Third Division
Filed: March 17, 2004

Nos. 1-03-0073 & 1-03-0074 (consolidated)

 

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In these consolidated appeals, the petitioners, County of Cook (County), Forest Preserve District ofCook County (Forest Preserve District), Sheriff of Cook County (Sheriff), and the Office of the Cook CountyState's Attorney (State's Attorney) seek review of decisions and orders of the Illinois Labor Relations Board(ILRB). The ILRB ruled that the petitioners violated the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS315/1 et seq. (West 2000)), when they failed to bargain with the respondent-labor unions representing variousgroups of the petitioners' employees over the enforcement of a new residency ordinance which required existingemployees who lived in Cook County to continue to do so and new employees to establish residency in CookCounty within six months from the date they were hired. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the decisionand order of the Local Panel of the ILRB, and dismiss the appeal taken from the decision and order of the StatePanel of the ILRB.

The facts giving rise to these consolidated appeals are essentially undisputed. The respondents,Teamsters Local Union No. 714 (Teamsters), Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (IFOP), andInternational Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150 (IUOE), are labor unions representing eleven bargainingunits of the petitioners' employees. Specifically, the Teamsters represent a single bargaining unit composedof the deputy sheriffs employed by the County and Sheriff. IFOP represents nine bargaining units composedof individuals employed by the petitioners, including: (1) Internal Affairs investigators in the Sheriff's CourtServices Department; (2) sheriff sergeants in Court Services; (3) Internal Affairs investigators in theDepartment of Corrections, (4) investigators in the Sheriff's Fugitive Unit; (5) investigators in the Sheriff's DayReporting Center; (6) security officers at the Cook County Hospital; (7) Juvenile Detention, MIS and CentralSupply employees; (8) Forest Preserve District police officers; and (9) State's Attorney investigators. IUOErepresents a bargaining unit composed of employees working in the County's Highway Department. With theexception of IFOP's Juvenile Detention unit and IUOE's bargaining unit, all of the units are composed of "peaceofficers" within the meaning of section 3(k) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/3(k) (2000)).

Prior to December 2000, the petitioners⁽¹⁾ did not require their employees to reside within Cook Countyas a condition of employment. On December 5, 2000, however, the Cook County Board of Commissionersadopted the following ordinance:

"ARTICLE I

Section 1. Short Title: This article shall be known as the Cook County Personnel ResidenceRequirement Ordinance.

Section 2. Purpose: To encourage each Cook County Employee to maintain a personalcommitment to a residence in Cook County and to assure all residents that employees sharein the responsibility of investing in the future of Cook County.

Section 3. Residency Requirement of All Cook County Employees: Upon the effectivedate of this Ordinance and thereafter, the County of Cook shall only employ persons whomaintain residence in Cook County throughout their employment. Wages, salary andemployee benefits may only be paid to persons residing in Cook County. Any new employeeshall have six (6) months from date of hire to establish actual residency with Cook County.

Section 4. Exemption: Grandfather Clause: All present Cook County employees whoreside outside of Cook County upon adoption of this Ordinance are exempt from theprovisions of the residency requirements of this Ordinance.

***

ARTICLE II

Section 1. Effective Date: This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon adoption."

After the ordinance was passed, the respondents requested that the petitioners bargain over the changescreated by the residency ordinance. The petitioners, however, refused to bargain over the residencyrequirements.

On February 8, 2001, April 12, 2001, and May 1, 2001, respectively, the Teamsters, IUOE, and IFOPfiled separate charges with the Local Panel of the ILRB, alleging that the County, Sheriff, and Forest PreserveDistrict engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the Act (5 ILCS315/10(a)(4), (1) (West 2000)) by failing to bargain over the residency requirement, which, they maintained,was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. IFOP also filed a companion charge with the State Panelof the ILRB, alleging the same infraction against the State's Attorney's Office. Following an investigation ofthe charges, the Executive Director of the ILRB issued separate complaints in each case, and then consolidatedthe matters for purposes of a hearing.

In lieu of presenting testimony at the hearing, the parties submitted stipulations of fact and stipulatedexhibits to the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ issued a single decision in which she found that theresidency requirement was a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that the petitioners violated the Act byfailing to bargain with the respondents over this matter. Thereafter, the petitioners, with the exception of theForest Preserve District, filed timely exceptions to the ALJ's recommended decision, and the respondentssubsequently filed responses to the exceptions.

The Local and State Panels of the ILRB heard oral arguments from all of the parties at a joint meetingheld on October 1, 2002. On December 5, 2002, the Local Panel of the ILRB issued a decision and orderwherein it adopted the ALJ's recommended decision. Specifically, the Local Panel of the ILRB found, interalia, that: (1) the 1997 amendment to section 14(i) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2000)), which statedthat residency requirements for peace officers are not mandatorily negotiable in "municipalities withpopulations greater than 1,000,000", did not include counties with populations over 1,000,000, such as CookCounty; and (2) with respect to all of the bargaining units, the residency requirement imposed by the ordinanceconstituted a mandatory subject of bargaining under the balancing test prescribed in Central City Ass'n v.Illinois Education Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992). Accordingly, the LocalPanel of the ILRB ordered the County, Sheriff, and Forest Preserve District to take certain actions, includingrescinding the subject ordinance, and ceasing and desisting from refusing to bargain collectively in good faithwith the respondents regarding any decision to implement a residency requirement.

Also on December 5, 2002, the State Panel of the ILRB issued a separate decision and order regardingthe State's Attorney, which closely mirrored that of the Local Panel. The Board noted, however, that the State'sAttorney had not addressed the issue of how the amendment to section 14(i) of the Act, excluding municipalitieswith populations greater than 1,000,000 from having to bargain over residency requirements, included theState's Attorney, who is an elected State official.

The County, Sheriff, and Forest Preserve District filed a timely petition for direct review of thedecision and order of the Local Panel of the ILRB (assigned appeal number 1-03-0073). The State's Attorneyalso filed a petition for direct review of the decision and order of the State Panel of the ILRB (assigned appealnumber 1-03-0074). On June 6, 2003, we consolidated appeal numbers 1-03-0073 and 1-03-0074.

The primary issue before us in these consolidated appeals is whether the petitioners' refusal to engagein collective bargaining with the respondents over the imposition of a new residency requirement amounted toan unfair labor practice in violation of sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(4), (1) (West2000)). For reasons which will become clearer later in this opinion, we will address the issues presented inappeal numbers 1-03-0073 and 1-03-0074 separately. We first consider the petitioners' arguments raised inappeal number 1-03-0073.

Under section 10(a)(4) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargaincollectively in good faith with a labor organization which is the exclusive representative of public employeesin an appropriate unit ***." 5 ILCS 315/10(a)(4) (West 2000). In determining whether the petitionerscommitted an unfair labor practice in violation of section 10(a)(4), we must determine whether they had amandatory duty to bargain collectively with the respondents before imposing the residency requirement.Therefore, the key determination in this appeal is whether the petitioners' decision to impose a residencyrequirement upon the employees represented by the respondents constitutes a mandatory subject of collectivebargaining.

In general, we determine whether a matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining by applying thebalancing test set forth by the Illinois Supreme court in Central City Education Ass'n v. Illinois EducationalLabor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992), and City of Belvidere v. Illinois State LaborRelations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998). Pursuant to the Central City/Belvidere test, a matteris a mandatory subject of bargaining if it concerns wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment and:(1) is either not a matter of inherent managerial authority; or (2) is a matter of inherent managerial authority,but the benefits of bargaining outweigh the burdens bargaining imposes on the employer's authority. CentralCity Education Ass'n, 149 Ill. 2d at 523; City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 206.

In this case, however, section 14(i) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2000)) specifically determinesthe negotiability of certain subjects of bargaining for firefighter and peace officer bargaining units. Prior to1997, section 14(i) explicitly provided that residency requirements were not mandatory subjects of bargainingfor peace officer bargaining units. The language in that section read in pertinent part as follows:

"(i) In the case of peace officers, the arbitration decision shall be limited to wages, hours andconditions of employment and shall not include the following: i) residency requirements;***." (Emphasis added.).

In 1997, section 14(i) was amended to read as follows:

"(i) In the case of peace officers, the arbitration decision shall be limited to wages, hours, andconditions of employment (which may include residency requirements in municipalities witha population under 1,000,000, but those residency requirements shall not allow residencyoutside of Illinois) and shall not include the following: i) residency requirements inmunicipalities with a population of at least 1,000,000; ***." (Emphasis added.) (5 ILCS315/14(i) (West 2000).

The petitioners maintain that, in amending section 14(i) of the Act, it is clear that the GeneralAssembly intended to: (1) remove the absolute statutory immunity from bargaining with respect to "municipalities with a population under 1,000,000"; and (2) preserve the immunity of "municipalities with apopulation of at least 1,000,000" from having to bargain over peace officer residency requirements. Theyargue, however, that it is unclear from the wording of the amendment whether or to what extent the legislatureintended to change the immunity of "other units of government" from having to bargain over residencyrequirements.

Judicial review of decisions of the ILRB is governed by the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)). City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 135 Ill. 2d 499, 507,554 N.E.2d 155 (1990). Where the issue before the reviewing court is one of law, such as the properinterpretation of a statute, the ILRB's findings are not binding on the court, and our review is de novo. American Foundation of State, Federal, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois State Labor RelationsBoard, 333 Ill. App. 3d 177, 181, 775 N.E.2d 1029 (2002). Nevertheless, courts should accord substantialweight and deference to a statutory interpretation made by the agency charged with the administration andenforcement of the statute. American Foundation of State, Federal, and Municipal Employees, Council 31,333 Ill. App. 3d at 181.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Kavanagh v. County of Will, 293 Ill. App. 3d 880, 882, 689 N.E.2d 299 (1997). The language of the statuteis the best indicator of legislative intent and, where it is clear, it must be given effect without resort to otherinterpretive aids. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 556, 723 N.E.2d256 (1999). Where the statutory language is clear, a court should not depart from its plain meaning by readinginto it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature. Gibbs v. Madison CountySheriff's Department, 326 Ill. App. 3d 473, 476, 760 N.E.2d 1049 (2001). If the language of the statutepermits two constructions, one of which would render the provision absurd and illogical and the other of whichwould render the provision reasonable and sensible, the former construction must be avoided. Kaszubowskiv. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 248 Ill. App. 3d 451, 457, 618 N.E.2d 609 (1993).

The petitioners offer two conclusions regarding the intended effect of the 1997 amendment to section14(i) of the Act. First, they assert that the legislature intended to divide all governmental entities, not justmunicipalities, into "two camps" based on a population threshold of 1,000,000. According to the petitioners,because the legislature intended to differentiate among local governmental entities based on population size,the logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to treat Cook County no differently than the City ofChicago (Chicago). As the petitioners maintain, Cook County "contains" the population of Chicago. Thepetitioners argue that the population-related factors that militate in favor of continuing to exempt Chicago frommandatory collective bargaining over peace officer residency requirements, such as the size and diversity ofthe community to which residency is confined and the burdens of bargaining on a large public employer, applyeven more so to Cook County. In further support of their argument, the petitioners note that the legislature haspreviously used the population threshold of 1,000,000 to distinguish Cook County and Chicago together fromother units of local government in Illinois (e.g., Cook County and Chicago specifically classified by populationunder the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/7-132 (West 2000)); (special classification for Cook County and Chicagowith respect to tax levies (35 ILCS 200/21-155 (West 2000))). According to the petitioners' interpretation ofthe amendment to section 14(i), the language providing that residency requirements are not mandatorilynegotiable in "municipalities with populations greater than 1,000,000" should also include counties withpopulations greater than 1,000,000, i.e., Cook County.

To adopt the petitioners' construction of the statute, however, would require us to ignore the plainlanguage of the statute. By amending section 14(i), the legislature deliberately removed the prior blanketprohibition regarding bargaining over residency requirements, and substituted a narrow exception for"municipalities" with populations greater than 1,000,000. Had the legislature wanted to distinguish on thebasis of population alone, as the petitioners assert was its intent, it could have done so simply by referring to"units of local government", which would have included, inter alia, counties and municipalities. Thelegislature's election in this instance to depart from using the broader term "units of local government" andinstead using the term "municipalities" in amending section 14(i) indicates that it intended a narrow applicationof the exception. As our supreme court has stated:

"There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature didnot mean what the plain language of the statute imports, and a court is not at liberty to departfrom the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions thatthe legislature did not express." Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 534, 689 N.E.2d 1047(1997).

We, therefore, reject the petitioners' argument that the narrow exception the legislature included in section 14(i)includes counties with populations in excess of 1,000,000.

The petitioners' second conclusion is that the legislature intended to remove the blanket prohibition onlyfor municipalities with populations of less than 1,000,000, as section 14(i) was amended to state thatbargaining "may include residency requirements in municipalities with a population under 1,000,000." Thepetitioners argue that this phrase clearly expresses the legislature's intent to impose new bargaining obligationsonly on smaller municipalities and to leave intact the prior prohibition on bargaining over residencyrequirements for all other governmental entities. In further support of its argument, the petitioners point outthat, while providing that bargainable matters now "may include" peace officer residency requirements inmunicipalities with populations under 1,000,000, this clause was further qualified by language stating, "butthose residency requirements shall not allow residency outside of Illinois." According to the petitioners, theforegoing additional restriction on bargaining rights makes it even clearer that the legislature intended the "mayinclude" clause to set forth the only addition in section 14(i).

The petitioners' second interpretation of the amendment to section 14(i) is equally unavailing. Itappears quite illogical to assert that the prior prohibition against bargaining over residency requirementscontinues to apply as to every public employer, other than "municipalities with populations of less than1,000,000," when the very language which created the prohibition ("arbitration decision *** shall not include*** residency requirements") has been entirely removed from the statute. We further disagree with thepetitioners' assertion that the ILRB's interpretation of section 14(i) would render superfluous the languagestating that an arbitrator may address residency requirements for peace officers in municipalities withpopulations less than 1,000,000. As the petitioners have pointed out, this language goes on to qualify that"those residency requirements shall not allow residency outside of Illinois." This provision is not duplicativeof any other language contained in section 14(i), and, therefore, the clause is not superfluous when read as awhole (see Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990) (a statute should be read as awhole and construed so that no word, phrase, or section is rendered meaningless or superfluous)).

Having rejected the petitioners' arguments with respect to the construction of the amendment to section14(i) of the Act, we find that the ILRB was correct in concluding that: (1) by adding language to section 14(i)providing that smaller municipalities "may" now bargain over residency, the legislature did not intend to keepin effect the prior blanket prohibition regarding bargaining; and (2) the legislature intended to make anexception from having to bargain over residency for peace officer bargaining units only for municipalities witha population over 1,000,000, not counties.

The petitioners further argue that the ILRB's interpretation of section 14(i) of the Act would violatethe special legislation provisions of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,