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Final Copy 288 Ga. 213 S10A1325. JACKSON v. THE STATE.

BENHAM, Justice. Appellant Elton Erwin Jackson appeals his convictions stemming from the death of Anwar Harris on March 22, 2005.1 For the reasons set forth below, his convictions are affirmed. 1. Appellant alleges the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Construed most strongly in favor of the verdict, the evidence adduced at trial established the following. On March 22, 2005, Anwar Harris, his girlfriend, and infant child were leaving the leasing offices of an apartment complex in Gwinnett County when appellant, who was known by the nickname "June," approached and shot Harris five times. Appellant ran up a hill and was seen climbing into the passenger seat of a waiting darkcolored pick-up truck which drove away. The victim's girlfriend, a mailman, and the apartment leasing agent all identified appellant as the shooter. The

On September 7, 2005, a grand jury indicted appellant for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellant was tried before a jury on August 27-30, 2007, and the jury found him guilty on all charges. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve life for malice murder and to serve five consecutive years for possession of a firearm. The aggravated assault charge merged and the felony murder charge was vacated as a matter of law. Appellant timely moved for a new trial on September 10, 2007, and amended his motion on December 3, 2009. A motion for new trial hearing was held on January 9, 2010. The trial court denied the motion on February 12, 2010. Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal on February 17, 2010, and the appeal was docketed to this Court's September 2010 term for a decision based on the briefs.

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medical examiner testified that the victim died from gunshot wounds to the head, neck, and chest. At trial, there was evidence that sometime prior to his death, the victim burglarized appellant's home and stole approximately $50,000. There was also evidence that, weeks prior to the shooting, the victim and appellant had a quarrel over money. The relevant inquiry on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, would authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he is charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Given the fact that three eyewitnesses identified appellant as the shooter, the evidence was sufficient such that a jury was authorized to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the crimes for which he was charged. 2. Appellant alleges his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when (a) he failed to object to testimony by the victim's girlfriend and the victim's father concerning statements made by the victim; (b) he failed to object to the admission of prior difficulty evidence; (c) he failed to object to form affidavits accompanying the photographic line-ups being sent with the jury; (d) he failed to object to witness testimony concerning appellant's telephone number; (e) he failed to object to the admission of a captioned photograph; (f) he failed to object to the trial court's charge on prior consistent statements; and alleges that the cumulative effect of said errors
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prejudiced him. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. A strong presumption exists that counsel's conduct falls within the broad range of professional conduct. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 34 (4) (644 SE2d 837) (2007). See also Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107 (3) (674 SE2d 275) (2009). For the reasons set forth below appellant has failed to meet this burden and so we must affirm. (a) At trial, the victim's girlfriend and father both testified that the victim confided to them that he had broken into appellant's apartment and stolen a large amount of cash. Appellant alleges his trial counsel should have objected to this testimony because it violated the confrontation clause and was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree because the statements were properly admitted. First, appellant's right to confront witnesses was not compromised because the statements in question were not testimonial. See Jenkins v. State, 278 Ga. 598 (2) (604 SE2d 789) (2004) (a statement is testimonial if it is made with the involvement of governmental officials). Secondly, the statements meet the necessity exception of the hearsay rule

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