SIXTH DIVISION
MARCH 28, 2003

JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Michael Chalhoub (Chalhoub), is the administrator of the estate of hisbrother, Christopher Chalhoub, who committed suicide in 1998 at the age of thirty-two. Chalhoub alleges that the defendant's negligence in the handling and storage of a firearmproximately caused Christopher Chalhoub to commit suicide. Chalhoub filed a complaint onbehalf of the estate, against William Dixon, the stepfather of both Michael and ChristopherChalhoub. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that thedefendant owed no duty to prevent Christopher's suicide. The estate appeals that finding.

On May 1, 1998, Christopher Chalhoub was treated at Northwest Community Hospitalafter his mother, Nadia, had gone to his apartment and found him depressed and crying. Nadiacalled the defendant and informed him that Christopher had threatened suicide. The defendantstated in his deposition that when he arrived at the hospital, he was told that Christopher couldnot be admitted to the mental unit for insurance reasons so he was being transferred to ForestHospital. The following day, May 2, 1998, Christopher was discharged from Forest Hospital. Chalhoub alleges that following Christopher's release, he was primarily staying at the home ofthe defendant who is the stepfather of Michael and Christopher. Chalhoub alleges that on May 7,1998, Christopher removed the defendant's handgun from the premises and used the gun to killhimself. Chalhoub alleges the defendant was negligent in that he failed to remove the handgunfrom the premises; to secure the handgun; to render the handgun inoperable; to ensure thatChristopher did not have access to the handgun; and to observe that Christopher had taken thehandgun.

The defendant testified in his deposition that he had been employed as a police officer forthe Sheriff of Cook County until 1991. After the defendant's employment with the Sheriff'sOffice ended, Mr. Dixon wrapped his handgun in a white t-shirt and placed it on a shelf in thecloset in the master bedroom, behind some shoes. Mr. Dixon kept the bullets to the gun in a boxmarked "bullets," in an unlocked drawer in his nightstand. Mr. Dixon stated that he owned thegun between May 1 and 7, 1998, but he was not exactly sure of its whereabouts on May 1st. Mr.Dixon testified that the last time he had seen the gun was shortly after he left the Sheriff's Officein 1991.

Mr. Dixon further testified that he first observed Christopher was depressed afterChristopher lost his job sometime prior to May 1, 1998. He stated that he and his wife discussedChristopher's depression and that he thought Christopher was seeing a counselor prior to theSpring of 1998.

Mr. Dixon testified that after Christopher was transferred to Forest Hospital, he overheardsomeone telling his wife that Christopher would be in the Hospital for five days and that ifChristopher was not then released by a doctor, he would be moved to a state mental hospital. However, Christopher was released from Forest Hospital the following day. Mr. Dixon statedthat he was comfortable with Christopher's discharge because he assumed the professionals at thehospitals knew what they were doing. Mr. Dixon and his wife only spoke to the receptionist atForest Hospital on the day Christopher was discharged. Mr. Dixon and his wife droveChristopher to their house.

Mr. Dixon testified that over the next few days and nights, Christopher may have stayedat either Mr. Dixon's home or at his own apartment. During that time, both Mr. Dixon and Nadiawere working. Mr. Dixon worked both a day job and a night job. Mr. Dixon was not aware thatChristopher had returned to his own apartment on May 7, 1998. After hearing aboutChristopher's death from Michael Chalhoub, he suspected that Christopher had used one of hisguns in his suicide. Mr. Dixon told the police that he had a gun fitting the description of thatused by Christopher. When Mr. Dixon returned home from the police station, he looked for thegun and instead found two hammers wrapped in the t-shirt in the closet where he had left the gunin 1991.

We begin our discussion by noting that summary judgment is appropriate when "thepleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that thereis no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as amatter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois,Inc., 188 Ill.2d 17, 30-31, 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999). The purpose of summary judgment is not to trya question of fact, but to determine if one exists. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill.2d 324, 775N.E.2d 987 (2002). The function of a reviewing court on appeal from a grant of summaryjudgment is limited to determining whether the trial court correctly concluded that no genuineissue of material fact was raised and, if none was raised, whether judgment as a matter of lawwas correctly entered. Malanowski v. Jabamoni, 293 Ill.App.3d 720, 724, 688 N.E.2d 732, 735(1997). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Morris v. Margulis, 197Ill.2d 28, 35, 754 N.E.2d 314 (2001).

The estate argues on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant did nothave a duty to prevent Christopher Chalhoub from committing suicide. The estate contends thatits claim is not that the defendant failed to prevent the suicide, rather the estate claims that thedefendant negligently stored and secured his handgun. The estate argues that the defendant owedChristopher Chalhoub a duty to safely store and secure the handgun and to prevent Christopherfrom gaining access to it. The estate further asserts that Christopher's suicide was foreseeableand thus did not constitute an independent intervening act. We disagree.

Regardless of how the plaintiff attempts to frame the argument, the claim is essentiallythat Dixon was negligent in storing and securing his handgun and this negligence led toChristopher's suicide. In order to sustain such a claim, the plaintiff must establish that Dixonowed Christopher a duty to safely store and secure the handgun. Moreover, the plaintiff mustestablish that Dixon's alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Christopher's suicide. Christopher's estate fails toestablish that Dixon breached a duty to Christopher, or that Dixon's alleged negligenceproximately caused Christopher's suicide.

Essentially, the estate seeks to impose on Dixon a duty to foresee and avoid Christopher'ssuicide. Although this court imposed such a duty on a psychiatrist who knew of his patient'shistory of suicidal depression and yet failed to protect the patient from self-harm, see Winger v.Franciscan Med. Ctr., 299 Ill.App.3d 364, 371-72, 375, 701 N.E.2d 813 (1998), the estate herepoints to no case law extending such a duty outside of the doctor-patient context. Because of thedifferences between the psychiatrist-patient relationship and the relationship here, we see nojustification for extending such a duty to lay persons. Psychiatrists are health care professionalstrained to care for their patients' mental and emotional health. By contrast, laypeople cannot bereasonably expected to anticipate the mental health consequences of their acts or omissions. Whether Dixon had a duty to prevent Christopher's suicide depends on the suicide'sforeseeability, its likelihood, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the potentialconsequences of placing that burden on Dixon. See Collins, 154 Ill.2d at 51, 607 N.E.2d 1185. Christopher's estate urges that Dixon should have foreseen that Christopher would use the gun tocommit suicide because he knew that Christopher was suffering from severe depression andbecause he knew Christopher had threatened to commit suicide. As we just noted, however,because Dixon was not a medical professional, he could not have reasonably been expected toforesee that his failure to secure his handgun would lead to Christopher using it to commitsuicide.

Moreover, the magnitude of placing such a burden on Dixon to foresee and prevent asuicide is very great. Dixon cannot reasonably be expected to secure his home so as to prevent asuicide. Imposing such a burden would create an unreasonable risk of liability as the scope ofsuch a burden would be ever expanding. Would such a burden include securing all knives, razors,aspirin, and other potentially harmful items in the home? What relationship is required toimpose such a duty? Here, Christopher used a handgun, however, he could have just as easilyused a kitchen knife or overdosed on aspirin. Further, Christopher was an adult who no longerresided in the Dixon home. For these reasons, we find that the estate fails to establish that Dixonhad a duty to foresee and avoid Christopher's suicide.

Further, even assuming that Dixon had such a duty, the estate fails to show that Dixon'salleged negligence proximately caused Christopher's suicide. A proximate cause is one thatproduces an injury through a natural and continuous sequence of events unbroken by anyeffective intervening cause. See Kleen v. Homak Mfg. Co., 321 Ill.App.3d 639, 641, 749 N.E.2d26 (2001).

It is well-established under Illinois law that a plaintiff may not recover for a decedent'ssuicide following a tortious act because suicide is an independent intervening event that thetortfeasor cannot be expected to foresee. See Kleen, 321 Ill.App.3d at 640, 749 N.E.2d 26; Mossby Moss v. Meyer, 117 Ill.App.3d 862, 864, 454 N.E.2d 48 (1983); Little v. Chicago Hoist &Body Co., 32 Ill.2d 156, 158-59, 203 N.E.2d 902 (1965); Stasiof v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co.,50 Ill.App.2d 115, 122, 200 N.E.2d 88 (1964).

We agree with the trial court that Christopher's suicide was an independent interveningevent that broke the chain of causation from Mr. Dixon's alleged malpractice to Christopher'sdeath. Christopher was an adult, and the estate has not alleged that he was mentally unstable. SeeKleen, 321 Ill.App.3d at 643, 749 N.E.2d 26. Moreover, Christopher removed the gun from thecloset and replaced it with hammers in order to hide the fact that the gun was missing. Therefore, we assume that Christopher was a competent adult who clearly understood what hewas doing and intentionally took his own life.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

O'BRIEN, P.J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.