FOURTH DIVISION
MARCH 25, 2004

JUSTICE HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is the third appeal involving these parties. (SeeBrowning, Ekelton Division v. Williams, 256 Ill. App. 3d 299, 305-07, 628 N.E.2d 878 (1993) (Browning I); and Browning, EkeltonDivision v. Williams, Nos. 1-98-3846, 1-99-1209 (August 2, 2001)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Browning II)). Inthe instant appeal, plaintiff/counterdefendant, BrowningCorporation (Browning), appeals from the circuit court's ordergranting defendant/counterplaintiff, Don Williams, post-judgmentinterest accruing from the original judgment date. Browning I andBrowning II presented the relevant facts in the instant case and,therefore, only those facts pertinent to this appeal follow.

On April 4, 1991, a jury trial on damages was held, in whichWilliams was awarded $3.525 million against Browning. Browning didnot appeal the award; instead, on July 15, 1991, Browning filed arequest, pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002) (section 2-1401)), to vacate thedamage award. On December 17, 1991, the circuit court grantedBrowning's section 2-1401 petition and Williams appealed. Thiscourt held that the circuit court could not vacate judgment withoutholding an evidentiary hearing. Browning I, 256 Ill. App. 3d at305-07. After a full evidentiary hearing on remand, the circuitcourt granted Browning's section 2-1401 petition. Williams againappealed, and this court reversed the order vacating the damageaward and reinstated the original $3.525 million judgment. Browning II, at 8. On April 23, 2002, the circuit court orderedBrowning to pay Williams post-judgment interest accruing from theoriginal judgment date of April 4, 1991.⁽¹⁾ Browning timely appeals.

On appeal, Browning questions only whether post-judgmentinterest may accrue from the original judgment date of April 4,1991. Williams has failed to file a response brief on time;nevertheless, this court elects to consider the appeal on itsmerits. First Capitol Mortagage Corp. v. Talandis ConstructionCorp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). Williams'motion for leave to file relevant authorities, taken with the case,is granted.

Browning argues the original judgment was in effect only (1)from April 4, 1991, the original judgment date, through December17, 1991, when the circuit court granted Browning's request forrelief from judgment; and (2) from August 2, 2001, when theoriginal judgment was reinstated, until present. At all othertimes, Browning claims, "the judgment was unenforceable and void"and "there was no reason to pay Williams, because no judgmentexisted."

Under section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS5/2-1303 (West 2002) (section 2-1303), "[j]udgments recovered inany court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum from thedate of the judgment until satisfied ***."⁽²⁾ The legislature didnot vest the circuit court with discretion in assessing interestunder section 2-1303; rather, the imposition of statutory interest,at the rate of 9% from the date the final judgment was entered, ismandatory. Longo v. Globe Auto Recycling, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1028,1039, 743 N.E.2d 667 (2001).

An award of interest on a money judgment requires that theamount of money to be paid was certain, and the judgment debtorenjoyed the improper use of the money during the period for whichinterest is to be awarded. Bank of Chicago v. Park National Bank,277 Ill. App. 3d 167, 174, 660 N.E.2d 19 (1995). Section 2-1303entitles a judgment creditor to draw interest on the judgmentduring the pendency of an appeal (Niemeyer v. Wendy'sInternational, 336 Ill. App. 3d 112, 115, 782 N.E.2d 784 (2002)(Niemeyer), even where it is the judgment creditor who seeks onappeal to correct errors regarding the judgment. Pinkstaff v.Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 31 Ill. 2d 518, 524, 202 N.E.2d 512(1964) (Pinkstaff). A judgment debtor may, however, halt theaccrual of interest by tendering payment of the judgment, costs andinterest accrued. Niemeyer, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 115.

An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings (134 Ill. 2d R.301) and, until either the time to appeal has expired or, where anappeal is being pursued, until the court of review has rendered adecision, the circuit court's judgment is not a final adjudication. Bates v. Board of Education, 136 Ill. 2d 260, 269, 555 N.E.2d 1(1990) (Bates). Unlike an appeal, however, a section 2-1401petition, although filed in the same proceeding, is thecommencement of a new cause of action and is not a continuation ofthe proceeding in which the prior judgment was entered. Village ofIsland Lake v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co., 212 Ill. App. 3d 115, 120,569 N.E.2d 1362 (1991) (Village of Island Lake).

In the case sub judice, the amount of the award againstBrowning was fixed and definite as of April 4, 1991, at which timemonetary damages became due. Browning did not tender payment atthat time nor did it appeal from the award. Once Browning's timeto appeal expired, the award became a final adjudication. Bates,136 Ill. 2d at 269. Although the circuit court subsequentlyvacated the original judgment, this commenced a new cause ofaction; it was not a continuation of the proceeding in which theApril 4, 1991 judgment was entered. Village of Island Lake, 212Ill. App. 3d at 120. Nonetheless, Williams temporarily stayed afinal adjudication of the circuit court's order by virtue of hisappeal (Bates, 136 Ill. 2d at 269), in which the order wasdetermined to have been erroneous and was remanded. Browning I,256 Ill. App. 3d at 305-07. After remand, when the circuit courtagain granted Browning relief from judgment, Williams appealed. During the pendency of that appeal, the circuit court's ruling hadnot yet become a final adjudication until Browning II, wherein thiscourt vacated the circuit court's order and reinstated the originaljudgment. At no time was the circuit court's vacatur of theoriginal judgment a final adjudication.

Furthermore, Williams' appeal from the circuit court's vacaturof judgment did not toll the accrual of statutory interest. Niemeyer, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 115. Browning could have halted theaccrual of interest by satisfying the damage award when due, thereby allowing Williams use of the funds while the matter waspending, but it did not. Kramer v. Mount Carmel Shelter CareFacility, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 389, 393, 750 N.E.2d 757 (2001). Browning enjoyed the use of that money during the period for whichinterest is to be awarded. Its contention, that the originaljudgment was void between December 17, 1991, and August 2, 2002, iswithout merit. Browning, therefore, remains liable for post-judgment interest accruing from the original judgment date in theamount as calculated by the circuit court.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook Countyis affirmed.

Affirmed.

QUINN, P.J., and THEIS, J., concur.

1. The circuit court's order became final and appealable onJune 20, 2002.

2. Section 2-1303 further provides:

"When judgment is entered upon any award, report orverdict, interest shall be computed *** from the timewhen made or rendered to the time of entering judgmentupon the same, and included in the judgment. Interestshall be computed and charged only on the unsatisfiedportion of the judgment as it exists from time to time. The judgment debtor may[,] by tender of payment ofjudgment, costs and interest accrued to the date oftender, stop the further accrual of interest on suchjudgment notwithstanding the prosecution of an appeal,or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify thejudgment." 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2002).