Flynn v. Hillard, No. 1-97-3656 1st District, February 18, 1999 |
FOURTH DIVISION
KEVIN FLYNN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TERRY G. HILLARD, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, THOMAS P. SADLER, Director of Personnel, and the CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation, Respondents-Appellees. | ) ) ) ) ) ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Honorable John K. Madden, Judge Presiding. |
PRESIDING JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:
Kevin Flynn, a probationary officer with the City of Chicago's department of police (Department), was terminated by the superintendent of the Chicago police department (Superintendent). Flynn brought an action for administrative review of the Superintendent's decision. The City of Chicago (City) filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court initially denied the City's motion to dismiss. On the City's motion for reconsideration, the circuit court granted the City's motion and dismissed the case.
Plaintiff was hired by the Department as a probationary police officer on March 18, 1996. Such officers must serve a probationary period before obtaining any career-service rights. During this period, probationary officers are evaluated by field training officers and may be terminated for any reason without formal proceedings or a finding of cause.
Flynn asserted that he received a negative evaluation by Officer Thomas Conley after Officer Conley had observed his performance for only four days. On the basis of negative evaluations, Flynn was ordered discharged.
On March 4, 1997, Flynn filed a petition for administrative review alleging that the Superintendent had unlawfully terminated him from his job as a probationary police officer. The complaint alleged that the Department failed to follow its own general and special orders in evaluating his performance and that he received a negative evaluation from an officer who should not have been permitted to evaluate him. He also alleged that he was interrogated about his poor evaluations in violation of his right to counsel under the Chicago Municipal Code (Chicago Municipal Code