Green v. Northwest Community Hospital

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-09-2233 Rel

Case Date: 04/28/2010

Preview:THIRD DIVISION April 28, 2010

No. 1-09-2233 WILLIAM J. GREEN, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Frankie Green, Deceased, and WILLIAM F. GREEN, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NORTHWEST COMMUNITY HOSPITAL and NORTHWEST COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE, Defendants-Appellees (Adam T. Cios, and Emergency Care Group of Northwest, S.C., Defendants). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

No. 08 L 2950

HONORABLE RONALD S. DAVIS, JUDGE PRESIDING.

JUSTICE STEELE delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiffs William J. Green, as special administrator for the estate of Frankie Green, and William F. Green, individually (Greens), appeal an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing their claims against defendants Northwest Community Hospital, individually and doing business as Northwest Community Healthcare (Northwest), in a medical malpractice case. Defendants Adam T. Cios, M.D., and Emergency Healthcare Group of Northwest, S.C., are not parties to this appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. BACKGROUND The record on appeal discloses the following facts. On April 15, 2004, the Greens filed their initial complaint against Northwest and Dr. Cios. The Greens' initial complaint claimed

No. 1-09-2233 medical negligence in the treatment of William F. Green's wife; wrongful death; survival; funeral and burial expenses; and spoliation of evidence. All of the counts related to the care of Frankie Green at Northwest on November 17, 2003. On April 3, 2006, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Northwest on counts V through VII of the Greens' third amended complaint, which alleged wrongful death, loss of consortium and survival claims, respectively. The circuit court's order provided that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). On August 20, 2007, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Northwest on counts IX and X of the Greens' fifth amended complaint, which alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and spoliation of evidence, respectively. The Greens' case was set for trial on October 24, 2007. On October 29, 2007, the Greens moved to voluntarily dismiss the case pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2006)). The trial court granted the Greens' motion over Northwest's objection. The trial court order provides that "[t]he plaintiff is granted leave to voluntarily dismiss with leave to reinstate as a matter of right." The Greens refiled their case on March 17, 2008. The Greens' 10-count complaint contained wrongful death, survival, loss of consortium, consumer fraud and healthcare fraud claims against Northwest regarding the care of Frankie Green at Northwest on November 17, 2003. On August 19, 2008, Northwest moved to dismiss the aforesaid five counts pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2006)), arguing that they were barred by the -2-

No. 1-09-2233 doctrine of res judicata. On January 16, 2009, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the wrongful death, survival, and loss of consortium claims. Both parties moved for reconsideration of the order. On May 28, 2009, the circuit court granted Northwest's motion to reconsider, entering an order additionally dismissing the Greens' consumer fraud and healthcare fraud claims against Northwest. On July 29, 2009, the circuit court granted Northwest's motion to clarify, finding no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order. 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). The Greens filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. DISCUSSION The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against Northwest under section 2-619 of the Code. The purpose of a section 2-619 motion is to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact early in the litigation. O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 436, 892 N.E.2d 994, 1004 (2008). A court's dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619 motion is reviewed de novo. O'Casek, 229 Ill. 2d at 436, 892 N.E.2d at 1004. One ground for dismissal in section 2-619 of the Code is that a prior judgment bars the plaintiff's cause of action, i.e., that the prior judgment has res judicata effect in the subsequent lawsuit. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 2006). Res judicata is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent multiple lawsuits between the same parties where the facts and issues are the same. Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 299, 685 N.E.2d 1357, 1363 (1997). Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any

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No. 1-09-2233 subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334, 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (1996). Illinois courts also generally follow a rule against claim-splitting. Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d 638, 657, 545 N.E.2d 481, 493 (1989). Under this rule, where a cause of action is in its nature entire and indivisible, a plaintiff cannot divide it in order to maintain separate lawsuits. Best Coin-Op, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 545 N.E.2d at 493. A plaintiff is not permitted to sue for part of a claim in one action and then sue for the remainder in another action. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 340, 665 N.E.2d at 1206. Instead, a plaintiff must assert all the grounds of recovery he or she may have against the defendant arising from a single cause of action in one lawsuit. Handley v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 56, 66, 463 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 (1984); see also Morris v. Union Oil Co. of California, 96 Ill. App. 3d 148, 154, 421 N.E.2d 278, 283 (1981) (a party must set out in his pleadings all of the grounds of recovery he may have). A plaintiff cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after loss of the first by limiting the theories of recovery alleged by the pleadings in the first action. Best Coin-Op, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 545 N.E.2d at 493. In Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 889 N.E.2d 210 (2008), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a plaintiff engages in claim-splitting if that plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a claim pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code after another part of the cause of action has gone to final judgment and subsequently refiles that claim. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 482, 889 N.E.2d at 222. The Hudson court said that once a voluntary dismissal has been entered, the case is terminated in its entirety and all final orders become immediately appealable. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d -4-

No. 1-09-2233 at 468, 889 N.E.2d at 214, citing Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 503, 687 N.E.2d 871 (1997). In Hudson, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging negligence and willful and wanton misconduct. The negligence count was dismissed. Plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed the willful and wanton misconduct count prior to trial and refiled the count within one year. The supreme court held that the refiled action was barred by res judicata, because part of the original cause of action had already reached final judgment in the previous case. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 483-84, 889 N.E.2d at 223. The Illinois Supreme Court also has adopted exceptions to the rule against claim-splitting set forth in section 26(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (Restatement (Second) of Judgments

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