative districts in accordance with federal and state
constitutional requirements.   Id.   After the Legislature adopts a joint resolution of
apportionment, the Florida Constitution requires the Attorney General to petition
this Court for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the Legislature‘s
apportionment plans as enacted.   Art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const.   Within thirty days of
receiving the Attorney General‘s petition, and after permitting adversary interests
to present their views, the Court has a mandatory obligation under the Florida
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Constitution to render a declaratory judgment determining the validity of the
Legislature‘s apportionment plans.   Id.
Before 2010, this Court held that Florida‘s constitutional requirements
guiding the Legislature during the apportionment process were ―not more stringent
than the requirements under the United States Constitution.‖   In re
Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987 (In re Apportionment Law—
2002), 817 So. 2d 819, 824 (Fla. 2002).   Under this construction of the Florida
Constitution, we reviewed legislative apportionment plans to determine whether
those plans complied with (1) the general provisions of the United States
Constitution, which set forth the one-person, one-vote standard under the Equal
Protection Clause, and (2) the specific provisions of the state constitution, article
III, section 16(a), requiring districts to be ―consecutively numbered‖ and to consist
of ―contiguous, overlapping or identical territory.‖
On November 2, 2010, the voters approved Amendment 5 (Fair Districts
Amendment) for inclusion in the Florida Constitution, greatly expanding the
standards that govern legislative apportionment.1   When approving the Fair
Districts Amendment for placement on the 2010 ballot, this Court explained that
the ―overall goal‖ of the Amendment was twofold: ―[T]o require the Legislature to
1.   Amendment 6 adopted identical standards for congressional redistricting.
The Legislature‘s congressional redistricting plan is not currently before us.
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redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination, while respecting
geographic considerations‖ and ―to require legislative districts to follow existing
community lines so that districts are logically drawn, and bizarrely shaped districts
. . . are avoided.‖   Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. re Standards for Establishing
Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d 175, 181, 187-88 (Fla. 2009) (plurality
opinion).   After its passage, the Fair Districts Amendment was codified as article
III, section 21, of the Florida Constitution.
With the advent of the Fair Districts Amendment, the Florida Constitution
now imposes more stringent requirements as to apportionment than the United
States Constitution and prior versions of the state constitution.   The new standards
enumerated in article III, section 21, are set forth in two tiers, each of which
contains three requirements.   The first tier, contained in section 21(a), lists the
following requirements: (1) no apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; (2) districts shall
not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity
of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish
their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and (3) districts shall consist of
contiguous territory.   The second tier, located in section 21(b), lists three additional
requirements, the compliance with which is subordinate to those listed in the first
tier of section 21 and to federal law in the event of a conflict: (1) districts shall be
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as nearly equal in population as is practicable; (2) districts shall be compact; and
(3) where feasible, districts shall utilize existing political and geographical
boundaries.   See art. III, § 21(b), Fla. Const.   The order in which the constitution
lists the standards in tiers one and two is ―not [to] be read to establish any priority
of one standard over the other within that [tier].‖   Art. III, § 21(c), Fla. Const.
These express new standards imposed by the voters clearly act as a restraint
on legislative discretion in drawing apportionment plans.   In this original
declaratory judgment proceeding, we must define these new standards for the first
time since the passage of the Fair Districts Amendment.   Although this Court‘s
role is unquestionably circumscribed by the extremely short time frame set forth in
article III, section 16(c), of the Florida Constitution, such a limitation cannot deter
the Court from its extremely weighty responsibility entrusted to us by the citizens
of this state through the Florida Constitution to interpret the constitutional
standards and to apply those standards to the legislative apportionment plans.
When interpreting constitutional provisions, this Court endeavors to
ascertain the will of the people in passing the amendment.   We follow the approach
that has been consistently undertaken when interpreting constitutional provisions:
The fundamental object to be sought in construing a
constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of the framers and the
provision must be construed or interpreted in such manner as to fulfill
the intent of the people, never to defeat it.   Such a provision must
never be construed in such manner as to make it possible for the will
of the people to be frustrated or denied.
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Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 944-45 (Fla. 2009); Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d
277, 282 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960));
Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm‘n, 838
So. 2d 492, 501 (Fla. 2003).
This Court‘s duty to measure the Legislature‘s apportionment plans with the
yardstick of express constitutional provisions arises from the ―well settled‖
principle that ―the state Constitution is not a grant of power but a limitation upon
power.‖   In re Apportionment Law Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972
Regular Session (In Re Apportionment Law—1972), 263 So. 2d 797, 805 (Fla.
1972).   With the recent addition of section 21 to article III of the Florida
Constitution, the Legislature is governed by a different and more comprehensive
constitutional measurement than before—the limitations on legislative authority in
apportionment decisions have increased and the constitutional yardstick has more
measurements.
In addition to measuring the Legislature‘s compliance with these standards,
we recognize the crucial role legislative apportionment plays with respect to the
right of citizens to elect representatives.   Indeed, the right to elect
representatives—and the process by which we do so—is the very bedrock of our
democracy.   To ensure the protection of this right, the citizens of the state of
Florida, through the Florida Constitution, employed the essential concept of checks
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and balances, granting to the Legislature the ability to apportion the state in a
manner prescribed by the citizens and entrusting this Court with the responsibility
to review the apportionment plans to ensure they are constitutionally valid.   The
obligations set forth in the Florida Constitution are directed not to the Legislature‘s
right to draw districts, but to the people‘s right to elect representatives in a fair
manner so that each person‘s vote counts equally and so that all citizens receive
―fair and effective representation.‖   Once validated by the Court, the
apportionment plans, which redraw each of the 40 Senate districts and each of the
120 House districts, will have a significant impact on the election of this state‘s
elected representatives for the next decade.
On February 9, 2012, the Legislature passed Senate Joint Resolution 1176
(Joint Resolution), apportioning this state into 120 House districts and 40 Senate
districts.   The next day, the Attorney General fulfilled her constitutional obligation
by filing a petition in this Court for a declaratory judgment to determine the
validity of the legislative apportionment plans contained within the Joint
Resolution.   Following the Attorney General‘s filing, this Court ―permit[ted]
adversary interests to present their views‖ as required by article III, section 16(c).
Under this Court‘s plenary authority to review legislative apportionment plans, we
now have ―jurisdiction to resolve all issues by declaratory judgment arising under
article III, section 16(c), Florida Constitution.‖   In re Apportionment Law
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Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session (In
re Apportionment Law—1982), 414 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 1982).
We have carefully considered the submissions of both those supporting and
opposing the plans.2   We have held oral argument.   For the reasons more fully
explained below, we conclude that the Senate plan is facially invalid under article
III, section 21, and further conclude that the House plan is facially valid.   We agree
with the position of the House that the House plan can be severed from the Senate
plan.   In accordance with article III, section 16(c), of the Florida Constitution, the
Court enters a declaratory judgment determining that the apportionment plan for
the House of Representatives as contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1176 is
constitutionally valid and determining that the apportionment plan for the Senate as
contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1176 is constitutionally invalid.
2.   The House and Senate submitted briefs in support of the Joint Resolution.
Briefs in opposition to the Joint Resolution were submitted by the following
entities: (1) the League of Women Voters of Florida, the National Council of La
Raza, and Common Cause Florida (together ―the Coalition‖); (2) the Florida
Democratic Party (FDP); and (3) the City of Lakeland.   The Attorney General filed
a brief, which did not take a position on whether the plans should be approved, but
instead argued for an extremely limited review and for allowing all fact-based
challenges to be brought subsequently in a trial court.   The Florida State
Conference of NAACP Branches, which did not take a position for or against the
Joint Resolution, directed its comments solely to the interpretation of the Federal
Voting Rights Act and Florida‘s constitutional minority voting protection
provision.   Finally, the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections filed a
comment to make the Court aware of the qualifying deadlines for the Florida
Legislature and Congress under the Florida Statutes.
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II.   HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF
ARTICLE III OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
In order to provide context for our present task of determining the validity of
the House and Senate apportionment plans, we first review the historical evolution
of the constitutional provisions pertinent to the Legislature‘s decennial
apportionment.
Before 1968, there was no process by which challengers to the Legislature‘s
apportionment plans could seek direct and immediate review of the apportionment
plans by the Supreme Court of Florida.   Under the Florida Constitution of 1885,
which was in effect until the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, litigation
surrounding the validity of the Legislature‘s adopted apportionment plans
proliferated.   Indeed, ―[f]rom the years 1955 through 1966, no fewer than seven
apportionment plans were formulated by the state legislature, all of which were
determined eventually to be invalid by the federal judiciary.‖   In re Apportionment
Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1048 & n.4 (citing Swann v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316
(S.D. Fla. 1962); Swann v. Adams, 214 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Fla. 1963), rev‘d, 378
U.S. 553 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev‘d, 383
U.S. 210 (1966); Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev‘d, 385
U.S. 440 (1967); Swann v. Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1967)).
In some cases, litigation over a particular plan literally spanned a period of
several years, infusing the apportionment and the electoral process with
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uncertainty.   The end product of the Legislature‘s attempt to avoid further
apportionment litigation was the drafting of article III, section 16.   In 1968, the
citizens of Florida approved article III, section 16, for inclusion in the Florida
Constitution, which provided a mechanism whereby the Supreme Court of Florida
was given mandatory and express jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
Legislature‘s enacted apportionment plan under a strict thirty-day time limit.   See
id. at 1048; see also art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const.3
The affirmative decision of the voters to place the apportionment
responsibility squarely in the state judiciary rather than leave it to the federal
judiciary was in line with the United States Supreme Court‘s recognition of that
preference:
The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment
or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized
by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has
been specifically encouraged.   State of Maryland Committee for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 676 (1964); City of Scranton
v. Drew, 379 U.S. 40 (1964), citing Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556
(1964); Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 724 (1964).   See also Kidd
v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), and discussion thereof in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 235-236 (1962).
Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (parallel citations omitted).
3.   This constitutional provision is still in effect and has not been changed,
other than a minor revision in subsections (b) and (f) to provide that if the Court is
required to apportion the state, it must file ―an order making such apportionment‖
with the custodian of state records.
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In addition, article III, section 16, required the Legislature to comply with
federal and state constitutional standards:
The legislature . . . shall apportion the state in accordance with the
constitution of the state and of the United States into not less than
thirty nor more than forty consecutively numbered senatorial districts
of either contiguous, overlapping or identical territory, and into not
less than eighty nor more than one hundred twenty consecutively
numbered representative districts of either contiguous, overlapping or
identical territory.
Art. III, § 16(a), Fla. Const.   In every apportionment decision since the adoption of
article III, section 16, this Court has reviewed the validity of the Legislature‘s joint
resolution of apportionment consistent with the language of that provision,
examining criteria such as population disparities between legislative districts
(federal equal protection standard of one-person, one-vote), territorial boundaries
(contiguity), and numbering issues (consecutiveness).4
In 2002, this Court discussed the scope of the Legislature‘s duty in relation
to the constitutional standards, explaining that ―the requirements under the Florida
Constitution [were] not more stringent than the requirements under the United
4.   See In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1972); In re
Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d 1040; In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G,
Special Apportionment Session 1992 (In re Apportionment Law—1992), 597 So.
2d 276 (Fla. 1992); In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 832.   In In re
Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 25E, 863 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2003), this
Court was required to determine the validity of a House Joint Resolution after the
House redrew districts in response to the Department of Justice‘s objection that
one of those districts was retrogressive within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act with respect to Hispanic voters.
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States Constitution.‖   In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824 (citing
In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 807-08).   Limited by a
construction of Florida‘s constitution that was not more extensive than the United
States Constitution, the Court declined to require the Legislature to adopt an
apportionment plan using the following four objective standards proposed by
Common Cause Florida and the Florida League of Women Voters:
[A]ll districts should (1) have equal population as closely as possible;
(2) be drawn to be compact and contiguous and respect local political
boundaries; (3) not dilute the voting strength of any racial, ethnic, or
minority group; and (4) be drawn neutrally without regard to the
incumbent or political party.
Id. at 832.   Other challengers, including the Attorney General, ―questioned the
Legislature‘s decision not to articulate objective standards that guided its
redistricting process.‖   Id. at 831.   The Court rejected all of these arguments,
making the following observation:
The only standards that the Legislature is constitutionally
required to follow in redistricting are the equal protection standard of
―one-person, one-vote,‖ the Florida Constitutional requirement that
legislative districts be ―either contiguous, overlapping, or identical
territory,‖ and the requirement not to discriminate against any racial
or language minority or political group.   See [Davis v.] Bandemer,
478 U.S. [109,] 118-27 (1986); In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597
So. 2d at 278-80.   While the other ―standards‖ advocated by the
opponents have been traditional considerations in the redistricting
process, they are not constitutionally required.   See Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. [630,] 647 [(1993)]; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. [735]
752 n. 18 [(1973)].   Hence, we decline the Attorney General‘s and
other parties‘ requests to return the plan to the Legislature to create
standards.   As explained above, for those standards that can be fully
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addressed in this opinion, we conclude that the Legislature has
complied with the requirements set forth by the federal and state
constitutions.
Id. at 832.
Under the state constitutional framework, while the Florida Constitution
grants the Legislature the authority to apportion the legislative districts every ten
years, the authority is circumscribed by the right of the people to instruct their
representatives on the manner in which apportionment should be conducted.   As
this Court stated in 1972:
When the people of Florida adopted the Constitution of 1968
they reserved to themselves the right to instruct their representatives
and, at the same time, authorized the election of these representatives
in senatorial and representative districts which may be ―either
contiguous, overlapping or identical territory.‖
In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 807.
In 2010, with the passage of the Fair Districts Amendment, the people of
Florida increased the instructions to their representatives to provide additional
constitutional imperatives for their elected representatives to follow when drawing
the senatorial and representative districts.   Our conclusion in 2002 that the above
criteria were not constitutionally required has been expressly overridden by a
constitutional amendment approved by the voters of Florida on November 2, 2010.
The ballot summary for the Fair Districts Amendment on which Florida
citizens voted stated:
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Legislative districts or districting plans may not be drawn to favor or
disfavor an incumbent or political party.   Districts shall not be drawn
to deny racial or language minorities the equal opportunity to
participate in the political process and elect representatives of their
choice.   Districts must be contiguous.   Unless otherwise required,
districts must be compact, as equal in population as feasible, and
where feasible must make use of existing city, county and
geographical boundaries.
Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d at 179.   Proposed
by initiative petitions that the organization FairDistrictsFlorida.org sponsored, this
constitutional amendment is now codified in article III, section 21, of the Florida
Constitution and imposes additional substantive standards with which the
Legislature must comply in carrying out its constitutional duties in establishing
legislative district boundaries.   See art. III, § 21, Fla. Const.
As approved by Florida voters, article III, section 21, provides in full:
In establishing legislative district boundaries:
(a) No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and
districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect
representatives of their choice; and districts shall consist of
contiguous territory.
(b) Unless compliance with the standards in this subsection
conflicts with the standards in subsection (a) or with federal law,
districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable;
districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where feasible, utilize
existing political and geographical boundaries.
(c) The order in which the standards within subsections (a) and
(b) of this section are set forth shall not be read to establish any
priority of one standard over the other within that subsection.
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Art. III, § 21, Fla. Const. (footnotes omitted).
In contrast to the standards that guided the Legislature during prior
apportionment cycles, the standards governing the instant apportionment process
are now more stringent than the requirements under the United States Constitution
and prior versions of the Florida Constitution.   It is our task to interpret these new
constitutional standards, together with the previous constitutional standards,
against the apportionment plans contained within the Joint Resolution.   Through
our interpretation of these provisions, we necessarily determine the validity of both
the House and Senate legislative apportionment plans.
In making these determinations, we first set forth the applicable standard of
review.   We next discuss each of the separate constitutional requirements imposed
by the Florida and United States Constitutions and how the requirements are to be
analyzed both individually and collectively.   Then, in light of challenges raised by
the opponents of the plans, we examine whether the Legislature‘s apportionment
plans are facially consistent with these requirements.
III.   ANALYSIS
A.  STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
The overarching question to be considered by the Court in this declaratory
judgment proceeding is the constitutional validity of the plans contained within the
Legislature‘s joint resolution of apportionment.   See In re Apportionment Law—
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2002, 817 So. 2d at 824; In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1052.
The validity of the joint resolution is determined by examining whether the
Legislature has operated within the constitutional limitations placed upon it when
apportioning the state‘s legislative districts.   The newly added constitutional
standards are directly related to ensuring that the process by which citizens choose
their elected officials is fair.
Like Florida, other states have recognized that legislative redistricting is
fundamental to ensuring that citizens choose their elected officials in an equitable
manner.   The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stressed this very principle when it
recently invalidated the Pennsylvania 2012 apportionment plan, stating that
―[l]egislative redistricting ‗involves the basic rights of the citizens . . . in the
election of their state lawmakers.‘ ‖   Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment
Comm‘n, 7 MM 2012, 2012 WL 375298, at *1 (Pa. Feb. 3, 2012) (quoting Butcher
v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 559 (Pa. 1964)).   The Supreme Court of Colorado has
similarly emphasized that ―[t]he basic purpose of the constitutional standards for
reapportionment is to assure equal protection for the right to participate in the . . .
political process and the right to vote.‖   In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen.
Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1241 (Colo. 2002).
The recognition of the critical importance of redistricting in ensuring the
basic rights of citizens to vote for the representatives of their choice is highlighted
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by a series of voting cases from the United States Supreme Court, most notably in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964):
[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society.   Especially since the right to exercise the
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. . .
. . .   To the extent that a citizen‘s right to vote is debased, he is
that much less a citizen.
Id. at 561-62, 567.
In explaining the goal of legislative apportionment in terms of the rights of
voters, the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds emphasized:
Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens
is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude
that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.   Diluting
the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as
invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race . . .
Id. at 565-66.
In describing the significance of its prior jurisprudence in Reynolds, the
United States Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the right of voters to
fair representation:
Furthermore, in formulating the one person, one vote formula,
the Court characterized the question posed by election districts of
disparate size as an issue of fair representation.   In such cases, it is not
that anyone is deprived of a vote or that any person‘s vote is not
counted.   Rather, it is that one electoral district elects a single
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representative and another district of the same size elects two or
more—the elector‘s vote in the former district having less weight in
the sense that he may vote for and his district be represented by only
one legislator, while his neighbor in the adjoining district votes for
and is represented by two or more.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123.   In Bandemer, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that fairness in voting under the federal constitution extended to
dilution of the right to vote based on districts that were drawn in a manner that
favored a political party.
With fairness in drawing the legislative districts as the focus, article III,
section 21, imposes additional standards upon the Florida Legislature to follow in
apportionment proceedings.   Article III, section 21, also provides Florida citizens
with additional constitutional protections to ensure that their right to fair and
effective representation is not impaired by the manner in which the legislative
districts are drawn.   These constitutional constraints imposed on the Legislature in
drawing legislative districts are designed to ―maximize electoral possibilities by
leveling the playing field‖ for the increased protection of the rights of Florida‘s
citizens to vote and elect candidates of their choice.   Brown v. Sec‘y of State, No.
11-14554, 2012 WL 264610, at *12 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2012).
Throughout these proceedings, the Attorney General, the Senate, and the
House have asserted that the Legislature should have full discretion in balancing
the constitutional criteria that apply to apportioning legislative districts.   However,
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when addressing similar arguments that state legislatures should have full
discretion in considering such matters, the United States Supreme Court in
Reynolds eloquently stated: ―We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into
political thickets and mathematical quagmires.   Our answer is this: a denial of
constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our
office require no less of us.‖                                                          377 U.S. at 566.
Although the advent of new constitutional requirements undoubtedly
increases the Legislature‘s apportionment obligations, the House and Senate plans
still come to this Court with an initial presumption of validity.   In re
Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824-25.   This presumption serves to
recognize the deference initially owed to legislative acts upon passage.   Thus, what
was true in 1972 regarding the respective roles of the Court and the Legislature in
the apportionment process still holds true today:
[W]e emphasize that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter
for legislative consideration and determination.   Judicial relief
becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion
according to federal and state constitutional requisites.   If these
requisites are met, we must refrain, at this time, from injecting our
personal views into the proposed reapportionment plan.   Even though
we may disagree with the legislative policy in certain areas, the
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional
provisions relating to reapportionment require that we act with
judicial restraint so as not to usurp the primary responsibility for
reapportionment, which rests with the Legislature.
In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 799-800; see also In re
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Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824 (same).
Even though we continue to recognize the presumption of validity that
governs ordinary legislative acts, the operation of this Court‘s process in
apportionment cases is far different than the Court‘s review of ordinary legislative
acts, and it includes a commensurate difference in our obligations.   Challenges to
the constitutionality of ordinary legislative acts passed by the Legislature must be
brought in a trial court and then reviewed by a district court of appeal.   This Court
has mandatory jurisdiction in those circumstances only if the legislative act is
found to be unconstitutional.   See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
In contrast, the Court‘s mandatory review to determine the validity of
apportionment plans every ten years derives from a different provision of the
constitution: article III, section 16(c).   The constitution specifies that the Attorney
General ―shall‖ file a petition for a declaratory judgment and that this Court ―shall
permit adversary interests to present their views.‖   Art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const.   In
this type of original proceeding, the Court evaluates the positions of the adversary
interests, and with deference to the role of the Legislature in apportionment, the
Court has a separate obligation to independently examine the joint resolution to
determine its compliance with the requirements of the Florida Constitution.
Because it is the obligation of this Court to enter a judgment declaring the joint
resolution valid or invalid, the Court has routinely accepted that judicial relief
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would be warranted where the Legislature has ―fail[ed] to reapportion according to
federal and state constitutional requisites.‖   In re Apportionment Law—2002, 817
So. 2d at 824 (quoting In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 800).
This Court in In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 806, while
cognizant that ―[t]he propriety and wisdom of legislation are exclusively matters
for legislative determination,‖ also recognized that the Legislature‘s authority was
not unbridled.   The Court observed that, although ―in accordance with the doctrine
of separation of powers, [it would] not seek to substitute its judgment for that of
another coordinate branch of the government,‖ pursuant to that same constitutional
doctrine, the Court was also responsible for measuring legislative acts ―with the
yardstick of the Constitution.‖   Id.
Unlike 2002, when ―the requirements under the Florida Constitution [were]
not more stringent than the requirements under the United States Constitution,‖ In
re Apportionment Law—2002, 817 So. 2d at 824, now, the Florida Constitution
imposes a higher standard on the Legislature when formulating the state‘s
apportionment plans.   The citizens of Florida mandated additional constitutional
imperatives for their elected representatives to follow when redrawing senatorial
and representative districts.
The new requirements dramatically alter the landscape with respect to
redistricting by prohibiting practices that have been acceptable in the past, such as
- 21 -

crafting a plan or district with the intent to favor a political party or an incumbent.
By virtue of these additional constitutional requirements, the parameters of the
Legislature‘s responsibilities under the Florida Constitution, and therefore this
Court‘s scope of review, have plainly increased, requiring a commensurately more
expanded judicial analysis of legislative compliance.
It is this Court‘s duty, given to it by the citizens of Florida, to enforce
adherence to the constitutional requirements and to declare a redistricting plan that
does not comply with those standards constitutionally invalid.   We reject the
assertions of the Attorney General and the House that a challenger must prove
facial invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.   While there have been decisions of
this Court reciting that principle with regard to legislative enactments, such as Crist
v. Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 134, 139
(Fla. 2008), cited by the House, that principle of statutory construction was stated
only once in an apportionment decision and was made in the context of an attack
on multi-member districts.   See In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at
805-06.   Since 1972, we have never used that principle of statutory construction
when enunciating the standard for our review of legislative apportionment,
including our last comprehensive statement in 2002.   Therefore, to use the standard
of beyond a reasonable doubt would be a departure from our precedent in
- 22 -

legislative apportionment jurisprudence.5
We conclude that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is ill-suited for an
original proceeding before this Court in which we are constitutionally obligated to
enter a declaratory judgment on the validity of the legislative plans.   Unlike a
legislative act promulgated separate and apart from an express constitutional
mandate, the Legislature adopts a joint resolution of legislative apportionment
solely pursuant to the ―instructions‖ of the citizens as expressed in specific
requirements of the Florida Constitution governing this process.
Because ―legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative
consideration and determination,‖ In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at
799-800, this Court will defer to the Legislature‘s decision to draw a district in a
5.   There is a difference between the Court‘s role in reviewing a legislative
apportionment plan to determine compliance with constitutionally mandated
criteria and the Court‘s role in interpreting statutes; this Court has stated its
responsibility in construing statutes differently.   For example, in Tyne v. Time
Warner Entertainment, 901 So. 2d 802, 810 (Fla. 2006), in upholding a statute as
constitutional, the Court stated that it had ―an obligation to give a statute a
constitutional construction where such a construction is possible.‖   This Court has
stated that it is
committed to the fundamental principle that it has the duty if
reasonably possible, and consistent with constitutional rights, to
resolve doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor of its
constitutional validity and to construe a statute, if reasonabl[y]
possible, in such a manner as to support its constitutionality—to adopt
a reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from
constitutional infirmity.
Id. (quoting Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1976)).
- 23 -

certain way, so long as that decision does not violate the constitutional
requirements.   With an understanding that the Court‘s responsibility is limited to
ensuring compliance with constitutional requirements, and endeavoring to be
respectful to the critically important role of the Legislature, the Court has
previously acknowledged that its duty ―is not to select the best plan, but rather to
decide whether the one adopted by the legislature is valid.‖   In re Apportionment
Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 285.
This principle is in keeping with the United States Supreme Court‘s decision
in Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 941 (2012), which stated that ―redistricting
ordinarily involves criteria and standards that have been weighed and evaluated by
the elected branches in the exercise of their political judgment.‖   In Perez, when it
became clear that a state‘s redistricting plan would not obtain preclearance under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a federal district court drew an interim
redistricting plan without giving deference to the state‘s policy choices.   In
reversing the federal court‘s drawing of the plan, the Supreme Court explained that
a federal district court may not wholly disregard policy choices made by a state‘s
legislature, where those policy choices are not inconsistent with the United States
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act.   Id. at 943.   The Supreme Court held that a
―state plan serves as a starting point‖ for a federal district court because ―[i]t
provides important guidance that helps ensure that the district court appropriately
- 24 -

confines itself to drawing interim maps . . . without displacing legitimate state
policy judgments with the court‘s own preferences.‖   Id. at 941.
Perez is in conformity with the federal judiciary‘s strong preference to yield
to states in making initial redistricting decisions as long as there is no violation of
either the United States Constitution or the Voting Rights Act.   As was emphasized
in Scott v. Germano over 45 years ago, the ―power of the judiciary of a State to
require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only
been recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court but appropriate action by
the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.‖   Germano, 381 U.S. at
409.
Any attempt to use Perez in support of an argument that the state judiciary
is constrained in performing its constitutionally mandated review takes the holding
of Perez out of context.   In contrast to Perez, this Court‘s initial review of the
Legislature‘s joint resolution of apportionment does not require any balancing of
concerns for federal versus state sovereignty.   Nor is this Court engaged at this
point in redrawing the plans.   Rather, this Court is required by the state constitution
to evaluate whether the Legislature‘s apportionment plans conflict with Florida‘s
express constitutional standards.   See art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const.   The Supreme
Court‘s concerns in Perez regarding judicial overreach by the federal court in
redrawing the state‘s apportionment plan do not apply to this original state
- 25 -

proceeding, during which this Court is mandated to assess the Legislature‘s
compliance with constitutional standards.   At this juncture, the Court plays no role
in drawing the Legislature‘s apportionment plans, and the deference owed by the
federal courts to the state in the drawing of the plan is not implicated.
In our initial review of the Legislature‘s plan, we recognize the limitations of
this Court‘s responsibilities.   At the same time, we acknowledge and accept our
paramount responsibility in apportionment, as set forth by the Florida Constitution,
to ensure that the adopted plans comply with the constitutionally required
mandates.   ―In other words, it is this Court‘s duty to enforce adherence to the
constitutional requirements and to declare a redistricting plan that does not comply
with those standards unconstitutional.‖   In re Legislative Districting of State, 805
A.2d 292, 316 (Md. 2002).
Where the legislative decision runs afoul of constitutional mandates, this
Court has a constitutional obligation to invalidate the apportionment plan.   To
accept the Legislature‘s assurances that it followed the law without any type of
inquiry or any type of meaningful review by this Court would render the Court‘s
review of the new constitutional standards, and whether the Legislature complied
with the new standards, essentially meaningless.   To accept the Legislature‘s and
Attorney General‘s position that this Court should not undertake a meaningful
review of compliance with the new constitutional standards in this proceeding, but
- 26 -

instead await challenges brought in trial courts over a period of time, would be an
abdication of this Court‘s responsibility under the Florida Constitution.   This
approach would also create uncertainty for the voters of this state, the elected
representatives, and the candidates who are required to qualify for their seats.6
The question then becomes how this Court will accomplish its review in a
meaningful way given the nature of this constitutionally required proceeding.
Undoubtedly, this Court is limited by time to be able to relinquish for extensive
fact-finding as we have undertaken in other original proceedings,7 or to appoint a
commissioner to receive testimony and refer the case back to the appellate court
together with findings that are advisory in nature only.8   A review of prior
reapportionment decisions from 1972, 1982, and 1992 reveals that in the past, the
Court has retained exclusive state jurisdiction to allow challenges to be later
brought, and then, on one occasion, the Court appointed a commissioner to conduct
fact-finding on a specific challenge pursuant to our apportionment original
6.   According to the comment filed on behalf of the Florida State
Association of Supervisors of Election, the qualifying date for all federal, state,
county, and district candidates is between June 4 and June 8, 2012, pursuant to
section 99.061, Florida Statutes.
7.   See, e.g., Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 329 (Fla. 2007)
(relinquishing in an all writs original proceeding to the trial court for that court to
make factual findings on lethal injection and to then file those findings with this
Court so this Court could make the ultimate determination).
8.   See, e.g., State ex rel. Clark v. Klingensmith, 170 So. 616, 618 (Fla.
1936).
- 27 -

jurisdiction.9
In light of two distinct developments, our past approach is not determinative
of our review in this post-2010 case.   The first development, as mentioned above,
is that in 2010, the voters imposed upon the Legislature explicit, additional state
constitutional standards.   In contrast to 2002, where the challenges exceeded our
limited scope of review because they were based on violations of federal law, the
challenges in 2012 are based specifically on allegations that the plans facially
violate the requirements of the new provisions of our state constitution.
The second development is that technology has continued to advance in the
last decade, allowing this Court to objectively evaluate many of Florida‘s
constitutionally mandated criteria without the necessity of traditional fact-finding,
such as making credibility determinations of witnesses.   In furtherance of the goal
to conduct an objective evaluation of the plans, the Court required all plans,
including alternative plans, to be submitted electronically in .doj format, allowing
for every party and the Court to evaluate the plans using the same statistical
analysis and data reports.   To ensure that the Court would have the means to
objectively evaluate the plans, the Court specified in its order the manner in which
the House and Senate plans should be submitted to the Court in .doj format:
For each plan file submitted for the newly created
9.   See Milton v. Smathers, 351 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1977).
- 28 -

apportionment plans, the Attorney General is directed to specify the
software used to create the plan, the data and criteria used in drafting
the plan, the source of the data used in drafting the plan, and any other
relevant information.   The Attorney General is also directed to file
along with the plan statistical reports for both the new plans and the
last legally enforceable plans in searchable Portable Document Format
(PDF), which include at a minimum the following from the 2010
Census: the population numbers in each district, the total voting age
population (VAP) in each district, and the VAP of each racial and
ethnic group in each district.   Reports with additional information and
statistics (e.g., compactness measurements), and reports for prior
apportionment plans, may also be submitted in searchable PDF
format.
The Attorney General is also directed to provide the Court with
maps of the House and Senate apportionment plans depicting the new
districts, which shall include maps depicting the entire state as well as
regional maps.   In addition to the maps depicting the districts, the
Attorney General may also file maps depicting the apportionment
plans with data overlays.   For each such map, the Attorney General is
directed to specify the data depicted in the data overlay and the source
of that data.   The Attorney General may also file maps other than
maps depicting the new apportionment plans, including maps of prior
apportionment plans with or without any data overlays.
In re Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment, No. SC12-1 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
order filed Jan. 25, 2012).   As for parties, the Court permitted the filing of
alternative plans and ordered the parties to comply with the following
requirements:
Parties submitting alternative plans must submit the alternative plans
electronically in .doj format . . .
For each plan file submitted, the submitting party must specify
the software used to create the plan, the data and criteria used in
drafting each plan, the source of the data used in drafting the plan, and
any other relevant information.   The submitting party shall also
specify whether the alternative plan is a partial or complete plan, and
the population deviation for each district in the plan; if a partial plan is
- 29 -

submitted, the submitting party must specify what county or counties
are included in the partial plan.   Parties may also submit statistical
reports related to each submitted plan in searchable PDF format.
For each submitted alternative plan, the submitting party must
file map(s) depicting the alternative plan districts with this Court.   At
least one map shall be filed that reflects the entire alternative plan.
The submitting party may file additional maps showing regions or
areas of interest.   In addition to maps depicting the districts of the
alternative plan, the submitting party may also file maps depicting the
apportionment plans with data overlays, including maps of the prior
plans.   Each such map shall specify the data depicted in the data
overlay and the source of that data.   For each map filed with the
Court, the submitting party shall file the map in electronic PDF format
and provide the Court with fifteen (15) color paper copies.
Id.   The only opponent in this case to submit an alternative plan was the Coalition,
which submitted two alternative plans to this Court: an alternative Senate plan and
an alternative House plan.10
The Court permitted alternative plans because alternative plans may be
offered as relevant proof that the Legislature‘s apportionment plans consist of
district configurations that are not explained other than by the Legislature
considering impermissible factors, such as intentionally favoring a political party
or an incumbent.11   The Legislature is not obligated to accept alternative plans; this
10.   After the deadline for the submission of briefs and alternative plans had
passed, the Coalition sought to file a supplemental appendix, including a revised
alternative House plan.   The Court denied that request, and the supplemental
appendix was stricken.   See In re Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment,
No. SC12-1 (Fla. Sup. Ct. order filed Feb. 22, 2012).
11.   In 1982, this Court concluded that because the proceeding was limited
to reviewing the facial constitutional validity of the joint resolution, ―the
- 30 -

Court, however, may review them to evaluate whether the Legislature‘s adopted
plans are contrary to law.   See, e.g., Holt, 2012 WL 375298, at *36 (explaining that
alternative plans may be used as proof that the final plan ―contained subdivision
splits that were not absolutely necessary‖).
In furtherance of our goal to ensure that the Court had complete information,
at the Court‘s direction, the Attorney General filed an appendix to the petition for
declaratory judgment and filed the apportionment plans electronically in .doj
format, which would allow this Court and the challengers to perform an objective
statistical analysis of the plans submitted by using standard redistricting software.
The House and Senate each developed and utilized its own web-based redistricting
software, MyDistrictBuilder and District Builder, respectively.   This Court had
access to both MyDistrictBuilder and District Builder as well as the data in the
House program, which included census data, American Community Survey data,
and voter registration and elections data.   We have also received the incumbent
suggestion that we should adopt an alternative plan [was] not permissible in these
proceedings.‖   In re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1052.   We did not
conclude that alternative plans were impermissible for the purposes of
constitutional comparison.   With the advent of the new amendment codified in
article III, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, portions of which bear a striking
resemblance to the Federal Voting Rights Act, we deem it necessary, as we did in
1992, to review alternative apportionment plans to assess effect and intent.   See In
re Apportionment Law—1992, 597 So. 2d at 282 n.7 (permitting all interested
parties to file alternative apportionment plans in support of their arguments with
respect to whether or not the Joint Resolution impermissibly discriminated against
a minority group).
- 31 -

addresses upon which the challengers based their claims that districts were drawn
to favor incumbents.12
The type of information available for this original review is objective data. 13
In performing its objective analysis of the data, the Court did not rely on the
figures or statistical analysis contained in the appendices filed by the FDP or the
Coalition.   Instead, the Court utilized the MyDistrictBuilder and District Builder
software applications to evaluate the Legislature‘s apportionment plans and the
Coalition‘s alternative plans.   The Court utilized both software applications to
evaluate voting-age population14 and to conduct a visual inspection of the districts.
All of the maps depicting districts contained in this opinion were obtained using
District Builder, except for a map depicting the City of Lakeland.   This Court
utilized MyDistrictBuilder when analyzing undisputed voter registration and
12.   We ordered the production of the incumbents‘ addresses upon which the
opponents rely in their arguments.   See In re Joint Resolution of Legislative
Apportionment, No. SC12-1, Order on Incumbents‘ Addresses (Fla. Sup. Ct. order
filed Feb. 21, 2012).   The Attorney General, Florida Senate, and Florida House of
Representatives were given the opportunity to advise the Court regarding whether
any of the addresses were inaccurate and, if so, to provide the correct address.
13.   In that regard, although the Court did not strike the affidavit of the
Florida Democratic Party‘s expert, as requested by the House and Senate, the
Court did not rely on that affidavit, instead conducting its own independent
analysis using objective data.
14.   The voting-age population numbers contained in MyDistrictBuilder
were consistent with those contained in District Builder.   With respect to the
Legislature‘s apportionment plans, these voting-age population numbers were also
consistent with the Attorney General‘s appendix.
- 32 -

election data because MyDistrictBuilder contained that data, but District Builder
did not.15   Specifically, this Court utilized the registration and election data to
conduct an analysis of minority voting behavior in evaluating challenges to
individual districts.   Further, this Court utilized this data to examine the overall
political composition of the House and Senate plans, as well as the political
composition of each challenged district.
The Court additionally acquired Maptitude for Redistricting and inputted
into Maptitude the voter registration, political, and elections data utilized by
MyDistrictBuilder.   The Court also inputted the incumbent addresses into
15.   The House recognized that this data was required in order to evaluate
compliance with Florida‘s minority voting protection provision as well as the
Federal Voting Rights Act, and it included the data in MyDistrictBuilder.   See
Open Data and Code for MyDistrictBuilder,
http://mydistrictbuilder.wordpress.com/opendata (last visited Mar. 6, 2012)
(―Elections data is required to comply with: Sections 2 and 5 of the federal Voting
Rights Act; and Florida‘s Constitution, Article III, Sections 20(a) and 21(a), which
both read, ‗districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in
the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their
choice‘ ‖).   The Senate chose to omit this data from District Builder.   The District
Builder Help Manual states: ―Recent changes to the Florida Constitution require
that districts not be ‗drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or
an incumbent.‘ . . .   With this new language, the mere presence of political metrics
in the interface for building districts could create a perception, unsubstantiated and
inaccurate though it may be, that partisan factors influenced how districts were
drawn.   The Senate, in an abundance of caution, therefore departed from traditional
practice and chose to omit voter registration counts and election results from
District Builder‘s dashboard.‖   District Builder Help Manual,
https://db10.flsenate.gov/db1/help (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
- 33 -

Maptitude.   The Court utilized Maptitude to conduct additional evaluation of the
plans, such as the location of incumbents‘ addresses and calculations of the
percentage of prior population retained by a district.   This Court also examined
graphical data overlays of voting-age population using Maptitude in evaluating
certain challenged districts.   Finally, the Court used ESRI Redistricting, also
acquired by the Court, to generate compactness scores using compactness
measurements of Reock and Area/Convex Hull, compactness measures that were
used by the House in its plan data reports.
The controversy between the parties, set forth primarily by the House and
Senate, is that no conclusion as to intent to favor a political party or incumbent can
be made.   The challengers contend that this Court is able to perform its review
based on an assessment of statistical analysis, a visual examination of the plans,
and an evaluation of legislative history.   The challengers contend that this evidence
will enable the Court to discern intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an
incumbent because intent can be inferred from effect.   We will discuss these
arguments in more detail when we analyze the specific standards and apply them to
the House and Senate plans.
Finally, we have the guidance of the many state courts that have similar
provisions providing their respective state supreme courts with original
- 34 -

jurisdiction.16   Those courts have, over the years, both validated and invalidated
plans based on many of the same criteria now contained in Florida‘s constitution.17
As in those states, the Florida Constitution ―expressly entrusts to this Court the
responsibility, upon proper petition, to review the constitutionality of districting
16.   See Ark. Const. art. VIII, § 5; Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 3(b); Colo. Const.
art. V, § 48(e); Conn. Const. art. III, § 6(d); Haw. Const. art. IV, § 10; Idaho Const.
art. III, § 2(5); Ill. Const. art. IV, § 3(b); Iowa Const. art. III, § 36; Kan. Const. art.
X, § 1(b); Mass. Const. amend. art. CI, § 3; Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; Md.
Const. art. III, § 5; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 3.71, 4.262; N.J. Const. art. II, § 2, ¶ 7;
Ohio Const. art. XI, § 13; Or. Const. art. IV § 6(3)(b); Pa. Const. art. II § 17(d); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 1909(a), (f); Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.130.
17.   Compare In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, No.
11SA282, 2011 WL 5830123 (Colo. Nov. 15, 2011) (invalid); Twin Falls Cnty. v.
Idaho Comm‘n on Redistricting, No. 39373, 2012 WL 130416 (Idaho Jan. 18,
2012) (invalid); Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 430 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. 1981)
(invalid); In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa
1972) (invalid); In re Legislative Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292 (Md. 2002)
(invalid); Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972 (Or. 2001) (invalid); Holt v. 2011
Legislative Reapportionment Comm‘n, No. 7 MM 2012, 2012 WL 375298 (Pa.
Feb. 3, 2012) (invalid); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor and
W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323 (Vt. 1993) (invalid), with Harvey v. Clinton, 826
S.W.2d 236 (Ark. 1992) (valid); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992) (valid); In
re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 46 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2002)
(valid); Fonfara v. Reapportionment Comm‘n, 610 A.2d 153 (Conn. 1992) (valid);
Kawamoto v. Okata, 868 P.2d 1183 (Haw. 1994) (valid); Bonneville Cnty. v.
Ysursa, 129 P.3d 1213 (Idaho 2005) (valid); Beaubien v. Ryan, 762 N.E.2d 501
(Ill. 2001) (valid); In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 196 N.W.2d 209
(Iowa 1972) (valid); In re Stovall, 45 P.3d 855 (Kan. 2002) (valid); In re 2003
Legislative Apportionment of House of Representatives, 827 A.2d 810 (Me. 2003)
(valid); Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646 (Md. 1993) (valid); McClure
v. Sec‘y of the Commonwealth, 766 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 2002) (valid); Leroux v.
Sec‘y of State, 640 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 2002) (valid); In re Reapportionment of
Towns of Woodbury & Worcester, 861 A.2d 1117 (Vt. 2004) (valid).
- 35 -

plans prepared and enacted by the political branches of government and the duty to
provide appropriate relief when the plans are determined to violate the United
States and [Florida] Constitutions.‖   In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d
292, 316 (Md. 2002).
With our important responsibility to ensure that the joint resolution of
apportionment comports with both the United States and Florida Constitutions, and
with full awareness of the inherent limitations in the process set out in the state
constitution, we undertake our constitutionally mandated review of the facial
validity of the Senate and House plans contained within Senate Joint Resolution
1176.
B.  THE STANDARDS GOVERNING OUR ANALYSIS
Although this is the fifth time the Court has had the responsibility to
undertake its constitutionally mandated review of legislative apportionment, it is
the first time that the Court has been charged with defining and applying the
criteria of article III, section 21.   This Court‘s interpretation of the language
contained in sections 16(a) and 21 of article III begins with the basic principles
spelled out by this Court in its 1972 apportionment decision:
Every word of the Florida Constitution should be given its intended
meaning and effect.   In construing constitutions, that construction is
favored which gives effect to every clause and every part of it.   A
construction which would leave without effect any part of the
language used should be rejected if an interpretation can be found
which gives it effect.
- 36 -

In re Apportionment Law—1972, 263 So. 2d at 807.
In accord with those tenets of constitutional construction, this Court
―endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent of the
framers and the voters.‖   Zingale, 885 So. 2d at 282 (quoting Caribbean
Conservation Corp., 838 So. 2d at 501).   In ascertaining the intent of the voters, the
Court may examine ―the purpose of the provision, the evil sought to be remedied,
and the circumstances leading to its inclusion in our constitutional document,‖ In
re Apportionment Law—1982, 414 So. 2d at 1048, with the view that a
constitutional amendment must be assessed ―in light of the historical development
of the decisional law extant at the time of its adoption.‖   Jenkins v. State, 385 So.
2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980).
Guided by both this Court‘s precedent and a proper construction of the
pertinent provisions contained within article III, we must determine whether the
Legislature‘s joint resolution is facially consistent with the specific constitutionally
mandated criteria under the federal and state constitutions.   The Federal Equal
Protection Clause requires that districts conform to the one-person, one-vote
standard.   Article III, section 16(a), requires the Legislature to apportion both the
Senate and the House in ―consecutively numbered . . . districts of either
- 37 -

contiguous, overlapping or identical territory.‖18
The new standards enumerated in article III, section 21, are set forth in two
tiers, each of which contains three requirements.   The first tier, contained in section
21(a), lists the following requirements: (1) no apportionment plan or district shall
be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; (2)
districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the
equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political
process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and (3)
districts shall consist of contiguous territory.   See art. III, § 21(a), Fla. Const.   The
second tier, located in section 21(b), enumerates three additional requirements in
drawing district lines, the compliance with which is subordinate to those listed in
the first tier of section 21 and to federal law in the event of conflict: (1) districts
shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; (2) districts shall be
compact; and (3) where feasible, districts shall utilize existing political and
geographical boundaries.   See art. III, § 21(b), Fla. Const.   The order in which the
constitution lists the standards in tiers one and two is ―not [to] be read to establish
any priority of one standard over the other within that [tier].‖   Art. III, § 21(c), Fla.
Const.
18.

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