SECOND DIVISION
June 22, 2004

No. 1-03-2072

Defendants Jon and Brenda Myers appeal from an order of thecircuit court of Cook County denying their motion to transferplaintiffs Diane and Patrick Allee's negligence action toStephenson County on the basis of forum non conveniens.⁽¹⁾ OnSeptember 12, 2003, we granted defendants' petition for leave toappeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2). On appeal,defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion indenying their motion to transfer because the private and publicinterest factors heavily weigh in favor of transferring this causeto Stephenson County. For the reasons set forth below, we reverseand remand with directions.

On August 1, 2002, plaintiffs filed their negligence complaintagainst defendants and codefendant in Cook County. Plaintiffsalleged that defendants owned property located at 7 East StephensonStreet, Freeport, Illinois. Defendants leased the second floor tothe Stephenson County Assault and Abuse Services. Diane wasemployed by this entity. Plaintiffs further alleged thatdefendants leased the third floor to codefendant, a twice-convictedfelon. According to the complaint, on January 2, 2001,codefendant, armed with a weapon, abducted Diane from her office onthe second floor and forced her to his third floor apartment wherehe repeatedly sexually assaulted her. Thereafter, with the weapon,codefendant forced Diane to accompany him to Chicago. Plaintiffsfurther alleged that on the evening of January 2, codefendant tookDiane to the Lincoln Hotel in Chicago where he again repeatedlysexually assaulted her. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendantswere negligent with respect to their premises in one or more of thefollowing ways:

"a. Failed to notify tenants such as theStephenson County Assault and Abuse Servicesthat they had leased to a felon convicted ofviolent crimes such as [codefendant];

b. Failed to take reasonable precautionsto warn tenants and others lawfully upon thepremises of the Stephenson Street propertythey had actual knowledge of [codefendant's]violent criminal background;

c. Allowed a third floor tenant such as[codefendant] free access to the common areasof the second floor such as the StephensonCounty Assault and Abuse Services;

d. Failed to inquire after entering intoa rental agreement with [codefendant] failedto inquire with other tenants prior to January2, 2001, regarding [codefendant's] activitiesor interactions with other tenants;

e. Failed to take any precautionswhatsoever for the security of other tenantswho worked at the premises after leasing to aknown violent felon."

According to plaintiffs, as a proximate result of these negligentacts, Diane was abducted at gunpoint by codefendant and repeatedlysexually assaulted in Freeport and Chicago.

On September 12, defendants filed an answer and a motion forchange of venue to Stephenson County. On November 4, while themotion for change of venue was still pending, defendants filed amotion to transfer based on forum non conveniens. On November 13,plaintiffs filed their answers to interrogatories, in which theyadmitted that no Cook County law enforcement personnel investigatedthe sexual assault, no Cook County State's Attorney investigatedthe matter, Diane did not obtain any medical treatment in CookCounty, and a criminal complaint was filed against codefendant inStephenson County. Plaintiffs identified two witnesses from CookCounty, one an employee of the Lincoln Hotel and another anemployee of a pancake house in Chicago.

On March 26, 2003, defendants filed their memorandum insupport of their motion for transfer based on forum non conveniens,arguing that the private and public interest factors stronglyfavored transfer of the cause to Stephenson County. On April 18,defendants filed their answers to venue interrogatories in whichdefendants stated that codefendant did not have a lease,codefendant did not fill out an application, and codefendant didnot pay a security deposit. Defendants also admitted that Jon hadaccompanied codefendant to Chicago on December 22, 2000.

On May 15, plaintiffs filed their response to defendants'motion to transfer, arguing that Cook County had a significantconnection to their lawsuit because the weapon used to abduct Dianewas purchased in Chicago and there were four witnesses who wouldtestify with respect to not only the purchase of the weapon, but inconnection with the events that transpired in Chicago. On May 27,defendants filed their reply. On June 24, the trial court denieddefendants' motion to transfer. This appeal followed.

Initially, we address an issue raised by defendants in theirreply brief. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have misstated thefacts and have included factual allegations that are not supportedby the record. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that: (1)defendants rented the apartment to codefendant free of charge; (2)Jon traveled with codefendant to Chicago in violation ofcodefendant's parole; and (3) Jon traveled with codefendant toChicago to purchase the weapon. According to defendants, none ofthese allegations are supported by the record and they are highlyinflammatory and offensive. Although defendants acknowledge that,in their answers to interrogatories, Jon admitted traveling toChicago one time with codefendant, there is nothing in the answersas to why the two traveled here, and specifically, nothing aboutobtaining a weapon. Defendants maintain that these facts should bestricken.

We agree with defendants. These facts appear only inplaintiffs' response to defendants' motion to transfer and were notcontained in plaintiffs' complaint. Additionally, plaintiffs didnot support these facts by affidavit or otherwise. As such, theyare not properly before this court.

Under section 2-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, venue lies"in the county of residence of any defendant who is joined in goodfaith" or "in the county in which the transaction or some partthereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose." 735 ILCS5/2-101 (West 2000). When more than one potential forum exists,the equitable doctrine of forum non conveniens may be invoked todetermine the most appropriate forum. Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R.Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 171, 797 N.E.2d 687 (2003). Under thisdoctrine, "the court in which the action was filed [may] declinejurisdiction and direct the lawsuit to an alternative forum thatthe court determines can better serve the convenience of theparties and the ends of justice." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172. Inruling upon a forum non conveniens motion, the court must apply abalancing test of private and public interest factors to determinethe appropriate forum. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172. Privateinterest factors include

"the convenience of the parties; the relativeease of access to sources of testimonial,documentary, and real evidence; theavailability of compulsory process to secureattendance of unwilling witnesses; the cost toobtain attendance of unwilling witnesses; thepossibility of viewing the premises, ifappropriate; and all other practicalconsiderations that make a trial easy,expeditious, and inexpensive." Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 172.

The relevant public interest factors include

"the administrative difficulties caused whenlitigation is handled in congested venuesinstead of being handled at its origin; theunfairness of imposing jury duty uponresidents of a county with no connection tothe litigation; and the interest in havinglocal controversies decided locally." Dawdy,207 Ill. 2d at 173.

The trial court must "look at the totality of the circumstances inan effort to determine whether the defendant has proven the factorsstrongly favor transfer." Botello v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.,No. 1-03-0314, slip op. at 15 (April 26, 2004).

In addition to the above factors, the trial court must"consider the plaintiff's substantial right to choose the forum inwhich to bring an action." Botello, slip op. at 16. In thisregard,

"[a] plaintiff's right to select the forum issubstantial. Unless the factors weighstrongly in favor of transfer, the plaintiff'schoice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173.

However, a plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to the sameweight or consideration in every case. Rather, " '[w]hen the homeforum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choiceis convenient.' [Citation.]" Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. Likewise,when the plaintiff chooses the forum in which the accident orinjury occurred, " 'the choice is convenient because the litigationhas the aspect of being "decided at home." ' [Citation.]" Dawdy,207 Ill. 2d at 173. Conversely, " '[w]hen the plaintiff isforeign, *** th[e] assumption is much less reasonable. Because thecentral purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensurethat the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deservesless deference.' [Citation.]" Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173-74. Inthis instance, "it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiffengaged in forum shopping to suit his individual interests, astrategy contrary to the purposes behind the venue rules." Botello, slip op. at 16. See also Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 174;Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Illinois Central R. Co.,329 Ill. App. 3d 189, 196, 768 N.E.2d 779 (2002). The presumptionfavoring a plaintiff's choice is also diminished where the injurydid not occur in the chosen forum. Czarnecki v. Uno-Ven Co., 339Ill. App. 3d 504, 509, 791 N.E.2d 164 (2003).

"A defendant seeking transfer is not required to show that theplaintiff's choice of forum is inconvenient; rather, transfer isallowed where defendant's choice is the substantially moreappropriate forum." Czarnecki, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 508. Ultimately, the test is "whether the relevant factors, viewed intheir totality, strongly favor transfer to the forum suggested bydefendant." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 176. The trial court's decisionon a forum non conveniens motion lies within its sound discretionand we will not disturb that decision absent an abuse ofdiscretion. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 176. "An abuse of discretionwill be found where no reasonable person would take the viewadopted by the trial court." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177. In otherwords, we must determine if the trial court abused its discretionin balancing the relevant factors. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177.

Defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretionin denying their motion to transfer to Stephenson County becausethis case has no practical connection to Cook County. With respectto private factors, defendants maintain that Stephenson County ismore convenient for both plaintiffs and defendants since bothreside there. In this regard, defendants argue they live 1 milefrom the Stephenson County courthouse, whereas the Daley Center is113 miles from their home.⁽²⁾ According to defendants, conducting atrial in Cook County will necessitate that both plaintiffs anddefendants incur travel, lodging, and meal expenses, as well asbeing away from their families. Defendants further argue that thefour investigating law enforcement officers are located inStephenson County, as well as Diane's coworkers, who may possessrelevant information with respect to defendants' alleged negligentconduct. Defendants further maintain there was no investigation ofthis matter in Cook County. Defendants also argue that in order toobtain evidence for trial, they may be forced to take evidencedepositions of witnesses because the witnesses may not want totravel to Chicago, which could interfere with their trial strategy. Similarly, by being forced to present evidence through evidentiarydepositions, the jury would not be able to evaluate the witnesses'credibility.

With respect to public interest factors, defendants maintainthat Stephenson County has an interest in ensuring the safety ofits residents and regulation of parties conducting businesstherein. According to defendants, although Diane was transportedfrom Stephenson County to Cook County, the alleged tortious conducton defendants' part, which is the basis of plaintiffs' complaint,occurred in Stephenson County and this is the conduct that will beevaluated by a jury in determining whether plaintiffs are entitledto damages. Defendants argue that it would be unfair to have CookCounty jurors render this decision. Defendants further note thatthe congestion of the Cook County court is a factor.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in refusing to transfer this cause to Stephenson County. Plaintiffs maintain that defendants have not stated how the trialcourt abused its discretion; specifically, they have notdemonstrated how no one would take the view adopted by the trialcourt. Plaintiffs further maintain that because Jon took defendantto Chicago to purchase the weapon later used in Diane's abduction,Cook County cannot be so inconvenient for defendants.⁽³⁾ Plaintiffsfurther argue that defendants' reliance on the law enforcementofficers' affidavits to support their contention that StephensonCounty is more convenient is misplaced because it is purelyspeculative whether defendants would call them as witnesses anddefendants failed to state how these witnesses would impact theirdefense. According to plaintiffs, these witnesses have little, ifany connection, to the question of defendants' negligence. Plaintiffs maintain that all of the factors here, while consideringplaintiffs' choice, do not so strongly favor a transfer toStephenson County. Plaintiffs further argue that the weapon waspurchased in Cook County, Jon took codefendant to Cook County topurchase the weapon, codefendant repeatedly assaulted Diane in CookCounty, and there are witnesses in Cook County who will testify onplaintiffs' behalf. With respect to the relevant private factors,plaintiffs argue that codefendant is a resident of Will County andthat it will not be inconvenient for him to have a trial in CookCounty. In a similar vein, plaintiffs argue that the ease ofaccess to Will County to take codefendant's deposition is equallysplit between Cook and Stephenson Counties, but this factor favorsCook County (plaintiffs do not state why). Plaintiffs furthermaintain that the ease of access to testimonial, documentary, andreal evidence are also equally split between Stephenson and CookCounties.

With respect to public interest factors, plaintiffs argue thatCook County has a strong interest in this proceeding because theweapon was purchased here and the assaults occurred here. According to plaintiffs, these factors establish a directconnection to Cook County. Plaintiffs further maintain that therehas been no real showing, by empirical data, to establishcongestion in the Cook County courts. According to plaintiffs, acitation to numbers alone is a red herring. Lastly, plaintiffsmaintain that defense counsel is located in Cook County.

Two recent cases are instructive on this issue. In Dawdy, thedefendant filed a motion to transfer the plaintiff's lawsuit fromMadison County to Macoupin County, which the trial court denied andthe appellate court affirmed. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 169. Thesupreme court reversed, concluding that trial in Macoupin County"would better serve the convenience of the parties and the ends ofjustice." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177. In so holding, the courtevaluated the following private and public interest factors. Withrespect to ease of access to the evidence, the court noted that theaccident occurred in Macoupin County, 2 witnesses lived in MacoupinCounty, most of the 18 potential witnesses lived in counties nearerto Macoupin County than Madison, no potential witness lived inMadison County, 4 of the 10 medical witnesses lived in MacoupinCounty, and the rest of the medical witnesses lived in 2 differentcounties that were nearer to Macoupin County than Madison. Dawdy,207 Ill. 2d at 178. The court concluded that

"[b]ecause the location of the accident is inMacoupin County, and the location of theidentified witnesses are on a whole closer toMacoupin County than Madison County, thesefactors slightly weigh in favor of theconvenience of Macoupin County over MadisonCounty." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178.

The court then noted that another factor, the possibility ofviewing the premises, was an important consideration and concludedthat "it would be irrational for a jury composed of Madison Countyresidents to travel to Macoupin County to view the accident scene." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 179. With respect to the fact that theplaintiff's attorneys were located in Madison County, the supremecourt stated that, while this was a relevant factor, "little weightshould be accorded it." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 179. The same wastrue with respect to mileage. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 180. Ultimately, the Dawdy court concluded that the private factorsfavored transfer to Macoupin County. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 180.

With respect to public interest factors, the court concludedthat they "strongly weighed against Madison County as theappropriate forum in which the case should be tried." Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 181. As to congestion, the court noted that "by itself,[this factor] is relatively insignificant" and "is not sufficientto justify transfer of venue when none of the other relevantfactors weigh strongly in favor of transfer." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2dat 181. However, the court further stated that "it is appropriateto consider the congested conditions of the docket in theplaintiff's chosen forum." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181. Afterreviewing the annual report of the Administrative Office of theIllinois Courts, the court found that the statistics demonstratedthat Madison County's congestion was a great concern. Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 181. With respect to "local interest in localcontroversies," the court found that

"the accident occurred in Macoupin County andnot Madison County. Neither plaintiff nor[the defendant] reside in Madison County. Although some of the witnesses may work inMadison County, there is little elseconnecting them to Madison County. Clearly,Madison County has little or no interest intrying the action of a nonresident whose claimarose in Macoupin County." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2dat 183.

Conversely, the Dawdy court found that

"Macoupin County has a strong connection withand interest in this action. In addition to[the defendant], some of the witnesses residein Macoupin County. Most significantly, thefact that the accident occurred in MacoupinCounty gives the action a local interest." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181.

Lastly, with respect to jury duty, the court concluded "that theresidents of Madison County should not be burdened with jury dutygiven the fact that the action did not arise in, and has norelation to, their county." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 183. Specifically, the court stated that because the accident occurredin Macoupin County, this gave that county "a significant interestin the dispute and, therefore, it would not be unfair to burden theresidents thereof with jury duty in this case." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2dat 183. Ultimately, the Dawdy court concluded that "the weight ofthe private interests favor Macoupin County" and "[t]he weight ofthe public interest factors greatly favors Macoupin County." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 184. The court further noted that "thedeference to plaintiff's choice of Madison County is reducedbecause he does not reside there and the action did not arisethere." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 184. Accordingly, the Dawdy courtconcluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in denyingthe defendant's motion to transfer. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 185.

Similarly, in Botello, the appellate court reversed the trialcourt's order denying the defendant's motion to transfer theplaintiff's lawsuit from Cook to DuPage County. In evaluating theprivate factors, the Botello court noted that the majority ofoccurrence witnesses were from DuPage County, all of whom were busyprofessionals. Botello, slip op. at 16. According to the Botellocourt, a trial in DuPage County would increase the convenience tothe witnesses by significantly shortening their travel times. Botello, slip op. at 16. Also, because of the increasedconvenience to the witnesses, the convenience to the parties wouldincrease by making the witnesses more readily available to testifyin court. Botello, slip op. at 16-17. The court then noted thatthe other three potential witnesses were Iowa residents, which wasalso closer to DuPage County. Botello, slip op. at 17. It wassignificant to the Botello court that the plaintiff had notidentified any witnesses from Cook County. Botello, slip op. at17. With respect to sources of proof, the court noted thatalthough the record was devoid of any information in this regard,because the witnesses were in Dupage County, "it stands to reasonthat the location of the sources of proof and the location ofwitnesses is one and the same." Botello, slip op. at 17. TheBotello court next noted that the accident and injury occurred inDuPage County and, if it was necessary to view the site, it wouldbe more expeditious to do so from the DuPage courthouse. Botello,slip op. at 17.

With respect to public interest factors, the Botello courtbelieved it was of great importance what effect a trial would haveon the Cook County courts and community that would be burdenedfinancially in furnishing a forum. Botello, slip op. at 20. Withrespect to local interest, the Botello court concluded that if thetrain tracks on which the accident occurred were found to beunsafe, the residents of DuPage County would have a strongconnection and interest in this finding. Botello, slip op. at 21. Specifically, DuPage County had a strong interest in ensuring thesafety of the tracks and its residents. Lastly, the Botello courtnoted that the Cook County courts are more congested. Botello,slip op. at 21. The Botello court remanded the cause foradditional proofs on the defendant's motion to transfer based onissues not relevant here. Botello, slip op. at 22. See alsoCzarnecki, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 509-11 (reversing the trial court'sdenial of the defendant's motion for transfer based on forum nonconveniens where the private and public interest factors stronglyfavored transfer from Cook County to Will County).

Applying the relevant factors to the instant case, we concludethat the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants'motion to transfer this cause to Stephenson County. Although weacknowledge that plaintiffs have a right to choose the forum inwhich to bring their action, we nonetheless conclude, afterconsidering the record, that the private and public interestfactors weigh strongly in favor of transferring this case toStephenson County.

The first private interest factor is convenience to theparties. Although plaintiffs focus on convenience with respect tocodefendant, there is no evidence that codefendant's convenience isrelevant because he has not filed an appearance in this case. Withrespect to having convenience to codefendant, for evidentiarydeposition purposes, Cook County is closer to Will County. Withrespect to convenience of the parties who have appeared here,Stephenson County is clearly more convenient. Both plaintiffs anddefendants reside there. Moreover, as defendants note, if thecause is tried in Chicago, both parties will incur travel, lodging,and meal expenses to participate in the trial and/or any othernecessary proceedings. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor oftransfer.

With respect to the location of the incident, this arguablyoccurred in both Stephenson and Cook Counties because Diane wassexually assaulted in both counties. However, plaintiffs misplacethe focus in this case, focusing upon the purchase of the weaponand the sexual assaults. The focus, however, is upon defendants'conduct in connection with the premises owned by defendants sincethat is the basis of plaintiffs' negligence claim against them. Assuch, and as defendants argue, codefendant's conduct after leavingthe premises is essentially irrelevant to the issue in this case. Likewise, the fact that the gun was allegedly purchased in CookCounty is irrelevant. There is no such allegation in plaintiffs'complaint and such conduct does not relate to defendants' allegednegligence. This factor, too, weighs in favor of transfer.

With respect to ease of testimonial, documentary, and realevidence, this factor also weighs in favor of transfer. Specifically, any potential witnesses with respect to the conditionof the premises, particularly their safety, including otheremployees of the Stephenson County Sexual and Abuse Service,reside, or at least work, in Stephenson County. Although weacknowledge that in Dawdy and Botello, it was significant to thecourts that no potential Madison County or Cook County,respectively, witnesses were identified by the plaintiffs, we donot find that fact dispositive or controlling here. Althoughplaintiffs identify four Cook County witnesses, they fail toinclude what facts those witnesses would testify to either ingeneral or in any detail. However, it is a logical assumption thatthose witnesses' testimony would relate to codefendant's conduct,not defendants' conduct. Accordingly, even though plaintiffsidentify four potential Cook County witnesses, this factor does notfavor Cook County. We further note that, like the situation inBotello, conducting a trial in Stephenson County would shorten thewitnesses' travel times and make them more readily available to theparties. This was a specific concern raised by defendants here--presentation of evidence through evidentiary depositions ratherthan live testimony.

Two additional private interest factors also favor transfer inthis case. With respect to the possibility of viewing thepremises, an important consideration, since there is such apossibility given the nature of the claimed negligence, it would beirrational to require a Cook County jury to travel 113 miles toStephenson County to view the premises. Similarly, with respect toplaintiffs' argument that defense counsel is located in CookCounty, this factor is entitled to little weight. Dawdy, 207 Ill.2d at 179.

Lastly, with respect to plaintiffs' choice of forum, littledeference should be given to this choice since plaintiffs areforeign and the actual conduct giving rise to this cause of action,defendants' alleged negligence in connection with their premises,did not arise in Cook County. The weight of the private interestfactors thus strongly support transferring this cause to StephensonCounty.

With respect to the public interest factors, although notentitled to substantial weight, the congestion of the Cook Countycourts is a great concern. The evidence offered by defendants insupport of their motion to transfer demonstrated that in StephensonCounty, in connection with jury demand cases in excess of $50,000,no new cases were filed in 2001, no cases were reinstated, one casewas disposed of, and, at the end of 2001, only six cases werepending. Conversely, in Cook County, 13,523 new cases were filedin 2001, 1,604 were reinstated, 14,004 were disposed of, and at theend of the year, 20,893 cases remained pending. There is anappreciable difference in congestion and the record overwhelmingshows that Stephenson County would resolve plaintiffs' case morequickly. With respect to plaintiffs' argument that citation tonumbers alone is a red herring, we do not agree. First, plaintiffscite no authority, nor make any coherent argument in this regard.Second, and more importantly, the numbers are certainly what othercourts rely on in addressing the issue, including the IllinoisSupreme Court. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181.

With respect to local interest, we find that Stephenson Countyhas a strong connection to the issue presented here. Clearly,Stephenson County, and not Cook County, has an interest in thesafety of its commercial buildings in connection with the safety ofits residents. See Botello, slip op. at 21. Cook County has nointerest in the safety of Stephenson County residents or itsbuildings. Although plaintiffs argue that Cook County has a strongconnection because the weapon used by codefendant was purchasedhere, again, this factor is essentially irrelevant to defendants'alleged negligence in reference to their property.

Lastly, with respect to jury duty, it would be unfair toburden Cook County jurors with determining whether defendants werenegligent in connection with their Stephenson County premises sincethere is no relationship between that conduct and Cook County. Thecontroversy here, defendants' alleged negligent maintenance oftheir premises, does not create a controversy for Cook Countyjurors. Thus, the public interest factors also strongly favortransfer to Stephenson County.

Accordingly, we find that both the private and public interestfactors strongly favor transfer to Stephenson County and that thetrial court abused its discretion in balancing the relevant factorsand in denying defendants' motion to transfer based upon forum nonconveniens.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuitcourt of Cook County and remand this cause with directions that thecourt transfer this cause to Stephenson County.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

WOLFSON, P.J., and GARCIA, J., concur.

1. Plaintiffs' complaint was also directed against defendantJerry Exum. Exum is imprisoned and has not appeared in thisaction. This memorandum refers to him as codefendant and to Jonand Brenda Myers as defendants. The details of the claim againstExum are not set forth here.

2. Defendants ask us to take judicial notice of this mileage. We do so since a reviewing court may take judicial notice of thedistance between two or more locations. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177.

3. Not only is this fact not of record, but plaintiffs' argumentmisses the mark. Simply because Jon traveled to Chicago on oneoccasion does not equate to a conclusion that travel to Chicago fortrial and other proceedings would be convenient.