Baraniak v. Kurby

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Baraniak v. Kurby

State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-06-0518 Rel

Case Date: 02/06/2007

Preview:SECOND DIVISION February 6, 2007

No. 1-06-0518 GRACE BARANIAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CASSANDRA KURBY, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 02 L 597 Honorable Ralph Reyna, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, Grace Baraniak, appeals from orders of the circuit court of Cook County, which entered judgment on a jury verdict in her favor in the amount of $15,000 and denied her posttrial motion. On May 31, 2000, plaintiff and defendant, Cassandra Kurby, were involved in a motor vehicle accident when the front of defendant's vehicle struck the rear of plaintiff's car. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a negligence action alleging she sustained permanent injuries and disability as a result of defendant's negligence and sought a judgment in excess of $50,000. At trial, plaintiff testified that on May 31, 2000, she was stopped at a red light in the intersection of Golf Road and Shermer Road in the village of Morton Grove, Illinois, when the car she was driving was struck in the rear by a vehicle being driven by defendant. Plaintiff described the impact as "hard," which caused her to "flip backwards" and strike the back of her head against

1-06-0518 the headrest. Immediately following the accident, she experienced a headache, pain in her neck, and a lack of feeling or sensation in her hands. She was transported by ambulance to a hospital emergency room where she was treated and released that evening. Six days later she went to her personal physician, who diagnosed her as having suffered a central spinal cord injury and whiplash. He referred her to a neurological surgeon, who treated her for her pain and limited mobility and prescribed steroids, pain killers, a cervical collar, and physical and massage therapies. Plaintiff underwent this regimen until the neurosurgeon discharged her in September of 2000, at which time he advised her there was nothing else that could be done for her. In February 2001, plaintiff went to another neurological surgeon, who referred her to the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago where she underwent physical therapy for approximately four months. She also went to the chronic pain clinic, which is part of the Rehabilitation Institute, and received treatment from a psychologist, physician, nurse, acupuncturist, and physical therapist due to her continuing pain and limited mobility. At the time of trial, she testified she was still under the care of a physician for the pain and limited mobility. She further testified that her medical bills amounted to $51,095.48 and had been paid. The defense admitted liability but challenged the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries. Defendant testified that her speed was about five miles an hour at the moment of the impact, which she described as "light," and that plaintiff, although she was "frazzled," did not appear to have been injured. Defendant's expert witness, a physician with a specialty in neurosurgery, testified by way of an evidence deposition that plaintiff's injuries were resolved by the time she was discharged by the first neurological surgeon in September 2000, and that all subsequent

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1-06-0518 treatment she received by the other neurosurgeons and physical and massage therapists was unrelated to the accident of May 31, 2000. Three of plaintiff's treating physicians, all of whom were neurosurgeons or neurologists, testified that her injuries and subsequent treatment, even up to the time of the trial, were related to the accident. During the jury instructions conference, plaintiff's attorney tendered Illinois Pattern Instructions, Civil, No. 30.22 (2005 ed.) (hereinafter IPI Civil No. 30.22 (2005)), which states: "If you find for the plaintiff you shall not speculate about or consider any possible sources of benefits the plaintiff may have received or might receive. After you have returned your verdict the court will make whatever adjustments are necessary in this regard." The defense attorney objected to the giving of this instruction, which the court sustained on the grounds that no evidence had been presented which would justify the giving of this particular instruction. After the jury was charged by the court, it began its deliberations on October 11, 2005. At 3:05 p.m. the jury sent out the following note: "(1) For medical bills: Who paid the $50,935.48 in medical bills (plaintiff/insurance)?" Plaintiff's attorney retendered IPI Civil No. 30.22 (2005) in light of and in response to the jury's question. The trial judge refused to give the instruction and sent a note to the jury, which read:

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1-06-0518 "You have received all the evidence and instructions in this case. Please continue to deliberate until you reach a verdict." At 3:48 p.m., the jury sent out a second note, which read: "Our understanding is that the medical bills were paid in full

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