JUSTCE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

In April 1994, plaintiff Joanne Beehn was involved in amultivehicle traffic accident. In July 1994, Beehn filed a com-plaint forpersonal injuries against trucking companies Cassens Transportation (Cassens),J.B. Hunt Transport (Hunt), American Boat Carriers (ABC), and the respectivedrivers of each truck involved in the April 1994 accident. Cassens filed acounterclaim for damage to its truck and cargo against Hunt and ABC. Prior totrial, the court granted a motion in limineprecluding Cassens from introducing evidence relating to its damaged cargo. Thejury found in Cassens' favor with respect to its counterclaim for damage to itstruck. On appeal, Cassens contends that the trial court erred by precludingCassens from introducing evidence relating to its damaged cargo. We reverse andremand.

I. BACKGROUND 

On April 7, 1994, Steven Eppard was driving anempty boat carrier for ABC. Eppard was driving eastbound on I-80/94 andapproximately four or five seconds behind a blue Cadillac. Sud-denly, Eppard sawthe Cadillac's brake lights illuminate. Eppard applied his brakes but theylocked and he hit the Cadillac. ABC's truck jackknifed and hit the barrier wallthat separates the eastbound and westbound traffic. This collision triggered achain reaction. Both Beehn's car and Hunt's truck, driven by Paul Christman,collided with ABC's truck. Then, Cassens' truck, driven by David Wilcox,collided with Hunt's truck.

On July 28, 1994, Beehn filed a complaint for personalinjuries against, inter alia, Cassens, ABC,Hunt, and their respective drivers. Cassens filed a counterclaim against Huntand ABC, seeking to recover property damage to its truck and the 10 Infiniti J30automobiles that it carried. The counterclaim alleged that ABC, Hunt, and theirrespective drivers failed to act with due care and, as a result, Cassenssustained damage to its truck (totaling $6,344) and cargo (totaling $30,649).

On November 13, 1998, Hunt filed a motion in limine,which ABC joined, seeking to preclude Cassens from introducing evidence that itsustained damage to its cargo. Primarily, Hunt argued that the owner of thecargo, Nissan Motor Corporation (Nissan), had already received compensation forthe cargo through a voluntary payment by Cassens. Hunt argued that recovery byeither a bailor or bailee for damage to bailed property through judgment orsettlement bars recovery by the other. Following oral arguments, the trial courtgranted Hunt's motion in limine.

On November 18, 1998, Cassens requested that the trial courtreconsider its in limine ruling. Afterhearing oral arguments, the trial court denied Cassens' motion to reconsider.

Shortly before trial, Beehn filed a motion to voluntarilydismiss Cassens and Wilcox from the suit. However, Cassens' maintained itscounterclaim. After hearing the evidence, a jury found in favor of Beehn andagainst ABC and Hunt, awarding Beehn $368,493 in recoverable damages. The juryalso found in Cassens' favor with respect to its claim for damages to its truck.The jury deemed Hunt responsible for 80% of the damages to Cassens' truck andassessed ABC with the remaining 20%.

On January 4, 1999, Cassens filed a posttrial motion seekingjudgment for damages to its cargo. Specifically, Cassens argued that the trialcourt erred, as a matter of law, when it barred Cassens' claim and that it wasentitled to judgment in light of the jury's determination that Cassens actedwithout negligence. At the hearing on its posttrial motion, Cassens orallyrequested to amend its motion to include a request for a new trial limited tothe issues of damages as an alternative to an outright judgment. Hunt and ABCargued that the trial court properly granted the motion in limineand that, if the trial court granted Cassens' posttrial motion, it should granta new trial on all the issues. The trial court denied Cassens' motion andCassens filed the instant appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, ABC claims that we lack jurisdictionover this appeal. Specifically, ABC notes that the trial court orally deniedCassens' posttrial motion on March 12, 1999, and that Cassens filed an untimelynotice of appeal on April 21, 1999. Cassens disagrees and contends that thetrial court's written order, filed March 23, 1999, constituted the court's finaljudgment. Therefore, Cassens argues, its April 21, 1999, notice of appeal wastimely. We agree with Cassens.

Similar circumstances arose in Federal Kemper LifeAssurance Co. v. Eichwedel, 266 Ill. App. 3d 88 (1994). On appeal, the courtnoted Supreme Court Rule 272, which states in pertinent part as follows:

"If at the time of announcing final judgment the judgerequires the submission of a form of written judgment to be signed by [thejudge], the clerk shall make a notation to that effect and the judgment becomesfinal only when the signed judgment is filed." 134 Ill. 2d R. 272.

After examining the record, the court found:

"The transcript of the hearing indicates that theparties all contemplated that a written order would be required. Moreover, awritten order was submitted to the judge and signed without an objection beingraised. This order states:

'That this court's judgment of April 28, 1992 in favor ofPlaintiff is vacated, set aside and held for naught.'

We conclude, then, that the judgment became final on April28, 1992. Measuring the 30-day filing period from this date, it is clear thatOld Republic's motion to vacate was filed within the statutory timelimitation." (Emphasis omitted.) Eichwedel, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 98.

Cassens has appended to its brief a letter purportedlycirculated amongst the attorneys indicating that the trial court contemplatedthat a written order be signed. However, the letter is not a part of the record.See 134 Ill. 2d R. 321; Stutzke v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 242 Ill.App. 3d 315, 317 (1993) (stating that an appendix is not part of the record andis not considered on appeal). Nevertheless, we note, as did the court in Eichwedel,that the trial court's order was dated and entered March 23, 1999. The recordcontains no objection as to the date, indicating the trial court and parties'intention that a written order would signify the final judgment in the matter.Further, during oral argument, ABC's counsel conceded that Cassens filed atimely appeal. Measuring the 30-day filing period from March 23, 1999, weconclude that Cassens' April 21, 1999, notice of appeal was timely.

B. Standard of Review

The parties disagree as to the proper standard of review.Cassens contends that we should review the circuit court's in limineruling de novo because that ruling reliesupon a conclusion of law. ABC and Hunt contend that our review should bedeferential because it was within the discretion of the circuit court to entersuch make such a ruling.

We agree with Cassens. A motion in limineis addressed to the trial court's inherent power to admit or exclude evidence.Generally, we will not disturb the trial court's ruling on a motion inlimine absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v.Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999). However, a trial court must exerciseits discretion within the bounds of the law. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at369. Where a trial court's exercise of discretion relies on an erroneousconclusion of law, as Cassens claims, our review is de novo.See Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369.

C. Pretrial In LimineRuling

Cassens argues that the trial court erred by granting the motion inlimine. ABC and Hunt disagree, arguing Cassens'voluntary payment to Nissan (i.e., paymentfrom bailee to bailor), for damage to Cassens' cargo (i.e.,the bailed property), precluded Cassens from recovering damages from ABC orHunt. We agree with Cassens.

ABC and Hunt primarily based their motion in limineon Montgomery Ward & Co. v. McBreen & Associates, 40 Ill. App. 3d69 (1976). In Montgomery Ward, the court held that a bailor was precludedfrom bringing an action against a negligent third party for loss of propertywhere the third party had already settled with the bailee. The court stated thecommon-law rule that "either a bailor or bailee may bring an action againsta negligent third party for loss or damage to the bailed property; but arecovery by one, through either judgment or settlement, will bar an action bythe other." (Emphasis added.) Montgomery Ward, 40 Ill. App. 3dat 73. ABC and Hunt renew this argument on appeal.

We find that Montgomery Ward is inapposite to the facts of the instantcase because, here, the bailor's recovery came from the bailee and not athird-party tortfeasor. Hunt even concedes in its brief that the effect ofpayment between bailee and bailor for the acts of a third party is an issue offirst impression in Illinois. If anything, Montgomery Ward supportsCassens' argument. The above-quoted language upon which ABC and Hunt relyexplicitly contemplates "an action against a negligent third party."(Emphasis added.) Montgomery Ward, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 73. AmericanJurisprudence (Second) similarly observes that "[a] judgment in an actionby either the bailee or the bailor against a third party for *** damageto property that is the subject of a bailment generally precludes a subsequentaction by either." (Emphasis added.) 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments