THIRD DIVISION
MARCH 29, 2002

JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company brought thissubrogation action to recover for property damage sustained in atraffic accident on June 30, 1994, alleging defendant CarolAnderson caused damage to the automobile owned by Allstate'sinsured and its subrogor Steve Salinas. Defendant appeals fromthe trial court's order barring her from rejecting the mandatoryarbitration award which was entered in favor of Salinas. Defendant contends that she did not fail to participate in thearbitration hearing in good faith when she visited a doctor foracute sinusitis instead of attending the arbitration hearing,that her actions were not contumacious, that the trial courtabused its discretion and she was denied due process. Inresponse, plaintiff attacks the jurisdiction of this court,contending that defendant failed to file her notice of appeal ina timely fashion. We agree and dismiss the appeal because welack jurisdiction.

Plaintiff filed its lawsuit against defendant in July 1999and sent defendant a Rule 237 Notice requiring her presence atthe arbitration hearing scheduled for November 8, 2000. 166 Ill.2d. R. 237. Defendant's counsel attended the arbitrationhearing, but defendant did not. The arbitrators entered an awardin favor of Salinas in the amount of $1,641.35. The arbitrationaward noted that defendant appeared only through counsel "despite237 notice" and placed the matter on the "Judgment on award" callfor January 5, 2001.

On November 17, 2000, defendant filed a notice rejecting thearbitration award. Plaintiff then moved to bar defendant'srejection of the award.

Defendant filed a response and attached her affidavit inwhich she stated that on November 8, 2000, she was unable toattend the arbitration because she suffered from a severe sinusinfection and had to visit her physician. She attached a copy ofthe doctor bill for November 8, 2000, which indicated thatdefendant had been diagnosed with acute sinusitis.

After a hearing on December 21, 2000, the trial courtgranted plaintiff's motion to bar defendant from rejecting thearbitration award. Its order stated that all parties werepresent, that the judgment on the award be entered instanter, andstated that "the JOA on January 5, 2001 [was] hereby stricken." The actual judgment on the award, a separate document, was alsoentered December 21, 2000.

For reasons that do not appear of record, the case was notstricken from the January 5, 2001 judgment on award call but wasdismissed apparently inadvertently for want of prosecution by thecourt. The half sheet or memorandum of orders indicates that thedismissal for want of prosecution was entered "o/c," (on order ofthe court), and there is no notation that either of the partieswas present.

On February 1, 2001, the dismissal was vacated onplaintiff's motion and the court ordered the prior "Judgment ofDecember 21, 2000, to stand." Defendant filed her notice ofappeal on February 26, 2001.

Plaintiff challenges the timeliness of defendant's notice ofappeal. In response, defendant contends that her notice ofappeal was not tardy because the final judgment was actually onFebruary 1, 2001, when plaintiff's motion to vacate the dismissalfor want of prosecution was granted and the previously dismissedDecember 21, 2000, judgment was reinstated. She also argues thatthe doctrine of revestment renders her notice of appeal timely. For the following reasons, we reject both arguments.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) provides that a noticeof appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of thefinal judgment appealed from or within 30 days after the entry ofan order disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion. 155Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). A final judgment for purposes of appeal isfinal when it terminates the litigation between the parties onthe merits. Waters v. Reingold, 278 Ill. App. 3d 647, 651(1996). Once a final order has been entered, the trial courtretains residual jurisdiction over the matter for 30 days. Gentile v. Hansen, 131 Ill. App. 3d 250, 254 (1985).

Here, plaintiff argues that a final judgment was entered onDecember 21, 2000, when the trial court entered judgment on thearbitration award and the litigation between the parties wasterminated on the merits. At that time, the parties were awareof the JOA (judgment on the award) call on January 5, 2001, andasked that the case be removed from that call. The December 21,2000, order provided that the "JOA on January 5, 2001, [was]hereby stricken." The dismissal for want of prosecution wasentered sua sponte by the court on January 5, 2001, and wasapparently inadvertent. The first question is what effect didthe dismissal have upon the final judgment entered two weeksearlier.

A dismissal for want of prosecution is ordinarily not afinal order because of plaintiff's right to refile under section13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2000); Marren Builders, Inc., v. Lampert, 307 Ill. App. 3d 937,941 (1999). When the time for refiling expires, the litigationis terminated and the order is final. S.C. Vaughan Oil Co. v.Caldwell, 181 Ill. 2d 489, 502 (1998). But no authority has beencited that a final judgment may be dismissed for want ofprosecution. In the case here, we find that the dismissal forwant of prosecution had no effect because a final judgment hadalready been entered and there were no pending matters. See,American Consulting Ass'n, Inc. v. Spencer, 100 Ill. App. 3d 917,920-21 (1981), where the court held that a dismissal for want ofprosecution was "apparently inadvertent" because it occurred on astatus call of all the cases on a calendar just assigned to thejudge who entered the order. The court further held that theunintended dismissal for want of prosecution did not amount to asetting aside of a default judgment. American Consulting Ass'n,Inc., 100 Ill. App. 3d at 921. Thus, we reject defendant's firstargument that entry of the dismissal for want of prosecutionrendered the final judgment of December 21, 2000, nonfinal. Wealso note that the order vacating the dismissal stated that thejudgment of December 21, 2000, was "to stand," thus, it did notcreate a new or different final judgment date.

Secondly, defendant maintains that plaintiff's motion tovacate the dismissal revested the trial court with jurisdiction.

The doctrine of revestment, which often applies to actionsdismissed for want of prosecution, provides that jurisdiction isrestored to the trial court when the litigants activelyparticipate without objection in proceedings which areinconsistent with the merits of a prior judgment. Harchut v.OCE/Bruning, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 790, 791 (1997). Here,plaintiff's motion to vacate the extraneous order of dismissalfor want of prosecution did not constitute active participationin proceedings inconsistent with the merits of the priorjudgment. Plaintiff was merely performing a housekeeping actionand did nothing to revest the court with jurisdiction. Moreover,plaintiff's post-judgment motion was not directed toward thejudgment and it did not extend the time for appeal. 155 Ill. 2dR. 303(a); Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., 193 Ill. 2d 186, 188-89(2000). Therefore, defendant's notice of appeal was late becauseit was not filed until February 26, 2001, more than two monthsafter entry of the final judgment. Accordingly, we have nojurisdiction and dismiss defendant's appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

WOLFSON, J., and SOUTH, J., concur.