FIFTH DIVISION
SEPTEMBER 30, 2003

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, William Shapiro (Shapiro), appeals from an order of the circuit court of CookCounty directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff, the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois(the Board), after a trial in an eminent domain action. On appeal, Shapiro contends that: (1) thejudgment of the trial court is void as in excess of its statutory authority regarding eminent domainproceedings; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of comparable salesproperties on the grounds that the acquisition of such properties was "under threat ofcondemnation"; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of comparable salesproperties with improvements to the land on the grounds that the properties were dissimilar to thesubject property; (4) the trial court erred in barring Shapiro's expert appraiser's testimony on thegrounds that a property used as an example of a comparable sale is zoned differently from thesubject property; and (5) the trial court erred in granting the Board's motion to strike Shapiro'sexpert's testimony after both parties had rested on their evidence. For the following reasons, weaffirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals the following relevant facts. Shapiro is the owner of record of a parcelof property located at 728 W. Liberty Street, Chicago, with a property index number (PIN) of 17-21-111-017 (Liberty property). The Liberty property consists of 1,825 square feet, is vacant andunimproved, and is zoned for industrial use only.

Section 7 of the University of Illinois Act (University Act) (110 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West2000)) grants the Board has the following power of eminent domain:

"The Trustees shall have power (a) to purchase realproperty and easements, and (b) to acquire real property andeasements in the manner provided by law for the exercise of theright of eminent domain, and in the event negotiations for theacquisition of real property or easements for making anyimprovement which the Trustees are authorized to make shall haveproven unsuccessful and the Trustees shall have by resolutionadopted a schedule or plan or operation for the execution of theproject and therein made a finding that it is necessary to take suchproperty or easements immediately or at some specified later datein order to comply with the schedule, the Trustees may acquiresuch property or easements in the same manner provided inSections 7-103 through 7-112 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 110 ILCS 305/7(a) (West 2000).

In accordance with the University Act, the Board passed a resolution on March 12, 1998, toacquire the Liberty property. On June 23, 2000, the Board exercised its authority under theUniversity Act to obtain Shapiro's property for use in its South Campus Development Project byfiling a complaint for condemnation.

On September 20, 2000, the trial court entered a case management order setting forthdeadlines for the parties' filings. The trial court set forth the date of November 29, 2000, as adeadline for Shapiro to file "Responses, if any, to the Complaint for Condemnation, includingMotions to Dismiss, Traverses, and Cross Claims."⁽¹⁾ The record shows that Shapiro did not fileany motion to dismiss the Board's action. On March 30, 2001, Shapiro answered the Board'sinterrogatories stating that he would rely on two real estate appraisal experts, Michael Grimesand Larry Starkman.

On June 22, 2001, the Board filed a motion in limine to bar the testimony of Starkman, onthe grounds that he had not been made available for deposition. The trial court granted thismotion by an order entered on June 27, 2001. The trial court further ordered that "DefendantWilliam Shapiro is barred from supplementing the appraisal of Michael Grimes," and orderedthat discovery be closed on July 16, 2001.

Prior to trial, Grimes submitted an appraisal report on the Liberty property. Grimes'appraisal report provided the sale price of four properties he considered "comparable" to theLiberty property. The report revealed that three out of the four property sales were made underthreat of condemnation and two of those three properties were zoned for commercial use. Properties Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were all within the area that the Board had, by resolution datedSeptember 10, 1992, specifically designated for acquisition as part of its South CampusDevelopment Project. Grimes' appraisal report identified properties 1 and 2 as having beenacquired by the Board in May and June 2000.

Grimes' appraisal report contained comparable sales of the following properties describedas follows:

Property No. 1: A vacant property located at 701 W.Maxwell Street, sold to the Board in June 2000, under threat ofcondemnation;

Property No. 2: An improved property located at 1232-34S. Halsted Street sold to the Board in May 2000, (a) under threat ofcondemnation; and (b) commercially improved with a brickbuilding;

Property No. 3: An improved property located at 1308 S.Halsted Street sold to the Board in October 1997, (a) under threatof condemnation; (b) commercially zoned and improved with abrick building used for retail purposes at the time of the sale; and(c) in which the owner invested $64,000 in improvements andwhich the owner continued to use as a retail store until the time theBoard acquired the property in 2000.

During his deposition, Grimes acknowledged that it was improper to rely on sales madeunder threat of condemnation and conceded that such sales are "normally not considered" whenappraising a condemned property. Grimes also testified that he attached no value to theimprovements on the four comparable properties in his report, but that these four properties weresuperior to the Liberty property in location and accessibility.

On August 22, 2001, the Board filed a motion in limine to prohibit Grimes from usingvaluation data of the above three described "comparable" property sales as improper since theywere sales made "under threat of condemnation." The Board submitted the affidavit of Ellen M.Hamilton, a University employee, who testified that these three properties were acquired by theUniversity pursuant to a resolution of the Board dated September 10, 1992. Ms. Hamiltontestified that the properties at 701 Maxwell Street and 1304 Halsted Street were acquired by theUniversity in June 2000 and May 2000, respectively, and that the property located at 1308Halsted Street was acquired by the University in August 2000. The Board also asserted that thethree properties were not comparable to the Liberty property because they were zoned differently. On November 8, 2001, the trial court excluded evidence of these three "comparable" sales.

At the jury instruction conference prior to trial, Shapiro tendered Illinois Pattern JuryInstruction Civil, No. 300.85 (3d ed. 1995), pertaining to the reasonable probability of rezoningthe Liberty property. The Board objected to the instruction because there had been nopreliminary showing that it was reasonably probable that the property could or would be rezoned,as required under Illinois law. The trial court rejected Shapiro's proposed instruction. Thereafter, the Board questioned whether Grimes would be permitted to render his opinion attrial that the property would be rezoned. The record reveals the following colloquy:

"MS. KENEDY: Your Honor, a point of clarification with respectto witness testimony , I'm uncertain, I don't know, but I'm hopefulthat we're not going to be hearing any testimony from Mr. Grimesor Shapiro concerning rezoning of this property given your ruling.

THE COURT: I'm not expecting them to bring that in.

MR. SHAPIRO: Me either."

At trial, the Board offered the testimony of its expert, James A. Gibbons, a real estateappraiser. Gibbons testified that he examined five "comparable" sales which fetched prices ofbetween $1.93 and $7.27 per square foot. The properties cited by Gibbons were described asfollows:

(1) Located at 26th Street and Dearborn Street, 14 blocksfrom the Liberty property, Property No. 1 measured approximately34,600 square feet, was vacant land zoned for manufacturingpurposes, and sold in March 2000 for $7.27 per square foot;

(2) Property No. 2, located at 2404 South Wabash Avenuewas 12 blocks south and 15 blocks east of the Liberty property,was also zoned for manufacturing, measured 22,683 square feet,and sold in 1999 for $5.29 per square foot;

(3) Property No. 3, located at Wallace Street and PershingRoad, 27 blocks south of the Liberty property, was an empty lotmeasuring 107,740 square feet and sold in 1999 for $3.95 persquare foot;

(4) Located at 2101 South Morgan Street, property No. 4was 9 blocks south of the Liberty property and measured 65,775square feet; this property was zoned for industrial use and sold in1998 for $4.26 per square foot; and

(5) Property No. 5, located at Throop Street and 21st Street,many blocks south of the Liberty property, measured 38,725 squarefeet, was zoned for manufacturing use, and sold in 1998 for $3.23per square foot.

Based on these "comparables," Gibbons opined that the Liberty property had a fair marketvalue of $7.50 per square foot for a total value of $13,700.

Grimes then attempted to testify on behalf of Shapiro that, in his opinion, the Libertyproperty could be rezoned for commercial or residential use, based on the nature of real estatedevelopment taking place in the neighborhood of the Liberty property. However, because of the trial court's ruling that evidence of rezoning would be precluded, the trial court did not allowGrimes to testify on the possibility of rezoning the Liberty property. Shapiro did not object to thetrial court's ruling.

Grimes testified that the highest and best use for a property is defined as a use that can"legally, feasibly, and monetarily support the highest value of the property." Grimes described acomparable sale of a property located at 1315 Taylor Street which was a vacant lot of roughly thesame size as the Liberty property, at 2,550 square feet. Grimes stated that this property sold inApril 1999 for $41.38 per square foot. Based on this comparable property, Grimes stated that theLiberty property would be properly valued at $42.62 per square foot for a total of $77,781.

Grimes opined that the highest and best use for the Liberty property was commercial andresidential development. Grimes considered the five properties offered by Gibbons ascomparable sales and concluded that those properties were not comparable because of their muchlarger size and distant location from the Liberty property.

At the conclusion of Grimes' direct testimony, Shapiro moved for an order acceptinghimself as an expert. The trial court stated it would "hold off" on that decision until after theBoard completed cross-examination.

On cross-examination, Grimes admitted that commercial and residential developmentwould not be legally permissible under the property's existing zoning. Grimes conceded that theonly comparable sale offered, 1315 Taylor Street, was an improved, commercially zoned parcelin the "Little Italy" neighborhood, and was far superior to the vacant Liberty property both interms of accessibility and location. Grimes admitted that zoning on this comparable propertypermitted a business use on the first floor and residential use on the upper floors, but that theindustrial-use zoning for the Liberty property would not permit such uses. Grimes made noadjustment in his valuation of the Liberty property based on the differences in zoning betweenthe one accepted comparable property and the Liberty property.

After cross-examination, Shapiro rested his case despite the fact that the trial court hadnot ruled on his motion to accept himself as an expert. The Board moved for an order strikingGrimes' testimony. The trial court heard arguments on the Board's motion, reviewed relevantcase law, and granted the motion, striking Grimes' testimony. The trial court entered an orderfining that Grimes' testimony was unreliable because: (1) Grimes improperly relied on a highestand best use that was illegal under the zoning for the subject property and no evidence wasbefore the jury on the reasonable probability of rezoning; and (2) Grimes made no adjustment inhis valuation of the Liberty property based on the differences in zoning between the one acceptedcomparable property and the Liberty property. Shapiro did not seek permission to reopen hiscase to allow the owner (Shapiro) to testify as to the fair market value of the property.

At the conclusion of the trial, the Board moved for a directed verdict. The trial courtconcluded that there was no range of value from which the jury could render a contrary verdict,and granted the Board's motion for a directed verdict setting just compensation in the amount of$13,700.

Shapiro timely appeals from entry of the directed verdict in favor of the Board, as well asthe orders of the trial court excluding the testimony and evidence of his expert at trial.

OPINION

Initially, Shapiro contends that the Board failed to exercise its eminent domain powers inaccordance with statutory authority thereby rendering its condemnation proceeding void. Shapiro argues that the legal basis for the eminent domain proceeding against the Liberty property is a resolution of the Board dated September 10, 1992 (1992 Resolution), and enactedpursuant to section 7 of the University Act. Therein, the Board identified 75 properties that itdeemed "necessary to take" for the purpose of developing the area to the south of the University'scampus in Chicago. Shapiro notes that the Liberty property, specifically "728 West Liberty," wasnot designated as one of 75 properties to be acquired by the Board. In fact, the 1992 Resolutionspecified the 75 properties by their PIN, including a series of properties on "Block 111," anddesignating properties with the PINs immediately before and after the Liberty property, i.e., PINs17-21-111-016 and 17-21-111-018. The PIN of the Liberty property, as noted above, is 17-21-111-017. Thus, Shapiro argues, the Board failed to comply with the procedure set forth insection 7 of the University Act.

A municipality can only exercise the power of eminent domain when it has beenspecifically conferred by legislative enactment. Village of Long Grove v. First National Bank ofLake Forest, 164 Ill. App. 3d 253, 255, 517 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1987). In determining whether astatute grants a municipality the authority to condemn, the court must construe the eminentdomain statute strictly, to protect the rights of property owners. People ex rel. Director ofFinance v. Young Women's Christian Association, 86 Ill. 2d 219, 232-33, 427 N.E.2d 70, 76(1981); City of Oakbrook Terrace v. La Salle National Bank, 186 Ill. App. 3d 343,542 N.E.2d478 (1989).

Here, the record shows that Shapiro's contention is waived for review for his failure tofile a traverse or motion to dismiss the Board's complaint for condemnation. Shapiro failed torespond by motion and assert that the Board lacked the authority to proceed in it's complaintpursuant to the University Act and the resolution adopted in 2000.

Next, Shapiro contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of three propertiesproposed as comparable by Grimes. Shapiro argues that the trial court erred in rejecting theevidence on the grounds that the sales of the properties were made under threat of condemnation.

It is well established that property sales made under threat of condemnation are notreliable evidence of fair market value, defined as the amount of money that a willing buyer,under ordinary circumstances, would pay to a willing owner in a voluntary sale, neither beingunder any obligation to buy or sell. Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Oberlaender, 42Ill. 2d 410, 415, 247 N.E.2d 888, 892 (1969). Property sales made under threat of condemnationare inadmissible because the party asserting the sale evidence cannot establish that the propertywas "sold freely and in the open market." Forest Preserve District v. Krol, 12 Ill. 2d 139, 148,145 N.E.2d 599 (1957); Oak Brook Park District v. Oak Brook Development Co., 170 Ill. App.3d 221, 235, 524 N.E.2d 213, 222 (1988).

The record shows that the Board passed its resolution to acquire properties for the SouthCampus Development Project area in 1992. Each of the three sales proffered by Grimes is aproperty that was subject to the Board's authority to condemn at the time of the sale. As such, thetrial court properly excluded evidence of these sales as comparable.

Shapiro further argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that two of the threeexcluded properties were too dissimilar to the Liberty property to be considered comparable.

In condemnation cases, the admission and exclusion of evidence as to comparable salesrest entirely in the discretion of the trial court. Department of Transportation v. Chicago Title &Trust Co, 303 Ill. App. 3d 484, 500, 707 N.E.2d 637 (1999). An expert in valuation of propertyfor condemnation purposes may only rely on facts or data that are legally relevant to the fair cashmarket value of the property in question. The trial court's determination shall not be disturbedabsent an abuse of discretion. City of Chicago v. Anthony, 136 Ill. 2d 169, 187, 554 N.E.2d1381, 1389 (1990). Evidence of the sale of improved property is inadmissible as a comparablesale of a vacant property unless the properties are otherwise closely comparable in size, use,zoning and locale. Sanitary District of Chicago v. Boening, 267 Ill. 118, 122, 107 N.E.810, 812(1915).

Here, the record shows that Grimes attempted to submit as comparable sales propertiesimproved with buildings and either residences or businesses when the Liberty property wasmaintained as an unimproved empty lot. The trial court properly denied the use of properties thatwere not, in fact, comparable.

Next, Shapiro contends that the trial court erred in striking Grimes' testimony as to futurepossible rezoning of the Liberty property. Grimes testified that the "highest and best use" of theLiberty property was for commercial and business purposes, while at the same time concedingthat the Liberty property was zoned solely for industrial purposes.

The reasonable probability of rezoning is a proper factor to be considered in determiningthe value of property taken in a condemnation proceeding (Department of Public Works &Buildings v. Rogers, 39 Ill. 2d 109, 113, 233 N.E.2d 409 (1968)), and where there is sufficientevidence for a court to make a finding that the reasonable probability exists, then the witnessesmay testify as to the value of the land based upon such probability. Department of Public Works& Buildings v. Ass'n of Franciscan Fathers, 69 Ill. 2d 308, 314-15, 371 N.E.2d 616 (1977);Department of Transportation v. First Bank of Schaumburg, 260 Ill. App. 3d 490, 499, 631N.E.2d 1145 (1992).

Here, Shapiro provided no preliminary showing as to the reasonable probability ofrezoning. In light of this fact, the trial court was required to exclude Grimes' opinion as to theprobability of rezoning the Liberty property.

Finally, Shapiro contends that the trial court erred in granting the Board's motion for adirected verdict and deciding the question of valuation. Shapiro argues that the trial courtusurped the role of the jury.

In an eminent domain case, a jury's verdict on the fair market value of the property to betaken must be within the range of value presented at trial. Forest Preserve District v. Kelley, 69 Ill. App. 3d 309, 319, 387 N.E.2d 368, 376 (1979). If a jury has no range of value from which torender a verdict, the court must enter a directed verdict for the value presented. Department ofPublic Works & Buildings. v. Butler, 5 Ill. App. 3d 134, 137, 283 N.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1972).

In the present case, Shapiro failed to present any evidence of the range of value of theLiberty property. Although Shapiro initially moved to submit himself as an expert witness, hefailed to follow through on a motion to reopen his case and present other evidence of valuationafter Grimes' testimony was excluded. Under this circumstance, with only the valuation evidencepresented by the Board for the jury to consider, the trial court properly directed a verdict in favorof the Board.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

QUINN and HARTIGAN, JJ., concur.

1. "Traverse" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows: "Common-law pleading. Aformal denial of a factual allegation made in the opposing party's pleading***." Black's LawDictionary 1506 (7th ed. 1999). In the context of a condemnation or eminent domain proceeding,a "traverse" serves as a motion to deny the legal right of the complainant--in this case, to takeland for the public purpose of the expansion of the University of Illinois, e.g., if the legislaturehas granted a municipality the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain, the propertyowner bears the burden of claiming and presenting evidence that the municipality lacks authorityto condemn or that it has abused its discretion: "Keller filed a traverse and motion to dismissalleging: (1) the City was not authorized to acquire the property by eminent domain proceedings; (2) the ordinance did not authorize the City to acquire the property for any purpose authorized bystatute; (3) the ordinance was 'ineffective in law to vest the power of condemnation in plaintiffor to authorize plaintiff to condemn'; and (4) the City did not make a bona fide attempt to agreeon the amount of compensation to be paid to Keller for the property."(Emphasis Added.) City ofOakbrook Terrace v. La Salle National Bank, 186 Ill. App. 3d 343, 346, 542 N.E.2d 478 (1989).