Preview:

Final Copy 288 Ga. 113

S10A1083. BLEVINS v. DADE COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS

NAHMIAS, Justice. On April 25, 2002, the General Assembly passed House Bills 918 and 919, which provided for local homestead exemptions for Dade County, subject to the approval of Dade County voters. House Bill 918 established a homestead exemption from certain Dade County ad valorem taxes for county purposes in an amount equal to the amount by which a residential property's current year assessed value exceeds the base year assessed value. House Bill 919 established a similar homestead exemption from certain Dade County School District taxes for educational purposes. The base year under the bills "is the taxable year immediately preceding the taxable year in which the [homestead] exemption is first granted to the most recent owner of [the] homestead." The bills therefore generally establish acquisition value tax exemptions. The exemptions are available to homeowners only, and they apply only to a taxpayer's primary residence and not more than three contiguous acres of land immediately

surrounding the residence. The exemptions do not apply to taxes assessed on "improvements to the homestead" or to land that is added to the homestead after July 1 of the base year. Dade County voters approved the homestead

exemptions on November 5, 2002. Appellant Rex Blevins owns land in Dade County but not a home that qualifies for the exemptions. He brought this action, challenging the

constitutionality of the homestead exemption bills on several grounds. The trial court ruled against Blevins's claims, and he appealed. We now affirm. 1. Blevins contends that the tax exemptions violate the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia Constitution, which provides that "all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax." Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III (a). In addition, Paragraph III (b) provides that, with limited exceptions not applicable here, "the classes of subjects for the taxation of property shall consist of tangible property and one or more classes of intangible personal property." To support its position that the tax exemptions do not violate the Uniformity Clause, the Dade County Board of Tax Assessors relies on cases that hold that, "[w]here uniformity of taxation is involved, reasonableness of 2

classification is all that is required." Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 290 (216 SE2d 250) (1975). Accord Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 229 Ga. 54, 55-56 (189 SE2d 439) (1972). These cases, however, did not involve "tangible property." See Chanin, 234 Ga. at 287-290 (excise taxes); Lake Lanier Theatres, 229 Ga. at 55-56 (business license taxes); Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229, 235-242 (116 SE 795) (1923) (occupation taxes). By contrast, the Constitution creates "tangible property" as a single class of property. See Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III (b). "Tangible property" includes real and personal property, and "the General Assembly has no authority to establish different classes or subclasses of tangible property other than as fixed by the [Constitution]." Griggs v. Greene, 230 Ga. 257, 263-264 (197 SE2d 116) (1973). See also Benson-Corwin, Inc. v. Cobb County School Dist., 239 Ga. 199, 200 (236 SE2d 361) (1977) (holding that real and personal tangible property "constitutes a single class of property and must be assessed and taxed alike"). The types of tangible property that may be separately classified and subclassified by the General Assembly under the Uniformity Clause are listed in subsection (b) of Article VII, Section I, Paragraph III and are inapplicable in this case. 3

Thus, the Uniformity Clause itself does not permit the classification and subclassification of the "tangible property" involved in this case. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Dade County homestead exemptions are constitutional under one of the Tax Exemption Clauses of our Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. II. Tax exemptions in general are at odds with the equality of taxation sought by the Uniformity Clause. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Combs, 270 SW3d 249, 263 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding that "exemptions from taxation are subject to strict construction because they place a greater burden on other tax-paying businesses and individuals rather than placing the burden on all taxpayers equally. . . . As such, tax exemptions are `the antithesis of equality and uniformity.'" (citation omitted)); Gilman v. Sheboygan, 67 U. S. 510, 517 (17 LE 305) (1863) ("`It cannot be denied that under the power of exemption unjust enactments in respect of the power of taxation might be made. But those who framed the [Wisconsin] Constitution did not see fit to prevent such evils by depriving the Legislature of the power.'" (citation omitted)). The Georgia Constitution, however, expressly authorizes statewide tax exemptions that are inconsistent with uniformity and equality in taxation of 4

tangible property. Article VII, Section II, Paragraph II (a) (1) permits the General Assembly to provide for a broad range of exemptions of property from ad valorem taxation if the "exemption is approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly and by a majority of the qualified electors of the state voting in a referendum thereon." Pursuant to this authority, the General Assembly has approved, for example, homestead exemptions for each resident of the State who owns and occupies a home as a residence, OCGA

Download S10A1083. BLEVINS v. DADE COUNTY BOARD of TAX ASSESSORS.pdf

Georgia Law