Preview:

Final Copy 289 Ga. 9 S10F1792. HUNTER v. HUNTER.

NAHMIAS, Justice. Pursuant to this Court's pilot project for divorce cases, we granted Carol Hunter's application for discretionary appeal of the parties' final judgment of divorce and of an order, entered on the same day the trial court denied Carol's motion for new trial, holding her in contempt of a temporary order. Because we find no merit to Carol's contentions, we affirm the trial court's judgments. Carol and Ernest Hunter married in July 1995. Carol filed for divorce in 2006, but in June 2007, the parties mutually agreed to a dismissal of that case. However, the parties were unable to reconcile, and Carol filed this action for separate maintenance in February 2008. Ernest counterclaimed for divorce. The action was assigned to the trial judge who presided over the 2006 divorce action. The parties have no children, and neither sought alimony, leaving only the issue of dividing the parties' property. On November 20, 2009, the day the bench trial ended, the trial court entered an order requiring Carol to pay into the court registry money that Carol had testified was remaining from a $250,000 line of credit that she took out on the parties' marital residence in violation of an order entered in the 2006 divorce action. On December 15, 2009, the trial court entered a final judgment on the divorce action. Carol filed a timely

motion for new trial, and Ernest filed a motion to hold Carol in contempt for failing to pay the full amount of the money remaining from the line of credit into the court registry. On January 29, 2010, the trial court denied Carol's motion for new trial, and held her in contempt of the November 20, 2009, order. 1. Carol contends that the trial court erred in dividing the parties' property. We disagree. "[A]n equitable division of marital property does not necessarily mean an equal division," and "an award is not erroneous simply because one party receives a seemingly greater share of the marital property." Wright v. Wright, 277 Ga. 133, 134 (587 SE2d 600) (2003). The trial court has broad discretion to equitably divide the parties' property "upon consideration of all the relevant evidence." Taylor v. Taylor, 283 Ga. 63, 64 (656 SE2d 828) (2008). We have reviewed the record, including the evidence regarding the parties' rental properties, residences, retirement and investment accounts, and vehicles, noting the trial court's statement that it did not find Carol's testimony to be credible. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the division of marital property.1
1

As part of this enumeration of error, Carol argues that a comment by the trial court during the trial indicates that the court improperly considered her behavior in the 2006 divorce action in deciding this case. We note that Carol testified on direct and cross-examination about the parties' behavior in the 2006 divorce case, including the incident about which the trial court commented. In any event, Carol voiced no objection to the court's comment at trial, and she therefore is barred from raising the issue on appeal. See Francis v. Francis, 279 Ga. 248, 248-249 (611 SE2d 45) (2005).

2. Carol contends that the trial court erred by failing to award her attorney fees. We see no merit to the contention. The trial court's order does not specify the statute pursuant to which the court considered an award of attorney fees. Because neither party sought attorney fees under OCGA

Download S10F1792. HUNTER v. HUNTER.pdf

Georgia Law