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Final Copy 290 Ga. 553 S11A1614. ARMOUR v. THE STATE. NAHMIAS, Justice. Appellant Demarcus Armour challenges his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Bernard Glass. We affirm the judgments of conviction, but we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.1 1. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the On April 3, 2007, Appellant's brothers,

verdict, showed the following.

Montraceus and Demetrius Sims, fought with Jeqavius and Montrez Jones at the Thomasville Heights housing project in Atlanta. Jeqavius Jones shot Demetrius Sims several times in the arm and leg with a 9mm handgun. About an hour later, Appellant and his cousin, co-defendant Damien Norris, jumped out of a van at the housing project and opened fire. Appellant was heard shouting, "I'm
The crimes occurred on April 3, 2007. On August 10, 2007, Appellant was indicted in Fulton County for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during a felony. On June 18, 2009, after a five-day trial along with co-defendant Dam ien Norris, the jury convicted Appellant of all charges. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the malice murder conviction and sentenced Appellant to three concurrent terms of life in prison. On June 29, 2009, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on August 16, 2010. After a hearing on March 17, 2011, the trial court denied the motion on March 29. Appellant filed a timely appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the September 2011 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.
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going to kill all you f------ n------" as he started shooting. Montrez Jones returned fire with his 9mm pistol as Appellant and Norris ran to a breezeway. Multiple witnesses saw two men running from the breezeway while still shooting. A bystander, 16-year-old Bernard Glass, was struck in the back by a .38 caliber bullet as he shielded another child; the wound was fatal. In photographic lineups, at trial, or both, five witnesses identified Appellant as one of the gunmen shooting toward Glass. Police recovered non-9mm shell casings from the breezeway. At trial, Appellant admitted being at the crime scene but denied being a shooter. When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) ("`It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.'" (citation omitted)). 2. Appellant raises three separate challenges to the effectiveness of his

trial counsel. To succeed on any of these claims, Appellant must show both that
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his counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance and that, but for this deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to him. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687-696 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). (a) Appellant contends that his trial counsel was deficient in

failing to seek suppression of multiple eyewitness identifications of him made during photo lineups. However, "due process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary." Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (132 SC 716, 724, 181 LE2d 694) (2012). See also Williams v. State, 286 Ga. 884, 888 (692 SE2d 374) (2010) ("`An unduly suggestive procedure is one which leads the witness to the virtually inevitable identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, and is equivalent to the authorities telling the witness, "This is our suspect."'" (citations omitted)). The record in this case gives no indication that the identification procedures the police used were performed improperly or in an inherently suggestive manner. See Perry, 565 U. S. at ___ (132 SC at 727) (discussing some improperly suggestive lineup procedures). In addition, three eyewitnesses
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who testified at trial knew Appellant before being shown the photo lineup and had seen him clearly during the commission of the crimes, and they therefore had an independent basis for proper identification. See Fletcher v. State, 277 Ga. 795, 797 (596 SE2d 132) (2004). Thus, Appellant has not shown that "`the photographic identification procedure was so (unnecessarily) suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."' Perry, 565 U. S. at ___ (132 SC at 724) (citation omitted). Having failed to show that an objection to the identifications would have been successful, Appellant has failed to establish deficient performance by his trial counsel. See Funes v. State, 289 Ga. 793, 796 (716 SE2d 183) (2011). (b) Appellant claims that his trial counsel was not adequately

prepared for trial based on an alleged failure to properly object when the State violated the discovery statute by disclosing 47 witnesses less than ten days before trial. See OCGA

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