"Any person who notifies the Authority that he or she was injured or has a cause of actionshall be furnished a copy of Section 41 of this Act. Within 10 days after being notified inwriting, the Authority shall either send a copy by certified mail to the person at his or her lastknown address or hand deliver a copy to the person who shall acknowledge receipt by his orher signature. When the Authority is notified later than 6 months from the date the injuryoccurred or the cause of action arose, the Authority is not obligated to furnish a copy ofSection 41 to the person. In the event the Authority fails to furnish a copy of Section 41 asprovided in this Section, any action commenced against the Authority shall not be dismissedfor failure to file a written notice as provided in this Section. Compliance with this Sectionshall be liberally construed in favor of the person required to file a written statement." (Emphasis added.) 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998).

Plaintiff argues that the courtesy card she filled out and turned in to Deyamfer on the day of theaccident constituted notice to the CTA that she "was injured" or "has a cause of action" and thus the CTA,having gotten such notice, was then statutorily required to furnish her with a copy of section 41 within 10days of receiving her courtesy card. Plaintiff further contends that CTA's failure to comply with thestatute's new distribution requirement by failing to send her a copy of section 41 precluded the CTA fromasserting section 41 as an affirmative defense. Plaintiff therefore argues that the trial court erred as amatter of law when it dismissed her complaint for failure to file a written notice with the secretary of theChicago Transit Board and the General Counsel for the CTA.

Defendants concede that notice to the CTA that plaintiff "was injured" or "has a cause of action"would trigger its obligation to furnish plaintiff with a copy of section 41 under the statute's newdistribution requirement. Defendants further concede that the CTA's failure to comply with thisdistribution requirement would preclude dismissal of plaintiff's complaint based on her failure to complywith section 41. However, defendant argues that the trial court's dismissal was proper because CTA'sreceipt of a courtesy card stating plaintiff's name, address, telephone number, date of birth, the date andtime of the accident, the bus driver's name and badge number, the bus number, and the bus's garage, wasinsufficient to create a duty to furnish plaintiff with a copy of section 41. Defendants contend thatplaintiff's initial notice to the CTA must affirmatively state, using the exact words in the statute, thatplaintiff "was injured" or "has a cause of action" in order to trigger the CTA's distribution obligation. Wedisagree.

When construing a disputed statutory provision, the court's primary goal is to ascertain and giveeffect to the legislature's intent. In re Marriage of Brackett, 309 Ill. App. 3d 329, 343 (1999). Todetermine the legislative intent, we first consider the statutory language. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41 (1992). The language within each section of a statute must beexamined in light of the entire statute. Stone v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review, 151Ill. 2d 257, 261 (1992). The court may also consider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils to beremedied, and the objectives to be attained. Koperski v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d494, 497 (1997). The court will assume that the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd or unjustresult. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d at 541.

The language employed by the legislature in section 41 appears straightforward when it states,"[a]ny person who notifies the Authority that he or she was injured or has a cause of action shall befurnished a copy of Section 41 of this Act." (Emphasis added). 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). However,application of this provision becomes less clear cut when one realizes that exactly what constitutessufficient "notice" is subject to interpretation. Unlike the notice provision in the first paragraph of section41, which itemizes the essential elements and has been held to be mandatory as to form, the paragraphadded by the 1998 amendment merely states the substance of what must be addressed in the initial noticeand is silent as to form. Defendants urge an interpretation of the 1998 amendment that would requireevery notice to the CTA to use the magic words "injured" or "cause of action" in order to trigger itsdistribution obligation. However, such an interpretation would clearly run afoul of the expressedlegislative intent and would produce absurd and unjust results.

The legislative history shows that the purpose of the 1998 amendment was to both eliminatesurprise to plaintiffs regarding the six-month statute of limitations and to mitigate the onerous burden ofsection 41's formal notice requirement so that legitimate claims would not be unjustly dismissed. Yonkley,307 Ill. App. 3d at 138-9, citing 90th Ill. Gen. Assem. Senate Debates May 21, 1997, at 52. In accord withthis purpose, the 1998 amendment states, "[c]ompliance with this Section shall be liberally construed infavor of the person required to file a written statement." (Emphasis added). 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). In Yonlkley, the court noted that the sentence regarding liberal construction was applicable only to thenewly-added notice provision in the second paragraph of section 41 and did not affect the mandatoryrequirements of the preexisting notice provision in the first paragraph. The court stated, "[t]he sentenceobviously requires the CTA to liberally construe the written communications it receives from possibleclaimants as constituting sufficient notification that a cause of action may exist so that these potentialclaimants are sent a copy of the section 41 statute by the CTA." (Emphasis added). Yonkley, 307 Ill. App.3d at 139.

The legislative history and the court's analysis in Yonkley demonstrate that the 1998 amendment tosection 41 altered the procedural scheme for commencing civil actions against the CTA. First, the addedparagraph provides a relaxed notice requirement whereby a potential plaintiff may submit an initialwritten communication directly to the CTA. The "liberal construction" standard adopted by the legislaturefor the purpose of construing plaintiff's initial notice defeats defendants' argument that the words "injury"or "cause of action" must be included in the notice in order for the notice to be valid. Upon receipt of anywritten communication that can be reasonably interpreted as notification that an individual claimant wasinjured or has a cause of action, the CTA is required to furnish the claimant with a copy of section 41within 10 days. See 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). The CTA's failure to comply with its distributionobligation under the 1998 amendment constitutes a waiver of the plaintiff's obligation to comply with theformal notice requirement outlined in the first paragraph of section 41. Thus, the only issue remaining iswhether the courtesy card submitted by plaintiff on the day of the subject incident can be reasonablyinterpreted as notice to the CTA that plaintiff "was injured" or "has a cause of action."

The courtesy card filled out by plaintiff and submitted to CTA agent Deyamfer states plaintiff'sname, address, telephone number, date of birth, the date and time of the accident, the bus driver's nameand badge number, the bus number, and the bus's garage. For the purpose of determining whetherplaintiff's written communication is sufficient under section 41, the most significant information providedto the CTA was the date and time of the accident. Illinois courts have defined the word "accident" as"[a]n unforeseen occurrence, usually of an untoward or disastrous character or an undesigned sudden orunexpected event of an inflictive or unfortunate character." Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Freyer, 89 Ill.App. 3d 617, 619 (1980). In the context of duties which apply to an operator of a motor vehicle, the word"accident" generally "contemplates any situation occurring on the highway wherein he so operates hisautomobile as to cause injury to the property or person of another using the same highway." (Emphasisadded). Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979). Therefore, applying the liberal construction standardadopted by the legislature, we find that a written communication that includes the date and time of an"accident" can be reasonably interpreted as notice to the CTA that a claimant "was injured" within themeaning of section 41.

We note that the written communication submitted to the CTA by plaintiff in the case at barincludes practically all of the elements necessary to satisfy even the formal notice provision in section 41.The formal notice provision in the first paragraph of section 41 requires plaintiff to file a notice thatincludes: "the name of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued, the name and residence of theperson injured, the date and about the hour of the accident, the place or location where the accidentoccurred and the name and address of the attending physician, if any." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). Surely it would be an absurd and unjust result if we construed the 1998 amendment as calling forinformation more specific than that required by the original notice provision, the harshness of which the1998 amendment was drafted to mitigate. See Yonkley, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 138-9. This court finds itcannot be reasonably argued, given the statutory content of the 1998 amendment, that the CTA hadinsufficient information from plaintiff's detailed courtesy card answers to vitiate the CTA's statutory dutyto furnish plaintiff with a copy of section 41.

In light of our analysis of the above issue, the CTA was obligated to provide plaintiff with a copyof section 41 within ten days of receiving plaintiff's courtesy card. As a result of the CTA's failure tocomply with the statute's distribution requirement, section 41 specifically states, "any action commencedagainst the Authority shall not be dismissed for failure to file a written notice as provided in this Section."

70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). Accordingly, the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff's complaintfor failure to file a written notice with the secretary of the Chicago Transit Board and the General Counselfor the CTA.