SIXTH DIVISION
JANUARY 30, 2004

Plaintiff Shedrina High appeals from an order of the circuitcourt dismissing her personal injury action against defendantChicago Transit Authority pursuant to section 41 of theMetropolitan Transit Authority Act (the Act) (70 ILCS 3605/41(West 2002)) on the ground that her notice under section 41failed to state the place or location of the accident. Plaintiffcontends on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing hercomplaint because (1) she complied with the Act's requirementthat she provide defendant a statement including the location ofthe accident that was the basis of her claim and (2) defendantdid not comply with the requirement of section 41 that it send aclaimant a copy of section 41 within a specified time afterreceiving the claim.

Plaintiff brought a personal injury action in July 2002,alleging negligence by defendant's employees in the collision oftwo elevated trains on the Brown Line on August 3, 2001.

In August 2002, defendant appeared and filed a motion todismiss, arguing that plaintiff's section 41 notice, sent todefendant on November 14, 2001, did not comply with the Actbecause the description of the collision's location, on the BrownLine in Chicago, was insufficient. Attached to the motion was acopy of plaintiff's statement, which described the incident asoccurring on a southbound train on "the Brown CTA line" in"Chicago, IL."

Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing thather statement was sufficient because there was only one accidenton the Brown Line on August 3, 2001, and because defendantreceived "over 40 other claims resulting from this accident" andwas thus aware of the location of the incident. She also arguedthat defendant did not comply with section 41's requirement thatdefendant send plaintiff a copy of section 41 within 10 days ofreceiving notice of plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff stated that acopy of section 41 was sent to plaintiff's address by certifiedmail, but to the incorrect person ("Sadrina Hibh") and apartmentnumber, and the signature on the certified mail card was nothers. Defendant also sent a copy of section 41 to plaintiff'scounsel,⁽¹⁾ who signed the certified mail card. Plaintiff argued,however, that it was not sufficient under the Act to send thecopy to plaintiff's counsel and that the copy was sent to counselon August 25, more than 10 days after the date of the incident(August 3), when defendant had notice of her claim from her oralstatement to defendant's investigator.

The trial court heard defendant's motion to dismiss onNovember 12, 2002, and issued a memorandum opinion and ordergranting the motion and dismissing the case. The court foundthat plaintiff "failed to provide the location of the accident"in her statement, noting that a plaintiff must comply strictlywith the requirements of the Act as to the content of herstatement. As to defendant sending a copy of section 41 toplaintiff, the court found that, since defendant's duty istriggered by notifying it in writing of an injury, plaintiff'soral "statement" on August 3, 2001, did not trigger defendant'sduty. However, her counsel's August 23, 2001, letter todefendant triggered the duty, and the copy of section 41 sent toplaintiff's counsel on August 25 was thus timely.

Plaintiff contends on appeal that the trial court erred indismissing her complaint because her statement complied with theAct since it accurately stated the location of the accident, onthe Brown Line in Chicago.

A cause of action may be involuntarily dismissed if it is"barred by [an] affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect ofor defeating the claim." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002). Our review of a section 2-619 dismissal is de novo. Chandler v.Illinois Central R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 331, 340-41 (2003).

Section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (Act)governs civil actions against defendant for personal injury. 70ILCS 3605/41 (West 2002). The Act requires:

"Within six *** months from the date thatsuch an injury was received or such cause ofaction accrued, any person who is about tocommence any civil action in any courtagainst [defendant] for damages on account ofany injury to his person shall file *** astatement, in writing, signed by himself, hisagent, or attorney, giving the name of theperson to whom the cause of action hasaccrued, the name and residence of the personinjured, the date and about the hour of theaccident, the place or location where theaccident occurred and the name and address ofthe attending physician, if any. If thenotice provided for by this section is notfiled as provided, any such civil actioncommenced against [defendant] shall bedismissed and the person to whom any suchcause of action accrued for any personalinjury shall be forever barred from furthersuing." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 2002).

The statement must strictly comply with the Act and must includeall the elements required by the Act. Curtis v. Chicago TransitAuthority, 341 Ill. App. 3d 573, 576 (2003). Defendant's actualknowledge of the facts relating to an injury does not excusestrict compliance or bar dismissal under the Act. Curtis, 341Ill. App. 3d at 576. Where some attempt to designate an elementis apparent, the statement is deemed sufficient if thedesignation reasonably fulfills the requirements of the Act anddoes not mislead or prejudice defendant, but defendant's actualknowledge is not a consideration. Margolis v. Chicago TransitAuthority, 69 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1033 (1979).

Here, plaintiff argues that she provided the place orlocation of the accident by stating that the incident occurred ona southbound Brown Line train in Chicago. However, the BrownLine is not, by itself, a "place or location." It extends fromVan Buren Street north to Lawrence Avenue, and runs from as fareast as Wabash Avenue to as far west as Kimball Avenue. Werecognize plaintiff's argument that, compared to a claimant froma bus accident, a claimant from a rail accident may not be ableto determine a proper street address due to the nature of a railline, running above or below the surface and often not directlybelow or above a street. However, plaintiff did not specify toany degree or in any form a discrete location along the lengthyBrown Line, such as "in station X" or "between stations X and Y." We therefore find that plaintiff's statement did not reasonablyfulfill the Act's requirement to state the "place or locationwhere the accident occurred."

Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred indismissing her complaint because defendant did not comply withsection 41's requirement that it timely send her a copy ofsection 41.

Section 41 provides in relevant part:

"Any person who notifies [defendant]that he or she was injured or has a cause ofaction shall be furnished a copy of Section41 of this Act. Within 10 days after beingnotified in writing, [defendant] shall eithersend a copy by certified mail to the personat his or her last known address or handdeliver a copy to the person who shallacknowledge receipt by his or her signature. *** In the event [defendant] fails to furnisha copy of Section 41 as provided in thisSection, any action commenced against[defendant] shall not be dismissed forfailure to file a written notice as providedin this Section." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West2002).

A person who notifies defendant in writing that she was injuredmust be provided a copy of section 41. Puszkarska v. ChicagoTransit Authority, 322 Ill. App. 3d 75, 80 (2001). "'[A]nywritten communication that can be reasonably interpreted asnotification that an individual claimant was injured'" qualifies. Puszkarska, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 79, quoting Fields v. ChicagoTransit Authority, 319 Ill. App. 3d 683, 688-89 (2001). Thiscourt has rejected defendant's contention that, under the Act,"only the person who was injured may notify it and be furnishedwith a copy of section 41," finding that a written notice sent byclaimant's attorney was sufficient. Puszkarska, 322 Ill. App. 3dat 79.

Plaintiff's oral disclosure of information to defendant'semployee on the day of the incident, August 3, 2001, was not awritten communication of her injury. However, the August 23,2001, letter from plaintiff's counsel clearly was such a writtencommunication, triggering defendant's duty to send a copy ofsection 41 within 10 days of August 23.

Defendant sent a copy of section 41 to plaintiff's counseland argues that this complied with the Act, while plaintiffargues that defendant could comply only by sending the copy toher personally. We are thus presented with the legal question ofwhat section 41 requires. First and foremost, this court inPuszkarska interpreted section 41 as providing that the writtencommunication from the injured person may be sent by a claimant'sattorney. Since there is nothing in the language of the Act thatdistinguishes between who may send the written communication ofinjury and to whom the copy of section 41 must be sent, itfollows that defendant may send the copy of section 41 to aclaimant's attorney when, as here, the attorney sent the writtencommunication.

Also, while the provision of the Act on sending a copy ofsection 41 must be "liberally construed in favor of the personrequired to file a written statement" (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West2002)), we must avoid constructions of a statute that wouldproduce absurd results. Kush v. Wentworth, 339 Ill. App. 3d 157,162 (2003), citing People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (2002).Since any written communication that reasonably notifiesdefendant that an individual was injured suffices to triggerdefendant's duty to send the copy, as stated in Puszkarska andFields, then the communication need not contain the personaladdress of the injured person. If the Act required defendant tosend the copy to the claimant individually, as plaintiffcontends, then a claimant could defeat the Act simply by havingher attorney send a written communication of claimant's injurythat did not include claimant's personal address. Were thiscourt to adopt plaintiff's interpretation of the Act, the secondparagraph of section 41 would in essence render the firstparagraph of the section a nullity.

We find that defendant satisfies the requirements of the Actby timely (within 10 days) and properly (in person or bycertified mail) sending the copy of section 41 to the person whosent the written communication of injury. Since plaintiff'sattorney sent the written communication, and defendant properlyand timely sent a copy of section 41 to the attorney, we findthat defendant fulfilled its duty under the Act. The trial courtdid not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GALLAGHER and SMITH, JJ., concur.

1. References to plaintiff's counsel or attorney are to hercounsel at the relevant time, August through November 2001. Plaintiff employed different counsel by July 2002, when she filedher complaint.