THIRD DIVISION

Date Filed: February 20, 2002

The plaintiff, El Sauz, Inc., doing business as El GatoNegro, filed a complaint for administrative review seeking reviewof an order of suspension issued by the Local Liquor ControlCommission of the City of Chicago. The defendants filed a motionto dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The circuitcourt granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals from the orderof dismissal.

On appeal, the plaintiff raises the following issues: (1)whether the defendants waived their jurisdictional challenge tothe plaintiff's complaint; (2) whether the License AppealCommission had jurisdiction to rule on the plaintiff's petitionfor rehearing; (3) whether the plaintiff was statutorily entitledto service of the License Appeal Commission's order by certifiedmail; (4) whether section 3-13 of the Liquor Control Act deniesthe plaintiff its constitutional rights to due process and equalprotection.

On September 1, 1998, following a hearing, the Local LiquorControl Commission (LLCC) ordered a 30-day suspension of theplaintiff's liquor license based on its finding that the purchaseof a controlled substance had been permitted on the plaintiff'spremises. The plaintiff timely filed its notice of appeal to theLicense Appeal Commission (LAC). On March 15, 1999, the LACissued its order affirming the findings of the LLCC and theimposition of the 30-day suspension penalty. Accompanying theorder was the certification by a staff assistant that the orderwas mailed on March 15, 1999, addressed to the attorney ofrecord.

On April 15, 1999, the plaintiff filed a petition forrehearing with the LAC. Anticipating a jurisdictional challengebecause the petition was not filed within 20 days of the LAC'sorder (see 235 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1998), the plaintiff allegedthat it never received a copy of the order and that its attorneydid not receive a copy of the March 15, 1999, order within the20-day period. The plaintiff further alleged that the order,which was served by regular mail, was required to be served bycertified or registered mail as provided for in the IllinoisAdministrative Procedure Act (the Procedure Act) (5 ILCS 10-50(West 1998)). The petition was supported by the affidavit of theplaintiff's president, Geraldine Lambert. After the filing ofthe petition, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of itsattorney. In his affidavit, the attorney stated that oralarguments in this case were held on March 8, 1999. Thereafter,he was out of town from March 17, through March 21, 1999, andfrom March 23, through April 9, 1999. When he returned to hisoffice on April 9, 1999, the LAC's order was included in the mailthat had been delivered while he was out of town.

On April 16, 1999, the LLCC filed a motion to dismiss theplaintiff's petition for rehearing. The LLCC alleged that the20-day period for filing the petition for rehearing wasjurisdictional. The LLCC further alleged that notice of theMarch 15, 1999, order was properly served by regular mail, sincethe Procedure Act did not apply to the procedures followed by theLAC.

On January 26, 2000, the LAC issued a corrected orderdenying the LLCC's motion to dismiss the petition for rehearing. The LAC determined that the Procedure Act was applicable to theLAC procedures and therefore, service of the March 15, 1999,order by regular mail did not comply with the Procedure Act. Asa result, the LAC concluded that the plaintiff's petition forrehearing had been timely filed. On January 28, 2000, the LLCCfiled a petition for rehearing, which was denied by the LAC onJanuary 31, 2000. After a hearing on the merits of theplaintiff's petition for rehearing, on March 17, 2000, the LACissued a corrected order denying the plaintiff's petition forrehearing.

On April 4, 2000, the plaintiff filed its complaint foradministrative review seeking reversal of the LAC's orderaffirming the LLCC's findings and the imposition of the 30-daysuspension of its liquor license.

On May 9, 2000, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss thecomplaint for lack of jurisdiction. The motion alleged the samejurisdictional arguments that the LLCC had raised in its motionto dismiss and its petition for rehearing before the LAC. Themotion to dismiss asserted that since the plaintiff was requiredto file a petition for rehearing before it could seek review ofthe LAC's order, (see 235 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1998)), its untimelyfiling of its petition for rehearing deprived the LAC ofjurisdiction to act on the petition for rehearing, and therefore,the circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

On June 15, 2000, the plaintiff filed a response to themotion to dismiss. In its response, the plaintiff pointed outthat the defendants did not file for administrative review of theLAC's order denying their petition for rehearing as required bysection 3-103 of the Administrative Review Act (Review Act) (735ILCS 5/3-103 (West 1998)) and thus waived review of the LAC'sdenial of its motion to dismiss. Therefore, the plaintiff arguedthat the defendants' motion to dismiss constituted animpermissible collateral attack on the LAC's order.

On July 28, 2000, the circuit court issued a written opiniongranting the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiff fileda motion for reconsideration and rehearing on August 25, 2000. The circuit court denied the motion on October 23, 2000. Theplaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on October 27, 2000.

[The following material is nonpublishable under SupremeCourt Rule 23.]

I. Whether the defendants waived their right to raise theissue of jurisdiction before the circuit court?

A. Standard of Review

Dismissal based upon a lack of jurisdiction is subject to denovo review where the facts are not in dispute. In re Marriageof Wiseman, 316 Ill. App. 3d 631, 634-35, 737 N.E.2d 325, 329(2000).

B. Discussion

The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred ingranting the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction because the defendants did not follow the statutoryrequirements for seeking review before the circuit court.

The Liquor Control Act (the Liquor Act) has expresslyadopted the appeals provisions of the Review Act to governappeals from its commissions. See 235 ILCS 5/7-11 (West 1998).

The January 31, 2000, order denying the LLCC's petition forrehearing provided that the parties had 35 days from the date ofservice of the order within which to commence an action foradministrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. See735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 1998).

The plaintiff argues that the defendants waived theirchallenge to the jurisdiction of the circuit court when theyfailed to seek administrative review of the LAC's January 31,2000, order denying their petition for rehearing.

Judicial review can only be undertaken where there is afinal agency determination. Buroff v. Board of Fire and PoliceCommissioners, 248 Ill. App. 3d 626, 629, 618 N.E.2d 930, 932(1993). Such a determination is made following "'some sort ofadversarial process involving the parties affected, where ahearing on controverted facts is held, and ultimately adisposition is rendered by an impartial officer.' [Citation.]"Buroff, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 629, 618 N.E.2d at 932. In theabsence of such a final administrative decision, the circuitcourt lacks jurisdiction to consider the matter. Buroff, 248Ill. App. 3d at 629, 618 N.E.2d at 932.

Under the Review Act, only complaints to review finaladministrative decisions may be brought. See 735 ILCS 5/3-103(West 1998). A final order or judgment has been defined as adetermination by the court on the issues presented by thepleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally therights of the parties to the litigation. Department of CentralManagement Services v. American Federation of State, County andMunicipal Employees, 182 Ill. 2d 234, 238, 695 N.E.2d 444, 446(1998). In this case, the decision denying the defendants'petition for rehearing was not a final decision since the LACstill had to determine whether to reverse its decision affirmingthe suspension of the plaintiff's liquor license.

The plaintiff then argues that the defendants still hadsufficient time to file for administrative review after the LACdenied the plaintiff's petition for rehearing and upheld thesuspension of its liquor license but that they failed to do so.

In general, a party who has obtained by a judgment all thatwas sought in the trial court cannot appeal that judgment. Piersall v. Sportsvision of Chicago, 230 Ill. App. 3d 503, 512,595 N.E.2d 103, 108 (1992). Specific findings adverse to theappellee do not require a cross-appeal so long as the judgmentwas entirely in favor of the appellee. Piersall, 230 Ill. App,3d at 512, 595 N.E.2d at 108. Under the Review Act, the right toseek judicial review of an administrative decision is limited tothe parties of record at the administrative proceeding whoserights, privileges, or duties were adversely affected by thedecision. Kemp-Golden v. Department of Children and FamilyServices, 281 Ill. App. 3d 869, 873, 667 N.E.2d 688, 691 (1996). One who is not "'aggrieved by the agency decision' does not havestanding to seek judicial review of the decision. [Citation.]"Kemp-Golden, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 873, 667 N.E.2d at 691.

Since the LAC affirmed the suspension of the plaintiff'sliquor license, the defendants received all they sought under theLAC's decision, and their rights were not adversely affected bythat decision. Therefore, the defendants were neither obligatedto nor were they able to appeal from the LAC's order denyingtheir petition for rehearing.

McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Commission, 165 Ill. 2d 1,649 N.E.2d 404 (1995), relied on by the plaintiff, isdistinguishable. In that case, the supreme court reiterated theprinciple that failure to comply with the rules governingadministrative review requires dismissal of the action. In thepresent case, we have determined that the defendants did complywith the Review Act.

The plaintiff then argues that the defendants' motion todismiss in the circuit court was an improper collateral attack onthe LAC's decision. The doctrine of collateral estoppelprecludes a party from re-litigating an issue of ultimate factthat was previously decided in a valid, final judgment. MidlandHotel Corp. v. Director of Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d312, 315, 668 N.E.2d 82, 86 (1996) (class action dismissed asimproper collateral attack on an administrative review decision). In the present case, the defendants are not attacking the LAC'sdecision affirming the suspension.

The plaintiff also relies on Tiskilwa Economic DevelopmentCorp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 148 Ill. App. 3d 884, 500N.E.2d 66 (1986). In that case, the zoning board grantedvariances to the plaintiff. However, the zoning enforcementofficer denied the plaintiff's request for building permitsallegedly allowed by the variances. The zoning board denied theplaintiff's appeal of the zoning enforcement officer's decision. The plaintiff filed for administrative review, and in response,the zoning board raised an affirmative defense, alleging that thegrant of the variances to the plaintiff violated the zoningordinance and was therefore void.

On appeal from the trial court's order remanding the case tothe zoning board for issuance of the building permit, thereviewing court held that the zoning board could not seek reviewof its own decision to grant the variances to plaintiff becausethe board was not among the class of parties entitled to seekreview of its decision and because its assertion of anaffirmative defense constituted a collateral attack on itsdecision to grant the variances. Tiskilwa Economic DevelopmentCorp., 148 Ill. App. 3d at 886-87, 500 N.E.2d at 68.

In the present case, the defendants are not seeking toreview the LAC's decision affirming the suspension of theplaintiff's liquor license. Further, the defendants have raisedthe jurisdictional issue in the same proceeding, unlike thezoning board in Tiskilwa.

Finally, as a general rule, questions concerning a trialcourt's jurisdiction may be raised collaterally or directly atany time. In re Marriage of Schlam, 271 Ill. App. 3d 788, 793,648 N.E.2d 345, 348 (1995). Even where a jurisdictional defecthas not been raised by the parties, any court of review has theindependent duty to insure that appellate jurisdiction is proper.Department of Central Management Services, 182 Ill. 2d at 238,695 N.E.2d at 446. Since the lack of jurisdiction could beraised at any time by either the parties or the circuit court,the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction wasnot an improper collateral attack on the LAC's decision.

We conclude that the defendants did not waive theirjurisdictional challenge to the plaintiff's complaint.

[The preceding material is nonpublishable under SupremeCourt Rule 23.]

II. Whether the LAC had jurisdiction of the plaintiff'spetition for rehearing.

A. Standard of Review

Review of an agency's legal conclusions is de novo. Stillov. State Retirement Systems, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1007, 714N.E.2d 11, 14 (1999). However, findings and conclusions of factare held to be prima facie true and correct and will not bedisturbed on review unless they are against the manifest weightof the evidence. Stillo, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1006, 714 N.E.2d at14.

B. Discussion

Section 7-10 of the Liquor Act provides in pertinent part asfollows:

"Within 20 days after the service of any rule,regulation, order or decision of said commission upon anyparty to the proceeding, such party may apply for arehearing in respect to any matters determined by saidcommission. *** No action for the judicial review of anydecision of said commission shall be allowed unless theparty commencing such action has first filed an applicationfor a rehearing and the commission has acted upon saidapplication." 235 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1998).

We will first address whether the plaintiff was required tofile its petition for rehearing before the LAC within 20 daysafer service of the LAC's decision. Our research has revealed nocase which deals specifically with this provision of section 7-10.

In an analogous case, Miller v. Daley, 14 Ill. App. 3d 394,302 N.E.2d 347 (1973), the court was asked to determine whetherthe legislature intended the time requirement for an appeal tothe LAC set forth in the Liquor Act to be mandatory or merelydirectory. The statutory provision stated in pertinent part asfollows:

"[t]he licensee shall have the privilege, within a period of20 days after the receipt of such order of fine, suspensionor revocation, of appealing the order to the local licenseappeal commission ***." 235 ILCS 5/7-5 (West 1998) formerlyIll. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 43, sec. 149.

The Miller court rejected the plaintiff's argument that thelanguage "shall have the privilege" should be construed asdirectory. The court distinguished Carrigan v. Illinois LiquorControl Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 166 N.E.2d 574 (1960) on thebasis that Carrigan involved the performance of an official duty. See Carrigan, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 166 N.E.2d 574 (time period withinwhich the LAC must act on the appeal directory); but see Johnkol,Inc. v. License Appeal Commission, 42 Ill. 2d 377, 247 N.E.2d 901(1969) (time period mandatory where the licensee could showinjury for the LAC's failure to act within the statutory period).

Instead, because the complaint requested administrativereview, the Miller court relied on the case law interpreting theReview Act. The court noted that the Review Act's provision thatan administrative review action be commenced within 35 days hadbeen held to be jurisdictional. Miller, 14 Ill. App. 3d at 398,302 N.E.2d at 350. The court concluded therefore that the 20 daytime limit for filing an appeal to the LAC was likewisemandatory. Miller, 14 Ill. App. 3d at 398, 302 N.E.2d at 350.

Like Miller, the case before us does not involve theperformance of an official duty, since the filing of the petitionfor rehearing is performed by the party. While the statutoryprovision at issue does not use the word "shall," we are of theopinion that the 20-day requirement of section 7-10 is alsomandatory.

Section 1-2 of the Liquor Act states that the Liquor Act isto be liberally construed to protect the welfare of the people. 235 ILCS 5/1-2 (West 1998). Under the Liquor Act, if a petitionfor rehearing is filed, "the licensee shall continue theoperation of the licensed business until denial of theapplication or, if rehearing is granted, until the decision onrehearing." See 235 ILCS 5/7-9 (West 1998) (provisions ofsection 7-9 relative to appeals before and from the StateCommission are applicable to the appeals before and from theLAC).

Construing the 20-day period for filing a petition forrehearing from the LAC's decision as mandatory prevents thelicensee from delaying the final determination of its license tooperate, which would not protect the welfare of the people. Moreover, the licensee would not be injured by such aconstruction, since filing the petition for rehearing within thetime set forth in section 7-9 would permit the continuedoperation of the licensee's business without interruption. SeeSip and Save Liquors, Inc. v. Daley, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1018,657 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1995) (failure to act did not result in the lossof jurisdiction, even though the word "shall" was used where thelate revocation order would not serve the welfare of the people.The licensee continued to run his business until the license wasrevoked, and the Liquor Act did not provide that jurisdiction waslost).

Therefore, we conclude that the 20-day period in section 7-10 for filing a petition for rehearing from a decision of the LACis mandatory. Therefore, the LAC has no jurisdiction to considera petition for rehearing filed beyond the 20 day period.

There is no dispute that the plaintiff filed its petitionfor rehearing more than 20 days after service of the decision.

Moreover, the plaintiff acknowledges that under the Review Act,service of the decision is deemed complete when the notice isdeposited in the mails (see 735 ILCS 5/3-103 West 1998)) and doesnot dispute that notice of the decision was mailed on March 15,1999. The plaintiff argues that the LAC's finding of fact,that the notice of its decision was not timely received by theplaintiff, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The plaintiff further argues that since the notice was nottimely, the time constraints of the Liquor Act and the Review Actdo not apply.

The affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney does not supportthe LAC's finding that service of the notice of its decision wasnot timely. The affidavit stated that the attorney was out oftown for two separate periods; March 17, through March 21, 1999,and from March 23, through April 9, 1999. The affidavit thenstated that the LAC's decision was in the mail that was deliveredto his office while he was out of town, and that he saw the orderfor the first time on April 9, 1999.

Based on the affidavit, the plaintiff argues that since thenotice, which was mailed on March 15, 1999, was not received bythe attorney by the time he left on March 17, 1999, and still hadnot been received when he returned and again left town, somethinghad obviously gone awry in the postal service, making it aquestion of fact for the LAC to resolve. See Thompson v.Bernardi, 112 Ill. App. 3d 721, 445 N.E.2d 1321 (1983) (plaintiffcan rebut presumption of receipt by denying receipt of thenotice, and receipt then becomes a question to be resolved by thetrier of fact).

In this case, the certificate of mailing stated that noticeof the LAC's decision was mailed to the plaintiff's attorney ofrecord on March 15, 1999, giving the plaintiff until April 4,1999, to file its petition for rehearing. The plaintiff deniedreceiving the notice until April 9, 1999. The only relevantevidence the plaintiff offered on the issue of the receipt of thedecision was the affidavit of its attorney.⁽¹⁾ However, nowhere inthe attorney's affidavit did he state that he examined his mailupon his return from the first trip and failed to find thenotice. He merely stated that the first time he saw the noticewas on April 9, 1999. Further, his affidavit makes it clear thatthe notice was delivered while he was out of town, which wasduring most of the 20-day period. Nothing in the affidavitsupports the LAC's finding that the notice of its decision wasdelivered after the 20 day period expired and therefore, itsconclusion that the notice of the decision was untimely isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.

We conclude that the LAC's factual finding that service ofits decision on the plaintiff was untimely was against themanifest weight of the evidence. We further conclude that sincethe plaintiff's petition for rehearing was filed after theexpiration of the mandatory 20-day period for the filing of apetition for rehearing, the LAC was without jurisdiction toconsider the petition.

III. Whether the plaintiff was statutorily entitled toservice of the LAC's decision by certified mail.

A. Standard of Review

Interpretation of a statute is reviewed de novo. Wiseman,316 Ill. App. 3d at 635, 737 N.E.2d at 329.

B. Discussion

The plaintiff contends that since the Liquor Act adopted theprovisions of the Procedure Act, it was entitled to service ofthe LAC's decision by certified mail. The plaintiff relies onthe following provision of the Liquor Act:

"The provisions of 'The Illinois Administrative ProcedureAct', as now or hereafter amended, are hereby expresslyadopted and incorporated herein as though a part of thisAct, and shall apply to all administrative rules andprocedures of the State commission under this Act." 235ILCS 5/3-13 (West 1998).

Section 10-50 of the Procedure Act provides in pertinentpart as follows:

"Parties or their agents appointed to receive service ofprocess shall be notified either personally or by registeredor certified mail of any decision or order." 5 ILCS 5/10-50(West 1998).

In Laristos v. City of Chicago License Appeal Commission,309 Ill. App. 3d 59, 722 N.E.2d 690 (1999), this court held thatthe Procedure Act does not apply to appeals from LAC decisions. The plaintiff in that case argued that, although section 3-13 ofthe Liquor Act referred only to the State Commission, theProcedure Act applies to "every agency as defined [therein]"other than units of local government. 5 ILCS 100/1-5(a), 1-20(West 1996). However this court determined that, while the LACwas an "agency," it was also a unit of local government, andtherefore, the Procedure Act, by its own terms, did not apply. Laristos, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 64, 722 N.E.2d at 693.

While acknowledging the decision in Laristos, the plaintiffargues that the Laristos court did not address the provisions ofsections 7-9 and 7-10 of the Liquor Act. Section 7-9 provides inpertinent part as follows:

"In cities, villages and incorporated towns having apopulation of 500,000 or more inhabitants, appeals from anyorder or action shall lie to the license appeal commissionof such city, village or incorporated town. All of theprovisions of this Section and Section 7-10 relative toproceedings upon appeals before the State Commission andrelative to appeals from the decisions of the StateCommission shall apply also to proceedings upon appealsbefore any license appeal commission and appeals from thedecisions of license appeal commission." 235 ILCS 5/7-9(West 1998) .

The plaintiff argues that the above language clearlyindicates that the provisions governing the appeals before andfrom the State Commission and the LAC shall be the same.

Section 7-10 of the Liquor Act provides in pertinent part asfollows:

"A copy of the rule, regulation, order or decision ofthe State commission or the license appeal commission, inany proceeding before it, certified under seal of saidcommission, shall be served upon each party of record to theproceeding before the commission and service upon anyattorney of record for any such party shall be deemedservice upon such party. Each party appearing before saidcommission shall enter his appearance and indicate to thecommission his address for the service of a copy of anyrule, regulation, order, decision or notice and the mailingof a copy of any rule, regulation or order of saidcommission or of any notice by said commission, in saidproceeding, to said party at such address shall be deemedservice thereof on such party." 235 ILCS 5/7-10 (West1998).

The plaintiff reasons that if the State Commission isrequired by the Procedure Act to serve section 7-10 noticespersonally or by certified or registered mail, then under thelanguage of section 7-9, the LAC is required to do so as well.

The defendants respond that the plain language of section 3-13 of the Liquor Act limits the application of the Procedure Actto the State Commission. Therefore, the LAC is bound by theprovisions of sections 7-9 and 7-10 but not by section 3-13.

Section 7-10 does not require service by certified orregistered mail. It is the notice provisions of section 7-10which are applicable to both the State Commission and the LAC, not the provisions of section 3-13, which, by its own terms, areclearly applicable only to the State Commission.

We conclude that the plaintiff was not entitled to serviceof the LAC's decision by certified mail or registered mail.

IV. Whether due process and equal protection require thatthe LAC comply with the same service requirements as the StateCommission.

A. Standard of Review

A reviewing court applies a de novo standard of review to acircuit court's decision with respect to the constitutionality ofa statute. Kaufman, Litwin and Feinstein v. Edgar, 301 N.E.2d826, 830, 704 N.E.2d 756, 760 (1998).⁽²⁾

B. Discussion

1. Due Process

A fundamental requirement of due process in any proceedingwhich is to be accorded finality is notice, reasonably calculatedunder the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of thependency of the action and afford them an opportunity to presenttheir objections. Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit District No.1, 133 Ill. 2d 413, 432, 551 N.E.2d 640, 648 (1990). Due processdoes not require useless formality in the giving of notice,requiring only reasonable assurance that notice will actually begiven and the person whose rights are to be affected will begiven a reasonable time to appear and defend. Stratton, 133 Ill.2d at 432-33, 551 N.E.2d at 648. There must be an opportunity,at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, for a hearingappropriate for the nature of the case. Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at433, 551 N.E.2d at 648.

Procedural due process in an administrative setting does notalways require application of the judicial model, and in fact,not all procedures are appropriate in administrative proceedings. Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 433, 551 N.E.2d at 648. The proceduralsafeguards mandated by due process in a particular case vary,depending upon: (1) the significance of the private interestwhich will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk ofthe erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proceduresused, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substituteprocedural safeguards, and (3) the significance of the Stateinterest, including the function involved and the fiscal andadministrative burdens that the additional or substituteprocedural safeguards would entail. Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at433, 551 N.E.2d at 648.

In Guerrero v. Ryan, 272 Ill. App. 3d 945, 651 N.E.2d 586(1995), this court rejected the plaintiff's argument that dueprocess required that notice of the suspension of his driver'slicense be made by certified mail. The court noted that theUnited States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "mailservice is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that isreasonably calculated to provide actual notice. Guerrero, 272Ill. App. 3d at 949, 651 N.E.2d at 589 citing Tulsa ProfessionalCollection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490, 99 L.Ed. 2d565, 578, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1347 (1988). The court further notedthat Illinois courts have also deemed the use of regular mailsufficient means for providing notice to creditors (ElmhurstStamping & Manufacturing Co. v. Amax Plating, Inc., 67 Ill. App.3d 257, 384 N.E.2d 839 (1978)) and for providing notice ofpending police action to abate a nuisance (Village of Bensenvillev. Botu, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 634, 637, 350 N.E.2d 239 (1976)). Guerrero, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 249, 651 N.E.2d at 589.

The plaintiff argues that Guerrero is distinguishablebecause the plaintiff in that case had failed to comply with therequirement that he notify the Secretary of State when he moved. However, the plaintiff in the present case was equally remiss byfailing to insure that the notice would not lie unopened in itsattorney's office.

The central question is whether notification by regular mailis reasonably calculated to provide actual notice. See Dusenberyv. United States, No. 00-6567, slip op. at 9 (U.S. January 8,2002) (Due Process Clause requires only that the Government'seffort be "reasonably calculated" to apprise a party of thependency of the action). In this case, but for the attorney'sabsence, the plaintiff would have been aware of the receipt ofthe LAC's decision and could have filed a timely petition forrehearing. The plaintiff suggests that 20 days is a relativelyshort period of time within which to provide notice. However,20 days would have been more than enough time for the plaintiffto file its petition for rehearing, but for the fact that itsattorney absented himself for the majority of the 20-day period,knowing that a decision from the LAC would be forthcoming butwithout providing for his mail to be checked for receipt of theLAC's decision. See Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 433, 551 N.E.2d at648 (two days notice was sufficient time to prepare for a hearingwhere the plaintiffs were aware of the facts which led to theirson's expulsion from school).

Since service of the LAC's decision in this case by regularmail was reasonably calculated to provide the plaintiff withactual notice, we conclude that section 3-13 of the Liquor Actdoes not deny the plaintiff due process.

2. Equal Protection

A denial of equal protection is an arbitrary and invidiousdiscrimination that results when government withholds from aperson or class of persons a right, benefit, or privilegewithout a reasonable basis for the governmental action. ChicagoNational League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357,367, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1250 (1985). It is well established thatunless an enactment impinges on a fundamental personal right oris drawn upon an inherently suspect classification, it ispresumptively valid, and it will survive constitutional scrutinyif it is rationally related to a legitimate governmentalpurpose. Triple A Services, Inc. v. Rice, 131 Ill. 2d 217, 225-26, 545 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1989).

The plaintiff contends that its rights to adequate noticeand judicial review of administrative decisions are fundamentaldue process rights. However, as our supreme court noted inMcLean v. Department of Revenue, 184 Ill. 2d 341, 704 N.E.2d 352(1998), due process does not require a state to provide a systemof appeals. The right of judicial review in cases such as theplaintiff's arises not from a constitutional right but from astatutory right provided for in the Review Act. See McLean, 184Ill. 2d at 354-55, 704 N.E.2d at 359. Therefore, theplaintiff's equal protection challenge to section 3-13 of theLiquor Act will be conducted under the rational basis test. SeeMcLean, 184 Ill. 2d at 355, 704 N.E.2d at 359 (review of theconstitutionality of the bond provisions of the Review Act andthe Retailers' Occupation Tax Act conducted under the rationalbasis standard).

As a rule, under the rational basis test, if any set offacts can reasonably be conceived to justify the legislativeprovision challenged, it must be upheld. McLean, 184 Ill. 2d at355, 704 N.E.2d at 359. That is, the statute in question needonly be rationally related to a legitimate state goal to bevalidated. McLean, 184 Ill. 2d at 355, 704 N.E.2d at 359.

Differentiating the City of Chicago from all other Illinoiscities is neither a new practice nor an invalid one. DesPlaines Firemen's Association v. City of Des Plaines, 267 Ill.App. 3d 920, 928, 642 N.E.2d 732 (1994). Populationclassifications distinguishing Chicago from other cities arepresumed valid and will be voided only when clearly arbitrary. Des Plaines Firemen's Association, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 928, 642N.E.2d at 737. Any such classification must be reasonable andbased upon rational differences of condition among theclassified municipalities. Des Plaines Firemen's Association,267 Ill. App. 3d at 928, 642 N.E.2d at 737-38. The burden ofdemonstrating the unreasonableness or arbitrariness of theclassification lies with the person attacking its validity, andreasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of upholding thevalidity of the legislation creating the classification. DesPlaines Firemen's Association, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 928, 642N.E.2d at 738.

The plaintiff relies on Johnkol, Inc. In that case, theplaintiff argued that a recent amendment to the Liquor Act whichallowed licensees who appealed to the State Commission to remainopen pending a decision by the reviewing agency, but denied thesame privilege to licensees whose appeals were heard by the LACwas unconstitutional.

The supreme court agreed, stating that it was unable tofind any rational basis for the difference in treatment oflicensees based upon population, since compliance with theapplicable statutes, the aim of the sanction, was equally to bedesired of all licensees throughout the state, regardless of thepopulation of the city in which their premises were located. Johnkol, Inc., 42 Ill. 2d at 381, 247 N.E.2d at 903.

Johnkol, Inc. is distinguishable from the present case. Asthe supreme court noted in that case, there was simply no basisfor imposing a sanction based upon population rather than uponthe misconduct. The difference was created by the legislatureand was not one inherent in the location to which the lawapplied. Johnkol, Inc., 42 Ill. 2d at 382, 247 N.E.2d at 903-04. However, in the case before us, the differing servicerequirements are reflective of the differences between mailservice in the City of Chicago and other municipalities.

The legislature is generally given great flexibility inaddressing the different needs throughout the State. Cutinellov. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 421, 641 N.E.2d 360, 365 (1994). Classification, an inevitable consequence of this flexibility,"'"requires that some persons who have an almost equally strongclaim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of theline, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawndifferently at some points is a matter for legislative, ratherthan judicial, consideration."' [Citations.]" Cutinello, 161Ill. 2d at 421, 641 N.E.2d at 365.

In this case, we may presume that the legislature, prior tomaking the classification in this case, took into considerationmail service, both in the City of Chicago and the rest of theState, when it determined not to require the LAC to serve itsnotices by certified mail. See People v. Palkes, 52 Ill. 2d472, 478, 288 N.E.2d 469, 473 (1972) (presumption exists thatthe legislature investigated and was aware of the problemspeculiar to the City of Chicago before making the complained ofclassification). Our supreme court has also recognized that thefact that the City of Chicago is more densely populated that anyother city in the State can be the basis for creating aclassification which may apply only to that city. See Palkes,52 Ill. 2d at 479, 288 N.E.2d at 473 (legislature justified increating classifications in police regulations which apply onlyto the City of Chicago based on its population).

As the defendants suggest, the legislature couldlegitimately have concluded that, in a unified andgeographically compact area such as the City of Chicago, serviceby regular mail would be sufficient to ensure timely receipt ofnotices without consuming too much of the LAC's time andresources. However, throughout the rest of Illinois where thelicensees and municipalities are diverse and far-flung, thelegislature could well have decided that the use of certifiedmail, despite its extra burden on the State Commission, would benecessary to perfect service.

We may also presume that the legislature surveyed theconditions existing in the population centers of this State andpursued the various means available to the General Assembly, notavailable to this court, in informing itself of theseconditions, before enacting a classification based uponpopulation. Palkes, 52 Ill. 2d at 477, 288 N.E.2d at 472.

Finally, as the defendants point out, the court in Laristosheld that the Procedure Act was not applicable to the LACbecause the LAC was a unit of local government, not because of ageographical distinction.

The plaintiff has offered nothing which proves that theclassification in this case is unreasonable and arbitrary otherthan the fact that, unlike those licensees who appeal to theState Commission, it is not entitled to receive notices from theLAC via registered or certified mail. Given the presumption ofthe validity of the classification, the plaintiff has failed tocarry its burden of proving either the unreasonableness or thearbitrariness of the legislature's decision not to require theLAC to serve its notices by registered or certified mail.

We conclude that the section 3-13 of the Liquor Act doesnot deny equal protection to the plaintiff.

The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County isaffirmed.

CERDA and SOUTH, JJ., concur.

1. The plaintiff also filed the affidavit of its president,Geraldine Lambert. However, the fact that Ms. Lambert did notknow about the decision until after April 8, 1999, is notpersuasive since the rule provides that service of the notice canbe on the attorney of record. In addition, although the petitionfor rehearing states that the plaintiff's attorney told Ms.Lambert that he did not receive the LAC's decision within the 20-day period, that fact is not supported by the attorney's ownaffidavit.

2. The constitutional issues were not raised before thecircuit court, although the issues were alluded to before theLAC. This court is not bound by the principle of waiver, and inthe interests of a just result, we elect to address theconstitutional issues. See American Federation of State, Countyand Muncipal Employees, Council 23, AFL-CIO v. County of Cook,145 Ill. 2d 475, 584 N.E.2d 116 (1991).