FIRST DIVISION

March 17, 2003

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:

Following the entry of judgment by the circuit court on a jury verdict in favor ofdefendants City of Chicago (City) and Chicago police officer Timothy Covelli in this wrongfuldeath and survival action, plaintiff Louise Brawner, as the Independent Administrator of theEstate of Emmett Blanton, Jr. (Blanton), appeals. On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erredby allowing testimony concerning alleged hearsay statements and defense counsel violated inlimine rulings concerning the use of such statements. Plaintiff contends defense counsel alsoimproperly attempted to elicit undisclosed opinion testimony. Plaintiff further contends the courtimproperly admitted evidence of the decedent, Blanton's, cocaine intoxication at the time of hisdeath and allowed defendants' toxicology expert to testify about Blanton's mental state during theincident. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Background

This action originated in September 1996, when Emmett Blanton, Sr., as specialadministrator of Blanton's estate, filed a complaint against the City alleging that Chicago policeofficers wilfully and wantonly shot and killed Blanton without probable cause on August 23,1996. The incident in question began with Blanton's alleged unlawful restraint of a woman in hiscar, then involved a police pursuit of Blanton, during which Blanton drove recklessly, struck abuilding and several vehicles, endangered police officers and ultimately threatened officers whothen shot him. Brawner, as the independent administrator of Blanton's estate, subsequentlyreplaced Blanton, Sr., as plaintiff. A third amended complaint was filed in March 2000, in whichplaintiff sought to recover damages under wrongful death and survival claims (740 ILCS 180/1,755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 1996)), and alleged that defendants and Chicago police officer JeffreyJablon wilfully and wantonly shot and killed Blanton.

In their answer, defendants denied plaintiff's material allegations and asserted affirmativedefenses of, among other things, governmental immunity (745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 1996)),justifiable use of force (745 ILCS 5/7-5, 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1996)), and Blanton's ownnegligent, wilful and wanton, and intentional conduct. Defendants alleged that Blanton's ownconduct, which consisted of committing several criminal offenses, attempting to flee the police,and acting under the influence of cocaine, was the cause of any injuries or damages that resulted.

Motions in limine

In March 2000, the court heard the parties' motions in limine. Among other things,plaintiff apparently sought to bar reference to evidence of Blanton's "drug use," including thepresence of cocaine in Blanton's system at the time of the incident. Defense counsel discussedthe expected testimony of a pharmacology expert (O'Donnell) concerning the effects of cocaineon Blanton based on the autopsy toxicology report. The court found that cocaine was "definitelyan issue in this case" and, noting that there was evidence of Blanton's use of drugs, deniedplaintiff's motion.

Then the parties discussed at length plaintiff's motion concerning Blanton's "mentalcondition and state of mind," apparently seeking to bar O'Donnell's conclusions about Blanton'scocaine intoxication and paranoia. Over plaintiff's objection that O'Donnell was not qualified torender a psychiatric diagnosis regarding paranoia, the court allowed the defense to presentO'Donnell's testimony as to the "manifestations" of cocaine intoxication. The court ruled thatBlanton's drug use was relevant and, over plaintiff's objection that the police officers had noknowledge of the drug use, denied plaintiff's motion. Following the hearing, the court entered awritten order in which, among other things, it denied plaintiff's "motions in limine regarding[Blanton's] mental condition and state of mind, [Blanton's] drug use and motion with respect todrug paraphernalia found at the scene."

Before trial in April 2000, the court heard additional motions in limine. At that hearing,argument centered on plaintiff's motion "to bar evidence and testimony regarding statementsmade by or attributed to Shadell Taylor," the alleged victim of unlawful restraint by Blanton. According to the parties, Taylor told police officers essentially that Blanton held her in his caragainst her will, threatened her by holding a screwdriver to her neck, and pushed her from hiscar. Defense counsel argued that the incident with Taylor was part of the "database" that bothparties' experts, including plaintiff's police procedure expert (Johnson) and O'Donnell, had reliedupon to form their opinions. Plaintiff's counsel conceded that the fact that Blanton was originallywanted for unlawful restraint was relevant, but objected to Taylor's statements about Blanton'suse of the screwdriver to threaten her as hearsay. The court ruled that the "unlawful restraint willcome in" and the witnesses could rely on Taylor's statements. In further discussion, the courtclarified that the defense would not call Taylor as a witness because she could not be found. Defense counsel argued that plaintiff's expert Johnson relied on the alleged hearsay in hisdeposition and, because Blanton's use of the screwdriver was "specifically" mentioned inJohnson's notes, it was relevant as a basis for Johnson's opinions. The court ultimately deniedplaintiff's motion concerning Taylor's statements.

The court then considered plaintiff's motion "to bar evidence and testimony regardingcontents of notes found in decedent's vehicle." Defense counsel argued that O'Donnell relied onthe notes in part, and the court ruled that, even if such material itself was not admissible, it couldbe relied upon by the witnesses. The court allowed the experts' conclusions based on the notes,specifying that O'Donnell could say Blanton was "depressed *** from reviewing these notes,"but granted plaintiff's motion as to the notes themselves. Following the hearing, the courtentered a written order, in which, among other things, it denied plaintiff's motion "to barevidence and testimony regarding statements made by or attributed to Shadell Taylor."

Trial: Plaintiff's Case

The following day the trial began and, in opening statement, defense counsel referred tothe incident involving Shadell Taylor in Blanton's car. Plaintiff objected, and in a sidebarconference, the court ruled that Taylor's statements were admissible to show the officers'"mindset as they start off on this chase [of Blanton]," but not for the truth of the matter asserted. After the court further ruled that the statements should be prefaced with the phrase "told that" tothe officers, plaintiff entered a continuing objection to such statements.

Plaintiff called several Chicago police officers to testify as adverse witnesses pursuant tosection 2-1102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-1102 (West 2000). OfficerTimothy Covelli testified that on August 23, 1996, he and his partner, Robert Balesh, firstreceived an emergency flash message about a crime in progress when they were at the policestation shortly after midnight. According to the message, Blanton tried to ram a police car head-on after crossing into the oncoming lanes in traffic. The officers were in their squadrol, withOfficer Balesh driving, when they received a second message concerning Blanton around 12:25a.m. That message conveyed that the police were chasing Blanton because there was akidnapping involved. According to the message, Shadell Taylor told the police that Blanton"grabbed her off the street," tried to ram a police car, and, when the police car made chase, heshoved her out of the car. In response to the message, the officers went toward Halsted and Clarkwith their sirens and emergency lights activated. There, they saw Blanton's car and a few squadcars in pursuit, and they joined in the chase. On direct examination, Officer Covelli testified that,at that point, based on the emergency message, he believed Blanton was armed and dangerous. Plaintiff objected to testimony as to what Officer Covelli believed, and the court sustained theobjection and struck the response.

Officer Covelli further testified that he and Officer Balesh pursued Blanton to theintersection of Clark, Diversey, and Broadway, where they saw Blanton's car crash into a storewindow on one corner, then back up. There were squad cars around Blanton and about six policeofficers on foot, with their guns drawn. Blanton's car came "flying back" off the curb by the storeand, in an attempt to flee, Blanton "chased" a few officers out of the intersection, almost hittingthem. Blanton chased one officer "way out of the way, like [he was] trying to run him down" andhe smashed into other officers' squad cars. All the officers were yelling at Blanton, directing himto stop and show his hands, but Blanton failed to comply. Instead, Blanton began to driveforward and Officer Covelli heard one gunshot fired from the direction of Blanton's car. At thetime, Officer Covelli did not know who fired the shot. Blanton's car then jumped the curb ontothe sidewalk on Diversey, and Blanton drove eastbound at about 40 miles per hour on thesidewalk, causing police officers and pedestrians to run for cover and dive out of the way. Blanton returned his car to the street and continued driving east on Diversey, then turned southonto Pine Grove and struck a parked car at the "T-shaped" intersection at Wrightwood. Theofficers pulled up about eight feet behind Blanton's car, blocking Blanton from going north onPine Grove, but without "wedg[ing]" him in the space, and activated a high-intensity light toshine into the rear of Blanton's car.

As soon as they stopped, Officer Covelli got out of the squadrol and, standing behind theopen passenger door, he drew his gun and pointed it through the open passenger door window forcover. Officer Covelli had his gun out because he was afraid for his life. He considered Blantonto be "a very dangerous man" based on all of Blanton's conduct up to that point, including

everything he had seen, the emergency messages he received, and the fact that Blanton was"behaving like a crazy person." Once Officer Covelli assumed the position of cover, he sawBlanton back up his car and ram into the front of the squadrol, hitting the bumper. From the timethe squadrol had stopped, Officers Covelli and Balesh shouted warnings and instructions toBlanton, directing him to get out of his car. Other police units approached behind them, butOfficer Covelli did not see them because his attention was focused on Blanton. Blanton did notattempt to go in either direction on Wrightwood. After backing into the squadrol, Blanton's car"bounced off" the squadrol and came to a stop.

According to further testimony, the next thing Officer Covelli saw was Blanton in his car,going down to his right and appearing to reach to the floor for something, disappearingcompletely from view. Then, in a single motion, Blanton "popped" up and turned toward OfficerCovelli, swinging his right arm over the middle of the front seat of his car and holding a shinyobject in his hand that he pointed at the officer. At that moment, Officer Covelli was "scared todeath" and he fired his gun at Blanton because he believed that Blanton was pointing a gun athim and was going to shoot him. Officer Covelli fired six times, continuing to shoot until hethought the threat was over. Then, with other officers, Officer Covelli approached Blanton's car,but he stopped at the rear bumper because he was still "in shock" and scared.

Officer Covelli did not make an official statement at the scene, but he told a sergeantthere that he had fired his gun and turned in the gun. Officer Covelli returned to the policestation, where he made reports and spoke with police personnel. When he learned that no gunwas found in Blanton's car, Officer Covelli still thought there was a gun that had not yet beenfound. Officer Covelli filled out a weapon discharge report and a statement to his commandingofficer within hours of the incident; those reports were accurate, but were only summaries. About two or three months later, Officer Covelli made an official written statement in which hementioned the shiny object that Blanton held.

Officer Jeffrey Jablon testified that at the time in question, he was on duty alone in anunmarked vehicle when he received a radio message about Blanton and the police pursuit. Afterreceiving a second emergency message, Officer Jablon activated his emergency equipment andjoined in the chase. Officer Jablon testified substantially consistent with Officer Covelli as to theincident at the store at Clark and Diversey. The officer heard a shot when Blanton pulled awayfrom the store and did not know who had fired, but thought there was a "50/50 chance" that theshot came from Blanton. Officer Jablon saw Blanton nearly hit one police officer with his carand another officer jump backwards onto the hood of his squad car to avoid getting hit.

Officer Jablon further testified that he saw Blanton drive on the sidewalk on Diversey,continued to follow him, and pulled up to the scene on Pine Grove after Officer Covelli'ssquadrol had stopped. Officer Jablon drew his gun when he got out of his car because, based oneverything known about Blanton to that point, he was dealing with a dangerous, and possiblyarmed, man. As Officer Jablon approached Blanton's car, he saw Blanton, who had turnedaround in the car to face Officer Covelli, point with something that he held in his right hand. Officer Jablon was in fear for his life and prepared to fire his gun. He heard Officers Covelli andBalesh shout at Blanton before he heard shots. When he heard the gunshots, Officer Jablonthought he was being shot at, and, upon seeing and hearing the glass in Blanton's car windowsbreak, he started to fire his gun. Officer Jablon discharged 10 bullets in rapid succession andlater informed a sergeant at the scene that he had fired his gun. When he returned to the policestation, Officer Jablon filled out reports but he did not remember if he mentioned in the reportsthat Blanton had something in his hand.

Officer Robert Balesh testified to substantially the same account of the incident as OfficerCovelli. Officer Covelli had already gotten out of the squadrol at Pine Grove and Wrightwood,while Officer Balesh was still inside, with his door open. Officer Balesh was yelling instructionsat Blanton and getting out of the squadrol when the shots were fired. Blanton looked to bothsides, as if looking for "an avenue to escape," then backed up his car and struck the squadrol. After Blanton's car bounced off the squadrol and rolled forward, Blanton bent down to his rightand came up with his arm "flinging out" toward Officer Balesh. When Blanton's arm "cameback," Officer Balesh saw something shiny in Blanton's hand. Officer Balesh thought Blantonhad a gun, and he "flinched down" and slid out of the squadrol, fearing for his life because hewas not in a good position. Blanton's arm was swung over in a "threatening manner" towardOfficer Covelli. After the shots were fired, Officer Balesh approached Blanton's car with otherofficers and he saw that Blanton was still breathing, performed a quick pat-down search ofBlanton and looked for a weapon. Officer Balesh completed a report to his commander later thatday and did not mention any shiny object in the report. Balesh was shocked when he learnedthere was no gun in Blanton's car.

The final Chicago police officer to be called as an adverse witness, Joseph Moran,testified that, on the day in question, he worked as a forensic investigator at the crime scenes atClark and Diversey, and at Pine Grove and Wrightwood. Officer Moran did not remembertalking to Officers Covelli or Jablon at the scene. Officer Moran saw damage to the headrest ofthe driver's seat in Blanton's car, but did not know if it was a bullet hole. There was a hole in thedashboard that Officer Moran believed to be from a bullet, red spatters that could have beenblood on the steering wheel, and bullet holes in the rear trunk area. Officer Moran found onescrewdriver on the floor of Blanton's car behind the passenger seat and another screwdriver onthe rear passenger seat. Detectives at the scene had already inventoried the screwdrivers.

The first of two occurrence witnesses to testify was Selvin Jones, who worked inmaintenance in a building on Lakeview, near the intersection of Pine Grove and Wrightwood. Atthe time in question, Jones was fixing a light fixture on an upper canopy. Jones was working ona 40-foot ladder when he heard the "squeaking" of tires from two cars, a bang, and police sirens,followed by about 10 gunshots. After Jones descended the ladder and hid behind a pillar, heheard several more shots.

Steven Baron, who was the night doorman in the building where Jones worked, testifiedthat he became aware of the police chase of Blanton by listening to a police scanner. Accordingto a scanner report, a victim had fallen or was pushed from Blanton's car and Blanton struck abuilding. When the vehicles entered the intersection, Baron was positioned by the window. There were pillars obstructing the view, but Baron saw Blanton's car and the squadrol stop in theintersection, and he heard sirens, followed by a shot. Baron then went behind his desk and heard15 more shots, but could not tell what direction the shots came from.

Louise Brawner, Blanton's mother, testified that Blanton had been married twice and hada daughter, Emily, with his second wife, Robin. One of the reasons for Blanton's divorce fromRobin was his drug use. Brawner knew that Blanton had been in a drug rehabilitation program in1996, but was not aware that he had been in such programs twice before.

Robin Yvette Blanton testified that she married Blanton in October 1991. In 1992, shegave birth to Emily and became aware that Blanton had a drug problem. Blanton told Robin hehad been using cocaine and he entered a drug rehabilitation program that year. When Emily wastwo years old, Blanton relapsed and was admitted to another rehabilitation program. Robin filedfor divorce in 1994 due to Blanton's drug problem. Blanton told her that he entered another drugtreatment program in 1996.

Dr. Eupil Choi, a forensic pathologist, testified that he performed the autopsy on Blanton. There were gunshot entry wounds to the back of the neck and the upper back, and on the backside of the right upper arm. The toxicology report showed that Blanton tested positive forcocaine and a metabolite of cocaine, which indicated the presence of cocaine in Blanton's systemfor a longer period of time.

Dr. Robert Kirschner, a forensic pathologist with a specialty in anatomic pathology,testified that, based on his review of materials, he believed Blanton was facing away from theshooter. Dr. Kirschner opined that one of the two "lodged" wounds to the back, which werecaused by bullets that were recovered and traced to Officer Covelli's gun, was potentially fatal. Dr. Kirschner agreed with Dr. Choi's interpretation of the wound to the right upper arm, that theentry was from the back and the exit was in the front. He did not believe that the entry wound inthe arm was consistent with Blanton being turned around in his car and pointing back with hisright arm, but concluded that it was not possible to determine the position of Blanton's arm at thetime of the injury. Dr. Kirschner admitted that the moment when Officer Covelli saw Blanton'sthreatening motion and the moment when the shot struck Blanton were different. He furtheradmitted that finding cocaine in Blanton's system might explain Blanton's actions before theshooting.

Gregory Johnson, a licensed private detective and former Chicago police officer andCook County State's Attorney's Office investigator with experience investigating excessive forcecomplaints against police officers, testified that he reviewed various police reports and listened topolice emergency radio tapes in this case. Johnson concluded that the police officers were notjustified in their use of force, basing his opinion, in part, on the fact that the reports filed by theofficers on the day of the incident did not mention the shiny object that they saw in Blanton'shand, but later reports included such mention. Johnson also reviewed the autopsy report and, oncross-examination, stated that it contained toxicology results showing the presence of cocaine inBlanton's system.

Johnson stated that the cocaine was significant because it would explain Blanton's erraticbehavior and he admitted that a crack pipe had been recovered from Blanton's pocket. Johnsonopined that Blanton's holding Taylor against her will and shoving a screwdriver to her neckconstituted erratic behavior that should be considered dangerous by the police. He admitted thatBlanton committed a violent act by trying to ram an officer's car and further opined that a policeofficer hearing the emergency message about Blanton should proceed as if Blanton were armedand dangerous. Johnson further admitted that Blanton jeopardized the lives of innocent peoplewhen he fled, he caused property damage and endangered police officers, and was "extremelydangerous." Johnson admitted that Blanton acted irrationally, erratically, and showed "everyintention of trying to escape," and the police reports mentioned that the officers believed Blantonhad a gun.

During the cross-examination of Johnson, after defense counsel asked a questionregarding Taylor's statement about Blanton threatening her with a screwdriver, the court calledfor a sidebar conference. At that time, the court noted plaintiff's standing objection and clarifiedthat the statement was relevant to show the state of mind of the officers, but was not admissibleto prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Plaintiff then rested and the defense moved for a directed verdict in favor of OfficersJablon and Covelli. The court granted the motion as to Officer Jablon, but denied it as to OfficerCovelli.

Defense Case

Chicago police officer Paul Venticinque testified that he and his partner were drivingnorth on Broadway in an unmarked squad car, when Blanton's car, which was southbound, cameinto the northbound lane toward them. Officer Venticinque, who was driving, had to swerve toavoid being hit head-on. He immediately made a U-turn and activated the emergency equipment. At that time, Officer Venticinque saw Blanton's car stop abruptly, the passenger door open andShadell Taylor "fly out backwards onto to street." Blanton's car then sped away and Taylor rantoward the officers, screaming "hysterically" and waving her hands, and she jumped in the backseat of the police car.

Plaintiff objected to testimony about the content of Taylor's conversation with the officerson the basis of hearsay. In a sidebar conference, defense counsel argued that Taylor's statementswere offered to show Officer Venticinque's state of mind and his response, and they alsoqualified as excited utterance hearsay exceptions. In overruling plaintiff's objection, the courtstated that the objection had been covered in the motion in limine and the statements were notbeing offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

Officer Venticinque testified that Blanton continued speeding south on Broadway,through a red light. Taylor told the officers that Blanton "wouldn't let her go" when she tried toget out of his car, but instead, he "pushed" a sharp, shiny object under her throat, told her she wasgoing to "complete the drama," and pushed her toward the door. Taylor said she thought she wasgoing to be killed and eventually told the officers that the sharp object Blanton held to her throatwas a screwdriver. She was physically shaken and screaming, and, because they were chasingBlanton's car, it was hard for the officers to get all the necessary information from her. OfficerVenticinque's partner called in the incident as an unlawful restraint. While they were pursuingBlanton, the officers were trying to determine, from Taylor's account, if the incident was akidnapping or unlawful restraint. At the time, the officers did not know if Blanton had a gun.

Officer Venticinque further testified that he lost sight of Blanton's car, but ultimatelyarrived at the scene at Pine Grove and Wrightwood. There, Taylor identified Blanton's car as theone she had been held in. Officer Venticinque turned off the ignition in Blanton's car, saw thatBlanton, who had been removed from the car, was severely injured, and told his partner to call anambulance. Taylor saw Blanton and identified him as the person who prevented her from gettingout of the car. Officers Covelli and Jablon told Officer Venticinque, in response to his questions,that they fired shots. The paramedics informed him that Blanton was deceased.

Chicago police officer Norman Knutson testified that he and his partner became involvedin the chase when they saw Blanton drive through a red light. They saw Blanton crash into thestore and pulled up next to him. Officer Knutson got out of the car with his weapon drawn andordered Blanton to shut the ignition. Blanton, who was facing away, turned toward OfficerKnutson and "growled," then "threw" his car into reverse. When Blanton's car broke loose fromthe store, it struck Officer Knutson's squad car and another officer's car. Blanton then drovedirectly toward Officer Knutson, who escaped injury by jumping onto the hood of the squad car. Blanton drove into the store again, and again reversed his car, hitting the squad car and removingthe bumper. Blanton backed up and headed toward the sidewalk where two other officers werestanding, so Officer Knutson fired a shot into the front passenger-side tire of Blanton's car. Thetwo officers jumped out of the way and Blanton drove down the sidewalk. At the scene onWrightwood, Officer Knutson informed a sergeant that he had fired his gun and turned in thegun.

Chicago police detective Robert Soreghan testified that he processed the scene at PineGrove and Wrightwood for evidence collection. He searched Blanton's car, and recovered andinventoried two screwdrivers, among other items. Detective Soreghan also recovered a crackpipe from Blanton's person. He directed another officer to photograph the interior of Blanton'scar where the screwdrivers were recovered based upon a determination that a screwdriver mighthave been the object the officers saw in Blanton's hand. The screwdriver that was found on theback seat of Blanton's car was inventoried as a weapon, based on the position, and screwdriverfound on the rear floor was inventoried as evidence. Detective Soreghan later interviewedOfficers Covelli and Jablon, who were kept separate so that their statements could be madeindependently.

James O'Donnell, an expert pharmacologist and pharmacist, testified to a reasonabledegree of scientific certainty that, based on a review of materials, including toxicology results inBlanton's autopsy report and descriptions of Blanton's behavior before the shooting, Blanton wasintoxicated and impaired by cocaine at the time of his death. The toxicology tests showed bothrecent use of cocaine by Blanton, sufficient to cause intoxication, and prolonged use throughoutthe day. O'Donnell described certain behavioral manifestations consistent with cocaineintoxication.

Plaintiff objected when O'Donnell mentioned "signs of paranoia" as such manifestation ofcocaine intoxication. In a sidebar conference, plaintiff argued that O'Donnell was not qualifiedto render an opinion as to "psychological, psychiatric conditions of paranoia." Defense counselargued that O'Donnell was not offering a psychiatric "diagnostic" of Blanton and the courtoverruled the objection. O'Donnell further testified that diminution in judgment and control,psychotic and reckless behavior, aggressiveness, and increased risk-taking and tendency toviolence were among the toxic manifestations of cocaine. In this case, the behavioral changeswere corroborated by Blanton's extreme reckless driving, risk-taking, fleeing the police, runningred lights, speeding, and, as described by witnesses, "talking crazy" and "acting like a madman."

John Bowman, a professor in police firearms training specializing in the use of deadlyforce, testified that based on a review of various materials, he believed to a reasonable degree ofprofessional certainty that Officer Covelli acted reasonably and "actually had no choice to pointthe weapon [and] use deadly force."

Dr. Martin Fackler, a physician and specialist on wound ballistics, testified that, afterreviewing various materials, he believed to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that theevidence indicated that "the incident [was] very consistent with exactly what the officers saidhappened." Dr. Fackler described the wound in Blanton's arm as a "front-to-back" wound andbelieved that the back wounds indicated torso movement that was "a continuation" of themovement made by Blanton when he had his arm over the seat. Dr. Fackler believed, based onthe difference in angles of the bullets, that Blanton was turning in a counter-clockwise directionwhen the shots were fired. He also believed that Blanton was hit in the arm, he reacteddefensively by turning away and was hit by the other bullets while turning. Dr. Fackler explainedthat there was a reaction response time and, from the time the officers saw Blanton's arm in aparticular position until the time the bullets struck, the position of Blanton's arm could change.

Dr. Vincent DiMaio, a leading authority on gunshot wound analysis, testified that hebelieved to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injuries to Blanton were incurred ina manner consistent with the police officers' accounts of the incident. Dr. DiMaio disagreed withDr. Choi's conclusion about the entrance and the exit wounds in Blanton's arm, believing insteadthat the physical evidence matched the officers' account of the incident.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the City and Officer Covelli and the court enteredjudgment on the verdict. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, amongother things, that Taylor's statements were improperly admitted as hearsay exceptions andimproperly used by defense counsel to suggest to the jury that the statements were substantiveevidence, defense counsel violated rulings concerning undisclosed opinions, and the courtimproperly admitted evidence of Blanton's cocaine intoxication and O'Donnell's testimonyconcerning Blanton's behavior. The court denied the motion, finding, among other things,Taylor's statements were admissible to show the effect on the officers who heard the statementsand as excited utterances; plaintiff's objections to defense counsel's use of Taylor's statementsand undisclosed opinions were sustained; and evidence of Blanton's cocaine use and O'Donnell'stestimony were properly admitted.

Discussion

Plaintiff raises essentially the same contentions on appeal. The appeal centers around theadmission of alleged hearsay statements made by Shadell Taylor to Officer Venticinque and hispartner after she was pushed from Blanton's car. Despite acknowledging the relevance of thestatements to show Officer Venticinque's state of mind, plaintiff contends the trial court erred byallowing Officer Venticinque to testify as to what Taylor told him because Taylor's statementswere unreliable. Plaintiff further contends the statements were irrelevant to Officer Covelli'sstate of mind and prejudicial.

Out-of-court statements that are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted thereinare hearsay and inadmissible. Hallowell v. University of Chicago Hospital, 334 Ill. App. 3d 206,211, 777 N.E. 2d 435 (2002). However, when such out-of-court statements are offered to provetheir effect on a listener's mind or to show why the listener subsequently acted as he did, they arenot hearsay and are admissible. People v. Thomas, 296 Ill. App. 3d 489, 499, 694 N.E. 2d 1068(1998).

Initially, we note defendants' contention that Officer Covelli's conduct was justifiableunder the Criminal Code as a proper use of force because Blanton was a dangerous fleeing felon. 720 ILCS 5/7-5(a)(2) (West 2000). Defendants further contend that the shooting, as allowed bylaw, did not constitute tortious conduct, and, therefore, Officer Covelli was entitled to a directedverdict at the close of plaintiff's case. However, we believe the case was properly submitted tothe jury. See Simmons v. City of Chicago, 118 Ill. App. 3d 676, 682, 455 N.E. 2d 232 (1983).

In the instant case, the statements made by Shadell Taylor to the police were offered inOfficer Venticinque's testimony to show why the police pursuit of Blanton began, or, the effect ofthose statements on the listener. Officer Venticinque's testimony established how the entireincident with Blanton started. The officer described his observations of the events that occurredin rapid succession after Blanton's car almost rammed his squad car head-on. OfficerVenticinque's account of what happened, including what he saw and heard from Taylor,explained why he and the other officers chased Blanton. As such, the information the officerlearned from Taylor was not offered to prove that Blanton actually tried to kill Taylor orthreatened her with a screwdriver. Rather, such statements were properly admitted to explain thecircumstances surrounding the police pursuit. See Thomas, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 499.

While essentially admitting the relevance of Taylor's statements to show the effect on thelistener and explain the pursuit of Blanton, plaintiff asserts that the statements were unreliable. Plaintiff bases the challenge to the reliability of Taylor's statements on the fact that Taylor gavethe police an address at which she later could not be located. Plaintiff relies primarily ontestimony of police procedure expert Johnson. However, Johnson did not characterize Taylor'sstatements as unreliable, but, rather, he explained that, without locating Taylor, he could notdetermine Taylor's trustworthiness. The record establishes that Taylor's statements werecorroborated in that Officer Venticinque saw Taylor thrown from Blanton's car and twoscrewdrivers were found in Blanton's car. To that extent, the record therefore contradictsplaintiff's claim that the statements were unreliable.

Additionally, plaintiff contends Taylor's statements were irrelevant to show OfficerCovelli's state of mind. As support for this contention, plaintiff relies upon Medina v. City ofChicago, 238 Ill. App. 3d 385, 397-98, 606 N.E. 2d 490 (1990), in which the court held that theevidence that the victim was unarmed was properly excluded. In Medina, the court discussed thetrial court's reliance on Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F. 2d 802 (7th Cir.1988), acknowledged that aSeventh Circuit decision is not controlling, but agreed with Sherrod that the reasonableness of apolice officer's actions in shooting a suspect should be determined based on the totality ofcircumstances known to the officer at time of the incident. To that extent, Medina supportsdefendants.

Defendants here did not represent that Officer Covelli had direct knowledge of theentirety of Taylor's statements. Rather, the effect of Taylor's statements was made directly onOfficer Venticinque, who, in turn, caused the emergency message concerning unlawful restraintto be broadcast. In that manner, Officer Covelli became personally aware that Blanton waswanted for unlawful restraint. Thus, Taylor's statements were relevant because they formed thebasis for the transmission about unlawful restraint, which was information possessed by OfficerCovelli at the time of the incident. See Sherrod, 856 F. 2d at 805 (reasonableness of policeofficer's actions must be based on information known to officer at time of shooting); see alsoPalmquist v. Selvik, 111 F. 3d 1332, 1339-41 (7th Cir.1997) (evidence properly limited to thepolice officers' personal knowledge, experiences and observations, including evidence ofdecedent's actions and reasonable inferences that intoxicants affected his conduct). Therefore,because the statements provided information for the emergency message, the contents of which,in turn, became personal knowledge possessed by Officer Covelli, and also because they wereexcited utterances (People v. Fields, 71 Ill. App. 3d 888, 892, 390 N.E. 2d 369 (1979); see alsoPeople v. Lang, 106 Ill. App. 3d 808, 810, 436 N.E. 2d 260 (1982)), we find Taylor's statementswere properly admitted.

Plaintiff next contends that defense counsel committed reversible error by repeatedlyviolating the court's in limine ruling concerning the use of Taylor's statements. Plaintiff contendsdefense counsel first violated the ruling in opening statement by referring to information suppliedto Officer Venticinque by Taylor. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, there was no violation of aruling in that instance. The record establishes that the court ruled in limine that the unlawfulrestraint was admissible and the witnesses could rely on Taylor's statements. During a sidebarconference, the court, in allowing Taylor's statements to show the effect on the officers, ruled thatthe statements be presented as "told to" the officers, and defense counsel complied.

Plaintiff further contends that defense counsel again violated the court's ruling concerningTaylor's statements in cross-examination of Johnson and during closing argument. However, inboth instances, defense counsel prefaced the reference to Taylor's statements as instructed by thecourt. In the first instance, during a sidebar conference to address plaintiff's objection, the courtreiterated that Taylor's statements were not to be used for the truth of the matter asserted. Duringclosing argument, the court sustained plaintiff's objection. Despite that ruling in the latterinstance, plaintiff distorts the record by suggesting that defendants were the "losing party" inmatters relating to the use of Taylor's statements. In fact, defendants prevailed on the motion inlimine when the court denied plaintiff's motion to bar Taylor's statements. Cf. Kutchins v. Berg,264 Ill. App. 3d 926, 929, 638 N.E. 2d 673 (1994) (plaintiff repeatedly violated order grantingdefendants' motion in limine). Therefore, in these two instances, we find no repeated disregardfor the court's rulings as to constitute reversible error.

Plaintiff also contends that defense counsel committed reversible error by twice"attempting to violate" an alleged order in limine with respect to undisclosed opinion testimony. Plaintiff contends that, first, during direct examination Officer Covelli improperly expressed anopinion as to whether a reasonable person would have believed that Blanton was armed.

Plaintiff admits that the court sustained an objection and struck the answer, but claims thatOfficer Covelli improperly expressed the same opinion during further testimony. However, atthat time, when Officer Covelli was explaining why he feared for his life during the incident,plaintiff did not object. Therefore, plaintiff has waived any objection to such testimony. SeeSimmons, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 684; see also Gillespie v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 135 Ill. 2d 363,374, 553 N.E. 2d 291 (1990).

Next, plaintiff argues that Detective Soreghan improperly referred to a weapon inBlanton's hands when he explained why he had the screwdrivers in Blanton's car photographed. Plaintiff acknowledges that the court sustained an objection in that instance also, but asserts thatbecause the detective's response was not stricken from the record, the likelihood of prejudice wassufficient to constitute reversible error. We disagree and find no reversible error in the failure tostrike Detective Soreghan's answer from the record.

Plaintiff next contends the trial court erred by denying the motions in limine to barevidence that Blanton was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the incident and to bartestimony by O'Donnell about Blanton's mental state. Plaintiff argues that the fact of Blanton'scocaine use was unknown to Officer Covelli at the time of the incident and, therefore, admissionof evidence of Blanton's cocaine intoxication at the time of his death constituted prejudicial error.

However, as previously discussed, Officer Covelli's testimony established that hepersonally observed Blanton engage in behavior that was irrational, erratic, and reckless, andwhich constituted the commission of various offenses. Such behavior led Officer Covelli toconclude that Blanton was "behaving like a crazy person" and would support a reasonableinference that Blanton was in some way impaired. Evidence that such behavior was consistentwith cocaine intoxication was therefore relevant to support such conclusion and was properlyadmitted. See Palmquist, 111 F. 3d at 1341 (reasonable inferences that intoxicants affecteddecedent's actions were properly admitted). Moreover, in opening argument plaintiff raised theissue of Blanton's cocaine intoxication at the time of the incident and plaintiff's witnessestestified to Blanton's history of cocaine abuse. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in thedenial of plaintiff's motion in limine to bar evidence of Blanton's cocaine intoxication. People v.Owen, 299 Ill. App. 3d 818, 823, 701 N.E. 2d 1174 (1998) (ruling on motion in limine is withindiscretion of trial court and will not be reversed on review absent clear abuse of discretion).

Finally, plaintiff concedes that O'Donnell was qualified to offer an opinion as to whetherBlanton was under the influence of cocaine at the time, but argues that the court abused itsdiscretion by allowing O'Donnell to use "psychological and/or psychiatric terms such as'paranoia' and 'psychotic[.]'" O'Donnell, however, did not use those terms to diagnose Blanton assuffering paranoia or psychosis. Rather, O'Donnell testified as to behavioral manifestations ofcocaine intoxication, and concluded that the behavior attributed to Blanton, such as the recklessdriving and fleeing the police, would be consistent as manifestations of cocaine intoxication. Asplaintiff admits, O'Donnell, as an expert pharmacologist, was qualified to testify as to the effectsof cocaine. Cf. In re Matter of Wellington, 34 Ill. App. 3d 515, 519-20, 340 N.E. 2d 31 (1975)(testimony of unqualified witness was not prejudicial and therefore, not reversible error). Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of O'Donnell's testimony.

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

GORDON, P.J., and O'MALLEY, J. concur.