FOURTH DIVISION

March 31, 2003

PRESIDING JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., Ogden Fairmount, Inc., Hawthorne Race Course,Inc., and Maywood Park Trotting Association, Inc. (plaintiffs), appeal from the circuit court'sdismissal under sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)) of their amended complaint for declaratory relief. On appeal, plaintiffs argue:(1) that the complaint was not barred by sovereign immunity; (2) that they adequately stated acause of action in that they were entitled under a 1999 amendment to the Illinois Horse RacingAct of 1975 (Racing Act) (230 ILCS 5/1 through 55 (West Supp. 1999)) to reimbursement ofcertain taxes paid to the Illinois Racing Board (Board); and (3) that the voluntary paymentdoctrine is not a bar to their requested relief. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgmentof the circuit court.

Plaintiffs are horse tracks that have conducted off-track wagering pursuant to inter-trackwagering licenses received from the Board. Plaintiffs had been paying a tax on 1% of the totalbets, otherwise called the "pari-mutuel handle," on inter-track and simulcast wagering into the"Horse Racing Tax Allocation Fund" (HRTA Fund) pursuant to the Racing Act. 230 ILCS5/26(h)(11)(B)(iii), (h)(11)(C) (West 1998). Amounts in the fund were to be allocated byappropriation to various governmental entities including the Illinois Department of Agriculture,park districts, and municipalities. 230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(C) (West 1998). The Racing Actfurther provided that the total amount of the HRTA Fund in any calendar year should not exceedthe amount collected and distributed to the HRTA Fund in 1994. 230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(B)(iii)(West 1998). Any monies exceeding 1994 levels were to be redistributed to the licensed horsetracks according to the amount they paid into the HRTA Fund and to race purses at the horsetracks. 230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(B)(iii) (West 1998).

Prior to 1999, plaintiffs allege that when they had paid an amount of tax equal to the 1994HRTA Fund level, the Board directed plaintiffs to withhold further payment. At the end of eachyear, the Board issued a determination of the proportion of tax owed by each plaintiff, along withother licensed horse tracks, and directed them to balance the accounts between themselves. Forexample, an exhibit to the complaint, a 1998 letter written by the director of the Board to thelicensees, stated:

"As of Sunday, November 15, 1998, total Horse Race TaxAllocation Funds ('HRTA') generated under section 26 of theHorse Racing Act (230 ILCS 5/26) since January 1, 1998,exceeded the total HRTA collected in the calendar year 1994. Pursuant to section 26(h)(11)(B) of the Act, HRTA fundsgenerated on or after November 16, 1998 through and includingDecember 31, 1998 must be re-allocated in calendar year 1999among licensees and purse accounts in the manner set forth in thestatute."

The letter then directed the licensees to "cease making HRTA payments for race dates November16, 1998 through December 31, 1998."

The Racing Act was amended in 1999 by Public Act 91-40 which was signed into law onJune 25, 1999, and was to be effective on that date. Pub. Act 91-40, eff. June 25, 1999 (1999 Ill.Laws 1184-1257). Amendments included the addition of section 27(a)(5), which imposed a flat1.5% "pari-mutuel tax" on the daily pari-mutuel handle from all monies bet at the race track fromall sources. Pub. Act. 91-40, eff. June 25, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 1219-20). This tax, beginning onJanuary 1, 2000, replaced a "privilege tax." Pub. Act. 91-40, eff. June 25, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws1219-20). The "privilege tax," ending December 31, 1999, was a base 2% tax on the daily pari-mutuel handle with additional graduated privilege taxes on multiple wagers. Pub. Act. 91-40,eff. June 25, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 1219-20). The amendments also included a "current year" and"immediate" "pari-mutuel tax credit" in section 32.1 that was available directly after the effectivedate of the statute. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. v. Topinka, 334 Ill. App. 3d 454, 460, 778N.E.2d 239, 244 (2002) (construing Pub. Act 91-40, eff. June 25, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 1234-35)(adding 230 ILCS 5/32.1)).

The Racing Act also retained language pertaining to the 1% tax on the pari-mutuel handleon inter-track and simulcast wagering and the accompanying redistribution language, but addedthe words "until January 1, 2000," to the provision. Thus, the amendment provided:

"From the sums permitted to be retained pursuant to thisAct each inter-track wagering location licensee shall pay * * * (iii)until January 1, 2000, except as provided in subsection (g) ofSection 27 of this Act, 1% of the pari-mutuel handle wagered oninter-track wagering and simulcast wagering at each inter-trackwagering location licensed facility to the Horse Racing TaxAllocation Fund, provided that, to the extent the total amountcollected and distributed to the Horse Racing Tax Allocation Fundunder this subsection (h) during any calendar year exceeds theamount collected and distributed to the Horse Racing TaxAllocation Fund during calendar year 1994, that excess amountshall be redistributed (I) to all inter-track wagering locationlicensees, based on each licensee's pro-rata share of the total handlefrom inter-track wagering and simulcast wagering for all inter-trackwagering location licensees during the calendar year in which thisprovision is applicable[.]" (Emphasis indicates added language)Pub. Act 91-40 (1999 Ill.Laws 1184-1257)

230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(B) (West 2000).

Public Act 91-40 also abolished the HRTA Fund, providing:

"(C) There is hereby created the Horse Racing TaxAllocation Fund which shall remain in existence until December31, 1999. Moneys remaining in the Fund after December 31, 1999shall be paid into the General Revenue Fund. Until January 1,2000, all monies paid into the Horse Racing Tax Allocation Fundpursuant to this paragraph (11) by inter-track wagering locationlicensees * * * shall be allocated by appropriation as follows[.]"(emphasis indicates added language) Pub. Act 91-40, eff. June 25,1999 (1999 Ill.Laws 1184-1257).

230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(C) (West 2000). This section retained the previous Act's allocationscheme of the HRTA Fund to various governmental entities. This section also set forth "[t]hissubparagraph (C) shall be inoperative and of no force and effect on and after January 1, 2000." 230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(C) (West 2000).

The amendments also added section 28.1, which provided:

"Beginning January 1, 2000, payments to all programs inexistence on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1999 thatare identified in * * * 26(h)(11)(C) * * * shall be made from theGeneral Revenue Fund at the funding levels determined byamounts paid under this Act in calendar year 1998." Pub. Act 91-40 (1999 Ill. Laws 1184-1257)

230 ILCS 5/28.1(d) (West 2000).

Plaintiffs allege that during 1999, each plaintiff made payment of 1% of the pari-mutuelhandle of inter-track and simulcast wagering into the HRTA Fund. When the 1994 limit hadbeen reached, plaintiffs were required to continue making payments through the end of 1999. The total amount paid by all horse tracks into the HRTA Fund was $5,793,168.00. This resultedin a payment in the year 1999 of $786,286.00 in excess of the 1994 levels.

Sometime after December 31, 1999, the deputy director of the Board advised plaintiffsthat the Board would not make a redistribution from the HRTA Fund. An April 25, 2000, letterfrom the deputy director to plaintiffs stated:

"as you are aware, the Illinois Horse Racing Act wasamended in June of 1999 resulting in sweeping changes to ourracing statutes. One component of the amendment included therepeal of the 1% HRTA tax, effective January 1, 2000. Along withthe repeal of the tax, was the elimination of the statutorymechanism mandating the redistribution of the HRTA funds inexcess of those collected in 1994. The General Assembly alsoauthorized continued funding for HRTA programs at 1998 levelsfinanced by the 'General Revenue Fund'. In addition statutorylanguage was added that required the transfer of the HRTA fundbalance to the 'General Revenue Fund' after December 31, 1999(26(h)(11)(c)). In past years, under the previous administration,licensees were directed to temporarily retain the excess HRTA taxuntil the Board directive was issued directing the redistribution ofsuch funds. This past practice was in direct conflict with the clearlanguage mandating that all HRTA taxes be remitted directly to theIRB. Therefore, IRB policy allowing licensees to retain all HRTAtaxes exceeding 1994 levels was discontinued in 1999. With the'sunset' of the redistribution language (26(h)(I)(B)) [sic.], and thespecific language added directing the transfer of the HRTA fundsafter December 31, 1999 (26(h)(11)(6)) [sic.], a redistribution ofHRTA funds collected in 1999 is not permitted."

Plaintiffs allege that the pro rata share of the excess tax payment made by each plaintiffis $120,628.16 by Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., $173,395.83 by Hawthorne Race Course, Inc.,$106,741.10 by Maywood Park Trotting Association, Inc., and $59,937.66 by Ogden Fairmount,Inc.

On April 3, 2001, plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and other reliefagainst the Board and Comptroller Daniel W. Hynes and Glen Brower, Director of the IllinoisDepartment of Revenue. On June 25, 2001, defendants filed a combined motion to dismisspursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2000)). Plaintiffs then filed a first amended complaint for declaratory judgment and other relief whichcontained identical factual allegations, but named as defendants Ralph M. Gonzales, chairman ofthe Board, and Board members William J. Chamblin, William E. Jackson, James M. Kane,Joseph F. Kindlon, Louise E. O'Sullivan, William J. Parrillo, Lorna E. Propes, Leon Schlofrock,and John B. Simon; as well as Daniel W. Hynes and Glen Brower (defendants).

Plaintiffs prayed that the court enter a judgment: (1) declaring that the plaintiffs areentitled to reimbursement of excess funds paid into the HRTA Fund in 1999; (2) orderingdefendants "to take such steps as are necessary to issue warrants to make payment to Plaintiffs inthe amounts set forth above"; and (3) that plaintiffs have such other, further or different relief asthe Court deems appropriate.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000). Defendants argued thecomplaint was barred by sovereign immunity because it was an action against the State andshould be brought in the Court of Claims. The defendants also argued that the plain meaning ofthe amendments to the Racing Act did not allow for the funds collected throughout 1999 to beredistributed after January 1, 2000. Defendants additionally argued that the voluntary paymentof the taxes barred plaintiffs' cause of action.

Plaintiffs responded by asserting their claim was not barred by sovereign immunitybecause it is an action against the defendants, who are acting in excess of their statutoryauthority, and not against the State because the State is presumed not to act in excess of itsstatutes. Plaintiffs also argued that the proper interpretation of the amendments to the RacingAct entitles them to redistribution of their excess payments in 1999. Plaintiffs lastly argued thatthe voluntary payment doctrine did not apply because plaintiffs did not erroneously pay the taxes,that payment of taxes was made under duress, and that recovery of the taxes is authorized bystatute.

On December 18, 2001, the circuit court dismissed the complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 with prejudice without stating its reasons. Plaintiffs appeal. Our review of adismissal pursuant to both sections 2-615 and 2- 619 is de novo, and we accept all well-pleadedfacts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of thenonmoving party. Hanna v. City of Chicago, 331 Ill. App. 3d 295, 303, 771 N.E.2d 13, 19(2002).

We begin by addressing whether subject matter jurisdiction was conferred on the circuitcourt. Defendants contend that the circuit court lacked power to grant the requested reliefbecause this action was, in effect, a suit against the State and therefore could only be brought inthe Court of Claims. 705 ILCS 5/1 (West 2000). We disagree.

A determination of whether a suit is brought against the State does not depend on thenamed parties but, rather, on the issues raised and the relief sought. Senn Park Nursing Center v.Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 186, 470 N.E.2d 1029, 1038 (1984); City of Springfield v. Allphin, 74 Ill.2d 117, 123, 384 N.E.2d 310, 312 (1978). "Where the issue is whether a State officer has refusedto disburse appropriated funds according to law, and the relief sought is an injunction directingthat those funds be released in accordance with the appropriation, the action is not one against theState." Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d at 124, 384 N.E.2d at 312; see also Board of Trustees of CommunityCollege District No. 508 v. Burris, 118 Ill. 2d 465, 473, 515 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (1987); Countyof Cook v. Ogilvie, 50 Ill. 2d 379, 383, 280 N.E.2d 224 (1972); E.H. Swenson & Son, Inc. v.Lorenz, 36 Ill. 2d 382, 223 N.E.2d 147 (1967); Board of Education of Township High SchoolDistrict No. 206 v. Cronin, 69 Ill. App. 3d 472, 475, 388 N.E.2d 72, 75 (1979). This is because"'[t]he presumption obtains that the State, or a department thereof, will not, and does not, violatethe constitution and laws of the State, but that such violation, if it occurs, is by a State officer orthe head of a department of the State, and such officer or head may be restrained by a properaction instituted by a citizen.'" Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d at 124, 384 N.E.2d at 313, quoting Schwing v.Miles, 367 Ill. 436, 441-42, 11 N.E.2d 944, 947 (1937).

We find City of Springfield v. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d 117, 384 N.E.2d 310 (1978), instructive. In Allphin, the Department of Revenue was empowered by statute to collect a tax on behalf ofplaintiff municipalities. A statutory formula called for the State to retain a specified percentageof the tax for the cost of collecting and administering the tax and the remainder was to bedisbursed to the plaintiff municipalities. The statute was then amended to reduce the State'sshare and a dispute arose as to when the statute was effective. The plaintiffs claimed the Directorof the Department of Revenue wrongfully certified a higher amount to be withheld according toan incorrect interpretation of the statute, resulting in the State's wrongfully withholdingapproximately $3 million from the plaintiff municipalities. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d at 121-22, 384N.E.2d at 311-12.

The Allphin court concluded the action was not against the State where the issue involvedthe interpretation of the effective date of a statute and the relief requested was a declaratoryjudgment and reimbursement of certain funds from the State treasury. Allphin 74 Ill. 2d at 126,384 N.E.2d at 314. The court rejected the argument that sovereign immunity barred the claimbecause granting of the requested relief would impact the State treasury. Allphin, 74 Ill.2d at126, 384 N.E.2d at 314. The court stated that the action challenged the legality of the defendants'withholding of funds from plaintiffs, and, as such, was not a suit against the State. The court alsonoted that "defendants' resort to 'self help,' in ordering the deposit of the disputed funds into theState's General Revenue Fund does not prohibit the courts from fashioning an appropriate formof relief." Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d at 126, 384 N.E.2d at 314, quoting Swenson, 36 Ill. 2d at 385, 223N.E.2d at 149. Courts had such power to fashion relief even in the absence of an expressstatutory appropriation from the General Revenue Fund. Allphin, 74 Ill.2d at 127, 384 N.E.2d at314. After interpreting the statute in favor of the plaintiff, the court remanded the case to thecircuit court to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to define more precisely the taxrevenue from which the plaintiffs could obtain reimbursement. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d at 131, 384N.E.2d at 316.

Like Allphin, we reject defendants' argument that because the relief must necessarilyimpact the General Revenue Fund, and there is no statutory authority for return of those moniesfrom the General Revenue Fund, that sovereign immunity bars the claim. Similarly, the issue inthis case is the interpretation of a statute, and the relief requested is a declaratory judgment andthe reimbursement of allegedly wrongfully withheld taxes. Defendants here also resorted to "selfhelp" by depositing the disputed funds into the General Revenue Fund. As such, the plaintiffs'suit is not one against the State, but is one that contests the conduct of State officials in allegedlyproceeding in contravention of their duties under the Racing Act. Such action is within thejurisdiction of the circuit court.

We next consider whether the amendments to the Racing Act allowed the redistributionof HRTA Fund amounts in excess of 1994 levels to plaintiffs. The cardinal rule of statutoryinterpretation, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to theintention of the legislature. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348, 747 N.E.2d 339, 346(2001). To this end, a court must first consider the statutory language, which is the best means ofdetermining legislative intent. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348, 747 N.E.2d at 346. Where anenactment is clear and unambiguous, the court is not free to depart from the plain language andmeaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislaturedid not express. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1997). It is notnecessary for the court to search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention of the legislature. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 443, 677 N.E.2d at 939. A court should construe a statute, if possible togive effect to each paragraph, sentence, clause, and word. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 350, 747N.E.2d at 347. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect withoutresort to other aids for construction. Woodward, 175 Ill.2d at 443, 677 N.E.2d at 939. Becausewe find the redistribution language to be clear and unambiguous, we do not turn to other tools ofstatutory construction.

The Racing Act expressly provides "until January 1, 2000 * * * to the extent the totalamount collected and distributed to the Horse Racing Tax Allocation Fund under this subsection(h) during any calendar year exceeds the amount collected and distributed to the Horse RacingTax Allocation Fund during calendar year 1994, that excess amount shall be redistributed[.]"(emphasis added.) 230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(B)(iii) (West 2000). Because the amount collected in1999 allegedly exceeds that collected in 1994, the statute unambiguously requires "that excessamount shall be redistributed." 230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(B)(iii) (West 2000).

Defendants read sections 26(h)(11)(B)(iii) and 26(h)(11)(C) (230 ILCS5/26(h)(11)(B)(iii), 26(h)(11)(C) (West 2000)) as requiring plaintiffs to pay the tax for the entireyear 1999, but absolving defendants of their duty to redistribute. Defendants assert section26(h)(11)(B)(iii) defines the redistribution in terms of "the total amount collected and distributed. . . during any calendar year." 230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(B)(iii) (West 2000). Because the "totalamount" collected in a year cannot be calculated until January 1, 2000, or, as defendantsconceded at oral argument, after the last race on December 31, 1999, Public Act 91-40eliminated the authority to redistribute on January 1, 2000. Furthermore, defendants contendsection 26(h)(11)(B) allowed only redistribution from the HRTA Fund, which was abolished onDecember 31, 1999, by section 26(h)(11)(C). Therefore, defendants state, they were notstatutorily authorized to redistribute the excess funds. We do not accept this interpretation.

First, this interpretation results in an actual increase of the tax assessed against plaintiffsin the face of the clear expression of the legislature that the funds are to be redistributed. Wereject defendants' implication that the legislature intended to subtly increase the tax in thismanner, when it could have simply removed the redistribution language. Furthermore, to adoptthe defendants' interpretation would render the redistribution language superfluous and violatesthe rule that a court should construe a statute, if possible, to give effect to each paragraph,sentence, clause, and word. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 350, 747 N.E.2d at 347.

We therefore reject defendants' argument that the "total amount" must be calculatedbefore redistribution may be made, and this calculation must be made after the new tax schemehad begun. The Board had previously made a practical redistribution of the monies before theend of the year by ordering a cessation of the payments because the amount in excess of the 1994level is ascertainable prior to the end of the year. The plaintiffs had been paying the moneythroughout the year of 1999; therefore, the Board could have calculated that the total amountexceeded1994 level as soon as the HRTA Fund reached the 1994 cap. It was not necessary towait for the total amount for the whole calendar year to spill over that cap to know there wouldbe an excess. Furthermore, as defendants concede, under their interpretation, the calculations cantheoretically be made on December 31, 1999, after the receipts had been submitted to the RacingBoard. Thus, the redistribution could also have theoretically been made in 1999.

We therefore find that the legislature's amendments which became effective on June 25,1999, left in place the tax scheme on inter-track and simulcast wagering which was based onpayment and redistribution during the full calendar year, and then simply terminated the taxbeginning on January 1, 2000. This interpretation is consistent with the legislature's amendmentsto the tax on the pari-mutuel handle from all sources elsewhere in the Racing Act. 230 ILCS5/27(a), 27(a-5), 32.1 (West 2000). These amendments provided for an end of the "privilege tax"on December 31, 1999, the beginning of the "pari-mutuel tax" on January 1, 2000, and the"current" and "immediate" pari-mutuel tax credit in the interim period between the effective dateof the Racing Act on June 25, 1999, and the beginning of the new tax scheme on January 1,2000. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 3d at 460, 778 N.E.2d at 244 (citing Pub. Act.91-40, eff. June 25, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 1219-20, 1234-35)). As shown by these amendments,the legislature could have expressly provided for an interim provision, such as that found insection 32.1 (230 ILCS 5/32.1 (West 2000)), if it intended to change the scheme in the interimperiod after the effective date of the statute and the beginning of the new tax scheme.

Our interpretation is also consistent with section 28.1(d) of the Racing Act. 230 ILCS5/28.1(d) (West 2000). This section states, "[b]eginning January 1, 2000, payments to allprograms in existence on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1999 that are identified in ** * 26(h)(11)(C) * * * shall be made from the General Revenue Fund at the funding levelsdetermined by amounts paid under this Act in calendar year 1998." 230 ILCS 5/28.1(d) (West2000). As stated earlier, section 26(h)(11)(C) allocated moneys from the HRTA Fund to variousgovernmental entities including the Illinois Department of Agriculture, park districts, andmunicipalities. 230 ILCS 5/26(h)(11)(C) (West 2000). When applied specifically to section26(h)(11)(C), the 1998 levels necessarily equaled 1994. Therefore, the legislature provided forthe appropriation of the funds that remained in the HRTA Fund at the 1994 level. As shown insupplemental briefs provided by the parties to this court, the fiscal year 2000 budget allocationsfor the governmental entities under this program such as the Department of Agriculture remainedat essentially the same levels as 1994, rather than at an elevated level due to the excess funds. While not dispositive of the issue at hand, this supports the conclusion that the 1994 cap was stillapplicable to the moneys in the HRTA Fund in 1999. Defendants point to no provision thatappropriates monies in excess of the 1994 cap. Rather, the only appropriation language for thatexcess money was by redistribution to the licensees in section 26(h)(11)(B)(iii), rather togovernment programs from the General Revenue Fund.

We also reject defendants' argument that because the racing industry gained numerousother advantages from Public Act 91-40, the redistribution of the 1999 excess monies representsa windfall to the industry unintended by the legislature. This invitation to pragmatically second-guess the legislature's policy judgment is a task for which the court is ill-suited. In this matter,the legislature is in the better position to balance the societal and fiscal consequences of taxlegislation concerning the economically and politically complex racing and gambling industry. As such, nullification of the redistribution language is beyond the bounds of judicial authority.

We also hold that the voluntary payment doctrine does not bar repayment to the plaintiffs. As defendants concede, this doctrine precludes recovery of taxes voluntarily paid, except when astatute authorizes such recovery. Freund v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 73, 499N.E.2d 473 (1986); Sullivan v. Board of Commissioners of Oak Lawn Park District, 318 Ill.App. 3d 1067, 743 N.E.2d 107 (2001). As decided above, the Racing Act authorizes recovery.

As a final matter, plaintiffs request that upon remand, they be allowed to amend theircomplaint consistent with the Allphin opinion to allow a possible reimbursement from futuretaxes owed to the State. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d at 130, 384 N.E.2d at 316. Although the particularwithholding scheme at issue here is no longer in force, the court retains the power to fashion anappropriate equitable remedy in the absence of specific statutory authority. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d at127, 384 N.E.2d at 314. We direct that, upon remand, the circuit court grant plaintiffs leave toamend their complaint consistent with the Allphin decision. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d at 131, 384N.E.2d at 316.

The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded tothe circuit court with directions.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

HARTMAN and GREIMAN, J.J., concur.