JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, the defendants, Edward Mozdzeniakand Cheers, Inc. (Cheers), were found to be not liable for theinjuries sustained by the plaintiff, Darlene Bielaga. On appeal,Bielaga contends the trial court erred when it: (1) allowedevidence of her drinking, and (2) found that the jury's verdictwas not against the manifest weight of the evidence. For thereasons that follow, we reverse and remand this case for a newtrial.

OVERVIEW 

While in a bar, the defendant, Mozdzeniak, who was on dutyas a bartender for Cheers, physically lifted up the plaintiff offof her seat. While holding the plaintiff, Mozdzeniak lost hisbalance, and he and the plaintiff fell to the floor. Theplaintiff alleges that she was injured as a result of the fall.

THE FACTS

At trial, Mozdzeniak, testified that on November 8, 1987, hewas working as a bartender at Cheers. Cheers is a bar and grillthat is owned and operated as an Illinois business corporationthat, in turn, is owned and controlled by Leo Galligani.

During his testimony, Mozdzeniak was asked if he rememberedlifting Bielaga on the night in question. Mozdzeniak testifiedthat he could not remember the specific date, but remembered anincident at Cheers, where he "picked her up, maybe, in a friendlygesture like a bear hug or something and slipping."

When asked if he remembered Bielaga being hurt that night,Mozdzeniak replied, "I remember something to that nature." Whenasked where she was hurt, he replied, "Actually, I couldn't giveyou a specific part of the body * * * I want to say maybe herfoot, knee." Mozdzeniak did not remember Bielaga leaving Cheers.

Mozdzeniak notified Galligani after the incident that therehad been an accident. Mozdzeniak said that he was notreprimanded, but Galligani "made it very clear to me he wasunhappy with the event."

Mozdzeniak saw Bielaga's husband after the incident. Mr.Bielaga informed Mozdzeniak that Mrs. Bielaga was hurt as aresult of the accident at Cheers. Mozdzeniak apologized to Mr.Bielaga during the conversation. Mozdzeniak said that he did notmean to drop Mrs. Bielaga.

Mozdzeniak testified that there was no written policyprohibiting him from drinking while he was bartending at Cheers. Mozdzeniak said that Galligani "made it known that he didn't wantanybody drunk behind the bar." Galligani was not present atCheers on the day of the accident.

Mozdzeniak was asked if he had been drinking on the night ofthe incident. Mozdzeniak replied, "I might have had a few."

Mozdzeniak testified that his duties as a bartenderentailed, taking money from patrons, serving drinks and food,cleaning tables, and occasionally closing the bar. Mozdzeniakwas asked if Galligani allowed him to pick up female customers,and he replied "to my knowledge, I shouldn't have picked upanybody." Mozdzeniak could not remember if he was responsiblefor closing Cheers on the night of the accident.

Jeanette Wilson Vieyra, a friend of Bielaga's, testifiedthat on November 8, 1987, she arrived at Cheers in the lateevening. When she arrived, Bielaga and Mozdzeniak were holding aconversation.

At different times during the evening, Mozdzeniak would comeover to where the women were sitting and talk to them. The womenwere sitting next to each other at the bar. Vieyra recalledseeing Mozdzeniak drink but did not think that he wasintoxicated.

On direct examination, Vieyra testified that Mozdzeniaklifted Bielaga up. Bielaga did not consent to Mozdzeniak liftingher. Vieyra said that Mozdzeniak: "came to [Bielaga] and liftedher up from her legs like supporting her back. * * * They bothfell back. Because he picked her up, they both fell backwards."

On cross-examination, Vieyra testified that she did not seeMozdzeniak pick Bielaga up in a bear hug fashion. Instead, shesaw Mozdzeniak pick Bielaga up with one arm under her thighs,with his other arm supporting her back. Vieyra testified that itwas similar to a groom picking up a bride and carrying her acrossthe threshold.

Vieyra said that Mozdzeniak "fell backwards, they both fellback. * * * They both hit, he flipped over, and...both ended upon the floor basically." Vieyra noticed blood immediately fromBielaga's face after the fall. Vieyra helped Bielaga clean up inthe bathroom. After cleaning the blood, she noticed thatBielaga's face was very pink. Vieyra testified that "I knewsomething really serious happened because the way she fell andthe way she was really shaken up. She was in quite a bit of painwhen she left."

Vieyra said that Bielaga was able to walk after the accidentbut was "walking very slowly because you c[ould] tell that theimpact to her face, it really shook her up to where she wasn'treally thinking straight, you know. She was walking yes, but itwas very kind of in an apprehensive I don't want to walk kind ofway." Vieyra also said that Bielaga looked very disoriented andshaken up when she left Cheers.

Vieyra said that she saw Bielaga sometime after the accidentand that Bielaga's face looked a little different.

Counsel for the defense asked Vieyra, "was [Bielaga]intoxicated," and Vieyra replied, "no." Vieyra was then askedhow many drinks Bielaga had. Over objection, Vieyra said thatshe did not know.

Bielaga testified that she and Mozdzeniak had been friendsfor 12 years. Bielaga initially came to Cheers with her childrento visit Mozdzeniak. While she was at Cheers, Bielaga telephonedher brother, who then came to Cheers. Bielaga's brother spentsometime talking with Bielaga and Mozdzeniak before leaving andtaking the children home, while Bielaga remained.

Bielaga testified that Mozdzeniak "picked me up and he wentflying back and I remember myself falling * * * towards the tableand after that I don't remember anything, not at all. I justremember myself falling and * * * my face going towards thetable."

Bielaga stated that she remembered Vieyra helping her up"and giving me a rag and it was all full of blood." Bielaga saidthat her face was numb. She said that she could not feelanything at all. Bielaga testified that she had pain in herback, "like somebody was pressing, like someone was sitting on meand I couldn't breath."

After Vieyra helped her clean up, Bielaga was told that shewent home. She could not remember going home. She was told thatshe drove home but could not recall.

After arriving at home, Bielaga remembered making telephonecalls to her husband and daughter, and then going to sleep. Whenshe woke the next morning, Bielaga had difficulty breathing. Sheasked her husband to get help. She testified that her chest andback area hurt. She said, "[m]y face, I didn't feel at all. Ididn't know I had an injury to the face. It was numb. I didn'tfeel anything. I knew there was blood. I thought I broke mynose but I [did not] know." When Bielaga's husband saw her, hecalled the paramedics.

When the paramedics arrived, Bielaga told them that she felldown the stairs. She testified that she lied to the paramedicsbecause she was embarrassed about the circumstances surroundingher injury.

Bielaga was taken to the emergency room at MacNeal MemorialHospital. There, she told the medical staff that she was injuredwhen she fell down stairs. Again, she said that she "was justtoo embarrassed to tell anybody what really happened." A fewdays later, Bielaga was transferred to Elmhurst Memorial Hospital(Elmhurst), where she had surgery to her face.

Under cross-examination, Bielaga was asked a number ofquestions concerning the amount she had to drink on the night ofthe accident.

The deposition of Dr. Eilo Fornatto was read to the jury. Dr. Fornatto was a physician at Elmhurst who specialized in ear,nose, throat, head, and neck surgery. Dr. Fornatto testifiedthat Bielaga suffered a blow out fracture of her left orbit. Dr.Fornatto testified that it was his understanding that Bielaga'sinjuries were caused when she was dropped by a next door neighborand subsequently hit her face on a coffee table. Dr. Fornattoreceived this information from a doctor who previously treatedBielaga at Elmhurst.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdictin favor of the defendants. Also, the jury, by way of a specialinterrogatory submitted by Cheers, found that Mozdzeniak was notacting within the scope of his authority at the time of theoccurrence. Subsequently, Bielaga filed timely motions for a newtrial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgmentn.o.v.). Approximately three and half months later, Bielagafiled a notice of motion with regard to her post-trial motionsand set them for hearing before the court.

The defendants then filed motions to strike and dismissBielaga's post-trial motions. The trial court subsequentlydenied both the defendant's motions and Bielaga's post-trialmotions for a new trial and judgment n.o.v. Bielaga timely fileda notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I

Bielaga argues that the trial court erred when it allowedevidence of her drinking. Specifically, she contends the jurywas prejudiced by defense allegations of her intoxication.

The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion ofthe trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trialcourt unless that discretion was clearly abused. Gill v. Foster,157 Ill. 2d 304, 312-13 (1993); citing People v. Enis, 139 Ill.

2d 264 (1990).

Evidence of drinking is so prejudicial that more than meredrinking must be shown; actual intoxication with impairment ofphysical or mental capabilities is required. Wagner v. Zboncak,111 Ill. App. 3d 268, 270 (1982). Insinuations or innuendos ofintoxication based upon evidence of drinking are impermissibleand irrelevant where there is no evidence of intoxication. Wagner, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 270; citing Benuska v. Dahl, 87 Ill.App. 3d 911, 914 (1980). However, such irrelevant evidence isgrounds for reversal only if it results in prejudicing the jury'sverdict. Wagner, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 270; citing Gilberto v.Nordtvedt, 1 Ill. App. 3d 677, 679 (1971).

In Wagner, the defendant was not found liable for theinjuries sustained by plaintiff during an automobile accident. The plaintiff argued that the trial court impermissibly allowedevidence of his intoxication. Prior to trial, plaintiff's motionin limine was granted which prohibited defendant from introducingevidence of plaintiff's alcohol consumption prior to theaccident. At trial, defendant testified the accident scenesmelled like a brewery and implied that the occupants ofplaintiff's car had attempted to conceal beer bottles in anadjacent vacant lot. Plaintiff moved for a mistrial which wasdenied.

The Wagner court held that the plaintiff was denied a fairtrial. Although there was a only reference to plaintiff'salcohol consumption, the court found that it occurred during theexamination of the first witness, when the jury was highlyattentive and the reference could have colored its perception ofthe following testimony; that it violated plaintiff's motion inlimine and plaintiff was unable to rebut the allegation withouthimself violating the order. Wagner, 111 Ill. App. at 270.

In Coleman v. Williams, 42 Ill. App. 3d 612 (1976), apedestrian and his wife brought an action against a motorist torecover for injuries and loss of consortium arising out of atraffic accident. While walking, the plaintiff was struck by thedefendant who was driving. The Coleman court wrote, "defensecounsel, by innuendo, planted in the minds of the jury thepossibility, if not the probability, that the plaintiff wasintoxicated as he was walking on the shoulder of the road inquestion. We find this to be reversible error." Coleman, 42Ill. App. 3d at 617.

In Benuska v. Dahl, 87 Ill. App. 3d 911, 914 (1980), thecourt found that irrelevant evidence that one defendant hadthrown a can of beer out of a car after an accident wassufficiently prejudicial as to require reversal.

In this case, Bielaga filed a motion in limine, where sherequested that the trial court bar evidence of her drinking. Hermotion was denied.

Mozdzeniak raised contributory negligence as an affirmativedefense prior to trial. Mozdzeniak alleged that Bielaga wasnegligent because she "became drunk and intoxicated [which]caus[ed] her to lose her balance." At the close of the evidence,during the jury instruction conference, based on the evidence attrial, the trial court refused to tender instructions which wouldhave permitted the jury to consider if Bielaga was contributorilynegligent. In denying the instruction, the trial judge statedthat there was "nothing in here to indicate that I should giveany instructions with respect to contributory negligence. So I'mnot directing it out. I don't see any evidence that justifies meputting that in this instruction."

Our review of the record reveals that counsel for thedefendants made numerous inquiries concerning Bielaga's drinking. During opening arguments, counsel for Cheers spoke of Bielaga'sdrinking on the night of the accident. Counsel stated the numberand type of drinks Bielaga consumed. Counsel also stated thatone reason Bielaga remained at Cheers after her brother left wasto continue drinking. During Bielaga's testimony, she wasquestioned about the number and types of drinks that she consumedby opposing counsel, and during closing argument, counsel fordefendants made comments concerning Bielaga's drinking.

The defense's persistence in following this line ofquestioning is best illustrated when we examine the testimony ofplaintiff's witness, Vieyra. During Vieyra's cross-examination,counsel for Mozdzeniak asked the witness if Bielaga had beendrinking, if Bielaga was intoxicated, if Bielaga had a "buzz," ifBielaga "was in anyway affected by the alcoholic beverages thatshe was drinking," and how many drinks did Bielaga consume. Afterwards, counsel for Cheers also inquired into Bielaga'sdrinking. Cheers' counsel asked Vieyra, whether Bielaga wasdrinking when Vieyra arrived at Cheers, what was Bielaga drinkingwhen Vieyra arrived, how many beers did Bielaga drink, and ifVieyra saw Bielaga drinking any shots of alcohol.

Here, the issue of Bielaga's drinking was irrelevant becausethe defendant could not show that Bielaga was contributorilynegligent. Whether or not Bielaga was intoxicated had norelevancy in determining whether the plaintiffs' negligence wasthe cause of her injuries. It was Bielaga's testimony that shedid not give Mozdzeniak permission to lift her and, in fact,there is a statement in the record that she objected to suchactivity when Mozdzeniak lifted plaintiff and Vieyra togetherjust before the incident in which plaintiff was injured. Mozdzeniak picked the defendant up and lost his balance and bothfell down.

We do not believe that this case can ever be tried withoutsome mention of the use of alcoholic beverages. The activitiesof the parties occur in a bar over several hours so that the jurywould not be so naive as to believe that we are dealing withteetotalers or abolitionists. The case is quite different fromWagner, Coleman and Babushka where there was no evidence ofalcohol consumption and inappropriate speculation that had notrelation to the facts of the respective cases.

Additionally, during voir dire, the trial court properlyinquired of the prospective jurors whether they had ever been toa bar.

It is not the mere mention of alcohol consumption that isoffensive in this case, but rather the overall cumulative effectof the defendant's continued and repeated questions concerningintoxication that created an inference that the reason Bielagawas injured was due to her drinking. As a result thereof,Bielaga was denied a fair trial.

II

Bielaga filed timely motions for a new trial and forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict but failed to file a noticeof motion and set the motions for hearing until three and a halfmonths later. Subsequently, defendants filed motions to strikeand dismiss Bielaga's post-trial motions, which the trial courtdenied, and proceeded to hear the said post-trial motions ontheir merits.

The defendants argue that Bielaga violated Rule 2.3 of theCircuit Court of Cook County Rules, when she filed her notice ofmotion more than 90 days after she filed her post-trial motion. As such, defendants argue the trial court should have entered anorder denying Bielaga's post-trial motion and abused itsdiscretion when it did not do so for that reason.

Rule 2.3 states, "[t]he burden of calling for hearing anymotion previously filed is on the party making the motion. Ifany such motion is not called for hearing within 90 days from thedate it is filed, the court may enter an order overruling ordenying the motion by reason of delay." (Emphasis added.) Cook.Co. Cir. Ct. G.O. 2.3 (eff. November 29, 1982).

It is apparent from the wording of Rule 2.3 that itsapplication is permissive, at the court's discretion. Here, thetrial court chose to hear the post-trial motions, and thatdecision will not be disturbed especially since appellees did notfile a cross-appeal on this issue. However, the trial court thendenied plaintiff's post-trial motions on their merits.

The standard of review where the trial court has denied amotion for a new trial is whether the jury verdict is against themanifest weight of the evidence. Tedrowe v. Burlington Northern,Inc., 158 Ill. App. 3d 438, 443 (1987); citing Mizowek v.DeFranco, 64 Ill. 2d 303 (1976); Demos v. Ferris-Shell OilCompany, 317 Ill. App. 3d 41, 52 (2000). A verdict is againstthe manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion isclearly evident or where the findings of the jury areunreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence.Tedrowe, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 444; Demos, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 52. Likewise, a judgment n.o.v. should only be granted if theevidence so overwhelmingly favors the moving party that nocontrary verdict could ever stand, and on appeal, the denial of ajudgment n.o.v. is subject to de novo review. Demos, 317 Ill.App. 3d at 47; citing Peterson v. Ress Enterprise, Inc., 292 Ill.App. 3d 566, 573-74 (1997).

Bielaga maintains the court erred when it denied her post-trial motions for a new trial and for judgment n.o.v. Bielagacontends the excessive evidence of drinking denied her a fairtrial and the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence because it was contrary to the uncontradictedevidence produced at trial. Specifically, Bielaga asserts thatthe jury disregarded the testimony of Mozdzeniak, Vieyra, andBielaga concerning the accident which occurred in Cheers.

We hold however that the jury's verdict was not against themanifest weight of the evidence, but that the evidence wasclosely balanced. The evidence in this case could support thejury's verdict. There was evidence which clearly broughtBielaga's credibility into question. When Bielaga sought medicalattention, she gave two different accounts of how she injuredherself. In one version she fell down the stairs and injured herface, in another version she was dropped and injured herself whenshe fell on a coffee table. The jury was free to believe eitherof these statements and reach the conclusion that Bielaga'sinjuries were not sustained as a result of falling in Cheers. However, because the plaintiff did not receive a fair trial asstated above due to the excessive emphasis on drinking by defensecounsel, we are constrained to reverse and remand this case for anew trial, on all issues. As a consequence, any issue regardingthe jury's finding on the special interrogatory submitted byCheers, is moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of thetrial court, and remand this case for new trial.

Reversed and remanded.