Preview:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIE JONES, also known as  “Willie,”
Respondent-Appellant.
NO.  20543
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO.  95-2042)
JULY  19,  2001
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND RAMIL, JJ.,
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE BLONDIN, IN PLACE OF
ACOBA, J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
On September  4,  1996, following a circuit court jury
trial, respondent-appellant Willie Jones  (Defendant) was
convicted of:                                                                            (1) one count of sexual assault in the second
degree, in violation of Hawai#i Revised Statutes  (HRS)
§  707-731(1)(a)  (1993)1  (Count I);  (2) one count of attempted
1
HRS  §  707-731(1)(a)  states  in  pertinent  part  that  “[a]  person  commits
the  offense  of  sexual  assault  in  the  second  degree  if  .  .  .  [t]he  person
knowingly  subjects  another  person  to  an  act  of  sexual  penetration
(continued...)




sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of HRS
§§  705-500  (1993)2 and  707-731(1)(a)  (Count II);  (3) one count of
sexual assault in the fourth degree, in violation of HRS  §  707-
733(1)                                                                   (b)  (1993)3  (Count III); and  (4) two counts of sexual
assault in the fourth degree, in violation of HRS  §  707-733(1)(a)
(1993)  (Counts IV and V).    Defendant appealed his convictions.
The ICA vacated Defendant’s convictions of Counts I through IV,
holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
regarding consent and that jury unanimity as to the verdicts was
required.    See State v. Jones, No.  20543  (Haw. Ct. App. Oct.  16,
1
(...continued)
by  compulsion[.]”
2
HRS  §  705-500  states,  in  pertinent  part:
Criminal  attempt.                                                       (1)  A  person  is  guilty  of  an
attempt  to  commit  a  crime  if  the  person:
(a)    Intentionally  engages  in  conduct  which  would
constitute  the  crime  if  the  attendant
circumstances  were  as  the  person  believes  them
to  be;  or
(b)    Intentionally  engages  in  conduct  which,  under
the  circumstances  as  the  person  believes  them  to
be,  constitutes  a  substantial  step  in  a  course
of  conduct  intended  to  culminate  in  the  person’s
commission  of  the  crime[.]
3
HRS  §  707-733  states  in  pertinent  part:
Sexual  assault  in  the  fourth  degree.                                (1)  A  person
commits  the  offense  of  sexual  assault  in  the  fourth  degree
if:
(a)    The  person  knowingly  subjects  another  person  to
sexual  contact  by  compulsion  or  causes  another
person  to  have  sexual  contact  with  the  actor  by
compulsion;
(b)    The  person  knowingly  exposes  the  person’s
genitals  to  another  person  under  circumstances
in  which  the  actor’s  conduct  is  likely  to  alarm
the  other  person  or  put  the  other  person  in  fear
of  bodily  injury[.]
-2-




1998).    The ICA also reversed Defendant’s conviction of Count V
after the prosecution conceded that there was no evidence in
support thereof.    See id.
We granted petitioner-appellee State of Hawaii's  (the
prosecution) application for a writ of certiorari to review the
decision of the ICA.    We agree with the ICA that the trial court
reversibly erred in instructing the jury.    However, in light of
our decision in State v. Klinge,  92 Hawai#i  577,  994 P.2d  509,
reconsideration denied,  92 Hawai#i  577,  994 P.2d  509  (2000), and,
because the ICA misapplied this court’s holding in State v.
Arceo,  84 Hawai#i  1,  928 P.2d  843  (1996), we write to clarify the
ICA’s analysis.
I.    BACKGROUND
The background facts are set forth in detail in the
ICA's opinion, see Jones, slip op. at  2-5, which we will not
repeat here.    However, the relevant facts for purposes of our
clarification of the ICA’s analysis are briefly stated below and
presented in more detail in the discussion section, infra.
In July  1994, Complainant, who was then fourteen-years-
old, her family, and some of her friends developed a friendship
with Defendant, who was then thirty-six-years old.    During their
friendship, Complainant and Defendant discussed Complainant’s
interest in modeling and how Defendant could help her begin a
career.
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Complainant testified that, during the course of an
outing with Defendant to the beach, his hotel swimming pool, and
his hotel room sometime in July or August  1994, Defendant:
(1) touched her leg and her right breast, as well as exposed his
genitals, while they were sitting in Defendant’s car;  (2) pulled
Complainant’s bathing suit to the side and  “tr[ied] to stick his
penis” into her vagina while swimming in the hotel pool; and
(3) pulled down her sweat shorts and inserted his penis into her
vagina three times while she was in the bathroom of Defendant’s
hotel room.    Complainant also testified that, when Defendant made
sexual advances toward her, she tried to avoid him or push him
away.
Defendant was subsequently indicted on six counts of
sexual assault for the following acts:    Count I for sexual
assault in the second degree  (sexual penetration in the hotel
room); Count II for attempted sexual assault in the second degree
(attempted sexual penetration in the pool); Count III for sexual
assault in the fourth degree  (exposure of genitals in the car);
Count IV for sexual assault in the fourth degree  (placing hand on
Complainant's breast in the car); Count V for sexual assault in
the fourth degree  (placing penis on Complainant's vagina in the
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hotel room); and Count VI for sexual assault in the fourth degree
(placing hand on Complainant's vagina in the hotel room).4
During closing arguments, Defendant argued that
Complainant had consented to his sexual advances.    The
prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the evidence showed
Complainant’s lack of consent and also focused on Complainant’s
youth, arguing that Defendant was a con artist who took advantage
of a young girl.
At the settling of jury instructions, the parties
agreed to the following consent instruction, which was given by
the court:
In  any  prosecution,  the  complaining  witness’s  consent  to  the
conduct  alleged  or  to  the  result  thereof,  is  a  defense  if
the  consent  negatives  an  element  of  the  offense  or  precludes
the  infliction  of  the  harm  or  evil  sought  to  be  prevented  by
the  law  defining  the  offense.
Consent  is  not  a  defense  if:
(1)  It  is  given  by  a  person  who  is  legally  incompetent
to  authorize  the  conduct  alleged  [hereinafter,  Ground  1];  or
(2)  It  is  given  by  a  person  who  by  reason  of  youth,[5]
mental  disease,  disorder,  or  defect,  or  intoxication  is
manifestly  unable  or  known  by  the  defendant  to  be  unable  to
make  a  reasonable  judgment  as  to  the  nature  or  harmfulness
of  the  conduct  alleged  [hereinafter,  Ground  2];  or
(3)  It  is  given  by  a  person  whose  consent  is  sought  to
be  prevented  by  the  law  defining  the  offense  [hereinafter,
Ground                                                                                        3];  or
                                                                                              (4)  It  is  induced  by  force,  duress,  or  deception
[hereinafter,  Ground                                                                         4].
4                                                                                             At  the  close  of  the  prosecution’s  case-in-chief,  Defendant  moved  for
judgment  of  acquittal  on  all  counts,  which  the  trial  court  denied,  except  as
to  Count  VI,  which  the  court  granted.
5                                                                                             We  note  here  that,  pursuant  to  the  strict  liability  offense  defined
in  HRS  §  707-732(1)(b)  (1993),  when  the  complainant  is  less  than  fourteen
years  old,  the  defendant’s  knowledge  of  the  complainant’s  “youth”  and  the
issue  of  the  complainant’s  consent  are  irrelevant.    Because  Complainant  in
this  case  was  fourteen  years  of  age,  Defendant  was  not  charged  with  the  strict
liability  offense,  and,  therefore,  HRS  §  707-732(1)(b)  is  inapplicable.
-5-




The  burden  is  upon  the  prosecution  to  prove  beyond  a
reasonable  doubt  that  the  complaining  witness  did  not
consent  to  the  conduct  alleged  or  the  result  thereof.    If
the  prosecution  fails  to  meet  its  burden,  then  you  must  find
the  defendant  not  guilty.
After deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to
Counts I through V, and Defendant timely appealed.
On appeal before the ICA, Defendant argued, inter alia,
that his convictions and sentences should be reversed because:
(1) the trial court committed plain error by including Grounds  1
and  3 in the consent instruction because there was no rational
basis in the evidence to support such an instruction;  (2) the
trial court committed plain error by failing to provide the jury
with a specific unanimity instruction with respect to Count I,
advising the jury that all twelve of its members must agree that
the same underlying culpable act had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt; and  (3) Defendant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to ensure
that the jury was properly instructed.
The ICA agreed that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury regarding consent with respect to Counts I
through IV.6    Specifically, the ICA held that,
"[I]neffective  consent"  in  a  criminal  case  as  set  forth  in
Hawai#i  Revised  Statutes                                                                  (HRS)  §  702-235  (1993)  is  an
attendant  circumstance  of  the  offense  to  which  it  is
attributed  and  therefore  a  material  element  which  must  be
proven  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  by  the  prosecution.    We
6                                                                                           As  previously  stated,  the  ICA  reversed  Defendant’s  conviction  and
sentence  as  to  Count  V  based  upon  the  prosecution’s  concession  that  the  trial
court  erroneously  denied  Defendant’s  motion  for  judgment  of  acquittal  on  that
count.
-6-




further  hold  that  because  there  are  four  potential  grounds
upon  which  ineffective  consent  may  be  found,  the  jury  must
be  informed  that  its  decision  must  be  unanimous  as  to  at
least  one  of  these  grounds  before  it  may  render  a  verdict  of
guilty  on  the  offense  involved.    We  also  conclude  that  where
the  jury  is  instructed  that  a  defendant's  criminal  liability
may  be  based  on  the  lack  of  consent  of  the  complaining
witness  (the  complainant)  and  is  also  instructed  on
ineffective  consent,  the  jury  must  be  advised  that  these
bases  for  criminal  liability  are  mutually  exclusive.    Thus,
the  jurors  must  reach  unanimity  on  one  of  them  as  the  basis
for  criminal  liability  as  to  the  offense  concerned.    Because
the  ineffective  consent  instruction  of  the  first  circuit
court  (the  court)  failed  to  inform  the  jury  of  the  foregoing
propositions,  the  instruction  was  prejudicially  erroneous.
Jones, slip op. at  1-2.    Accordingly, the ICA vacated Defendant’s
convictions as to Counts I through IV and remanded the case for a
new trial on those counts.    In light of its disposition, the ICA
declined to address Defendant's remaining contentions.
On November  17,  1998, we granted the prosecution’s
timely petition for a writ of certiorari, wherein the prosecution
argues that the ICA erred in vacating Defendant’s convictions.
The prosecution concedes that the ineffective consent instruction
was erroneously given because the instruction was inapplicable to
the evidence adduced.    However, the prosecution maintains that
the inclusion of the ineffective consent instruction did not
contribute to the verdict because there was sufficient evidence
that Complainant did not consent to Defendant's conduct in the
first place.    The prosecution also contends that the ICA
misapplied this court’s holding in State v. Arceo,  84 Hawai#i  1,
928 P.2d  843  (1996), and that jury unanimity was not required in
this case.
-7-




II.    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.    Statutory Interpretation
“‘The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewable de novo.’”    State v. Klinge,  92 Hawai#i  577,  584,  994
P.2d  509,  516  (quoting State v. Kotis,  91 Hawai#i  319,  327,  984
P.2d  78,  86  (1999)  (citations omitted)), reconsideration denied,
92 Hawai#i  577,  994 P.2d  509  (2000).
B.    Jury Instructions
In the instant case, Defendant’s trial counsel agreed
to the jury instructions as given and, thus, invited the error of
which Defendant now complains.    The ICA, stating that,
ultimately, the trial court is responsible for properly
instructing the jury, concluded that the erroneous instructions
prejudiced Defendant and amounted to plain error by the trial
court.    Jones, slip op. at  19  (citing State v. Feliciano,  62 Haw.
637,  643,  618 P.2d  306,  310  (1980)).    An error is deemed plain
error if the substantial rights of the defendant have been
affected adversely.    See State v. Vanstory,  91 Hawai#i  33,  42,
979 P.2d  1059,  1068  (1999).
We acknowledge that, generally, invited errors are not
reversible.    See State v. Puaoi,  78 Hawai#i  185,  189,  891 P.2d
272,  275  (1995).    However, on appeal before the ICA, Defendant
argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based
on, inter alia, defense counsel’s failure to ensure that the jury
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was properly instructed.    Specifically, Defendant contends that
the ineffective consent instruction agreed to by trial counsel
was not supported by the evidence adduced and that this error
prejudiced Defendant.    When an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is raised, the defendant has the burden of establishing:
“1) that there were specific errors or omissions reflecting
counsel's lack of skill, judgment, or diligence; and  2) that such
errors or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or
substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.”
State v. Fukusaku,  85 Hawai#i  462,  479-80,  946 P.2d  32,  49-50
(1997)  (citations omitted).
Whether we review the jury instructions in this case
for plain error by the trial court or as an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the ultimate question is whether the
erroneous instructions prejudiced Defendant’s rights.    Here, the
prosecution has conceded that the ineffective consent instruction
was erroneously given.7    Indeed,  “erroneous instructions are
presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal unless it
affirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error
was not prejudicial.”    State v. Valentine,  93 Hawai#i  199,  204,
998 P.2d  479,  484  (2000)  (citations omitted).    However, the error
7                                                                                            As  discussed  infra,  our  independent  review  of  the  record  and  relevant
case  law  supports  the  prosecution’s  confession  of  error.    See  State  v.  Hoang,
93  Hawai#i                                                                                  333,  336,  3  P.3d  499,  502  (2000)  (recognizing  that,  even  when  the
prosecutor  concedes  error,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  appellate  court  to  ascertain
whether  the  confession  of  error  is  supported  by  the  record  and  well-founded  in
law).
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is  not  to  be  viewed  in  isolation  and  considered  purely  in
the  abstract.    It  must  be  examined  in  the  light  of  the
entire  proceedings  and  given  the  effect  which  the  whole
record  shows  it  to  be  entitled.    In  that  context,  the  real
question  becomes  whether  there  is  a  reasonable  possibility
that  error  may  have  contributed  to  conviction.
If  there  is  such  a  reasonable  possibility  in  a
criminal  case,  then  the  error  is  not  harmless  beyond  a
reasonable  doubt,  and  the  judgment  of  conviction  on  which  it
may  have  been  based  must  be  set  aside.
Id.  (emphasis added)  (citations omitted).
III.    DISCUSSION
The key issue presented in this case is whether the
consent instruction was prejudicially erroneous because:  (1) the
jury was instructed that it could find Defendant guilty based on
either of two alternative theories of guilt based on the lack of
legal consent  -- either  (a) that Complainant did not consent to
the conduct, or  (b) that Complainant consented, but her consent
was legally ineffective  (based on any of the four grounds of
ineffective consent);  (2) it is impossible to ascertain the
theory of guilt upon which the jury rested its guilty verdict
because the jury was not instructed that it must be unanimous as
to one of the theories; and  (3) there was legally insufficient
evidence to support the ineffective consent theory.
The prosecution concedes that the trial court’s
instruction as to ineffective consent was erroneously given
because there was insufficient evidence to support such an
instruction, but maintains that the error was harmless.    The
prosecution argues that, inasmuch as the ineffective consent
instruction was clearly inapplicable and there was strong
-10-




evidence that Complainant did not consent, the error did not
contribute to the verdict.    However, the prosecution also
acknowledges and the record reflects that there was some evidence
and argument to the jury supporting some of the grounds of
ineffective consent.    Because it is possible that the jury
incorrectly believed that it could convict Defendant based on a
finding of ineffective consent, despite the lack of legally
sufficient evidence, see discussion infra, we agree with the ICA
that the consent instruction as given was prejudicially
erroneous, affecting Defendant’s substantial rights.    However, we
granted the prosecution’s application for certiorari to clarify
the ICA’s analysis.
A.    Counts I through IV
1.                                                                       General Principles
HRS  §  702-205  (1993) defines the  “elements of an
offense” as:
such  (1)  conduct,  (2)  attendant  circumstances,  and  (3)
results  of  conduct,  as:
(a)    Are  specified  by  the  definition  of  the  offense,  and
(b)    Negative  a  defense  (other  than  a  defense  based  on  the
statute  of  limitations,  lack  of  venue,  or  lack  of
jurisdiction).
(Emphases added.)    Further, HRS  §  701-114  (1993) provides that no
person may be convicted of an offense without proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of each element of the offense.    As discussed
below, the lack of legal consent was an element of each of the
offenses in Counts I, II, III, and IV.
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Because  “compulsion” is an element of each of the
crimes charged in Counts I, II, and IV, the prosecution had the
burden of proving that Defendant committed the culpable acts  “by
compulsion.”    HRS  §§  707-731(1)(a) and  707-733(1)(a).8    The
definition of compulsion includes the  “absence of consent.”    HRS
§  707-700  (1993).9    Thus, with respect to Counts I, II, and IV,
the  “absence of consent” is an element of the offense  “specified
by the definition of the offense,” HRS  §  702-205(a), and was
required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the
prosecution.
With respect to Count III, the prosecution must prove
that Defendant  “knowingly expose[d]  [his] genitals to
[Complainant] under circumstances in which  [his] conduct  [was]
likely to alarm the  [Complainant] or put the  [Complainant] in
fear of bodily injury[.]”    HRS  §  707-733(b)  (emphasis added).
HRS  §  702-233  (1993) provides that:
In  any  prosecution,  the  [victim's]  consent  to  the  conduct
alleged,  or  to  the  result  thereof,  is  a  defense  if  the
consent  negatives  an  element  of  the  offense  or  precludes  the
infliction  of  the  harm  or  evil  sought  to  be  prevented  by  the
law  defining  the  offense.
(Emphasis added.)   Clearly, consent negatives the element that
Defendant's  “conduct  [was] likely to alarm  [Complainant] or put
8                                                                                        See  supra  notes  1  and  3.
9                                                                                        HRS  §  707-700  provides  that  “‘[c]ompulsion’  means  the  absence  of
consent,  or  a  threat,  express  or  implied,  that  places  a  person  in  fear  of
public  humiliation,  property  damage,  or  financial  loss.”      The  prosecution’s
theory  of  the  case,  however,  focused  upon  the  absence  of  consent.
-12-




[her] in fear of bodily injury.”    Id.    Consent, therefore, is a
defense to Count III, and, pursuant to HRS  §  702-205(b), the
prosecution had the burden of negating the defense of consent.
In the context of this case, there were two possible
ways for the prosecution to meet its burden of negating the
defense of consent.    The first way  -- the prosecution’s primary
theory  -- was to prove that Complainant did not consent at all,
i.e.,  “the absence of consent.”    The second way was to prove
that, even if Complainant consented, such consent was
ineffective.    HRS  §  702-235  (1993) provides that consent is not a
defense if:
(1)                                                                      It  is  given  by  a  person  who  is  legally  incompetent  to
authorize  the  conduct  alleged  [Ground  1];    or
(2)                                                                      It  is  given  by  a  person  who  by  reason  of  youth,  mental
disease,  disorder,  or  defect,  or  intoxication  is
manifestly  unable  or  known  by  the  defendant  to  be
unable  to  make  a  reasonable  judgment  as  to  the  nature
or  harmfulness  of  the  conduct  alleged  [Ground  2];    or
(3)                                                                      It  is  given  by  a  person  whose  improvident  consent  is
sought  to  be  prevented  by  the  law  defining  the  offense
[Ground  3];    or
(4)                                                                      It  is  induced  by  force,  duress  or  deception  [Ground
4].
The commentary to HRS  §  702-235 provides that  “[t]his section
deprives the defendant of a defense based on consent in those
situations where the  [victim’s] apparent consent is actually
meaningless.”    Commentary to HRS  §  702-235  (emphasis added).
Further,  “[f]acts which deprive consent of its effectiveness
negative a defense, thereby making them elements of the offense.”
Id.
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Moreover, Hawaii’s case law recognizes that ineffective
consent, if proven, also renders consent meaningless where the
absence of consent is an element of the crime specified in the
definition of the offense.    See State v. Oshiro,  5 Haw. App.  404,
408,  696 P.2d  846,  850  (1985)  (“[I]f consent as a defense is
subject to the ten qualifications of HRS  §  702-235, then  [lack
of] consent as an element is similarly restricted.”).    Thus, with
respect to each of Counts I, II, III, and IV, the attendant
circumstance of lack of legal consent was an element of the
charged offense, see HRS  §  702-205, and the prosecution could
prove that element by establishing  (1) that Complainant did not
consent  (“absence of consent”) or  (2) that any  “apparent” consent
was ineffective pursuant to HRS  §  702-235  (“ineffective
consent”).    As discussed in section III.B., infra, we must
determine whether the jury was required to reach a unanimous
verdict as to the particular mode of proving the element of lack
of legal consent.
2.                                                                         Jury Instructions
With respect to jury instructions, "[i]t is a grave
error to submit a  [criminal] case to a jury without accurately
defining the offense charged and its elements.    Accordingly, the
jury may not be instructed in a manner that would relieve the
prosecution of its burden of proving every element of the offense
charged.”    State v. Jenkins,  93 Hawai#i  87,  108,  997 P.2d  13,  34
-14-




(2000)  (citations and footnote omitted).    Further,  “where  .  .  .
the jury has been given instructions on a defense other than an
affirmative defense,[10] but has not been instructed that the
prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
with respect to negativing that defense, substantial rights of
the defendant may be affected and plain error may be noticed.”
Raines v. State  79 Hawai#i  219,  225,  900 P.2d  1286,  1292  (1995);
see also HRS  §  701-115  (1993).
In its application, the prosecution seems to argue that
Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of
consent.    However,
[o]ur  cases  have  firmly  established  that  a  defendant  is
entitled  to  an  instruction  on  every  defense  or  theory  of
defense  having  any  support  in  the  evidence,  provided  such
evidence  would  support  the  consideration  of  that  issue  by
the  jury,  no  matter  how  weak,  inconclusive,  or
unsatisfactory  the  evidence  may  be.    State  v.  Sawyer,  88
Hawai#i                                                                                         325,  333,  966  P.2d  637,  645  (1998)  (quoting  State  v.
Kaiama,  81  Hawai#i                                                                            15,  24,  911  P.2d  735,  744  (1996)[).]
State v. Cabrera,  90 Hawai#i  359,  370,  978 P.2d  797,  808  (1999)
(some citations and internal quotation marks omitted).    It was
Defendant's theory of the case that Complainant had consented to
his sexual acts based on evidence that she voluntarily
accompanied him all day to the beach and his hotel room, even
after an alleged assault, and that she did not complain to any of
10                                                                                              Pursuant  to  HRS  §  701-115(3)  (1993),  “[a]  defense  is  an  affirmative
defense  if:                                                                                    (a)  It  is  specifically  so  designated  by  the  Code  or  another
statute;  or  (b)  If  the  Code  or  another  statute  plainly  requires  the  defendant
to  prove  the  defense  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.”    An  affirmative
defense  is  not  one  that  the  prosecution  is  required  to  negative  as  an  element
of  the  offense.    See  State  v.  Anderson,  58  Haw.  479,  484-85,  572  P.2d  159,  163
(1977).
-15-




the other children who were present.    Although this evidence is
inconclusive as to the ultimate question whether Complainant
consented to the conduct alleged, under Cabrera, the evidence was
relevant to Defendant’s theory that Complainant consented.
Therefore, as to Counts I, II, III, and IV, the attendant
circumstance of lack of legal consent was an element of the crime
charged, and thus, the trial court was required to instruct the
jury as to the defense of consent with respect to each of those
counts.    Accordingly, we reject the prosecution’s argument that
Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding the
defense of consent.
B.    The Right to a Unanimous Verdict
The prosecution contends that the ICA erred by holding
that Defendant was denied his right to a unanimous verdict
because the ICA misapplied this court’s holding in Arceo.
“[T]he right of an accused to a unanimous verdict in a
criminal prosecution, tried before a jury in a court of this
state, is guaranteed by article I, sections  5 and  14 of the
Hawai#i Constitution[11].”    Arceo,  84 Hawai#i at  30,  928 P.2d at
872.    The jury must unanimously find that each material element
of the offense has been proven  -- the conduct, the attendant
11
Article  I,  section  5  of  the  Hawai#i  Constitution  provides  in  relevant  part
that  “[n]o  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due
process  of  law[.]”    Article  I,  section  14  provides  in  relevant  part  that,
“[i]n  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a  speedy
and  public  trial  by  an  impartial  jury[.]    Juries,  where  the  crime  charged  is
serious,  shall  consist  of  twelve  persons.”
-16-




circumstances, and the result of conduct  -- as well as the mental
state requisite to each element.    See id.; HRS  §§  702-204  (1993)
and  702-205  (1993).
1.                                                                      State v. Arceo:    Separate and Distinct Culpable Acts
In Arceo, evidence of multiple acts of sexual contact
and sexual penetration was introduced to support each of two
counts of sexual assault.                                               84 Hawai#i at  3,  928 P.2d at  845.    This
court held that, "when separate and distinct culpable acts are
subsumed within a single count charging a sexual assault  -- any
one of which could support a conviction thereunder  -- and the
defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged
offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous
verdict is violated" unless either the prosecution elects the
specific conduct upon which it intends to rely to establish the
conduct element of the offense or the trial court gives the jury
a specific unanimity instruction.    Id. at  32-33,  928 P.2d at
874-75.    The prosecution argues that the unanimity requirement
articulated in Arceo does not apply to the instant case because
the various grounds upon which the jury could have found a lack
of consent, i.e., the absence of consent or one of the four
grounds for finding ineffective consent, did not amount to
separate and distinct culpable acts that could support separate
counts of an indictment or complaint.    We agree with the
prosecution.
-17-




As this court recognized in Valentine,
[t]he  Arceo  decision  dealt  with  a  situation  in  which  the
prosecution  had  adduced  evidence  regarding  independent
incidents,  during  each  of  which  the  defendant  engaged  in
conduct  that  could  constitute  the  offense  charged,  and  each
of  which  could  have  been,  but  were  not,  charged  as  separate
offenses.    Inasmuch  as  these  independent  instances  of
culpable  conduct  were  submitted  to  the  jury  in  a  single
count  that  charged  but  one  offense,  we  held  that  a  specific
unanimity  instruction  was  necessary  to  ensure  that  each
juror  convicted  the  defendant  on  the  basis  of  the  same
incident  of  culpable  conduct.
Thus,  two  conditions  must  converge  before  an  Arceo
unanimity  instruction,  absent  an  election  by  the
prosecution,  is  necessary:  (1)  at  trial,  the  prosecution
adduces  proof  of  two  or  more  separate  and  distinct  culpable
acts;  and  (2)  the  prosecution  seeks  to  submit  to  the  jury
that  only  one  offense  was  committed.    Moreover,  it  bears
repeating  that  the  purpose  of  an  Arceo  unanimity  instruction
is  to  eliminate  any  ambiguity  that  might  infect  the  jury's
deliberations  respecting  the  particular  conduct  in  which  the
defendant  is  accused  of  engaging  and  that  allegedly
constitutes  the  charged  offense.
93 Hawai#i at  208,  998 P.2d at  488  (emphases added)  (citations
omitted).
In the instant case, although the prosecution adduced
proof of two or more  “separate and distinct culpable acts” or
“independent incidents,” the prosecution correctly charged
Defendant with separate counts of sexual assault with respect to
each distinct culpable act or incident.12    Thus, the danger
present in Arceo that the jury did not agree upon which
independent incident constituted the charged offense was not
presented by the consent instruction in this case.    See
12                                                                                             The  jury  was  presented  with  the  following  “separate  and  distinct
culpable  acts”  or  “independent  incidents”:    Count  I  for  sexual  assault  in  the
second  degree  (sexual  penetration  in  the  hotel  room);  Count  II  for  attempted
sexual  assault  in  the  second  degree  (attempted  sexual  penetration  in  the
pool);  Count  III  for  sexual  assault  in  the  fourth  degree  (exposure  of  genitals
in  the  car);  Count  IV  for  sexual  assault  in  the  fourth  degree  (placing  hand  on
Complainant's  breast  in  the  car);  and  Count  V  for  sexual  assault  in  the  fourth
degree  (placing  penis  on  Complainant's  vagina  in  the  hotel  room).
-18-




Valentine,  93 Hawai#i at  208,  998 P.2d at  488  (“[T]here was no
danger that the jury would be confused regarding the conduct of
which  [Defendant] was accused and that constituted the charged
offense.”).    Rather, the problem presented by the consent
instruction in this case, discussed infra, was that the jury was
presented with alternative means of establishing a single element
of each of the charged offenses, specifically, the lack of legal
consent, where there was insufficient evidence to support one of
those alternative means.
Other state courts have made a distinction between
“alternative means” cases and  “multiple acts” cases.    The
distinction has been explained as follows:
In  an  alternative  means  case,  where  a  single  offense
may  be  committed  in  more  than  one  way,  there  must  be  jury
unanimity  as  to  guilt  for  the  single  crime  charged.
Unanimity  is  not  required,  however,  as  to  the  means  by  which
the  crime  was  committed  so  long  as  substantial  evidence
supports  each  alternative  means.[13]    In  reviewing  an
alternative  means  case,  the  court  must  determine  whether  a
rational  trier  of  fact  could  have  found  each  means  of
committing  the  crime  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.
In  multiple  acts  cases,  on  the  other  hand,  several
acts  are  alleged  and  any  one  of  them  could  constitute  the
crime  charged.    In  these  cases,  the  jury  must  be  unanimous
as  to  which  act  or  incident  constitutes  the  crime.    To
ensure  jury  unanimity  in  multiple  acts  cases,  we  require
that  either  the  State  elect  the  particular  criminal  act  upon
which  it  will  rely  for  conviction,  or  that  the  trial  court
instruct  the  jury  that  all  of  them  must  agree  that  the  same
underlying  criminal  act  has  been  proved  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt.
13                                                                                     Jurisdictions  employ  varying  approaches  in  determining  whether  jury
unanimity  is  required  in  alternative  means  cases  and  differ  as  to  whether
substantial  evidence  of  each  alternative  means  is  required.    See  infra
sections  III.B.2.a.  and  III.B.2.b.
-19-




State v. Timley,  875 P.2d  242,  246  (Kan.  1994)  (quoting State v.
Kitchen,  756 P.2d  105,  109  (Wash.  1988))  (citations and quotation
marks omitted).    The foregoing distinction is consistent with
Arceo, which relied heavily on federal law, as well as cases from
Washington, Alaska, Colorado, and Tennessee, in holding that
unanimity is required, absent an election by the prosecution, as
to each separate and distinct culpable act.    Arceo,  84 Hawai#i at
32,  928 P.2d at  874  (“In our view, the logic of  [State v.
]Petrich,  [683 P.2d  173,  177  (Wash.  1984), modified by Kitchen,
756 P.2d at  109-10,] Covington  [v. State],  [703 P.2d  436,  440,
aff’d in part on reh’g, State v. Covington,  711 P.2d  1183,  1185
(Alaska Ct. App.  1985)  (holding that, although trial court erred
by failing to give unanimity instruction, error was not raised at
trial and did not constitute plain error requiring reversal of
conviction)],  [People v.  ]Aldrich,  [849 P.2d  821  (Colo. Ct. App.
1992),]  [State v.  ]Brown,  [762 S.W.2d  135, reh’g denied,  762
S.W.2d  135  (Tenn.  1988)], and the line of federal decisions
arising out of  [United States v.  ]Echeverry[,  719 F.2d  974  (9th
Cir.  1983)] is cogent, compelling, and ineluctable.”).    Some of
the cases relied upon by the court in Arceo, like Timley, make
the distinction between alternative means cases and multiple acts
cases.    See Petrich,  683 P.2d at  177  (distinguishing case
involving  “several criminal acts” from  “alternative means
cases”); Covington,  703 P.2d at  439-40  (distinguishing case
-20-




involving  “separate criminal acts” from a case involving
“different means of committing the same offense”).    Indeed, each
of the jurisdictions relied upon in Arceo employs some form of
alternative means analysis.    See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona,  501
U.S.  624, reh’g denied,  501 U.S.  1277  (1991)  (adopting rational
and fair approach to alternative means analysis); Kitchen,  756
P.2d at  109  (making distinction between alternative means cases
and multiple act cases, identifying Petrich as a multiple acts
case); State v. James,  698 P.2d  1161,  1165-67  (Alaska  1985)
(holding that juries need not unanimously agree upon particular
statutory theory of crime charged if there is sufficient evidence
in record to support either theory, where jury is instructed
disjunctively or on alternative methods by which defendant may
commit single offense; jury need only be unanimous in its
conclusion that defendant committed single offense described in
statute)  (cited in and distinguished by Covington,  703 P.2d at
439-40); James v. People,  727 P.2d  850,  854-55  (Colo.  1986)
(recognizing  “the general principle that a defendant is not
deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict in circumstances
where the court instructs the jury that the crime can be
committed in alternative ways and the jury returns a general
verdict of guilty” and holding that there must be sufficient
evidence of each alternative to uphold the general verdict);
State v. Lemacks,  996 S.W.2d  166,  169-71  (Tenn.  1998)  (holding
-21-




that unanimity was not required as to alternative theories of
establishing DUI offense and distinguishing case from  “multiple
criminal acts” cases such as Brown).
We agree with the foregoing distinction and emphasize
that  “separate and distinct culpable acts,” or  “independent
incidents,” each of which could support a separate count of an
indictment or complaint, may not be treated as  “alternative
means” of proving the conduct element of an offense.14    Each
“separate and distinct culpable act” or  “independent incident”
that may be charged as a separate count includes the conduct,
attendant circumstances, and result of conduct that may be
present.
To illustrate the conceptual difference between
separate and distinct culpable acts or independent incidents and
the conduct element, consider the following example.    A defendant
is charged with committing the offense of simple trespass upon
two different properties on the same day.    HRS  §  708-815  (1993)
provides that  “[a] person commits the offense of simple trespass
if the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon
premises.”    Evidence is adduced that Defendant trespassed upon
14                                                                                        As  discussed  infra,  we  use  the  term  “alternative  means”  to  describe
the  legal  concept  of  statutory  alternatives  for  proving  a  single  element  of
the  offense  charged.    See  State  v.  Klinge,  92  Hawai#i  577,  994  P.2d  509,
reconsideration  denied,  92  Hawai#i  577,  994  P.2d  509  (2000).    The  legal
concept  of  “alternative  means”  is  distinct  from  the  term  “multiple  acts,”
which  refers  to  “separate  and  distinct  culpable  acts”  as  discussed  in  Arceo,
84  Hawai#i  at                                                                           32-33,  928  P.2d  at  874-75.
-22-




premises A  (Incident A) and upon premises B  (Incident B).    If the
prosecution has charged the defendant in a single count, then the
analysis in Arceo applies and either the prosecution must elect
which incident it is relying upon in the single count or a
unanimity instruction is required.    The prosecution may not treat
the acts of entering premises A and B as  “alternative means” of
proving the conduct element of one count because they represent
independent incidents.    However, if the prosecution charges the
defendant with separate counts as to each independent incident,
then the requirements of Arceo are met.    With respect to each
individual count, the statutory alternatives of  “enters” or
“remains” may be treated as  “alternative means” of proving the
conduct element of the offense, as long as it is  “rational and
fair” to do so under the test set forth in Klinge.    See
discussion infra.                                                         “Alternative means” is a specific legal
concept that addresses whether statutory alternatives, not
multiple acts or incidents, may be treated as a single element of
the crime.    See Klinge,  92 Hawai#i at  586-89,  994 P.2d at  518-21.
In an abstract sense, there may be a danger that separate and
distinct culpable acts could be viewed as alternative ways of
establishing the conduct element of the crime.    However, this is
precisely why we distinguish  “multiple act” cases from
“alternative means” cases.    This distinction affirms the
principles underlying both Arceo and Klinge and avoids the absurd
-23-




result of requiring unanimity every time a criminal statute uses
the word  “or.”    Cf. Klinge,  92 Hawai#i at  606 n.12,  994 P.2d at
538 n.12  (Ramil, J. dissenting)  (“It is elementary that the mere
presence of the word  ‘or’ in a statute would not, in and of
itself, implicate a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict.”).15
Because the prosecution correctly charged Defendant
with separate counts of sexual assault with respect to each
distinct culpable act or incident, the danger present in Arceo  --
that the jury did not agree upon which independent incident
constituted the charged offense  -- was not presented by the
consent instruction in this case.    Having determined that Arceo
does not apply to the facts of this case, we now examine this
court’s recent decision in Klinge, which recognized that
unanimity may not be required where the jury is presented with
alternative means of establishing a single element of the offense
charged.                                                                                        92 Hawai#i at  589,  994 P.2d at  521.
15                                                                                              We  recognize  that  reasonable  minds  may  disagree  as  to  whether
statutory  alternatives  may  “rationally  and  fairly”  be  treated  as  “alternative
means”  of  establishing  a  single  element  of  a  crime  or  actually  define  separate
crimes.    For  example,  in  Klinge,  the  majority  of  the  court  believed  that
“intent  to  terrorize”  and  “intent  to  evacuate”  were  merely  “alternative  means”
of  establishing  the  mental  state  of  the  offense  of  terroristic  threatening
under  HRS  §  707-715  (1993).    See  Klinge,  92  Hawai#i  at  589,  994  P.2d  at  521  &
discussion  infra.    The  dissenters,  on  the  other  hand,  believed  that  these
statutory  alternatives  were  aimed  at  prohibiting  different  results  and  that
the  language  of  the  statute  evinced  a  legislative  intent  to  define  separate
offenses.    Id.  at  597-600;  994  P.2d  at  529-32  (Ramil,  J.,  dissenting,  joined
by  Levinson,  J.).
-24-




2.                                                                        State v. Klinge:    Alternative Means
In Klinge, the defendant  (Klinge) was convicted of
terroristic threatening in the first degree.                              92 Hawai#i at  579,
994 P.2d at  511.    HRS  §  707-715  (1993) provides that a person
commits the offense of terroristic threatening
if  the  person  threatens,  by  word  or  conduct,  to  cause  bodily
injury  to  another  person  or  serious  damage  to  property  of
another  or  to  commit  a  felony:
(1)                                                                       With  the  intent  to  terrorize,  or  in  reckless
                                                                          disregard  of  the  risk  of  terrorizing,  another
person;  or
(2)                                                                       With  intent  to  cause,  or  in  reckless  disregard
of  the  risk  of  causing  evacuation  of  a  building,
place  of  assembly,  or  facility  of  public
transportation.
On appeal, Klinge argued that his constitutional right to a
unanimous verdict was violated because the two alternative mental
states upon which the jury could have convicted him of
terroristic threatening gave rise to separate crimes and the
trial court erred in failing to issue an instruction guaranteeing
unanimity as to either  “intent.”    Id. at  579-80,  994 P.2d  511-12.
Rejecting Klinge’s contentions, this court held that
HRS  §  707-715  defines  a  single  criminal  offense.  .  .             .  HRS
§§  707-715(1)  and  (2)  constitute  alternative  means  of
establishing  the  mens  rea  of  the  offense  of  terroristic
threatening  --  either  one  giving  rise  to  the  same  criminal
culpability.    Accordingly,  the  trial  court  in  [Klinge]  did
not  err  in  its  instruction  to  the  jury.
Id. at  589,  994 P.2d at  521  (emphasis omitted).    In Klinge, the
determination whether unanimity was required focused on whether
the two alternative mental states, provided in the statute,
defined separate crimes requiring individual proof of each
-25-




offense16 or merely constituted alternative means of establishing
the state of mind element of a single offense.    In order to
determine whether jury unanimity was required as to the
alternative mental states provided in the statute, this court in
Klinge, relying on Schad v. Arizona,  501 U.S.  624, reh’g denied,
501 U.S.  1277  (1991), considered  “whether the level of verdict
specificity required by the instructions was rational and fair,
considering history and practice, and the degree of
‘blameworthiness and culpability.’”    Klinge,  92 Hawai#i at  586-87,
994 P.2d at  518-19  (citation omitted).17
16                                                                                            We  note  that,  in  certain  circumstances,  if  statutory  alternatives  do
indeed  define  separate  offenses,  then  the  court  must  consider  whether
conviction  of  more  than  one  offense  would  be  prohibited  under  HRS  §  701-109
(1993).
17                                                                                            In  Schad,  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  rejected  the  adoption  of
any  single  test  or  criterion  for  determining  whether  statutory  alternatives
could  fairly  be  treated  as  alternative  means  or  separate  crimes.    The  Court
recognized  that  there  was  a  body  of  federal  law,  derived  from  United  States  v.
Gipson,  553  F.2d  453  (5th  Cir.  1977),  that  employed  a  “distinct  conceptual
groupings”  test  [hereinafter,  conceptually  distinct  test]  to  determine  what
constitutes  an  immaterial  difference  as  to  mere  means  and  what  constitutes  a
material  difference  requiring  separate  theories  of  a  crime  to  be  treated  as
separate  crimes  subject  to  separate  jury  findings.    Schad,  501  U.S.  at  633-34.
However,  Schad  rejected  the  Gipson  conceptually  distinct  test  as  “too
indeterminate  to  provide  concrete  guidance”  and  also  rejected  the  adoption  of
“an  inflexible  rule  of  maximum  verdict  specificity.”    Id.  at  635-36.    The
Court  reasoned  as  follows:
It  is  tempting,  of  course,  to  follow  the  example  of  Gipson
to  the  extent  of  searching  for  some  single  criterion  that
will  serve  to  answer  the  question  facing  us.    We  are
convinced,  however,  of  the  impracticability  of  trying  to
derive  any  single  test  for  the  level  of  definitional  and
verdict  specificity  permitted  by  the  Constitution,  and  we
think  that  instead  of  such  a  test  our  sense  of  appropriate
specificity  is  a  distillate  of  the  concept  of  due  process
with  its  demands  for  fundamental  fairness,  see,  e.g.,
Dowling  v.  United  States,  493  U.S.  342,  352-353,  110  S.  Ct.
668,  674,  107  L.  Ed.  2d  708  (1990),  and  for  the  rationality
that  is  an  essential  component  of  that  fairness.    In
translating  these  demands  for  fairness  and  rationality  into
(continued...)
-26-




The discussion in Klinge makes clear that the
determination whether it is rational and fair to treat statutory
alternatives as  “alternative means” must be made on a case-by-
case basis.18    In making such determination, we considered
17
(...continued)
concrete  judgments  about  the  adequacy  of  legislative
determinations,  we  look  both  to  history  and  wide  practice  as
guides  to  fundamental  values,  as  well  as  to  narrower
analytical  methods  of  testing  the  moral  and  practical
equivalence  of  the  different  mental  states  that  may  satisfy
the  mens  rea  element  of  a  single  offense.    The  enquiry  is
undertaken  with  a  threshold  presumption  of  legislative
competence  to  determine  the  appropriate  relationship  between
means  and  ends  in  defining  the  elements  of  a  crime.
Id.  at  638  (emphasis  added).
Following  Schad,  federal  courts  have  further  clarified  the  difference
between  “means”  and  “elements”  by  recognizing  that  the  jury  must  unanimously
find  that  each  element  has  been  proven,  but  the  jury  need  not  agree
unanimously  on  the  means  by  which  an  element  has  been  proven.    See  United
States  v.  Powell,  226  F.2d  1181,  1196  (10th  Cir.  2000)  (citing  Richardson  v.
United  States,  526  U.S.  813,  817  (1999)  (citing  Johnson  v.  Louisiana,  406  U.S.
356,  369-71  (1972)  (Powell,  J.,  concurring);  Schad,  501  U.S.  at  629)).    In
this  opinion,  we  go  even  further  than  the  federal  courts  in  the  level  of
unanimity  required  by  specifically  distinguishing  “multiple  acts”  cases  from
“alternative  means”  cases  and  ensuring  that  “separate  and  distinct  culpable
acts”  or  “independent  incidents”  may  not  be  treated  as  alternative  means  of
proving  the  conduct  element  of  an  offense.    See  supra  note  13  and  accompanying
text.
18                                                                                            By  way  of  illustration,  HRS  §  707-711  (1993)  provides  in  relevant
part:
Assault  in  the  second  degree.  (1)  A  person  commits  the
offense  of  assault  in  the  second  degree  if:
(a)    The  person  intentionally  or  knowingly  causes
substantial  bodily  injury  to  another;  [or]
(b)    The  person  recklessly  causes  serious  bodily
injury  to  another  person[.]
Although  subsections  (a)  and  (b)  are  “statutory  alternatives”  for  proving
assault  in  the  second  degree,  they  could  not  rationally  and  fairly  be  treated
as  alternative  means  of  establishing  a  single  element  of  an  offense.    Rather,
subsections  (a)  and  (b)  define  separate  offenses,  each  with  its  own  “set  of
elements.”    The  history  and  practice  in  this  jurisdiction  also  demonstrate
that  subsections  (a)  and  (b)  have  been  treated  as  separate  offenses.    See,
e.g.,  State  v.  Gomes,  93  Hawai'i  13,  15,  995  P.2d  314,  316  (2000)  (indictment
charged  defendant  with  one  count  of  assault  in  the  second  degree,  in  violation
of  subsection  (a));  State  v.  Kekona,  77  Hawai'i  403,  404,  886  P.2d  740,  741
(continued...)
-27-




several factors, including, but not limited to, the language and
legislative history of relevant statutes, the history and
practice in Hawai#i and other jurisdictions, and whether the
alternatives reflect equivalent notions of blameworthiness and
culpability.    Id.    In holding that unanimity was not required as
to the alternative mental states defined in the terroristic
threatening statute applicable in Klinge, we declined to  “express
any opinion on the necessity of unanimity in other situations not
present in this case.”    Id. at  589 n.12,  994 P.2d at  521 n.12.
Thus, although this court recognized that unanimity may not be
18
(...continued)
(1994)  (defendant  charged  with  assault  in  the  second  degree  in  violation  of
subsection  (b)).    Thus,  if  a  defendant  was  charged  with  and  evidence  was
adduced  of  a  single  incident  of  assault,  the  prosecution  would  have  to  elect
which  offense  --  subsection  (a)  or  (b)  --  it  was  attempting  to  establish  and,
under  HRS  §  701-109,  the  defendant  could  not  be  convicted  of  both  offenses  for
the  same  conduct.    See  supra  note  15.
However,  we  note  that,  where  a  defendant  is  charged  with  committing  an
offense  under  subsection  (a),  the  statutory  alternatives  --  “intentionally”  or
“knowingly”  --  may  be  treated  as  alternative  means  of  establishing  the
requisite  mental  state  under  subsection  (a).
As  in  Klinge,  we  emphasize  that  the  determination  whether  the  statutory
alternatives  may  rationally  and  fairly  be  treated  as  “alternative  means”  must
be  made  on  a  case-by-case  basis.    In  his  concurring  opinion  (in  which
Levinson,  J.  joins),  Justice  Ramil  suggests  that,  applying  the  factors
discussed  in  Schad  and  adopted  in  Klinge,  this  court  is  somehow  bound  to
interpret  the  Hawai#i  Penal  Code,  specifically  HRS  §  707-701(1)  (1993),  which
defines  the  offense  of  first  degree  murder,  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  both
the  intent  of  the  Hawai#i  legislature  and  the  Hawai#i  Constitution.    See
Concurring  op.  at  9-10  &  n.5.    To  the  contrary,  the  factors  to  be  considered
under  Schad  and  Klinge  include  the  intent  of  the  legislature  and  the
consideration  of  what  is  rational  and  fair  under  the  due  process  clause  of  the
Hawai#i  Constitution.    See  discussion  supra.    We  do  not  necessarily  disagree
with  Justice  Ramil’s  interpretation  of  HRS  §  707-701(1),  which  is  essentially
that,  based  on  the  language  of  the  statute  and  the  history  and  practice  in
this  jurisdiction,  subsections  (a)  through  (e)  of  HRS  §  707-701(1)  define
separate  offenses  that  could  not  rationally  and  fairly  be  treated  as
alternative  means  of  establishing  an  element  of  the  crime.    However,  we  fail
to  see  how  the  application  of  the  factors  adopted  in  Klinge  would  require  a
different  result.
-28-




required where the jury is presented with alternative means of
satisfying the requisite state of mind element of a single
offense, we did not address in Klinge the issues presented here:
(a) whether jury unanimity is required when the jury is presented
with alternative means of establishing an element other than
mental state; and  (b) whether due process requires sufficient
evidence of each alternative means to uphold a verdict where it
is impossible to tell which alternative the jury relied upon.
a.    alternative means of establishing lack of
legal consent
In addressing the first issue, we must determine
whether the alternative theories of guilt presented to the jury
regarding the lack of legal consent  --  (1) the absence of consent
or  (2) ineffective consent  (based on any of the four grounds of
ineffective consent)-- define separate crimes or may be treated
as alternative means of establishing an element of a single
offense.    As in Klinge, we examine the statutory provision, the
“history and practice” in Hawai#i and other jurisdictions, and
whether the alternatives  “reasonably reflect notions of
equivalent blameworthiness and culpability.”    See Klinge,  92
Hawai#i at  587-89,  994 P.2d at  519-21.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that, based on
the facts and the charged offenses in this case, the alternative
theories of absence of consent and ineffective consent do not
represent separate crimes; rather, they are alternative means of
-29-




proving the attendant circumstance element of a single crime.
Although one theory is based on the statute defining the crime
and the other theory negatives a defense based on the statute
prescribing when consent is not a defense, both alternatives deal
with the same attendant circumstance  -- the lack of legal
consent.
The language and history of the relevant statutory
provisions support treating the absence of consent and
ineffective consent as alternative means of proving the element
of lack of legal consent rather than as separate crimes.    HRS
§§  702-233  (1993) and  702-235  (1993), located in HRS Chapter  702
(1993), entitled  “General Principles of Penal Liability,”
describe when consent is available as a defense.    The  “General
Principles of Penal Liability” are applicable to all offenses.
They do not create separate crimes.    HRS  §§  702-233 and  702-235
are based on the Model Penal Code  (MPC)  §  2.11  (1962).    The
commentary to MPC  §  2.11 makes clear that the consent provisions
deal generally with the concept of consent and must be analyzed
in the context of the particular offenses to which they apply.
Model Penal Code and Commentaries  §  2.11, comment  1 at  394
(Official Draft and Revised Comments  1985)  [hereinafter, MPC
Commentaries]  (“The question of whether consent can constitute a
defense to a crime is best analyzed in the context of particular
offenses and particular conduct.”); MPC Commentaries,  §  2.11,
-30-




comment  3 at  398  (discussing why general provision dealing with
ineffective consent lends completeness to Code,  “while avoiding
repetition of the same ideas in the definitions of the various
offenses to which they are applicable”).    Thus, because the
general principles of liability, which include the ineffective
consent statute, do not define discrete or separate offenses, the
statutory scheme does not support treating the absence of consent
and ineffective consent as elements of separate crimes.
Moreover, as previously stated, the Commentary to HRS
§  702-235 provides that the ineffective consent statute  “deprives
the defendant of a defense based on consent in those situations
where the complainant’s apparent consent is meaningless.”    The
commentary thus supports treating ineffective consent and the
absence of consent as giving rise to the same criminal
culpability.
Hawai#i case law further supports the conclusion that,
in the context of this case, absence of consent and ineffective
consent reflect equivalent notions of blameworthiness.    In State
v. Oshiro,  5 Haw. App.  404,  696 P.2d  846  (1985), the defendant, a
dentist, raised the defense of consent to a charge of rape in the
third degree based upon his assault upon his dental assistant
while she was mentally incapacitated due to the defendant’s
administration of nitrous oxide.    With the intent of engaging in
sexual intercourse with his newly hired dental assistant, the
-31-




defendant induced her to try nitrous oxide by telling her that
she would be able to explain to patients what it felt like to be
under nitrous oxide.    At the time the offense occurred, HRS
§  707-732(1) defined rape in the third degree as follows:                “A
male commits the offense of rape in the third degree if he
intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with a female who is
mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless.”    Oshiro,  5 Haw. App. at  405 n.1.,  696 P.2d at  848 n.1.
The defendant argued that the trial court’s finding of mental
incapacitation was erroneous because his deception did not
vitiate the complainant’s consent to the gas.    Id. at  407,  696
P.2d at  849-50.    Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the ICA
reasoned as follows:
The  term  "mentally  incapacitated"  is  defined  in  HRS
§  707-700(13)  as  the  state  of  a  person  who  is  temporarily
incapable  of  appraising  or  controlling  his  conduct  due  to  a
substance  administered  to  him  without  his  consent.    Under
HRS  §  702-235(4)  (1976)[,  the  ineffective  consent  statute,]
consent  will  not  "constitute  a  defense  if  .  .  .  [i]t  is
induced  by  .  .  .  deception."    Defendant  argues  that  the
trial  court  incorrectly  applied  the  consent  statute  to  the
mentally  incapacitated  statute,  as  the  factor  of  consent  in
HRS  §  707-700(13)  is  not  a  defense,  but  an  element.
Therefore,  he  contends,  the  trial  court's  finding  that  his
deception  negated  the  victim's  consent  is  erroneous.
.  .  .  It  is  true  that  consent  here  is  an  element  so
HRS  §  702-235(4)  is  not  directly  applicable.    However,  both
common  law  and  common  sense  impel  the  logical  conclusion
that  the  denomination  of  consent  as  an  element  or  a  defense
should  not  affect  its  basic  nature.    Extrinsic  factors  such
as  the  burden  of  proof  may  change,  but  the  essence  of  what
constitutes  consent  does  not.    No  other  term  in  the  legal
lexicon  is  subject  to  such  a  dichotomy.    Thus,  if  consent  as
a  defense  is  subject  to  the  ten  qualifications  of  HRS
§  702-235,  then  consent  as  an  element  is  similarly
restricted.    We  therefore  agree  with  the  trial  court  and
hold  that  the  deception  did  vitiate  the  victim's  consent.
-32-




Id. at  407-08,  696 P.2d at  849-50  (footnote omitted)  (some
emphases added and some omitted).    Therefore, in practice, this
jurisdiction has treated the absence of consent and ineffective
consent as giving rise to the same culpability.
The history and practice in other jurisdictions also
supports the conclusion that treating absence of consent and
ineffective consent as alternative means of proving the element
of lack of consent is rational and fair.    For example, in State
v. Ice,  997 P.2d  737  (Kan. Ct. App.  2000), the jury was presented
with the following alternative theories, based on statutory
alternatives, of establishing that sexual intercourse was
committed without the consent of the complainant under
circumstances when:                                                     (1) she was overcome by force or fear; or
(2) she was physically powerless; or  (3) she was incapable of
giving valid consent because of mental deficiency or disease; or
(4) she was incapable of giving valid consent because of the
effect of    alcoholic liquor.    Id. at  739.    Although the Kansas
Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s rape conviction because
one of the alternative theories was not supported by sufficient
evidence, see discussion infra, the court treated the
alternatives as  “alternative means by which the jury could have
determined lack of consent” rather than as separate crimes.    Id.
Although the Kansas statute at issue in Ice is substantially
different than the statutes at issue in this case, the Kansas
-33-




court’s analysis supports the conclusion that it is rational and
fair to treat the alternative theories in this case as
“alternative means” rather than separate crimes.    Id.; see also
State v. Ortega-Martinez,  881 P.2d  231,  234-35  (Wash.  1994)
(holding that jury unanimity as to alternative means of
committing rape was not required where there was sufficient
evidence of either alternative:                                       (1) by forcible compulsion; or
(2) with someone incapable of consent by reason of mental
incapacity).    Cf. State v. Timley,  875 P.2d  242,  245-46  (Kan.
1994)  (holding that unanimity not required where there was
sufficient evidence of both of the alternative means of
perpetrating sexual act presented to the jury: by the use of
force or by the use of fear).
With respect to whether the statutory alternatives in
this case may be treated as alternative means, it is not
significant that the jury may have reached different conclusions
regarding whether Complainant did not consent or any apparent
consent was ineffective, i.e., meaningless, because such
differences do not reflect disagreement as to the specific
incident charged.    Cf. Arceo,  84 Hawai#i at  32-33,  928 P.2d at
875-75  (requiring juror agreement as to the specific crimina

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