Third Division
March 31, 2003

JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of the court:

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether an appealshould be afforded to a successful party who agrees with thetrial court's judgment, but disagrees with the specific reasons,conclusions or findings on which that judgment is based. We holdthat such an appeal should not be granted.

This cause arose out of an action to determine whichinsurers were obligated to defend appellees E.W. CorriganConstruction Company (Corrigan), and its subsidiary, E.W.Contractors, Inc., (EWC), in an underlying property damagelawsuit titled D.W. Lakeshore Associates Limited Partnership v.E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., No. 95--L--8426 (Cir. Ct. CookCo.).⁽¹⁾ At the direction of the trial court, multiple insurancecompanies were joined in the underlying lawsuit.

On September 24, 1999, the trial court heard arguments onmotions for partial summary judgment filed by the variousinsurance companies, including CNA⁽²⁾. In an order dated September29, 1999, the trial court granted CNA's motion for partialsummary judgment as to the concrete issue, finding that CNA didnot have a duty to defend Corrigan and EWC (hereinafter sometimescollectively referred to as Corrigan) in the underlying lawsuit. The trial court's ruling was based on its finding that the thirdamended complaint in the underlying lawsuit failed to allege thatthe relevant property damage occurred during the time that CNA'spolicy was in force.

On October 22, 1999, Corrigan filed a motion forreconsideration of the trial court's September 29, 1999, order asit pertained to CNA. In the motion for reconsideration, Corriganclaimed that endorsement No. 12 in the CNA policy⁽³⁾ required CNAto defend Corrigan in the underlying lawsuit even if the relevantproperty damage occurred outside the policy period and even ifthe other insurers did not have a duty to defend. Corriganasserted that under endorsement No. 12, the relevantconsideration was not when the property damage occurred, butwhether there had been or might be a "determination" that theconcrete in question was defective. Corrigan claimed that this"determination" triggered the duty to defend even if it was madeoutside the policy period because the endorsement was silent asto when this "determination" must be made.

On February 10, 2000, the trial court heard arguments on avariety of motions including Corrigan's motion forreconsideration. During the course of the hearing, it was agreedthat a "determination" that the concrete work was defectiveconstituted property damage under the policies at issue. Such a"determination" could be made by an accredited independent agencyor by mere evidence that concrete had actually fallen off thesubject structure. This "determination" was the event that"triggered" coverage and the duty to defend. The parties,however, disagreed as to whether a policyholder was covered wherethe determination was made outside the policy period. The trialcourt believed that if concrete was installed and it was later"determined," after the policy period had ended, that theconcrete was defective, then the policyholder was stillpotentially covered because the term "determination" as it wasused in endorsement No. 12 was ambiguous since the endorsementdid not specifically state when the "determination" was to bemade.

CNA argued that endorsement No. 12 did not trigger coverageunder the policy because there was language in the endorsementstating that all provisions of the policy remained unmodified andthat one of the provisions that remained unmodified was therequirement that the property damage occur during the policyperiod. CNA also argued that it did not have a duty to defendbecause its policy was an excess policy.⁽⁴⁾ The trial courtdisagreed with both of CNA's arguments, finding that endorsementNo. 12 triggered coverage under the policy because the term"determination" as it was used in the endorsement was ambiguous,and that CNA's policy was not excess.

Thus, in an order dated February 28, 2000, the trial courtgranted Corrigan's motion for reconsideration, finding that CNAdid have a duty to defend Corrigan in the underlying lawsuit. OnMarch 23, 2000, CNA then filed a motion to reconsider theconcrete issue on the ground that, pursuant to the excessprovision in endorsement No. 12, it did not have a duty todefend. In an order dated May 26, 2000, the trial court grantedCNA's motion for reconsideration, finding that CNA did not have aduty to defend Corrigan in the underlying lawsuit because itspolicy was an excess policy.

CNA now attempts to appeal the trial court's earlier orderof February 28, 2000, on the ground that the trial court in thatorder incorrectly found that endorsement No. 12 triggeredcoverage under the policy. Corrigan responds that this courtdoes not have the jurisdiction to hear or determine CNA'schallenge to the trial court's order of February 28, 2000,because that order was effectively overruled and vacated as toCNA by the trial court's subsequent order of May 26, 2000, wherethe trial court found that CNA did not have a duty to defendCorrigan in the underlying lawsuit. Corrigan also contends thatthe February 28, 2000, order is not a final, appealable order,because the order did not resolve all the issues as to all theparties since the court did not make a Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2dR. 304(a)) finding, whereas the trial court in its order of May26, 2000, did include a Rule 304(a) finding with regard to theruling affecting CNA.

ANALYSIS

We review this case de novo since it involves the trialcourt's resolution of a legal question. Primeco PersonalCommunications, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 196 Ill 2d70, 83, 750 N.E.2d 202 (2001). As an initial matter, we notethat we cannot agree with Corrigan's contention that this courthas no jurisdiction to hear this appeal on the ground that theFebruary 28, 2000, order is not a final, appealable order. Afinal judgment in a civil case is entered where the last ordercloses the case and leaves no issues to be decided. In re E.L.,152 Ill. App. 3d 25, 30, 504 N.E.2d 157 (1987). In the presentcase, when the trial court entered its order of May 26, 2000,this order was a final order regarding CNA's duty to defendCorrigan in the underlying lawsuit. Once a final order isentered, all prior nonfinal orders and rulings become appealable.In re E.L., 152 Ill. App. 3d at 30; Burtell v. First CharterService Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433, 394 N.E.2d 380 (1979);Steinberg v. System Software Associates, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d157, 166, 713 N.E.2d 709 (1999). Thus, the February 28, 2000,order became appealable when the trial court entered its finalorder on May 26, 2000.

We next consider whether an appeal should be afforded to asuccessful party who agrees with the trial court's judgment, butdisagrees with the specific reasons, conclusions or findings onwhich that judgment is based. Here, CNA agrees with the trialcourt's order of May 26, 2000, holding that CNA does not have aduty to defend Corrigan in the underlying lawsuit, however, CNAdisagrees with the specific reason or finding on which this orderis based. A party cannot complain of error that does notprejudicially affect it, and one who has obtained by judgment allthat has been asked for in the trial court cannot appeal from thejudgment. Geer v. Kadera, 173 Ill. 2d 398, 413-14, 671 N.E.2d 692(1996). In the instant case, CNA obtained all that it asked forwith respect to its motion for reconsideration, where the trialcourt found that CNA did not have a duty to defend Corrigan inthe underlying lawsuit. CNA sought a judgment declaring that itdid not have a duty to defend Corrigan in the underlying lawsuit. The judgment in the trial court's order of May 26, 2000, didexactly that.

It is true that CNA made two distinct arguments in the trialcourt that it did not have a duty to defend. The first argumentwas based on the trigger issue. The second argument was based onthe contention that the policy was an excess policy. The trialcourt rejected the trigger argument and accepted the excesspolicy argument, thereby finding that CNA did not have a duty todefend Corrigan in the underlying lawsuit. Therefore, CNAobtained by judgment all that was sought in the trial court andthis judgment cannot be appealed. Where a trial court's judgmentis entirely in favor of a party, specific findings of the trialcourt that may have been adverse to the party, do not give riseto an appeal. Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98Ill. 2d 382, 386-87, 457 N.E.2d 9 (1983); Piersall v.SportsVision of Chicago, 230 Ill. App. 3d 503, 512, 595 N.E.2d103 (1992); People ex rel. Village of Buffalo Grove v. Village ofLong Grove, 173 Ill. App. 3d 946, 953, 526 N.E.2d 670 (1988). Itis the trial court's judgment, not its reasoning, that isreviewed on appeal. Guerino v. Depot Place Partnership, 273 Ill.App. 3d 27, 31, 652 N.E.2d 410 (1995). The forum of appellatecourts should not be afforded to successful parties who may notagree with the reasons, conclusion, or findings of the trialcourt. Geer, 173 Ill. 2d at 414; Material Service Corp., 98 Ill.2d at 386.

CNA contends that we should consider its appeal despite theholdings in Piersall and Village of Buffalo Grove, because thereis a possibility that the trial court's adverse finding regardingthe trigger issue might be asserted in future litigation. Wemust decline CNA's offer. An appellate court's function, as areviewing court, is to determine whether the lower courts reachedthe correct result. Devoney v. Retirement Board of thePolicemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund for the City of Chicago, 199Ill. 2d 414, 422, 769 N.E.2d 932 (2002). A reviewing courtcannot permit hypothetical worst-case scenarios to be the basisupon which it decides the case before it. Department of PublicAid ex rel. Skelton v. Liesman, 218 Ill. App. 3d 437, 441, 578N.E.2d 310 (1991). If the resolution of a certain question oflaw cannot affect the result as to the parties or controversybefore it, a reviewing court should not resolve the questionmerely to guide future litigation. Primeco, 196 Ill 2d at 100.

In the instant case, the record indicates that the trialcourt found that three insurers had a duty to defend Corrigan inthe underlying lawsuit: National Union Fire Insurance Company,Pacific Employers Insurance Company, and U.S. Fire InsuranceCompany. In addition, the trial court ordered Reliance InsuranceCompany to contribute a share of defense costs through the dateits named insured was granted summary judgment in the underlyinglawsuit. The record further indicates that these named insurersare now paying for Corrigan's defense in the underlying lawsuitand that none of them are seeking contribution from CNA. As aresult, there is no pending dispute between CNA and any otherparty to the case. Therefore, based on the rationale set forthin Skelton and Primeco, we decline to issue an order regardingthe "trigger" issue merely because this issue might be assertedin future litigation.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of CookCounty is affirmed.

Affirmed.

SOUTH, P.J., concurring.

WOLFSON, J., specially concurring.

JUSTICE WOLFSON, specially concurring:

I would dismiss this appeal because the February 28, 2000,order was vacated on motion for reconsideration. There isnothing to appeal.

1. In the original complaint filed in D.W. Lakeshore on May4, 1995, it was alleged that concrete supplied by Corrigan and/orEWC suddenly evidenced cracking in February 1995.

2. Appellant, Continental Insurance Company, will be referredto as CNA Insurance, since Continental Insurance Company is asubsidiary of CNA Insurance.

3. Endorsement No. 12 modified the definition of propertydamage contained in the primary policy from physical injury,destruction, or loss of use of tangible property caused by anoccurrence, to a determination that concrete products that aredefective shall be deemed to constitute property damage caused byan occurrence.

4. An "excess policy" typically provides protection beyondthat which is provided by the primary liability policy. J.O'Connor, Insurance Coverage Settlements and the Rights of ExcessInsurers, 62 Md. L. Rev. 30, 31 (2003).