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Final Copy 288 Ga. 187 S10A1102. MOORE v. THE STATE HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice. Appellant Marland Moore appeals his conviction for malice murder and related offenses arising from the shooting death of Roddy Cunningham. For the reasons that follow, we find no error and therefore affirm.1 1. Construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence adduced at trial established as follows. Co-indictee Karryn Davis agreed to help

The crimes occurred on March 20, 2007. On November 16, 2007, appellant was indicted in Fulton County on charges of malice murder (Count 1); three counts of felony murder (Counts 2-4), predicated on the underlying felonies respectively charged in Counts 5, 7, and 8; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 5); possession of a firearm during commission of a felony (Count 6); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7); and, along with coindictees Karryn Davis and Veleda Washington, conspiracy to commit the crime of trafficking in cocaine (Count 8). After Davis and Washington agreed to cooperate with the prosecution, the charges against them were nol prossed; Counts 7 and 8 as against appellant were also nol prossed. At the conclusion of a jury trial held March 3-7, 2008, appellant was found guilty on all remaining counts and sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder and five years consecutive for the firearm charge. The remaining charges merged or were vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (4), (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Appellant's timely motion for new trial was denied following a hearing. Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court, where it was docketed to the April 2010 term and was thereafter submitted for decision on the briefs.
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victim Cunningham purchase drugs and contacted co-indictee Veleda Washington, who agreed to assist in the transaction. Washington contacted appellant, a convicted felon, whom she knew through the father of her children, and arranged for Cunningham to buy a kilogram of cocaine. Together

Washington and Cunningham drove to meet appellant at a hotel bar, and the three then drove in Cunningham's car to a nearby apartment building, with Cunningham driving, Washington in the front passenger seat, and appellant in the back seat. Once they were parked, appellant produced a bag; while Cunningham looked inside, appellant took out a gun and hit Cunningham with it. Washington jumped out of the car, and appellant began shooting.

Cunningham was shot, staggered out of the car, fell to the ground, and died at the scene from a gunshot wound to the torso. Washington was also grazed by a bullet. Appellant fled the scene in Cunningham's car. A witness parked in front of Cunningham's car saw the shooting in her rearview mirror and corroborated various details of the foregoing account, though she was unable to identify or give a description of the shooter. Washington failed to name appellant as the shooter when initially interviewed by police, but months later, after an arrest warrant was issued in connection with

the incident charging her with conspiracy to commit cocaine trafficking and distribution, she identified appellant to police as the perpetrator. Testimony from a firearms examiner regarding the trajectory of the fatal bullet was consistent with the shooter having fired the gun while reaching over from the back seat of the car. In addition, witness Yvette Norwood, a close friend of Washington who was acquainted with appellant, testified about several conversations she had with Washington and appellant: in the first one, prior to the shooting, Washington said she had arranged for Cunningham to buy drugs from appellant; in another one, a few hours after the shooting occurred, appellant called her inquiring about Washington, which Norwood found unusual, and assured her that Washington would be released from police questioning because "she hadn't done nothing"; and, in a final conversation, the morning after the shooting, Washington told her that appellant was the shooter. After appellant was identified to police and an arrest warrant was issued, he eluded the police in their first attempt to arrest him and in the process broke into the home of a stranger, offered her money to secrete him from police, and punched her when she refused. He was ultimately apprehended, several months after the shooting.

Appellant now contends that the evidence as to his involvement in the crimes was insufficient under the rule that "[in] felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient." OCGA

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