SECOND DIVISION
March 30, 2004

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Robert and Bonnie Duresa appeal from an order ofthe circuit court granting the motion of defendant CommonwealthEdison, also known as Com Ed, to reconsider its order denying bothplaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and defendant'scross-motion for summary judgment, and granting summary judgment infavor of defendant. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trialcourt erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendantbecause genuine issues of material fact existed as to the validityof the document under which defendant claimed it possessed aneasement over plaintiffs' property, the amount of damage defendantcaused to plaintiffs' property, and the reasonableness ofdefendant's conduct on plaintiffs' property. For the reasons setforth below, we reverse and remand.

In 1990, plaintiffs purchased 3.77 acres of land at 1001 PlumTree Road in Barrington Hills, Illinois. Situated on the propertywas a 1875 Victorian home, as well as many varieties of maturelilac bushes, honeysuckle, forsythia, and flowering privets. Cherry and Mulberry trees lined the 750-foot roadside. Over thenext several years, plaintiffs restored the home and clearedovergrown brush and shrubbery from the property.

On October 14, 1997, plaintiffs filed a complaint for atemporary restraining order and other relief against defendant andthe Village of Barrington Hills (Village),⁽¹⁾ alleging that onSeptember 17 and 26 defendant erected two utility poles onplaintiffs' property that resulted in extensive damage to theproperty. Specifically, defendant erected a new 50-foot pole 16,although a 35-foot pole 16 already existed on the property andapparently still remained at the time of the proceedings below and,in doing so, defendant destroyed four 5-foot flowering privets. Defendant also replaced a 35-foot pole 13 with a 50-foot pole 13and, in doing this, defendant gouged a 21-foot native cherry tree(which later died), destroyed two 4 to 5-foot flowering privets,and removed five 15 to 18-foot Ludwig Spaeth lilac trees. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendant from replacing any additionalpoles without their consent and to prohibit defendant from enteringtheir property. On the same day, plaintiffs received a letter fromdefendant's project design supervisor, enclosing an allegedeasement granted to it by a predecessor in interest to plaintiffs'property, which, according to defendant, authorized its activitieson plaintiffs' property. The easement was dated September 1, 1934, and was signed "A. Cowles by John L. Weaver." The easement grantedto defendant's predecessor in interest "the right, permission andauthority to construct, maintain, and renew 'pole line equipment'*** and also to trim, from time to time, such trees, bushes and_____ [sic] as may be reasonably required for the construction andefficient operation of said 'pole line equipment' ***."

On October 16, the trial court entered an order, in which theparties agreed that poles 14 and 15 would be relocated three feetcloser to the street, that the relocation would not requireextensive tree trimming, and that defendant was to restoreplaintiffs' landscaping upon completion of the work. The next day,defendant replaced poles 14 and 15 with 50-foot poles. Inconstructing pole 14, defendant destroyed five 15 to 18-foot lilacbushes. In erecting pole 15, defendant destroyed four 15 to 18-foot lilac bushes and a native cherry tree. Also, a mulberry treesubsequently died due to damage caused by defendant's activities.

On February 6, 1998, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint,alleging that defendant, contrary to the provisions of the October16 order, removed numerous trees and caused other extensive damageduring the replacement of the poles, and that a controversy existedas to whether defendant possessed a valid easement. According toplaintiffs, the easement was invalid since it was not signed by theproperty owner and was not recorded. After defendant's subsequentmotion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint was granted,plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, alleging thatdefendant only possessed a prescriptive easement, which itexceeded. Plaintiffs asked the court to order defendant to removethe four 50-foot poles and to restore the trees and shrubbery ithad destroyed.

On April 6, 2000, plaintiffs filed their answers todefendant's notice to produce and interrogatories in which theyincluded numerous photographs and stated that defendant choppeddown many rare and irreplaceable lilac bushes, other trees, andprivets with respect to work surrounding five pole areas: 13, 14,15, 16, and 16A. According to plaintiffs, defendant also scorchedthe earth in these areas. Plaintiffs attached various consultationreports with respect to the damage done and replacement or damageestimates.

On August 15, plaintiffs filed a motion for a restrainingorder, asking the court to prohibit defendant from again enteringtheir property for the purpose of tree trimming after they receiveda postcard from defendant indicating its intent to undertaketrimming on the property. On August 17, the trial court grantedthe motion, prohibiting defendant from entering plaintiffs'property between that date and August 30, unless an emergencysituation existed. On October 4, the trial court entered an order,after the parties had met on the property for an inspection,authorizing defendant to trim one tree.

On April 25, 2002, plaintiffs filed a motion for partialsummary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to the easement's validity because it was notsigned by the property owner, nor recorded. On June 11, defendantfiled a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that itpossessed an express grant of an easement and that the document wasadmissible and genuine under the ancient document rule. Attachedto this motion was the easement, as well as a copy of Cowles' willin which he gave Weaver $500, and a bill sent by Weaver (anattorney) to Cowles' estate for services rendered in an unrelatedmatter. Defendant argued that the tree trimming and replacement ofthe poles were authorized under the easement. In response todefendant's cross-motion, plaintiffs argued that genuine issues ofmaterial fact existed regarding the extent of the alleged easement,what damages were caused by defendant's conduct, and the amount ofdamages caused by defendant. On July 25, defendant replied,arguing that the amount of damages was only an issue if defendantdid not have the authority to do the work, which it did. OnSeptember 5, the trial court entered an order, stating that thethere was "significant disagreement" between the parties as towhether defendant possessed a valid easement, which precludedsummary judgment in either parties' favor. The court thereforedenied both motions.

On September 30, plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider theSeptember 5 order, stating that the easement was invalid becausedefendant failed to present evidence that Weaver was Cowles' agent. On October 9, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the September5 order, arguing that the easement was valid because it was anancient document.

On December 23, the trial court entered an order, stating thatthe issue was whether defendant possessed a valid easement. According to the court, defendant had presented sufficient evidencethat it possessed a valid easement and, moreover, that equitableprinciples rested with defendant. Accordingly, it deniedplaintiffs' motion to reconsider, granted defendant's motion toreconsider, and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred ingranting summary judgment in defendant's favor because the documentdefendant relied upon as granting an easement over plaintiffs'property was signed by someone (John Weaver) other than theproperty owner (A. Cowles) at the time of the alleged easement anddefendant failed to present evidence of any agency relationshipbetween Weaver and Cowles. According to plaintiffs, the trialcourt erred in deciding fact questions with respect to agencyissues in finding the easement valid. Plaintiffs also contend thatthe trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuineissues of material fact existed regarding the amount of damagecaused by defendant to plaintiffs' property and the reasonablenessof defendant's conduct on their property, i.e., did defendant'sconduct constitute misuse or exceed the boundaries of the easement.

Defendant contends that, under the ancient document rule, theadmissibility and genuineness of the easement is presumed, and itneed not demonstrate direct proof of execution or authority to doso by an agent. Defendant further contends that the easement mustbe sustained under principles of equity, particularly given thefact that plaintiffs had notice of the easement since poles were inexistence on their property. Defendant also contends that we mustdisregard those arguments with respect to remaining fact questionsbecause plaintiffs failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 191 inthat they attached no affidavits to their motion for partialsummary judgment and failed to cite authority, thus waiving theseissues for review. Additionally, according to defendant,plaintiffs did not raise the issue of damages until their responseto defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment, which was animproper time. Alternatively, defendant contends that even ifplaintiffs did not waive review of these issues, no fact questionsexisted. According to defendant, it demonstrated, based on theeasement, that it had authority to undertake the activities it didon plaintiffs' property, that it was required to "trim or removetrees" that may interfere with its power lines under the NationalElectric Safety Code,⁽²⁾ and that the trimming it did was necessary.

We initially note that defendant's argument that plaintiffsraised the issue of damages only in response to defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment, which was an improper time, isillogical. Plaintiffs only raised the validity of the easement intheir motion for partial summary judgment; plaintiffs did not raiseany other issues, including the issue of damages. Thereafter,defendant sought summary judgment on all issues. It was only atthis time that other issues, e.g., the reasonableness ofdefendant's conduct and damages, became viable issues with respectto summary judgment.

Additionally, we note that both parties have failed to cite topertinent authority, which they could have, either from Illinois,other jurisdictions, or legal periodicals, despite the fact thatthere is a plethora of same. Specifically, plaintiffs clearly havenot researched the law on the ancient document rule or, if theyhave, they continue to ignore it. Similarly, plaintiffs havefailed to cite to pertinent law on the interpretation of easementsand uses thereof, despite the fact that there is not only generallaw in Illinois, but case law in other jurisdictions factually anddirectly on point. Likewise, defendant has failed to offer anyauthority as to why the ancient document rule applies to anunrecorded easement. Clearly, the two cases it relies upon, whichwe need not address, involved deeds, at least one of which wasrecorded. Similarly, defendant ignores the nature of the ancientdocument rule, as discussed below, and argues that simply becausethere is an ancient document rule, the easement at issue here mustbe deemed valid and binding and, based on the easement, defendantcan do anything it desires vis-a-vis plaintiffs' property. We donot condone the laxity of either party's counsel and could dismissthis appeal on this basis alone. However, because we are of theopinion that this case involves important issues, we choose toaddress them. Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill.2d 1, 11, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (1996) (waiver is a limitation on theparties, not on the court).

Our standard of review is well-settled:

" 'The purpose of a motion to reconsideris to bring to the court's attention newlydiscovered evidence which was not available atthe time of the hearing, changes in the law orerrors in the court's previous application ofexisting law. [Citation.] As a general rulea motion to reconsider is addressed to thetrial court's sound discretion. [Citation.] But a motion to reconsider an order grantingsummary judgment raises the question ofwhether the judge erred in his previousapplication of existing law. Whether thecourt has erred in the application of existinglaw is not reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. [Citation.] As with anyquestion regarding the application of existinglaw, we review the denial of such a motion denovo.' [Citation.]" Sacramento CrushingCorp. v. Correct/All Sewer, Inc., 318 Ill.App. 3d 571, 577, 742 N.E.2d 829 (2000).

See also O'Connor v. County of Cook, 337 Ill. App. 3d 902, 911, 787N.E.2d 185 (2003) (stating that we review "the trial court'sapplication of law to the facts presented before it on a de novobasis").

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions,and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, showthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that themoving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d324, 335, 775 N.E.2d 987 (2002). The right to relief must soclearly favor the movant that no fair-minded person could disputethe movant's right to judgment in its favor. The SouthernIllinoisan, a Division of Lee Enterprises v. Department of PublicHealth, 319 Ill. App. 3d 979, 986, 747 N.E.2d 401 (2001). In otherwords, the movant's entitlement to judgment must be clear and freefrom doubt. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867(1986); Turner Investors v. Pirkl, 338 Ill. App. 3d 676, 680, 789N.E.2d 323 (2003). "Our function on an appeal from the grant ofsummary judgment is limited to determining whether the trial courtcorrectly found that no genuine issue of material fact existed and,if that was the case, whether the trial court correctly enteredjudgment as a matter of law." General Casualty Co. of Illinois v.Carroll Tiling Service, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 883, 889, 796 N.E.2d702 (2003).

A. Ancient Document Rule

"At common law, a document purporting to be 30 or more yearsold is generally admissible in evidence without the ordinaryrequirements as to proof of execution and authenticity, as long asit is produced from proper custody and is on its face free fromsuspicion, and circumstances exist which corroborate itsauthenticity." 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence