THIRD DIVISION
FILED: 03/31/03

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Hayes Machinery Movers, Inc. (Hayes), filed theinstant action seeking a judgment against the defendant, REO Movers& Van Lines, Inc. (REO), for breach of contract. REO filed anamended third-party complaint for breach of contract against thethird-party defendant, DMBC, Inc. (DMBC). On February 5, 2002,after a bench trial, the circuit court entered both a judgment inthe amount of $12,800 plus costs in favor of Hayes against REO anda judgment in the sum of $12,400 plus costs in favor of REO againstDMBC. Thereafter, on March 5, 2002, DMBC filed a pleading entitleda "Motion for Findings," requesting that the trial court "modifythe Judgment entered in this matter by providing its findings offact and law that were the basis for the Judgment." In response toDMBC's motion, the trial court entered an order on March 20, 2002,setting forth a number of its factual findings. On April 18, 2002,DMBC filed a notice of appeal from the judgment entered against iton February 5, 2002, and the trial court's subsequent order ofMarch 20, 2002.

In its brief to this court, Hayes argues, inter alia, that weshould dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction by reason ofDMBC's failure to file its notice of appeal within 30 days of theentry of the trial court's judgment as mandated by Supreme CourtRule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303). REO has adopted Hayes' brief.

Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that:

"the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of thecircuit court within 30 days after the entry of the finaljudgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motiondirected against the judgment is filed, whether in a juryor a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of theorder disposing of the last pending post-judgmentmotion." 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).

It is undisputed that, in order to vest this court withjurisdiction to entertain DMBC's appeal, its notice of appeal musthave been filed within the time provided in Rule 303. ArcherDaniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538-39, 470 N.E.2d290 (1984).

The resolution of the question of whether we have jurisdictionover the instant appeal requires a determination as to whetherDMBC's March 5, 2002, "Motion for Findings" constitutes a post-trial motion such that it tolled the time for filing of a notice ofappeal. For a motion in a non-jury case to qualify as a post-trialmotion within the meaning of Rule 303(a)(1), "one or more of thetypes of relief specified in section 2-1203 [of the Code of CivilProcedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2002))] must bespecifically requested." Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church ofHinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 461, 563 N.E.2d 459 (1990). Section 2-1203(a) of the Code states that:

"[i]n all cases tried without a jury, a party may,within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or withinany further time the court may allow within the 30 daysor any extension thereof, file a motion for a rehearing,or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or tovacate the judgment or for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2002).

In this case, DMBC's motion did not request a rehearing, aretrial, or an order vacating the judgment entered against DMBC onFebruary 5, 2002. Our analysis turns then to the issue of whethera motion, such as the one filed by DMBC, which requests that thecourt provide the findings of fact and law which formed the basisfor a previously entered judgment constitutes a motion for amodification of that judgment or seeks "other relief" within themeaning of section 2-1203.

Relying primarily upon the holding in Knapp v. City ofDecatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d 498, 513 N.E.2d 534 (1987), DMBC arguesthat its March 5, 2002, "Motion for Findings" is a post-trialmotion directed against the trial court's February 5, 2002,judgment. As a consequence, DMBC asserts, its notice of appeal,having been filed within 30 days of the disposition of the March 5,2002, motion, is timely and vests this court with jurisdiction. For the reasons which follow, we disagree with DMBC's arguments inthis regard and decline to follow Knapp.

In Knapp, the court was also faced with the question ofwhether a "Motion for Findings" was a post-trial motion. Subsequent to the entry of a final order dismissing their action,the plaintiffs in Knapp filed a motion requesting that the trialcourt "indicate (1) whether the plaintiffs' motion for leave tofile an amended complaint was granted; (2) whether plaintiffs'first-amended complaint was filed; (3) whether the complaint oramended complaint was dismissed; and (4) whether the cause wasdismissed with or without prejudice." Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at501. After observing that the plaintiffs' motion requestedspecific findings not stated by the trial court at the time itdismissed the action, the Knapp court held that the motion wassufficiently directed to the dismissal order to constitute a post-trial motion. Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 503. The court reasonedthat, although the plaintiffs' motion for findings may not haverequested an outright modification of the dismissal order, it askedfor similar relief and, therefore, came within the scope of the"other relief" specified in section 2-1203. Knapp, 160 Ill. App.3d at 503. We disagree.

To modify an item is to change it. Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 1452 (1981). A motion which merelyrequests that the court articulate the findings of fact and lawupon which its prior judgment is predicated does not request achange in the judgment. Such a motion requests only a statement ofthe underlying reasons for the entry of the judgment. If themotion is granted and the court states its findings of fact andlaw, the judgment is not changed or altered.

Here, DMBC's "Motion for Findings" requested no change in thetrial court's February 5, 2002, judgment. The motion requestedonly that the trial court provide the "findings of fact and lawthat were the basis for the judgment." Regardless of theresolution of DMBC's motion, the court's $12,400 judgment againstDMBC on REO's third-party complaint would remain unchanged. Forthis reason, we hold that DMBC's motion did not request amodification of the judgment.

We must next consider whether DMBC's "Motion for Findings"requested a type of relief falling within the scope of "otherrelief" as that term is used in section 2-1203 of the Code. "[T]he'other relief' specified in section 2-1203 must be similar innature to the other forms of relief enumerated in the section." Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 461-62. A request that a court articulatethe findings of fact and law upon which its prior judgment ispredicated is in no way similar to a request that the court granta rehearing or a retrial or that it vacate its prior judgment. Further, because such a motion does not request a change in theprior judgment, it is not similar to a request for a modificationof that judgment. For these reasons, and contrary to the holdingin Knapp, we conclude that a motion which merely requests that thetrial court state the factual findings and legal conclusionssupporting a previously entered judgment is not a post-trial motionwithin the meaning of section 2-1203 of the Code.

Our analysis of this issue leads us to conclude both thatDMBC's March 5, 2002, "Motion for Findings" was not a post-trialmotion within the meaning of Rule 303(a)(1) and that its notice ofappeal is untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after theentry of the trial court's February 5, 2002, judgment. As aconsequence, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal for want ofjurisdiction. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 103 Ill. 2d at 539.

Appeal dismissed.

HALL, J., concurs.

WOLFSON, J., specially concurs.

I write this special concurrence because I do not agree thatKnapp v. City of Decatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d 501 (1987) was wronglydecided. In Knapp, the trial judge first entered an order that didnot tell the parties which complaint was dismissed or whether thedismissal was with or without prejudice. The motion at issue didnot ask for findings of fact or law. It asked that the order bechanged to provide clarity for the action taken by the trial judge.

The court correctly held the motion for findings came withinthe "other relief" portion of section 1203(a) because it requested"a change in the form of the original judgment to reflect theactual action taken." Knapp v. City of Decatur, 160 Ill. App. 3dat 503. The first order did not further a policy of bringingfinality to judgments and ends to disputes. See Sizer v. LotusGrain and Coal Company, 70 Ill. App. 3d 739, 740 (1970).

In contrast, the Motion For Findings filed by DMBC was not apost-trial motion within the meaning of 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West2002). See Lewis v. Loyola University, 149 Ill. App. 3d 88 (1986)(motion for entry of proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw is not directed against the judgment as required by SupremeCourt Rule 303(a)(1)). For that reason, I agree we have nojurisdiction to consider this case.