FOURTH DIVISION
February 17, 2005

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:

Loop Paper Recycling, Inc. (Loop Paper Recycling), appealsfrom the judgment of the circuit court which found thatConnecticut Speciality Insurance Company (Connecticut) owed noduty to defend it in a lawsuit arising out of a fire at itsfacility in Riverdale, Illinois. Connecticut had issued ageneral commercial liability policy under which Loop PaperRecycling was a named insured. Specifically, the courtdetermined that (1) the policy's "total pollution exclusion"barred coverage for bodily injury claims because the Riverdalefacility was engaged in the handling, storage, disposal,processing or treatment of waste; (2) the underlying complaintdid not allege "personal injury" as defined by the policy; and(3) even if the underlying complaint had alleged "personalinjury," the policy's "absolute pollution exclusion" barredcoverage. On appeal, Loop Paper Recycling argues that thecircuit court erred in finding no duty on the part of Connecticutto defend.

BACKGROUND

On or about July 16, 2000, vandals set fire to an unknownamount of cardboard that was located at Loop Paper Recycling'sRiverdale facility. The resulting fire burned for several days,sending clouds of smoke and toxic substances into the surroundingneighborhood. On August 17, 2001, residents of that neighborhood(underlying plaintiffs) filed suit against Loop Paper Recycling,asserting claims for strict liability and negligence.

In their complaint, the underlying plaintiffs alleged that"Loop Paper Recycling owns, operates, and manages various paperrecycling facilities." One of Loop Paper Recycling's facilities,known as the Suburban Warehouse, was located at 13050 StateStreet in the City of Riverdale, Cook County, Illinois. Per theunderlying plaintiffs' complaint, Loop Paper Recycling's businessoperations at the Riverdale facility allegedly consisted of"gathering, holding, storing, handling, baling, packaging,shipping and transporting cardboard." According to theircomplaint, "cardboard commonly utilized and obtained forrecycling contains additives, adhesives, bonding material, and/orother fixatives as well as vinyl chloride, urea, melamine, phenolformaldehyde, urethanes, and acrylics and other substances and oninformation and belief, the cardboard present at the Defendant,Loop Paper [Recycling's] facility did contain such materials."

The underlying plaintiffs alleged that when the cardboardcontaining these materials was ignited, the resulting smokereleased "into the air the fixatives and substances so as tocause highly toxic and hazardous" pollution. Thus, as a directand proximate result of the fire at Loop Paper Recycling'sRiverdale facility, the underlying plaintiffs alleged that theywere exposed to the hazardous and toxic substances. They soughtdamages for "medical diagnosis, testing, and monitoring todetermine the impact of the toxic substances that they wereexposed to as a result of the aforementioned release."

On January 15, 2001, Loop Paper Recycling tendered itsdefense in the underlying lawsuit to Connecticut. On May 21,2001, Connecticut agreed to defend Loop Paper Recycling, butreserved its right to deny coverage.

The policy provided for three types of coverage: (1)"Coverage A" for bodily injury and property damage liability; (2)"Coverage B" for personal and advertising injury liability; and(3) "Coverage C" for medical payment claims. Under Coverage A,the policy stated, in relevant part:

"[Bodily Injury and Property Damage]

1. Insuring Agreement

a. We will pay those sums that the insuredbecomes legally obligated to pay as damagesbecause of 'bodily injury' or 'propertydamage' to which this insurance applies. Wewill have the right and duty to defend theinsured against any 'suit' seeking thosedamages. However, we will have no duty todefend the insured against any 'suit' seekingdamages for 'bodily injury' or 'propertydamage' to which this insurance does notapply.

***

b. This insurance applies to 'bodily injury' and'property damage' only if:

A. The 'bodily injury' or 'propertydamage' is caused by an 'occurrence'that takes place in the 'coverageterritory'; and

B. The 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' occurs during the policy period."

Within Coverage A, the policy contained a "total pollutionexclusion," which stated that the insurance did not apply to thefollowing:

"[Total Pollution Exclusion to Coverage A]

f. Pollution

(1) 'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' whichwould not have occurred in whole or part butfor the actual, alleged or threateneddischarge, dispersal, seepage, migration,release or escape of pollutants at any time.

This exclusion does not apply to 'bodilyinjury' or 'property damage' arising out ofheat, smoke or fumes from a hostile fireunless that hostile fire occurred ororiginated:

(a) At any premises, site or location whichis or was at any time used by or for anyinsured or others for the handling,storage, disposal, processing ortreatment of waste; or

(b) At any premises, site or location onwhich any insured or any contractors orsubcontractors working directly orindirectly on any insured's behalf areperforming operations to test for,monitor, clean-up, remove, contain,treat, detoxify, neutralize or in anyway respond to, or assess the effectsof, pollutants.

***

As used in this exclusion, a hostile firemeans one which becomes uncontrollable orbreaks out from where it was intended to be.

***

Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous,or thermal irritant or contaminant includingsmoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acid, alkalis,chemicals and waste. Waste includes materialto be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed."

Coverage B stated, in pertinent part:

"[Personal and Advertising Injury]

1. Insuring Agreement

a. We will pay those sums that the insuredbecomes legally obligated to pay as damagesbecause of 'personal injury' or 'advertising injury' to which this insurance applies.

b. We will have the right and duty to defend theinsured against any 'suit' seeking thosedamages. However, we will have no duty todefend the insured against any 'suit' seeking damages for 'personal injury' or'advertising injury' to which this insurancedoes not apply. "

Coverage B contained an "absolute pollution exclusion,"which stated:

"[Absolute Pollution Exclusion to Coverage B]

2. Exclusions

This insurance does not apply to:

a. 'Personal injury' or 'advertising injury;'

***

(5) Arising out of the actual, alleged orthreatened discharge, dispersal,seepage, migration, release or escape ofpollutants at any time.

***

Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous orthermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals andwaste. Waste includes materials to be recycled,reconditioned or reclaimed."

On September 28, 2001, Connecticut filed a complaint fordeclaratory judgment, arguing that, under the terms of thepolicy, it owed no duty to defend or provide coverage to LoopPaper Recycling in the lawsuit filed by the underlyingplaintiffs. The circuit court granted Connecticut's motion forsummary judgment, finding that while the underlying plaintiffssufficiently alleged that they suffered "bodily injury" asdefined in the policy, there was no coverage under the policy's"total pollution exclusion." The court also found that theunderlying plaintiffs failed to allege "personal injury" andthat, even if they did, the "absolute pollution exclusion" barredcoverage. Loop Paper Recycling filed a timely notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that thereis no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. Chatham Corp. v. DannInsurance, 351 Ill. App. 3d 353, 358, 812 N.E.2d 483, 488 (2004). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we must construeall evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Acceptance Insurance Co., 342 Ill.App. 3d 167, 171, 793 N.E.2d 736 (2003). We review a trialcourt's grant of summary judgment de novo. Sears, 342 Ill. App.3d at 171.

The duty of an insurer to defend its insured is much broaderthan its duty to indemnify. Sears, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 171. When determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend itsinsured, the court must compare the allegations contained in theunderlying complaint to the relevant provisions of the insurancepolicy. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d473, 479, 687 N.E.2d 72 (1997).

In determining whether an insurer owes a duty to defend anaction brought against its insured, the court must consider onlythe allegations in the underlying complaint and the relevantpolicy provisions. Lexmark International, Inc. v. TransportationInsurance Co., 327 Ill. App. 3d 128, 136, 761 N.E.2d 1214 (2001),quoting Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Fulkerson, 212 Ill. App. 3d556, 562, 571 N.E.2d 256 (1991). "[W]here summary judgment issought in the context of a declaratory judgment action todetermine whether an insurer has a duty to defend, the use ofextrinsic evidence is inappropriate." Atlantic Mutual InsuranceCo. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill. App. 3d552, 567, 734 N.E.2d 50 (2000).

If the court determines that the allegations fall within,

or potentially within, coverage under the policy, the insurer hasa duty to defend the insured against the underlying complaint. Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty MutualFire Insurance Co., 347 Ill. App. 3d 411, 414, 806 N.E.2d 1224(2004). Insurance policies are to be liberally construed infavor of coverage, and where an ambiguity exists in the terms ofthe contract, the ambiguity will be resolved in favor of theinsured and against the insurer. Traveler's Insurance Co. v.Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 293, 757 N.E.2d 481(2001). The insurer bears the burden of establishing that aclaim falls within a provision that limits or excludes coverage. Progressive Universal, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 414.

When construing an insurance policy, the primary function ofthe court is to ascertain and enforce the intentions of theparties as expressed in the agreement. Central Illinois LightCo. v. Home Insurance Co., 342 Ill. App. 3d 940, 950-51, 795N.E.2d 412 (2003). A court must construe the policy as a wholeand take into account the type of insurance purchased, the natureof the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. If the words of a policy are clearand unambiguous, they must be afforded their plain, ordinary andpopular meaning. Traveler's Insurance Co., 197 Ill. 2d at 292,quoting Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1993). Unambiguous clauseswithin insurance contracts must be enforced according to theirterms and courts should refrain from adopting interpretationsresulting in distortions and creating ambiguities where noneexist. Young v. Allstate Insurance Co., 351 Ill. App. 3d 151,157-58, 812 N.E.2d 741 (2004).

I. COVERAGE A: BODILY INJURY LIABILITY

Though the policy here contains a maze of provisions thatmust be navigated in order to determine whether coverage forbodily injury resulting from a fire exists, in the end, thedetermination hinges upon the kind of business Loop PaperRecycling was running at its Riverdale facility. The policy inthis case begins by stating that Connecticut will providecoverage for "those sums that the insured becomes legallyobligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or'property damage' to which this insurance applies." "Bodilyinjury" is defined in the policy as an "injury, sickness ordisease sustained by a person, including death resulting from anyof these at any time."

Under the policy's "total pollution exclusion," however, nocoverage exists if the "bodily injury *** would not have occurredin whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threateneddischarge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape ofpollutants at any time."⁽¹⁾ The "total pollution exclusion"contains an exception, which reinstates coverage if the "bodilyinjury" arises "out of heat, smoke or fumes from a hostile fire." This exception does not apply, however, if "that hostile fireoccurred or originated" at a site or location where the insured"handled, stored, disposed, processed or treated waste." Thepolicy states that "waste" includes "material to be recycled,reconditioned, or reclaimed."

The issue here is whether, based upon the allegationscontained in the underlying plaintiffs' complaint, the exceptionto the total pollution exclusion applies, i.e., whether thecomplaint sufficiently alleged that Loop Paper Recycling was"handling, storing, disposing, processing or treating waste" atits Riverdale facility when the fire occurred. (Emphasis added.) Put another way, if the cardboard that the vandals set fire toqualified as "waste," i.e., "material to be recycled,reconditioned, or reclaimed," under the policy, and if Loop PaperRecycling was involved in handling, storing, disposing,processing or treating that cardboard at its Riverdale facility,the policy's total pollution exclusion would bar coverage.

Loop Paper Recycling argues that the allegations in the complaintdid not sufficiently state as much and that the circuit courterred in finding that the total pollution exclusion barredcoverage. We disagree.

First, the underlying plaintiffs' complaint alleged thatLoop Paper Recycling's Riverdale facility was a "paper recyclingfacility." Specifically, the complaint alleged:

"Loop Paper *** owns, operates, and manages various paper recycling facilities and does business in Cook County, Illinois, including in the City of Riverdale. A fire from burning cardboard that continued for at least three (3) days on said Defendant's Riverdale facility causing the release of toxic substances into the environment." (Emphasis added.)

The underlying plaintiffs averred that Loop Paper Recycling'sbusiness is owning, operating, and managing various paperrecycling "facilities." In describing Loop Paper Recycling'spresence in Riverdale, the underlying plaintiffs utilized thesame noun that they employed in describing Loop Paper Recycling'sgeneral operations: facility. Moreover, the underlyingplaintiffs did not distinguish what Loop Paper Recycling did atits Riverdale facility in any way from its general operations.

Second, the underlying plaintiffs alleged that Loop PaperRecycling "conducted its operations and business of gathering,holding, storing, handling, baling, packaging, shipping, andtransporting cardboard" at its Riverdale facility. They furtheralleged that "cardboard commonly utilized and obtained forrecycling contains additives, adhesives, bonding material, and/orother fixatives as well as vinyl chloride, urea, melamine, phenolformaldehyde, urethanes and acrylics and other substances and oninformation and belief, the cardboard present at the Defendant,Loop Paper [Recycling's] facility did contain such materials." (Emphasis added.) This latter allegation equates cardboard thatis "commonly utilized and obtained for recycling" with thecardboard that was present at Loop Paper Recycling's Riverdalefacility. If the underlying plaintiffs did not intend to equatethe two, this allegation would serve no purpose; why would it berelevant to allege what substances are normally found in"cardboard commonly utilized and obtained for recycling" if thecardboard at Loop Paper Recycling's Riverdale facility was notused and obtained for the same purpose?

Third, of course, is its name: Loop Paper Recycling, Inc.Though the underlying plaintiffs' complaint did not explicitlystate that Loop Paper's Riverdale facility was a "recycling"facility, the allegations, when read together, certainly point tothat conclusion. Under the terms of the policy, therefore,because Loop Paper Recycling was involved in the handling,storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste at itsRiverdale facility, the circuit court properly found that thetotal pollution exclusion barred coverage.

Loop Paper Recycling relies upon Mid-Continent Casualty Co.v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. App. 2000), tosupport its argument that the policy's total pollution exclusiondoes not bar coverage for the fire at its Riverdale facility. InMid-Continent, an "unintended" fire at a factory that processedscrap tires began in a wire pile and spread to some rubber chips,which produced "huge volumes of thick, black smoke" thatpermeated the surrounding area. Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420. Residents of the area around the facility filed suit, alleging"damage and injury that was proximately caused by the inhalationand proximity to the smoke from Defendants' [factory] fire." Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420.

At the time of the fire, the factory was covered under ageneral commercial liability policy, which provided coverage for"bodily injury" or "property damage" that resulted from a fire. Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420. The policy contained apollution exclusion, stating that coverage was not provided for"' "bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the ***release or escape of pollutants' " " 'at or from any premises,site or location which is or was at any time used by or for anyinsured or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processingor treatment of waste.' " Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420. Thepolicy also included a "hostile fire" exception to the pollutionexclusion, which reinstated coverage unless the fire originatedfrom any premises used by the insured for " 'the handling,storage, disposal, processing, or treatment of waste.' " Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420. Under the policy, the term "waste"included " 'materials to be recycled, reconditioned orreclaimed.' " Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424.

The court found that the term "waste," as defined inMerriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, encompassed onlyunwanted byproducts and, because "[t]he rubber chips and wirefrom which the fire in this case originated are the desiredproducts of the tire-recycling process" and did "not constitute'waste' under the policy," held that the factory was coveredunder the insurance policy. Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424. Werecognize that the policy in Mid-Continent contained nearly thesame language as the policy in this case. However, we disagreewith both the holding and rationale in Mid-Continent for threereasons.

First, the court in Mid-Continent ignored the policy'sdefinition of the term "waste," i.e., " 'includes materials to berecycled, reconditioned or reclaimed' " (Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3dat 421), and, instead, resorted to a dictionary to define it. See Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 423-24. It is a basic andfundamental tenet of contract law, however, that even if acontract offers only a limited definition of a term, it must beapplied as written. See Young, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 157-58(stating that unambiguous clauses within insurance contracts mustbe enforced according to their terms and courts should refrainfrom adopting interpretations resulting in distortions andcreating ambiguities where none exist); Central Illinois LightCo., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 950-51 (when construing an insurancepolicy, the primary function of the court is to ascertain andenforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in theagreement).

Like the policy in Mid-Continent, the policy here statedthat "waste" included materials "to be recycled, reconditioned orreclaimed." Though this definition could have been moredetailed, it is a definition nonetheless. We cannot simplyignore the express language of the policy. See PipefittersWelfare Educational Fund v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 976F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to adopt a "colloquialdefinition" for the term "'waste'" because the policy "expresslygives the term a more refined, technical meaning" of "materialsto be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed" (emphasis ommited));Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424-26 (Gray, J., dissenting) (takingissue with the majority's interpretation of the term "waste"because "the policy contains a 'definition' of 'waste' byreference to what is included within the meaning of the term"). Because the underlying plaintiffs' complaint alleged that thecardboard set afire at Loop Paper Recycling's Riverdale facilitywas cardboard "to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed," itqualified under the policy's "more refined, technical" definitionof "waste." Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043; Mid-Continent, 16S.W.3d at 424-26 (Gray, J., dissenting);

Second, the basis for the majority opinion in Mid-Continentwas that "[t]he rubber chips and wire from which the fire in thiscase originated [were] the desired products of the tire-recyclingprocess" and, therefore, did not "constitute 'waste' under thepolicy." Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424. Because the fodderwas not "waste" as defined in the policy, the pollution exclusiondid not apply.

Here, the underlying plaintiffs' complaint alleged that whatcaught fire was "cardboard commonly utilized and obtained forrecycling." (Emphasis added.) Unlike the fodder in Mid-Continent, it was not "end-product" material which caught fire atLoop Paper Recycling's Riverdale facility. It was not bundles ofnewly recycled cardboard that the vandals set fire to, but rathercardboard that was to be used during, and specifically obtainedfor the purpose of, recycling. See Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043(rejecting argument that the scrap metal which burned was not"waste" because it was a "saleable and useful product").

Third, what drove the court's holding in Mid-Continent wasthe fear that applying the insurer's definition of "waste" would"render the hostile fire exception *** meaningless." Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424, citing American Star Insurance Co.v. Grice, 121 Wash. 2d 869, 877-78, 854 P. 2d 622, 627 (1993). In this same vein, Loop Paper Recycling argues:

"If the term 'waste' includes useful and valuable products, then liability arising out of the release of pollutants from a hostile fire which breaks out at an insured's premises which manufactures and therefore 'handles' aluminum cans, newspapers, magazines, books, batteries, glass, plastic, or clothing, will never be covered because those materials can be recycled. For example, losses arising out of chemical fumes released during a hostile fire at a newspaper's printing press facility would be excluded, because even if the newspaper company does not recycle the newspaper at The printing facility, its sells the newspapers to readers who do."

Any fear that the hostile fire exception might be rendered"meaningless," however, comes from a basic misunderstanding as tohow that exception is applied.

The crux of the determination into whether the hostile fireexception applies is the nature of the insured's activity at thepremises where the hostile fire occurs. Under the terms of thepolicy, any bodily injury or property damage that results frompollution caused by a hostile fire is covered so long as thepremises where the fire occurred was not (1) "used by or for anyinsured or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processingor treatment of waste" or (2) a location "on which any insured orany contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectlyon any insured's behalf are performing operations to test for,monitor, clean-up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, neutralizeor in any way respond to, or assess the effects of, pollutants." It is only when the insured is involved in some sort of wastestorage, treatment, processing, or cleanup business at itspremises that the hostile fire exception does not apply.⁽²⁾

For instance, this policy would have provided coverage forbodily injury caused by toxic smoke emitted during a buildingfire, so long as that building was not used in the handling,treatment, storage, etc., of waste. Additionally, in Loop PaperRecycling's example recounted above, the newspaper printing presswould be covered because, regardless of the nature of what isproduced there, the premises where the fire occurred was neither"used by or for any insured or others for the handling, storage,disposal, processing or treatment of waste" nor a location "onwhich any insured or any contractors or subcontractors workingdirectly or indirectly on any insured's behalf are performingoperations to test for, monitor, clean-up, remove, contain,treat, detoxify, neutralize or in any way respond to, or assessthe effects of, pollutants." That newspapers can be and arerecycled is irrelevant because the "refined, technical"definition of "waste" under the policy is "material to berecycled, reconditioned or reclaimed." (Emphasis added.) It iswhat the insured actually does with the material at the site, andnot what one could do with the material, that makes it "waste"under the policy.

In summary, Loop Paper Recycling's policy sets forth a clearand unambiguous, though limited, definition of the term "waste." Because that term includes "materials to be recycled," becausethe underlying plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged thatLoop Paper Recycling was involved in the business of recyclingcardboard at its Riverdale facility, and because the effects fromthe burning of that cardboard were the basis for the underlyingplaintiffs' lawsuit against Loop Paper Recycling, the circuitcourt properly found that the policy's total pollution exclusionbarred coverage for the underlying plaintiffs' bodily injuries.

II. COVERAGE B: PERSONAL INJURY LIABILITY

Loop Paper Recycling next argues that the circuit courterred in finding that the underlying complaint failed to allege a"personal injury" as defined in the policy and that, even if a"personal injury" was alleged, the "absolute pollution exclusion"barred coverage.

Under Coverage B, the policy provided that Connecticut wouldpay sums that Loop Paper Recycling became legally obligated topay as "damages because of 'personal injury.'" The policydefined "personal injury" as an "injury, other than 'bodilyinjury,' arising out of *** [t]he wrongful eviction from,wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of privateoccupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupiesby or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor." Coverage B's"absolute pollution exclusion," however, bars coverage for a"personal injury" which arises "out of the actual, alleged orthreatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release orescape of pollutants at any time." The policy defines"pollutants" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritantor contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids,alkalis, chemicals and waste." Even assuming, arguendo, that theunderlying plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged a "personalinjury" as defined in the policy, the absolute pollutionexclusion bars any coverage.

In American States Insurance Company v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d473, 476, 687 N.E.2d 72 (1997), our supreme court wrestled withthe seemingly limitless scope of what is commonly known as an"absolute pollution exclusion." In Koloms, carbon monoxide wasreleased from a faulty furnace located in a two-story commercialbuilding, saturating the air inside the building. Koloms, 177Ill. 2d at 476. As a result, those present on the premisesbecame ill and filed suit. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 476. Theinsurer of the building denied the insured's tendered defense,arguing that, because carbon monoxide was a pollutant, there wasno coverage under the policy's absolute pollution exclusion. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 476.

On appeal, the insured argued that the insurer's profferedinterpretation of the "absolute pollution exclusion" was toobroad. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 483-84. Specifically, the insuredcontended that, based upon the "historical purpose of theexclusion," the scope of the clause was limited to "large scale,environmental contamination" and that it was "intended solely toprotect insurers from having to defend and indemnify insureds inconnection with governmental clean-up costs." Koloms, 177 Ill.2d at 483-84. The insured argued that "because this caseinvolves personal injuries caused by exposure to materials whichdo not constitute 'pollution' in the traditional sense of theword, the exclusion does not apply." Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 484.

The Koloms court first noted widespread criticism of theinsurance industry's attempt to broadly define what constitutes a"pollutant." See Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 484. The court citedtwo examples where a broad reading of that term would lead to the"absurd" result of noncoverage: (1) " 'bodily injuries sufferedby one who slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle ofDraino' " and (2) " 'bodily injury caused by an allergic reactionto chlorine in a public pool.' " Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 484,quoting Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043.

After recognizing that, "despite the abundance of opinionsconstruing the exclusion, courts have not reached a clearconsensus as to its proper interpretation" (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2dat 485) and stating that it was "troubled" by "an overbreadth inthe language of the exclusion as well as the manifestation of anambiguity which results when the exclusion is applied to caseswhich have nothing to do with 'pollution' in the conventional, orordinary, sense of the word" (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 488), thecourt "restricted the exclusion's otherwise potentially limitlessapplication to only those hazards traditionally associated withenvironmental pollution" (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 489).

After extensively recounting the "'well-documented andrelatively uncontroverted [citation]'" (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at489) historical events leading up to the insurance industry'sadoption of the absolute pollution exclusion (see Koloms, 177Ill. 2d at 489-93), the court determined that the "predominatemotivation in drafting an exclusion for pollution-relatedinjuries was the avoidance of the 'enormous expense and exposureresulting from the "explosion" of environmental litigation'"(emphasis in original) (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 492, quotingWeaver v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 140 N.H. 780, 783, 674A.2d 975, 977 (1996), quoting Vantage Development Corp. v.American Environmental Technologies Corp., 251 N.J. Super. 516,525, 598 A.2d 948, 953 (1991)). In other words, the "pollutionexclusion has been, and should continue to be, the appropriatemeans of avoiding '"the yawning extent of potential liabilityarising from the gradual or repeated discharge of hazardoussubstances into the environment."' (Emphasis in original.)Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 493, quoting West American Insurance Co.v. Tufco Flooring East, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 312, 323, 409 S.E.2d692, 699 (1991), quoting Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v.Peerless Insurance Ca., 315 N.C. 688, 698, 340 S.E.2d 374, 381(1986).

Thus, the Koloms court found that in order for the absolutepollution exclusion to apply, there must be "traditionalenvironmental pollution (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 493), "whichincludes "'any "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape" of apollutant *** into the environment'" (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494,quoting Tufco, 104 N.C. App. at 325, 409 S.E.2d at 700). Applying this rule to the facts before it, the court found that,because the exclusion "applies only to those injuries caused bytraditional environmental pollution," and because the accidentalrelease of carbon monoxide that is contained inside a building isnot a release of pollutants into the environment, the exclusiondid not apply to bar coverage. See Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494.

After Koloms, this court's first foray into theapplicability of an absolute pollution exclusion occurred in Kimv. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 770, 776, 728N.E.2d 530 (2000), where a cleaning company argued that itsinsurer had breached its duty to defend and indemnify after thecompany settled a lawsuit brought by the company's landlord fordamages resulting from a pollutant which had seeped through thefloor into the soil underneath the building. Kim, 312 Ill. App.3d at 772-73. After recounting the rule delineated in Koloms,the Kim court held the absolute pollution exclusion barredcoverage because, unlike in Koloms, the "hazardous material wasnot confined within the cleaning company's building, *** but wasdischarged into the soil underneath its dry cleaning and laundrystore." Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 775. Because the hazardousmaterial had escaped beyond the walls of the insured's buildingand into the soil below, the court found that "traditionalenvironmental pollution" had occurred. Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at775.

Though not explicitly stated in either Koloms or Kim, a

primary factor to consider in determining if an occurrenceconstitutes "traditional environmental pollution" and, thus, isnot covered under an absolute pollution exclusion, rests uponwhether the injurious "hazardous material" is confined within theinsured's premises or, instead, escapes into "the land,atmosphere, or any watercourse or body of water." CompareKoloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494 (finding that an accidental leak ofcarbon monoxide from a faulty furnace that was contained withinthe insured's building did not "constitute the type ofenvironmental pollution contemplated by the clause"), with Kim,332 Ill. App. 3d at 775 (determining that the insured's"discharge of a hazardous material into the soil [met] thedefinition of traditional environmental pollution" (emphasisadded)).

Other cases dealing with the absolute pollution exclusionwould seem to support this distinction. See Economy PreferredInsurance Co. v. Grandadam, 275 Ill. App. 3d 866, 870-71, 656N.E.2d 787 (1995) (finding, as the first Illinois court toconstrue an absolute pollution exclusion, that the exclusionbarred coverage when the minor son of the insured spilled mercuryin the home of a neighbor); Housing Authority Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority, 378 F.3d 596, 606 (7thCir. 2004) (holding that the absolute pollution exclusion barredcoverage for injuries resulting from "hazardous materials thatwere 'introduced, released and allowed to remain in theenvironment in Altgeld Gardens by the surrounding industrialplants, abandoned factories, toxic waste dumps, landfills and aMetropolitan Sanitary District plant' [citation], and by PCBs andPAHs that CHA introduced, released, and allowed to remain in theenvironment of Altgeld Gardens"); Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1044(finding that "one could not characterize the discharge onto landof 80 gallons of PCB-laden oil as anything but pollution")(emphasis added)); Guilford Industries Inc. v. Liberty MutualInsurance Co., 688 F. Supp. 792 (D. Me. 1988) (coverage excludedfor damages resulting from rupture of oil tanks at textile milland subsequent contamination of a river).

This distinction becomes even more reasonable when thepurpose behind an absolute pollution exclusion is taken intoaccount: " 'to exclude governmental clean up costs' " (Koloms,177 Ill. 2d at 492, quoting Tufco, 104 N.C. App. at 324, 409 S.E.2d at 699), and avoid "the 'enormous expense and exposureresulting from the "explosion" of environmental litigation' "(emphasis in original) (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 492, quotingWeaver, 140 N.H. at 783, 674 A.2d at 977, quoting VantageDevelopment Corp., 251 N.J. Super. at 525, 598 A.2d at 953). Apollutant contained within the premises of the insured, whilecertainly harmful to those that come in contact with it, does notpose the same threat, both to the public at large and thepocketbooks of insurance companies, that a pollutant released onor into "the land, atmosphere, or any watercourse or body ofwater" poses. The above-cited cases support the propositionthat, for there to be traditional environmental pollution,triggering the absolute pollution exclusion, the pollutant mustactually spill beyond the insured's premises and into theenvironment.

Here, the underlying plaintiffs' complaint alleged that thefire burned "for several days sending clouds of smoke into theair and sending highly toxic substances into the air throughoutthe surrounding neighborhoods." Because the underlying complaintalleged that the hazardous material (toxic smoke containingchemicals emitted from the burning cardboard) was not confined tothe Riverdale facility, but, instead, spread to the "surroundingneighborhoods," we find that traditional environmental pollutionoccurred, i.e., hazardous material discharged into theatmosphere, and that the policy's absolute pollution exclusionbarred coverage.

We note that "[t]he distinction we draw here *** is by nomeans scientific, but one must remember that insurance contractinterpretation 'is at bottom a practical art.'" Pipefitters, 976F.2d at 1044, quoting Continental Casualty Co. v. PittsburghCorning Corp., 917 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless,we draw this distinction because we are not satisfied, nor is ithelpful, to have a "We-know-it-when-we-see-it" standard for whatconstitutes traditional environmental pollution.

Furthermore, we do not say that the release of a pollutantthat is contained within an insured's property cannot constitutetraditional environmental pollution. We only hold that, in thiscase, the release of toxins by the burning cardboard into theneighborhoods surrounding the Riverdale facility constitutedtraditional environmental pollution. Thus, the circuit courtcorrectly found that the "absolute pollution exclusion" inCoverage B barred coverage

Affirmed.

GREIMAN and THEIS, JJ., concur.

1. This exclusion applies only to "those sums that theinsured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages." Thus, itwould not bar coverage for Loop Paper Recycling's own damagesfrom a fire on its own property, i.e., building damage, lostinventory, etc.

2. Here, rather than obtaining its own policy, Loop PaperRecycling joined with nine other companies to split the$31,221.34 in premiums paid to Connecticut through CorporateCoverage Company, the entity that initially obtained the policy.